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Abstract 
 
Interest in accessing, developing and transporting offshore resources in the 
polar environments comprise elements of energy and environmental security. 
These contemporary issues place stress on the systems of polar governance, 
expressed in this thesis as operating systems. The capacity of each polar 
operating system to deal with emerging issues is determined by operating 
system robustness. This thesis argues that robustness of polar governance is 
not solely dependent on the structure of the operating system. Robustness is 
attained, and maintained, through the dynamic interaction between the actors 
and the systems’ components. Robustness is defined through the combination 
of participant confidence and the ability to effectively avoid prejudice to 
states’ rights. Participant confidence further relies on state authority, 
legitimacy and resilience. Robustness is lost if the system is pushed below an 
operating system threshold.  
 
Case studies linked to energy and environmental security have been used to 
identify characteristics of participant confidence and effectiveness. The case 
studies examine the debate concerning the status of the Arctic waterways, the 
negotiation and abandonment of the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, and the continental shelf delimitation 
process undergone by the Russian Federation in the Arctic and Australia in 
the Antarctic. Polar offshore oil and gas activities, potential and regulation are 
also examined. Once compared, the capacity of the operating systems to 
accommodate contemporary challenges and future issues which accompany 
increased access to the polar environments is examined. Contemporary 
challenges include industry-related scientific research, shipping and the 
increase, or onset of, offshore oil and gas industry activities.  
 
This analysis reveals both differences and similarities between the Arctic and 
Antarctic operating systems. In the Arctic voluntary initiatives and recognized 
sovereignty reinforce the ability of state authority to drive participant 
confidence and regional norms. Commitment to regional accountability 
advances legitimacy and resilience within the system. In the Antarctic every 
state committed to the Antarctic Treaty System acts to ensure prejudice of 
states’ rights does not occur. Resilience of the system is reinforced by the 
significant consequences for abandoning the system. Widely accepted norms 
of behavior within the mix of hard and soft law instruments of the Antarctic 
operating system contributes to its legitimacy.  
 
This thesis highlights the capacity of the polar operating systems to 
accommodate challenges. Each system, though different in structure, has 
remained above the operating system threshold. As long as there is acceptance 
of the operating system dynamics, sources of law and terms of engagement 
related to sovereign rights and regional cooperation, contemporary and 
emerging regulatory issues can in turn be overcome.   
 
 vi 
Acknowledgements 
 
Throughout my candidature I was fortunate to meet several generous 
individuals who took considerable time away from their own work to answer 
my questions and relay to me as much knowledge and information as possible. 
Among others, I would like to thank Phil Symonds of Geoscience Australia, 
Ron MacNab, retired from the Geological Survey of Canada and Christian 
Marcussen of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland. Bill 
Campbell of the Australian Attorney General’s office, Richard MacDougall of 
the Canadian Hydrographic Service, and Wendell Sanford of the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) have also been very 
helpful. Many thanks are extended to Bill Bush for his contributions to the 
chapter on CRAMRA. 
 
With the support of the Association of Canadian Studies in Australia and New 
Zealand (ACSANZ), I was able to study at the Centre for Military and 
Strategic Studies (CMSS) at the University of Calgary under the guidance of 
Rob Huebert. I am very grateful to ACSANZ, the CMSS and Rob, in 
particular, for his tutelage and kind introduction to individuals including Galo 
Carrero and Wendell Sanford.  
 
My appreciation extends to my supervision team, Marcus Haward, Andrew 
Jackson and Julia Jabour. Thank you for your patience and support in the 
construction of this thesis. I would like to acknowledge the generous 
contributions of Andrew Jackson and his immense expertise and insight into 
the Antarctic Treaty System processes. As well, I would like to thank Marcus 
Haward for his patience and expertise in, among other things, the 
development of this research framework. 
 
I would like to extend my appreciation to the University of Tasmania for the 
International Postgraduate Research Scholarship. I would also like to 
acknowledge the Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research 
Centre and the Institute of Marine and Antarctic Studies for funding and 
support over the course of these studies. 
 vii 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction and Research Framework ................................................. 1 
Introduction............................................................................................................ 1 
Polar Governance................................................................................................... 2 
The Arctic .............................................................................................................. 3 
The Antarctic ......................................................................................................... 6 
Energy and environmental security ....................................................................... 9 
Research method and hypothesis ........................................................................... 12 
      Operating system schematic ............................................................................ 13 
Significance of research......................................................................................... 15 
Scope and limitations............................................................................................. 17 
Sources and data .................................................................................................... 19 
Research and analytical framework ....................................................................... 19 
     State authority within the operating system...................................................... 22 
     Legitimacy ........................................................................................................ 23 
     Effectiveness ..................................................................................................... 24 
     Resilience: response to challenge ..................................................................... 25 
     Robust operating systems ................................................................................. 25 
Thesis Structure ..................................................................................................... 30 
 
 
Chapter One: The Polar Operating Systems ........................................ 33 
1.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 33 
1.2 Common sources of polar law ......................................................................... 35 
     Vienna Convention ........................................................................................... 35 
     Customary international law ............................................................................. 37 
     Treaty law ......................................................................................................... 40 
          London Convention ..................................................................................... 41 
          MARPOL 73/78........................................................................................... 42 
     United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea........................................... 44 
          Part VI – Continental shelf regime .............................................................. 45 
          Part XI – Regime of the Area ...................................................................... 48 
          Part XII – Protection of the marine environment......................................... 52 
 viii 
          Part XIII – Marine scientific research.......................................................... 57 
          Regional coordination under LOSC............................................................. 62 
1.3 Arctic operating system ................................................................................... 64 
     Sources of law................................................................................................... 65 
          Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy ................................................... 67 
          Arctic Council .............................................................................................. 69 
          Regional fora................................................................................................ 72 
          Arctic and customary international law ....................................................... 73 
     Actors................................................................................................................ 75 
     Jurisdiction........................................................................................................ 76 
     Institutions......................................................................................................... 78 
1.4 Antarctic operating system .............................................................................. 80 
     Sources of law................................................................................................... 81 
          The Antarctic Treaty .................................................................................... 82 
          Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.... 84 
          Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ... 86 
          Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty ................... 88 
          Antarctic and customary international law .................................................. 91 
     Actors................................................................................................................ 97 
     Jurisdiction........................................................................................................ 98 
     Institutions......................................................................................................... 99 
1.5 Chapter conclusion........................................................................................... 102 
     Table 1: Components of the polar operating systems....................................... 104 
 
 
Chapter Two: Arctic Waterways .............................................................. 105 
2.1 Arctic waterways ............................................................................................. 105 
2.2 Northwest Passage ........................................................................................... 108 
2.3 Northern Sea Route.......................................................................................... 109 
2.4 Varying positions available to states................................................................ 111 
     Straits used for international navigation ........................................................... 111 
     Internal waters................................................................................................... 112 
     Application of Article 234 ................................................................................ 114 
 ix 
2.5 Evolution of NWP issues in the Arctic operating system................................ 115 
     The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act .................................................... 117 
     Canadian Arctic straight baselines.................................................................... 120 
     Other 1985 Canadian policy measures ............................................................. 124 
     Arctic Cooperation Agreement ......................................................................... 125 
2.6 Evolution of the NSR issue within the Arctic operating system ..................... 127 
     Russian Arctic straight baselines ...................................................................... 131 
     US/USSR joint statement.................................................................................. 131 
     NSR Regulations............................................................................................... 132 
2.7 Cooperative arrangements and industry involvement...................................... 136 
2.8 Discussion of Arctic robustness....................................................................... 139 
2.9 Chapter conclusion........................................................................................... 145 
 
Chapter Three: Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities ........................................................................ 147 
3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 147 
3.2 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities ....... 148 
     History of the negotiations................................................................................ 148 
     Components of CRAMRA................................................................................ 151 
     Negotiating the ‘package deal’ ......................................................................... 159 
3.3 Components of the ‘package deal’................................................................... 164 
     Institutions......................................................................................................... 164 
     Collective authority........................................................................................... 167 
     Environmental harm.......................................................................................... 169 
     Liability............................................................................................................. 170 
     Title to Resources ............................................................................................. 171 
     Coastal state jurisdiction ................................................................................... 171 
     Sponsoring States.............................................................................................. 172 
3.4 The shift from CRAMRA ................................................................................ 173 
3.5 The minerals prohibition and the ‘walkout clause’.......................................... 179 
3.6 Discussion of Antarctic robustness.................................................................. 180 
3.7 Chapter conclusion........................................................................................... 187 
 x 
Chapter Four: Continental Shelf Delimitation – Russian and 
Australian Case Studies ................................................................................ 189 
4.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 189 
4.2 Continental shelf delimitation process............................................................. 190 
4.3 The Russian submission................................................................................... 198 
     Boundary delimitations and continental margins ............................................. 208 
          Overlap......................................................................................................... 211 
          Donut holes .................................................................................................. 211 
     Submission rights and possibilities................................................................... 214 
     Collaborative Arctic research ........................................................................... 220 
4.4 Discussion of Arctic robustness and the Russian submission ......................... 225 
4.5 The Australian submission............................................................................... 231 
     Other Antarctic claimant states ......................................................................... 237 
     The examination of Australia’s submission...................................................... 247 
          Proclamation ................................................................................................ 252 
4.6 Discussion of Antarctic robustness and the Australian submission................. 253 
4.7 Chapter conclusion........................................................................................... 260 
 
 
Chapter Five: Polar Offshore Exploration and Development ........ 261 
5.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 261 
     The process ....................................................................................................... 261 
     History............................................................................................................... 262 
5.2 Physical characteristics and estimates relating to offshore resources.............. 264 
     Arctic................................................................................................................. 264 
          Snapshot of Arctic petroleum activity ......................................................... 269 
     Antarctic............................................................................................................ 272 
          Snapshot of Antarctic petroleum activity .................................................... 276 
5.3 Barriers to exploration and development in the polar regions......................... 278 
     Economics......................................................................................................... 278 
     Politics............................................................................................................... 280 
     Marine environment.......................................................................................... 283 
     Technology ....................................................................................................... 284 
 xi 
     Transportation – oil tankers and LNG fleets..................................................... 287 
          Shipping ....................................................................................................... 290 
               Arctic Guidelines .................................................................................... 290 
               Unified Requirements for Polar Ships .................................................... 292 
               International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters.......................... 292 
          Pipelines....................................................................................................... 294 
5.4 Impacts of oil and gas development................................................................. 294 
5.5 Polar development within the operating systems............................................. 296 
5.6 Arctic development.......................................................................................... 298 
     Arctic jurisdiction and regulatory measures ..................................................... 298 
     Outer continental shelf and Arctic high seas enclave ....................................... 304 
5.7 Discussion of Arctic robustness and development .......................................... 310 
5.8 Antarctic development ..................................................................................... 316 
     Antarctic jurisdiction and state rights ............................................................... 316 
     Proclamation and outer continental shelf responsibilities ................................ 321 
     Regulatory measures......................................................................................... 326 
5.9 Discussion of Antarctic robustness and development ..................................... 333 
5.10 Chapter conclusion......................................................................................... 338 
 
 
Chapter Six: Comparing the Operating Systems................................ 341 
6.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 341 
6.2 Section one introduction .................................................................................. 342 
     Sources of law................................................................................................... 342 
     Actors................................................................................................................ 345 
     Jurisdiction........................................................................................................ 347 
     Institutions......................................................................................................... 347 
     Table 2: Comparison of the components of the operating systems .................. 350 
6.3 Section two introduction .................................................................................. 354 
     Operating system schematic ............................................................................. 354 
     Effectiveness ..................................................................................................... 354 
     Participant confidence....................................................................................... 363 
          State authority .............................................................................................. 363 
 xii 
          Legitimacy ................................................................................................... 367 
          Resilience..................................................................................................... 372 
6.4 Comparison of variables of robustness across the systems ............................. 377 
6.5 Chapter conclusion........................................................................................... 381 
 
 
Chapter Seven: Contemporary Challenges ........................................... 383 
7.1 Introduction...................................................................................................... 383 
7.2 Contemporary challenges in the Arctic............................................................ 383 
     Areas of unresolved/disputed jurisdiction ........................................................ 385 
     Outer continental shelves and beyond .............................................................. 389 
     Soft law mechanisms ........................................................................................ 390 
     Symbolic pressures ........................................................................................... 394 
7.3 Arctic robustness against contemporary challenges ........................................ 397 
7.4 Contemporary challenges in the Antarctic....................................................... 400 
     Development-related scientific research........................................................... 402 
     Outer continental shelves and beyond .............................................................. 406 
     Regulatory mechanisms and Article IV............................................................ 409 
     Symbolic pressures ........................................................................................... 413 
7.5 Antarctic robustness against contemporary challenges ................................... 414 
7.6 Comparison and discussion of polar system robustness .................................. 418 
7.7 Chapter conclusion........................................................................................... 421 
 
 
Thesis Conclusion ........................................................................................... 423 
Research objective ................................................................................................. 423 
Findings/empirical data.......................................................................................... 426 
     Arctic................................................................................................................. 426 
     Antarctic............................................................................................................ 429 
     Comparison ....................................................................................................... 433 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 436 
 
 
 xiii 
Select Bibliography......................................................................................... 439 
Articles/books/reports ............................................................................................ 439 
AEPS and Arctic Council documents .................................................................... 454 
Antarctic Treaty documents................................................................................... 455 
UN documents ....................................................................................................... 457 
Conventions, legal cases and legislation................................................................ 463 
Other sources ......................................................................................................... 467 
 xiv 
List of Figures and Tables 
 
Figures 
Introduction and Research Chapter 
Figure 1: Arctic region........................................................................................... 5 
Figure 2: Antarctic region...................................................................................... 8 
Figure 3: Arctic sea ice extent 2005 and 2007....................................................... 10 
 
Chapter Two: Arctic Waterways 
Figure 1: Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route .......................................... 106 
 
Chapter Four: Continental Shelf Delimitation Process 
Figure 1: Arctic Basin and coastal states ............................................................... 199 
Figure 2: Map pertaining to the 2001 submission of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf for the Russian Federation.......................................................... 201 
Figure 3: Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge Complex and Lomonosov Ridge which 
traverse the Arctic Ocean Basin............................................................................. 203 
Figure 4: Equidistance and sector theory boundary delimitation in the Arctic ..... 205 
Figure 5: Maritime boundaries in the Arctic.......................................................... 210 
Figure 6: ‘Donut holes’ of the Arctic Ocean Basin ............................................... 212 
Figure 7: The extent of Australia's continental shelf and the political boundary 
of the Antarctic Treaty (60˚S)................................................................................ 250 
 
Chapter Five: Polar Offshore Exploration and Development 
Figure 1: Arctic seabed .......................................................................................... 265 
Figure 2: Prospective and development areas of the Arctic .................................. 268 
Figure 3: Sedimentary basins offshore Antarctica................................................. 274 
 
Tables 
Table 1: Components of the polar operating systems............................................ 104 
Table 2: Comparison of the components of the operating systems ....................... 350 
 xv 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
 
AAT  Australian Antarctic Territory 
ACAP Arctic Council’s Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution in the 
Arctic 
ACIA  Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
AEPS  Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
AMAP  Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
AMSA  Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
AMSP  Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 
ANARE Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition 
APM  Associated Protective Measure 
ARTA  Alpha Ridge Test of Appurtenance 
ASOC  Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition 
ASPA  Antarctic Specially Protected Area 
ASPPR Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations 
ASMA  Antarctic Specially Managed Area 
ATCM  Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
ATCP  Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party 
ATS  Antarctic Treaty System 
AWPPA Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
BEAC  Barents Euro-Arctic Council 
BEAR  Regional Council for the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 
BIMCO Baltic and the International Maritime Council 
CAFF  Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 
CCAMLR Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 
CCAS  Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
CBC  Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
CBD  Convention on Biological Diversity 
CEAMARC Collaborative East Antarctic Marine Census 
CEP  Committee for Environmental Protection 
CHM  Common heritage of mankind 
 xvi 
CLCS  Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
CMATS Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea 
COMNAP Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs 
CRAMRA Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities 
DOALOS Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
EPPR  Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
fn  footnote 
FSRU  Floating, storage and Re-gasification units 
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GBS  Gravity Based System 
HIMI  Territory of Heard and McDonald Islands 
IAATO International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators 
IACS  International Association of Classification Societies 
IASC  International Arctic Science Committee 
IBCAO International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICRW  International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling 
IHO  International Hydrographic Organization 
IMDG  International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
INSROP International Northern Sea Route Programme 
INTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker 
Owners 
IP  Information Paper 
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPY  International Polar Year 
ISBA  International Seabed Authority 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
LOMROG Lomonosov Ridge off Greenland project  
LORITA Lomonosov Ridge Test of Appurtenance 
LOSC  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
MAST  Mapping of Arctic Sediment Thickness 
 xvii 
MEPC  Marine Environment Protection Committee 
MMBOE         Million Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
MPA                Marine Protected Area 
MSC                Murmansk Shipping Company 
MSR  Marine Scientific Research 
n  note 
NEAFC Convention on the Future of Multilateral Cooperation in North-
East Atlantic Fisheries 
NM  Nautical Mile 
NGO  Non-governmental Organizations 
NORDREG Arctic Canada Traffic System 
NSR  Northern Sea Route 
NWP  Northwest Passage 
OPA  Oil Pollution Act 
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OSPAR Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment in the 
North-East Atlantic 
PAME  Protection of the Arctic Environment 
para(s)  paragraph(s) 
PSSA  Particularly Sensitive Sea Area 
POP  Persistent organic pollutants 
RPA  Regional Programme of Action 
SAAO  Senior Arctic Affairs Official 
SAO  Senior Arctic Official 
SCAR  Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
SOLAS  International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea  
SPLOS States Parties to the Law of the Sea 
TROOPS Guidelines for Transfer of Refined Oil and Oil Products in 
Arctic Waters 
TSC  Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
UK  United Kingdom 
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNEP  United Nations Environment Programme 
 xviii 
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
US  United States of America 
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
USGS  United States Geological Survey 
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VME  Vulnerable Marine Ecosystem 
VTS  Vessel Traffic System 
WP  Working Paper 
WSSD  World Summit on Sustainable Development 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
 
 
 1 
Introduction and Research Framework 
 
Introduction 
The two polar regions, the Arctic and the Antarctic, share physical 
characteristics such as remoteness and harsh climates. They appeal to the 
public through their aesthetic values and as frontiers of exploration and 
adventure. The polar regions contribute appreciably to the overall 
understanding of the global climate systems and provide a lens through which 
to examine regional governance and politics. They differ in terms of 
sovereignty, indigenous populations, and current (as well as prospective) 
industry activity. Each has distinctive regional governing arrangements, 
creating systems of polar governance. Over the years these regions have been 
the targets and scenes of significant geopolitical activity. Issues dealt with and 
pressure placed on the Arctic and Antarctic governing systems stem from 
regulatory uncertainty, concern for the environment and resource demands. As 
such, environmental and energy security form a platform from which to 
compare and contrast polar governance.  
 
This thesis connects case studies that relate to the exploration, development 
and regulation of conventional offshore oil and gas resources in the Arctic and 
the Antarctic in order to examine robustness of the polar governing systems. 
Case studies on the Arctic waterways, the Antarctic minerals debate, the 
continental shelf entitlement process, and the potential for exploration and 
development offshore are utilized. The cases highlight integration of legal 
rights and responsibilities, the nuanced approach to issue resolution, and the 
variability between driving factors such as national interest and collaboration 
within the polar governing systems, referred to in this thesis as the operating 
systems. Variables that relate to robustness connect these case studies. These 
variables include participant confidence and the ability to effectively protect 
and preserve states’ rights during the resolution or accommodation of issues. 
 
 
 2 
Polar governance 
Governance is a process. It is the ‘creation and operation of rules of conduct 
that define practice, assign roles and guide interaction for dealing with 
collective problems’.1 Governance outlines the manner in which the actors 
involved manage and regulate activities that are occurring within a defined 
area. The arrangements in place concerning the Arctic and the Antarctic can 
be referred to as polar governance. Regional governing arrangements can 
include hard and soft law instruments that together contribute to the system of 
governance. Each polar region has its own governance system, referred to in 
this thesis as the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems.2  
 
Polar operating systems include international law principles, specific regimes, 
and instruments intending to be binding and soft law arrangements. Through 
the combination of these sources of law or instruments, key polar states 
participate in regional governance. Beyond key participating states, subsidiary 
interests are also captured through the involvement of other states.3 The polar 
operating systems provide the foundation from which jurisdiction is defined, 
rights are exercised, and regulations are created and enforced. 
 
The exercise of jurisdiction within the operating systems is according to, and 
influenced by, sovereignty arrangements. Sovereignty over territory 
guarantees entitlement and access to adjacent maritime zones and the 
continental shelf. Jurisdiction then provides the practical control over the 
exercise of rights including the exclusive rights to explore and exploit natural 
resources.4 In most cases, jurisdiction, or the practical authority to deal with 
                                                
1 Geir Hønneland and Olav Schram Stokke, 'Introduction' in Geir Hønneland and Olav 
Schram Stokke (eds), International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime 
Effectiveness and Northern Region Building, Routledge (2007) 1, at 1. See also Chapter 1 
below. 
2 The concept of an ‘operating system’ is taken from work by P. Diehl, C. Ku and D. Zamora, 
'Dynamics of International Law: Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems' (2003) 57 
(Winter) International Organization 43-75. 
3 For example, non-coastal states and non-Arctic states participate in the Arctic Council. Non-
claimant states participate in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs). Refer to 
Chapter 1 for further description of the polar operating systems. 
4 For example, in accordance with Article 77(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (LOSC), opened for signature 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1261, entered into force 
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the legal matters relating to the exercise of sovereign rights and the 
administration of justice, rests with the state.  
 
Jurisdiction may, however, also be granted to a legal body rather than an 
individual state for specific purposes. For example, jurisdiction may be 
granted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for dispute resolution. A 
group of states may also together provide collective jurisdiction as a 
condominium in which jurisdiction over an area of common interest is shared 
by two or more states.5 Groups of states may also create regional governing 
arrangements, such as regional fisheries management organizations, that may 
change the exercise of sovereign rights in a practical manner. 
 
The Arctic 
The Arctic is a region encompassing a vast Arctic Ocean, surrounded by land 
territory that falls under the sovereignty of eight States – Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the US. For the most part – 
with some exceptions – sovereignty is not in dispute.6 The Arctic is often 
defined using physical markers such as the northern extent of the tree line, 
above which only tundra exists, or the 10˚C July isotherm line.7 The southern 
boundary may also be defined by the Arctic Circle at 66˚33’ N or by the 60˚ 
North parallel (see Figure 1).8  The Arctic is home to approximately 10 
million people and over 30 different indigenous groups, spanning an area that 
                                                                                                                          
16 November 1994, a coastal state exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.   
5 Discussed in relation to the Antarctic Treaty in William E. Westermeyer, The Politics of 
Mineral Resource Development in Antarctica: Alternative Regimes for the Future, Westview 
Press (1984), at 71. 
6 Hans Island, located between eastern Canada and western Greenland is the only territorial 
dispute still unresolved. See Christopher Stevenson, 'Hans Off! The Struggle for Hans Island 
and the Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution' (2007) 30(1) 
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 263-276. The Spitsbergen 
Archipelago, Svalbard, may be considered another area of dispute in as much as disputes over 
resource entitlements offshore of this archipelago do still exist. See Torbjørn Pederson, 'The 
Constrained Politics of the Svalbard Offshore Area' (2008) 32(6) Marine Policy 913-919;  
Louise Angelique de la Fayette, 'Oceans Governance in the Arctic' (2008) 23(3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 531, at 540. 
7 North of this isotherm, average temperatures in July remain lower than 10˚C.  
8 Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber, 'Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of Polar Sovereignty?' 
(2008) 17(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
(RECIEL) 27, at 29 and fn 20. 
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encompasses around fifteen percent of the planet’s land area.9 Numerous 
economic activities occur in the Arctic, ranging from fishing, tourism, and 
shipping to mining and oil and gas development.  
 
With respect to the offshore area, coastal state jurisdiction prevails under the 
umbrella of regional collaboration within the Arctic operating system. There 
are five coastal states to the Arctic Ocean – Canada, Denmark (Greenland), 
Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States (US). Regional 
collaboration is comprised of multilateral treaties and regional councils.10 
These initiatives have different mandates and interact with the jurisdiction of 
states in specific ways. For example, under its mandate, the Arctic Council11 
provides decisions and actions related to the assessment and monitoring of the 
Arctic environment. The Council cannot assert jurisdiction over nationals or 
their activities. Jurisdiction is exercised only by national authorities.12 
 
                                                
9 Oran R. Young, 'The Structure of Arctic Cooperation: Solving Problems/Seizing 
Opportunities' (Paper presented at the request of Finland in preparation of the fourth 
conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, Rovaniemi, 27-29 August 2000, 
Hanover, 2000), at 3. 
10 Refer to Chapter 1 for a description of the regional collaborative initiatives within the 
Arctic operating system. 
11 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), 19 September 
1996, 35 ILM 1382-1390. 
12 For more information see supra n. 8, at 33 and Chapter 1. 
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Figure 1: Arctic region.13  
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 The Arctic Region 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/arctic_region_pol02.jpg> at 02 
December 2009. 
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The Antarctic 
The Antarctic is a region encompassing the continent of Antarctica and the 
surrounding oceans (Figure 2). Often the political boundary of 60˚S latitude is 
used as the northern boundary of the Antarctic region. However, the maritime 
boundary has also been described as the Antarctic Convergence, where warm 
waters from the north meet upwelling cold Antarctic waters. In some areas, 
the Antarctic Convergence lies north of 60˚S while in other locations it lies 
south of 60˚S. Thus the Antarctic region expands beyond the political 
boundary of 60˚S in some locations.14 There are no indigenous people of the 
Antarctic and most human occupancy is temporary. Science, tourism, and 
fishing are the main industries carried out in the Antarctic region. Existing 
infrastructure supports scientific research. Scientific bases are generally small 
in capacity. However, a few have become small communities. The majority of 
scientific research, non-governmental activities and tourism are carried out in 
the austral summer months between October and May. Some stations remain 
operational year round with a skeleton crew of support staff at the facilities. 
There are as of yet no tourism-specific onshore facilities.  
 
The Antarctic operating system is comprised of a specific regime, the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), and other multilateral treaties and 
initiatives.15 The ATS is based on the Antarctic Treaty,16 which is a regional 
multilateral treaty. Under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, there are seven 
states that have claims (claimant states) to territory on the Antarctic continent. 
These are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom (UK).  
 
In accordance with Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, claimant states can 
maintain claims to territorial sovereignty yet other signatory states to the 
                                                
14 In accordance with Article I(1) and (4), the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) ‘applies to the Antarctic marine living resources of the 
area south of 60˚South latitude and to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area 
between that latitude and the Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem’. 
15 Refer to Chapter 1 describing the Antarctic operating system. 
16 Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 01 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71, entered into force 
23 June 1961. 
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Antarctic Treaty do not have to recognize those claims.17 Thus, the Antarctic 
Treaty establishes a unique perspective on sovereignty. Under these terms, the 
rights of other states in the non-recognition of claims are as legitimate as 
claims to territorial sovereignty. The exercise of sovereign rights can proceed, 
but the Treaty provides that such actions can be interpreted as not affecting 
other states’ rights to non-recognition. The reverse also holds true – acts of 
non-recognition cannot be held to diminish the validity of the sovereign 
claims. The exercise of coastal state jurisdiction must also conform to this 
arrangement.   
                                                
17 Ibid., Article IV(1). 
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Figure 2: Antarctic region18 
 
 
                                                
18 The Antarctic Region 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/antarctic_ref802648_1999.jpg> at 02 
December 2009. 
The northern limits of the 
Norwegian claim are further 
defined through the process of 
submitting data regarding the 
outer limits of the continental 
shelf. Refer to Chapter 4 for 
related discussion. 
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Energy and environmental security 
Recently observed changes in the Arctic climate have increased attention on 
the Arctic environment. The demand on energy supplies worldwide has also 
brought Arctic issues into the energy security debate. Oil and gas industry 
activity is already occurring in the Arctic and is on the rise.19 Arctic oil and 
gas supplies are targets for securing energy resources for the future. 
Technological advances regarding exploration and development of continental 
shelf resources continue.20 The ability, however, to exploit resources depends 
to a certain extent on the delimitation of the legal continental shelf. 
Delimitation determines under whose jurisdiction the exercise of sovereign 
rights to resources lies.21  The delimitation process occurs through the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)22 and the timing of this 
process has coincidentally emerged alongside environmental and energy 
concerns.  
 
Historically, the Arctic oil and gas industry/market has experienced 
transportation and access limitations.23 Arctic sea ice and the harsh 
environment constrain industry activity and the ability to use sea passages 
through the Arctic. However, as climate variation causes sea ice extent to 
decrease24 (see Figure 3 on sea ice extent), the waterways, such as the 
Northwest Passage (NWP) in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and the 
Northern Sea Route (NSR) along northern Russia may become more 
accessible and offer a shorter transportation distance from Pacific to Atlantic 
                                                
19 Refer to Chapter 5 describing the current industry activity and potential reserves. 
20 Offshore-technology.com: The Website for the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 
<http://www.offshore-technology.com/> at 24 August 2009 is an excellent resource. The 
website describes offshore technology, past and current projects and ongoing research and 
development. 
21 Delimitation of the continental shelf outlines the area of entitlement of a coastal state, 
where entitlement is the guarantee of access to a continental shelf because of rights and 
agreement through international law. 
22 Supra n. 4. In this thesis LOSC refers to the convention whereas the abbreviation UNCLOS 
refers to the conferences that were held for the purposes of drafting the Law of the Sea 
Convention. 
23 Refer to Chapter 5, which describes some barriers to development. 
24 The continued significant reduction in summer sea ice extent and the decrease in the 
amount of older, thicker ice are two of the most dramatic signals of the general Arctic-wide 
warming trend in recent years. For more information see J. Richter-Menge and J.E. Overland, 
Arctic Report Card 2009 <http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard> at 02 November 2009, at 
9-12 and the ACIA, 'Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Scientific Report' (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), at Chapter 9, 456-458 .   
 10 
markets.25 Over the last century, the authority over the waterways and 
jurisdiction over activities/people within these waterways has been, at times, 
controversial. Recently, in the context of environmental and energy security, 
this issue has re-emerged.26 
 
 
Figure 3: Arctic sea ice extent 2005 and 2007. Sea ice extent reached record lows in 
September 2007.27 
 
 
                                                
25 For a recent assessment of Arctic Shipping potential see PAME, Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment (AMSA) (2009) Arctic Council 
<http://pame.arcticportal.org/images/stories/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf> 
at 10 November 2009. As an example of recent activity in the Arctic, in August/September of 
2009 the first successful commercial transit of the Northeast Passage from Asia to Europe via 
the Northern Sea Route was completed by a German company, Beluga Shipping. Two multi-
purpose heavy lift carriers the MV Beluga Fraternity and the MV Beluga Foresight made the 
transit. See LogisticsManager.com, Beluga Shipping Completes First Northeast Passage 
Commercial Transit (02 October 2009) 
<http://www.logisticsmanager.com/Articles/12410/Beluga+Shipping+completes+first+Northe
ast-Passage+commercial.html> at 21 October 2009; Janet Nodar, Beluga Shipping's Vessels 
Travel Northeast Passage (21 August 2009) The Journal of Commerce Online - News Story 
<http://www.joc.com/node/413026> at 21 October 2009.  
26 See for example, Aldo Chircop, 'The Growth of International Shipping in the Arctic: Is a 
Regulatory Review Timely?' (2009) 24(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
355-380. 
27 Figures available from the National Snow and Ice Data Center, Images of Sea Ice Extent 
Minimum <http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/images/20071001_extent.png> 
at 02 November 2009, Boulder, Colorado, US.  
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Concomitantly, more attention has also been paid to the manner in which the 
Arctic, as a region, is governed or managed.28 Pressure rests on the regional 
governance arrangements to respond to international concern over the 
environment, the economic demands placed on the region and its existing and 
future management. While states currently implement initiatives and 
directives in accordance with national interest, regional and international 
considerations must be granted attention.  
 
Pressure created by the continental shelf delimitation process, energy security 
concerns, and climate changes also exist in relation to the Antarctic. Attention 
is being drawn towards both regions. This connection is not surprising 
considering that both polar regions are important to understanding climate 
cycles.29 While the Antarctic itself may be less commercialized, issues that 
revolve around understanding environmental security, jurisdiction and legal 
rights to resources have gained salience.  
 
The outer continental shelf delimitation process applies to states that are 
Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. Yet because of the sovereignty 
arrangements of the Antarctic Treaty, questions relating to coastal state rights, 
the exercise of sovereign rights, and the practice of jurisdiction within the 
existing governance arrangements consistently re-emerge. Antarctic mineral 
exploitation is currently prohibited for the 34 states party to the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol).30 
However, the question of future resource development for these states, as well 
as the remaining states not party to the current prohibition remains 
                                                
28 Several authors have recently published work on Arctic governance. Refer to supra n. 6, de 
la Fayette and n. 8. See also T. Potts and C. Schofield, 'Current Legal Developments: The 
Arctic' (2008) 23(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 151 and Oran R. 
Young, 'Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North' (2009) 
45(232) Polar Record 73.  
29 The polar regions are important to the study of climate change. A recent report compiled by 
the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) reviews the climate system of the 
Antarctic region as a contributor to the global system. See John Turner et al, 'Antarctic 
Climate Change and the Environment' (Scott Polar Research Institute, Cambridge, UK, 2009). 
This is the companion document to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment of 2005 (supra n. 
24, ACIA), which highlights the Arctic region with respect to climatic variables.  
30 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol), opened 
for signature 04 October 1991, 30 ILM 1455, entered into force 14 January 1998, Annex V 
entered into force 24 May 2002, Annex VI was adopted 14 June 2005. 
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unanswered. Marine-based activities including fishing, tourism, 
bioprospecting and marine scientific research are also increasing pressures on 
Antarctic shipping and resource regulation. Antarctic commercialization and 
resource development may still be many decades away from consideration. 
Nonetheless, any rapid and unregulated increases in marine-based activities, 
including potential oil and gas resource exploration, could be harmful to 
ecosystems and disruptive to existing systems of governance. States involved 
with regional governance of the Antarctic must stay abreast of the emerging 
concerns and future implications. Thus, an opportunity exists to examine the 
robustness of polar governance in the context of environmental and energy 
security. 
 
Research method and hypothesis 
The varying manner in which issues are mitigated and/or managed represents 
the capacity of an operating system. Robustness is, therefore, the capacity of 
the regime or operating system to accommodate emerging issues and 
challenges. It is a characteristic of strength within the system to which 
numerous variables contribute. In this examination, participant confidence and 
the system’s ability to be effective are key variables to understanding 
robustness. Effectiveness is defined as the ability to produce non-prejudicial 
outcomes. Participant confidence exists when state behavior within the 
operating system coincides with the ability to maintain state authority and 
states’ rights. Participant confidence also carries a degree of operating system 
legitimacy and resilience. Legitimacy is derived from internally recognized 
authority, application and acceptability of the operating system and resilience 
is the capacity to mitigate instability and challenges. These variables 
interconnect with each other and with effectiveness to contribute to this 
assessment of robustness. If the cumulative assessment of these variables 
promotes robustness, the operating system operates above a threshold. If these 
variables are compromised to an extent that robustness falters, the system falls 
below an operating threshold and would need to change in order to re-
establish a robust operating capacity. 
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Operating system schematic 
 
 
 
Participant confidence:              Effectiveness 
      State authority   (non-prejudice of states’ rights) 
      Legitimacy 
      Resilience 
 
 
 
     Robustness 
----------------------Operating System Threshold------------------------ 
      
The research hypothesis, therefore, is that operating system robustness relates 
to participant confidence and the ability to mitigate challenges in a non-
prejudicial manner rather than the scope of regulatory or enforcement 
mechanisms within the system. 
 
The primary objective of examining robustness of the polar operating systems 
as it relates to real or potential offshore resource development will be met by: 
1. describing case studies that relate to polar offshore oil and gas 
development;  
2. examining the variables of robustness (participant confidence and 
the ability to not prejudice the rights of states); and  
3. comparing the similarities and differences observed between how 
the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems accommodate these issues. 
 
Further to the hypothesis regarding robustness, secondary research questions 
have been developed: 
1. Given the manner in which other issues have been integrated into the 
operating system, are the operating systems robust enough to integrate 
contemporary issues such as an increase in marine-based activities 
including offshore oil and gas development and polar shipping? How 
is this demonstrated? How does it compare? 
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2. Recognizing the differences in contemporary challenges and the 
perception of the international community with respect to 
collaborative regional management, how are the operating systems and 
the variables of robustness likely to be affected with the onset of 
contemporary challenges? How does it compare? 
 
Issue resolution or accommodation that does not prejudice the rights of states 
provides evidence that there is a functional level of capacity and confidence in 
the operating system. This capacity reflects robustness. A robust operating 
system can be effective or ineffective at producing behavioral changes while 
still successfully accommodating possibly divergent interests of individual 
states and levels of interest in collaborative efforts. Emerging issues, such as 
entitlement to offshore oil and gas resources of the continental shelf and 
related jurisdiction, do not have to cause the operating system to divorce from 
its normative principles. Within the operating system, states are able to use 
different strategies/mechanisms to incorporate unilateral interests, divergent 
interests and controversial issues into existing normative principles. A sense 
of national position can coincide with regional collaboration and regional 
governance. Understanding how the operating system exhibits these variables 
in the presence of challenges or possible instability contributes to an 
appreciation of robustness. Understanding assists in the identification of the 
different approaches used by the systems and contributes to the appreciation 
of vulnerability to disruptive issues or changes in stability. 
 
A robust regime may experience periods of instability or destabilizing 
incidents where state authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness may be 
temporarily challenged. If throughout the duration of instability or 
ineffectiveness, accommodation of the emerging issues remains acceptable to 
the participants, participant confidence in the operating system may still be 
present. A non-robust system may still be stable – stability defined as the 
capacity to survive over time31 – but may not have the capacity to 
                                                
31 See Oran  R. Young, Resource Management at the International Level: the Case of the 
North Pacific, Frances Printer Ltd (1977), at 49 for a discussion on stability in reference to 
international regimes. 
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accommodate emerging issues. In a similar manner, a robust regime may have 
the capacity to accommodate issues but fail to produce effective outcomes or 
compliance, depending on the measure of effectiveness. 
  
Significance of the research  
In an era of increased energy and environmental security concerns, 
understanding the capacity and robustness of the polar operating systems 
provides a foundation for considering the ebb and flow of security concerns 
on a national and regional level. The case studies chosen encapsulate 
controversial issues. These case studies, like many other emerging issues, 
occur within the context of the operating system. As interest in resources 
waxes and wanes depending on economic and political pressures, the 
robustness of the operating system, rather than individual pressures, provides 
greater understanding of polar governance.  
 
Significant media and public attention to polar issues already exists and is 
growing as the effects of climate change in the polar regions becomes more 
evident. It is likely that media and public attention will increase as growing 
energy demand converges with reduced sea ice extent and increasing resource 
accessibility. It is, therefore, important to bring together regional dynamics of 
states within a legal context to appreciate media and public concerns. 
Understanding the capacity of the existing operating systems and 
demonstrating the robust nature of these systems contributes to a broader 
appreciation of potential governing options as this convergence occurs. This 
understanding reiterates how issues gain complexity with respect to the Arctic 
and Antarctic and helps to place media attention on the polar regions within 
the context from which it is derived. Overall, these cases studies contribute to 
the understanding of polar governance from a legal, political and public 
interest perspective.  
 
Comparison and case studies are the methods of research used in this thesis to 
investigate imbalances and indicate robustness within the polar operating 
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systems. Controlled comparative studies are discussed in George32 and 
Eckstein.33 According to Eckstein, comparative studies are most useful as 
preliminary, yet inclusive, aids to conclusive case studies.34 Polar 
comparisons have been used for the evaluation of numerous issues, such as 
the development of international law, polar maritime delimitation and 
pollution prevention.35  
 
With respect to activities relating to offshore oil and gas development, several 
technological and environmental barriers are comparable between the Arctic 
and Antarctic. Technologies such as ships for transportation and/or drilling or 
drilling platforms are likely to be transferable between the polar 
environments.36 However, the regulatory foundation will differ. Comparing 
these differences can highlight positive and negative regulatory outcomes. 
Differences between operating systems provide a wider array upon which to 
examine the issues related to offshore oil and gas development. Lessons taken 
from the Arctic, a region already accommodating resource activity, can be 
applied to the Antarctic region, which is yet to see resource exploitation. In a 
similar manner, the integration of controversial issues in an operating system 
yet to exploit resources provides a broader consideration of the overall 
capacity of operating systems. Comparing the unique ways in which the polar 
operating systems function provides a broader appreciation of operating 
systems and polar governance. In light of the fact that the public, media, 
                                                
32 Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, 
Focused Comparison' in Paul Gordan Lauren and Alexander L. George (eds), Diplomacy: 
New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, The Free Press (1979) 43-68. 
33 Harry Eckstein, 'Case Study and Political Theory' in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company (1975) vol 7, 79-137, at 93. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See, among others, Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell, The Law of the Sea and 
Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001); Donald R. 
Rothwell, The Polar Regions and Development of International Law, Press Syndicate of the 
University of Cambridge (1996); Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, Polar Politics: 
Creating International Environmental Regimes, Cornell University Press (1993); and Davor 
Vidas, Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention, 
Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge University Press (2000).  
36 As discussed in John Yates, Paul Cunningham and Denis Smith, 'Polar Hydrocarbon 
Technologies' (1995) 19(5) Marine Policy 419-436, specific technologies may be more 
appropriate to the Arctic or Antarctic. Modification may still be required to meet specific 
environmental differences such as the different characteristics of sea ice in each region. 
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scientists and social scientists consistently link the Arctic and the Antarctic, 
bipolar studies will continue to be profitable.  
 
Scope and limitations 
This thesis provides a snapshot of knowledge on contemporary issues 
including resource potential, economics and technology related to the offshore 
oil and gas industry capabilities in the polar regions. The focus of this thesis is 
on polar governance rather than on industry capabilities. In light of the 
growing concern over both energy and environmental security, however, an 
illustration of the complexities and realities of the offshore industries will 
provide another case study and a platform from which to discuss polar 
governance.37  
 
To analyze the effect of issues relating to energy and environmental security 
and contemporary issues on polar governance, it is important to recognize that 
all states involved are guided by similar driving influences. National interest 
and regional collaboration are distinct but parallel concerns. In some respects, 
behavior along strict national positions may interfere with jurisdictional issues 
in a region of shared interests.38 Alternatively, some forms of collaboration, 
which suggest that entitlement to rights and resources must also be sacrificed 
in the interests of cooperation, may also not be acceptable for states within a 
regional operating system.39 Regardless of the jurisdiction or governing 
arrangements outlined in the polar operating systems, the legal rights of states 
remain. 
 
The net effect of differences between Arctic and Antarctic governance rests 
less with the structure of the institutions, but in how adaptations within the 
operating system account for the realpolitik and the approach to sovereignty.  
                                                
37 See Chapter 5. 
38 For example, if a national position is upheld in a disputed area, the entitlement to resources 
cannot be practiced without negatively interfering with the rights of the other state(s) engaged 
in the dispute. 
39 For example, the ability of the Arctic states to exercise appropriate regional jurisdiction is 
only possible through the involvement of an over-arching institution and limited national 
jurisdiction. 
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Processes and outcomes, rather than operating system components, for each 
case study are examined in relation to the manner in which the operating 
system absorbs different issues. The means of mitigating the issue without 
creating prejudice to states’ rights, balancing national and collaborative 
interests and responding to operating system instability, will highlight aspects 
of operating system robustness. Legitimacy and participant acceptability will 
be identified as participant confidence, a contributing factor to robustness.  
 
It is recognized that an examination, which links the ability to maintain states’ 
rights and participant confidence with the capacity of an operating system to 
function, does not measure the effectiveness of an operating system in terms 
of institutional creation, impact within or outside the operating system, or 
behavioral change such as compliance or enforcement. This is a study linking 
realpolitik and diplomacy within polar governance. This thesis uses case 
studies to provide a foundation on which to identify and compare the capacity 
of the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems. This approach to examining 
governance captures the similarities and differences between the polar 
operating systems and applies the test of robustness to the systems. 
 
The test of robustness applied is novel and combines aspects of regime 
effectiveness and international relations. This approach uses abductive 
reasoning40 to connect the case studies and identify the best possible links to 
operating system robustness. The link between participant confidence and the 
protection of states rights to operating system robustness is validated through 
the examination of the case studies and becomes the analytical framework for 
comparing the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems. This is of course only 
one method of approaching a comparison between Arctic and Antarctic 
governance. The approach in this thesis does not minimize the importance of 
other indices of effectiveness in the evaluation of robustness but provides a 
novel approach that may contribute to the overall understanding of polar 
regimes while examining a topical issue for polar regions. This framework, 
                                                
40 A method of reasoning introduced by Charles Sanders Pierce, abductive reasoning is a 
process of inference which produces a hypothesis through considering seemingly unrelated 
facts alongside the intuition that they are somehow linked. See Thomas A. Sebeok, The Play 
of Musement, Indiana University Press (1981), at 33-34. 
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which provides a broad examination of inter-state dynamics within regionally 
based governing systems, is described in a following section.  
 
Sources and data 
The sources and data within this thesis vary and include research that was 
completed on earlier occasions by other authors. In many of the case studies 
the background and legal analysis has been from this previously published 
research. This thesis draws from those previously reviewed and published 
works in order to gather data and present arguments that reflect the novel 
approach to assessing robustness of a governing or operating system. Recent 
work has also focused on governance of the polar regions (especially the 
Arctic). These reviews complement this study but may not contribute directly 
to the analysis. This thesis also draws from key interviews and discussions 
undertaken in accordance with appropriate university ethics approval.41 In 
addition, data on industry activities, barriers to industry development and 
climate related information has been used in this thesis to help describe the 
issues faced by the polar operating systems. Further indepth study of these 
variables will be warranted for a comprehensive understanding of industry 
trends.  
 
Research and analytical framework 
Numerous previous studies, from which this methodological approach has 
been derived, have used the term ‘regime’. Concepts upon which the approach 
is built apply equally to regimes as operating systems. The concept of an 
operating system, however, differs slightly from the concept of a regime. 
Young defined a regime as a set of agreements among some specified group 
of actors spelling out a well defined distribution of power and authority, a 
system of rights and liability rules, and a collection of behavioral prescriptions 
or rules that indicate actions of the members.42  
                                                
41 University of Tasmania Ethics Reference Number: H0009910. 
42 Supra n. 31, at 44. 
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A regime is a system of government, though it need not involve the 
existence of a written constitution or the presence of any formal 
institutional arrangements.43 
 
In international relations theory, regimes are described as ‘sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations’.44 However, as Stokke and Vidas remark, the tendency is to identify 
regimes on the basis of explicit rules rather than observed behavior.45 They 
define a regime as comprising  
a normative component of principles and rules, and a structural 
component assigning states and other subjects roles within the regime; 
sometimes also instituting procedures for collective decision-making.46 
 
A regime has a structure of its own, implying that external processes are not 
necessarily an aspect of the regime. For example, regimes are often insulated 
from direct exposure to domestic politics. The operation of a regime is 
determined by the provisions of the regime, for the purpose established within 
the regime. Regimes exist as entities separate from each other and while 
regimes provide an important source of international law, they are also 
subjects of international law. As such, regimes in this thesis exist within an 
operating system.    
 
Operating systems enable international law to perform effectively through a 
framework that supports the operation of law and provides a mechanism for 
interactions between states as actors.47 Components of the operating system 
are similar to regimes and include: (1) the sources of law and the processes 
through which law is formed; (2) the actors, including how and to what degree 
                                                
43 Ibid., at 45. 
44 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables' (1982) 36(2) International Organization 185, at 186. 
45 Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas, 'Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International 
Regimes' in Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: The 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge University Press 
(1996) 13, at 14. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Supra n. 2, at 43. 
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they may exercise assigned rights; (3) jurisdiction, which defines the rights of 
actors to deal with legal problems and violations and; (4) institutions 
including courts, which create forums and rules to hear disputes and 
decisions.48 In summary, to quote Diehl et al., 
 
[t]he operating system provides a framework within which 
international law is created and implemented and defines the roles of 
different actors as well as providing mechanisms for the settlement of 
disputes.49 
 
An operating system offers a platform for the engagement of states. 
Engagement is not restricted by established provisions but can encompass 
external processes and occur along similar or divergent interests. Operating 
systems enable law to perform effectively but are not limited to legal rules or 
binding instruments alone. Soft law, hard law, economics and politics are 
included within operating systems and operating systems can encompass 
regimes. The concept of an operating system widens the engagement of states, 
using international law as the foundation around which all states function.  
 
Diehl et al.’s concept of an operating system accounts for similar aspects of a 
regime, as defined above by Young50 and Stokke and Vidas.51 Sources of law 
provide structure, actors are subjects, and jurisdiction and institutions 
contribute to decision making. However, decision making within an operating 
system can also encompass unilateral decisions shaped outside a set regime. 
Operating systems as defined by Diehl et al. are ‘usually greater than the sum 
of any parts derived from individual norms or regimes’ and ‘precede the 
developments of the normative system’.52 
 
Within the operating systems, mutual rights and obligations of states party to 
certain treaties and instruments exist alongside concomitant rights and 
                                                
48 Ibid., at 47. 
49 Ibid., at 50. 
50 See page 18, supra n. 42 and 43. 
51 See page 19, supra n. 46. 
52 Supra n. 2, at 48. 
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obligations in the absence of specific agreements. These concomitant rights 
become important with respect to regional cooperation and mutual respect of 
each others’ rights.53  
 
International law does not assume limits of states rights, but accepts that 
limitations can be set or recognized by interference; meaning that adverse or 
negative impacts on a state’s rights can define the limits of acceptable state 
behavior or action.54 For this thesis, the limit of acceptable state behavior is 
determined by whether other states’ rights are prejudiced.  
 
State authority within the operating system 
In terms of governments, the state expresses and represents concepts of 
collective identity of a nation and also asserts rights and responsibilities to 
interpret and define these concepts.55 The state and its leaders are set above 
the state and justify themselves by being an expression of the state. The state 
and its leaders ‘assert their unique and authoritative expression of the essential 
qualities of the nation’.56 Therefore, in Barker’s sense, ‘the authority of the 
state can never be externally derived, because…it is in fact uniquely 
possessed’.57 This is supported by the definition of a sovereign state, which is 
one that can be subject to the authority of no other state. This theory can be 
applied to polar governance and operating systems. The states involved in the 
operating systems express, represent and assert rights and responsibilities 
within the polar regions and their authority to do so is uniquely possessed. 
The Arctic states assert their unique and authoritative expression of the Arctic 
within the Arctic Council and through international law. The Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties (ATCPs) assert a similar authority with respect to the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and international law. The authority of these 
systems, for the derivation and expression of collective concepts or principles 
                                                
53 Ian Townsend-Gault, 'Regional Maritime Cooperation: Do Boundaries Matter Any More?' 
in Gerald Blake et al (eds), International Boundaries and Environmental Security: 
Frameworks for Regional Cooperation, Kluwer Law International (1997) 3, at 12. 
54 Ibid., at 9 and 12. 
55 Rodney Barker, Political Legitimacy and the State, Clarendon Press, Oxford University 
Press (1990), at 28. 
56 Ibid., at 27. 
57 Ibid., at 28. 
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through various measures, is recognized within the operating system and 
recognition often confers legitimacy.58 This legitimate authority is maintained, 
and even strengthened, by the assertions and outcomes of the operating 
system.  
 
Legitimacy 
Legitimacy coincides with a belief in, and recognition of, a right to govern.59 
Stokke and Vidas, in examining the legitimacy and effectiveness of regimes 
within the ATS, suggest that legitimacy involves two criteria. The first is the 
extent of applicability and the second is the level of acceptance by relevant 
subjects.60 The same concepts can be applied to an operating system. To that 
end, if an issue can be integrated into an operating system without producing a 
prejudicial action or position, then it follows that the operating system was an 
applicable framework for the issue. That is not to judge that it is the best 
framework, only that it is an applicable, legitimate framework. As well, in 
light of the maintenance of states’ rights alongside the principles of the 
system, a level of acceptability must also exist.  
 
Acceptability involves an attitude towards the character of the regime,61 or in 
this thesis, towards the operating system. Thus, legitimacy is not only a matter 
of policies and outcomes, but also a matter of procedures and persons. 
Focusing attention on the state and on politics as distinct, although not 
necessarily autonomous institutions and activities, provides a political 
reference to legitimacy.62 Barker suggests that there is profit to be gained from 
looking at political actions and motives as distinct from, although integral 
with, government actions and motives.63 In this thesis, realpolitik and 
diplomacy are integral aspects of the operating system, providing mechanisms 
through which to incorporate emerging issues within the operating system and 
                                                
58 On recognition, see Maurice Cranston, 'From Legitimism to Legitimacy' in Athanasios 
Moulakis (ed), Legitimacy/Legitimite, Walter de Gruyter (1986) 36, at 39. 
59 Supra n. 55, at 27. 
60 Supra n. 45, at 23. 
61 Ibid. See also supra n. 55, at 28. 
62 Ibid., Barker, at 28. 
63 Ibid. 
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prevent the prejudice of other states’ rights. These aspects provide the means 
for acceptability and participant confidence in the operating system. 
 
Effectiveness 
Hønneland and Stokke defined effectiveness as ‘mitigation or removal of 
specific problems addressed by a regime.’64 Young incorporates the features 
of political feasibility and acceptability as criteria for the regime evaluation, 
relating fundamental acceptance by the principal actors to implementation and 
maintenance of the regimes.65 This provides an element of compliance in a 
political and behavioral sense. Young categorizes compliance as a measure of 
effectiveness in the sense of (1) behavioral effectiveness: whether behavior 
has occurred that would otherwise not have occurred in the absence of the 
regime, and (2) process effectiveness: demonstrating the extent to which 
provisions are implemented and to which compliance occurs.66 Measures of 
effectiveness can also be determined in other ways such as whether or not a 
problem has been solved, a goal has been attained, social practice has been 
constituted or whether the regime performs efficiently.  
 
All of these dimensions invoke a sense of measuring an output or impact.67 
Young emphasizes that there is no basis for assuming that the different 
dimensions of effectiveness will ‘co-vary in any simple or easily predictable 
manner’68 and that analysts will often find themselves fashioning explanatory 
accounts that include multiple variables,69 such as is done in this thesis. The 
extent to which actors comply with mitigated behavioral prescriptions relates 
to legitimacy and effectiveness and can vary widely. Effectiveness and 
legitimacy contribute to operating system stability and are accounted for 
within regime or operating system robustness. As demonstrated below, 
                                                
64 Supra n. 1, at 2. 
65 Supra n. 31, at 49. 
66 Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless 
Society, Cornell University Press (1994), at 145-146. 
67 See supra n. 45, at 13. 
68 Supra n. 66, at 150. 
69 Ibid., at 152. 
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however, measures related to effectiveness, such as compliance and 
enforcement are not sole determinants of robustness. 
 
Resilience: response to challenge 
Ku and Diehl identified four mechanisms that occur in response to challenge 
to an operating system. These include (1) actions of non-state or transnational 
networks; (2) internationalization of international law; (3) the use of domestic 
and political processes and (4) soft law instruments.70 While it is clear that 
these are not traditional, intrinsic legal responses, in this thesis even these 
responses are included within the operating system because they are products 
of international relations, political will and the influence of variables 
including economics and culture. These mechanisms provide options for 
integrating an emergent issue into an operating system when the legal 
framework within the system, and its interpretation, fall short of 
accommodating the new issues. 
 
Ku and Diehl also suggest that an operating system responds to change only 
when a response is necessary, when change is coterminous with a dramatic 
change in the political environment (“political shock”) and in the absence of 
opposition by leading states to the change.71 This thesis recognizes that 
changes in state behavior or interaction do not have to equate to or be initiated 
by changes in an operating system. Adaptation or change in state behavior is 
assumed to occur without needing to change or destabilize the operating 
system, unless the operating system is no longer robust enough to 
accommodate change.  
 
Robust operating systems 
Robustness is the quality to withstand stresses, pressures or changes in 
procedure or circumstance and the capacity to survive over time. If a regime 
                                                
70 C. Ku and P. Diehl, 'Filling the Gaps: Extrasystemic Mechanisms for Addressing 
Imbalances between International Legal Operating Systems and the Normative System ' 
(2006) 12 Global Governance 161, at 163. 
71 Ibid., at 164. 
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or operating system is robust, it is also likely to be effective, although the 
measure of effectiveness can be assumed on numerous interrelated variables. 
Robustness and effectiveness are related, but separate. For the purposes of this 
thesis, robustness is a function of willingness to participate within the 
operating system and the ability to create actions, instruments or results that 
are non-prejudicial to states’ rights. These two variables together are 
represented as participant confidence. High confidence and lack of internal 
dissent between the participants are key factors to the robustness. Confidence 
levels relate to the accommodation of interests within the system as well as to 
implementation, compliance and enforcement of measures or behaviors. 
Numerous variables factor into the perception of confidence from any given 
participant. For example, if a highly volatile subject is brought in line with the 
principles of the operating system with ease, the confidence in the operating 
system may or may not be any greater than if a benign issue was solved with 
less efficiency. The ability to accommodate interests, no matter how 
divergent, corresponds with high confidence, as does the notion, or 
appearance, of effective implementation of decisions. Real or implied 
compliance and enforcement also correlates with high participant confidence. 
These factors also relate to the effectiveness of the operating system. 
 
If non-compliance and lack of enforcement do not adversely affect the rights 
of other states within the system, confidence in the operating system – 
although perhaps founded on false pretenses – can remain relatively high. 
Alternatively, poor implementation of decisions, non-compliance or 
ineffective measures may create outcomes and activities that counter the 
principles of the system, creating instability. Instability may lead to decreased 
participant confidence. Participant confidence will also be compromised if, in 
carrying out activities or outcomes, the rights of states are compromised, 
creating prejudice. 
 
Participant confidence is chosen as a significant variable in the analysis of 
regime robustness rather than implementation, compliance or enforcement 
because it more accurately reflects the operation of the system. There is a 
positive correlation between participant confidence and system robustness that 
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does not clearly exist for implementation, enforcement and compliance 
variables. If the system is robust, participants will find a way to make the 
system effective by defining effectiveness in terms of their acceptance. If 
participants are confident in the system, the system will continue to provide 
results that are acceptable to the participants and operate in an effective 
manner. If the participants have low confidence in the system, the system is 
inherently weak and participants will look outside the system for alternate 
results or measures. States may disregard the rights of other states and 
insecurity in a system may manifest as disruptive and prejudicial unilateral 
assertions.  
 
Measuring regime robustness through implementation, compliance and 
enforcement in the absence of participant confidence can provide false 
negative and false positive correlations in a manner similar to that discovered 
when evaluating effectiveness. For example, when evaluating regime 
effectiveness, Mitchell remarks that a strict focus on compliance creates two 
analytical problems.72 Equating compliance with operating system robustness 
may be misleading if compliant behaviors would have occurred irrespective of 
measures within the system. This type of ‘coincidental compliance’ is a 
positive attribute although it does not necessarily reflect operating system 
effectiveness or robustness, since the operating system was not necessary to 
achieve the same result.73 On the other hand, ‘induced compliance’ does 
correlate with effectiveness because it assumes behavior by the actors to be 
compliant when they would not have been without the system in place. This 
type of compliance would contribute to the concept of a robust system.  
 
Also misleading is the assumption that non-compliance implies a lack of 
robustness in the operating system. States may make efforts to foster an 
agreement but fall short on the legal standards of implementation.74 This type 
of non-compliance reflects the willingness of actors to participate in the 
                                                
72 Ronald B. Mitchell, 'Compliance Theory: Compliance, Effectiveness and Behaviour 
Change in International Environmental Law' in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunee and Ellen Hey 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford University Press 
(2007) 893, at 895. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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system even though their capacity to comply with decisions falls short.75 An 
operating system cannot be assumed to be weakened by this sort of non-
compliance. However, non-compliance in the absence of shortcomings in 
implementation capacity reflects unwillingness of the participants and would 
be a true negative attribute of the system. This type of non-compliance could 
reflect operating system weakness. In light of the ambiguity caused by linking 
compliance with robustness, it is suggested that participant confidence more 
accurately demonstrates the state of robustness of the operating system. 
Participant confidence, nonetheless, cannot determine robustness on its own. 
 
When a lack of implementation, compliance and/or enforcement results in 
prejudice of the rights of other states (where in the past the rights were still 
upheld), the capacity of the system to operate is brought into question and the 
confidence of participants in the system will similarly not be upheld.  Events 
may destabilize the operating system and threaten its capacity to 
accommodate issues without prejudice. However, if participant confidence is 
upheld alongside states rights, challenges can be absorbed within a robust 
system. If participant confidence is reduced sufficiently, intervention or 
abandonment may be required. For this thesis, this is considered the 
‘operating system threshold’, above which the system is functional and robust 
and below which the system is dysfunctional.  
 
Below the operating system threshold, intervention may occur through the 
states involved, with or without external participation. The end result is a 
different operating system altogether, where all four components (ie: sources 
of law; actors; jurisdiction; and institutions) are changed. Above this 
threshold, changes may still occur within the operating system. However, at 
least one of the components of the original operating system remains 
essentially the same. If threats or challenges to the system are managed within 
the system and the rights of states are not prejudiced despite the risk of this 
happening, confidence can remain above the threshold. The incidence of 
instability was mitigated within the system.  
                                                
75 Ibid., see also pp 908-910. 
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Studies of regime effectiveness, as an indicator of robustness, have been 
carried out by numerous authors. Young reviews several approaches in search 
of indices of effectiveness.76 For instance, the ‘standardized measurement 
concept’ developed by Sprinz and Helm includes three distinct variables: 1) 
the no-regime counterfactual; 2) actual performance and; 3) the collective 
optimum.77 In the no-regime counterfactual, a measure of effectiveness is 
derived from considering the alternative of not having a regime in place to 
manage particular issues. The actual performance measures the desired output 
of the regime against the actual output or performance of states/participants. 
Problem solving undertaken by one state within a regime also benefits others, 
creating a collective optimum that helps assess effectiveness. Taken together, 
these variables can benefit the operation of the regime. However, as Young 
remarks, the process does not allow for any kind of coordination or 
cooperation among players78 and may undervalue the overall effectiveness of 
regimes.79 Alternatively, distinctions between outputs, outcome and impacts, 
initially developed by Easton80 have several advantages. As Young 
summarizes, outputs are construed as regulations, policy instruments, 
compliance measures and so forth; outcomes are the behaviors of the actors; 
and impacts are the biogeographical conditions meant to be regulated by the 
formation of the regime.81 This process directs attention to forms of behaviors 
and encourages a systematic consideration of substantive regulations and 
procedural efforts.82 However, the study of outputs can ‘degenerate into 
                                                
76 Oran R. Young, 'Inferences and Indices: Evaluating the Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes' (2001) 1(1) Global Environmental Politics 99-121; Oran R. Young, 
The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Causal Connections and 
Behavioural Mechanisms, MIT Press (1999) and supra n. 66. 
77 Ibid., Young (2001), at 109-112 and Detlef F. Sprinz and Carsten Helm, 'The Effects of 
Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept' (1999) 20(4) International 
Political Science Review 359, at 361. 
78 Ibid., Young, at 111. 
79 Ibid., at 112. For example, Young suggests that if actual performance is an empirical 
measure alone, such as a measure of air borne pollutants, a number of effects of regimes that 
analysts have come to regard as important consequences of the regimes, such as improved 
understanding of the problem, and social learning, are left out. This underscores the 
effectiveness of the regime. 
80 For concept development see, David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-
Hall (1965).  
81 Supra n. 76, Young (2001), at 114. 
82 Ibid., at 115. 
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formalistic accounts that tell us little or nothing about matters of general 
interest or even about the real determinants of the outcomes of the political 
processes.’83 The approach in this thesis does not minimize the importance of 
other indices of effectiveness in the evaluation of robustness. Rather, it strives 
to provide a novel approach that may contribute to the overall understanding 
of polar regimes while examining a topical issue for the polar regions. 
 
Thesis structure 
The extent to which polar operating systems have exemplified and/or 
maintained robustness is measured by assessing the structure and mechanisms 
of the operating systems and the accommodation of salient events leading up 
to and including the most recent issue of resource entitlement over the 
continental shelf. Following a description of the framework of analysis, the 
first chapter provides a background on each of the polar operating systems in 
which the components of each operating system are described. Following this 
background chapter, the case studies relevant to the contemporary issue of 
offshore oil and gas development will be examined in terms of how the 
operating systems and actors within the system have responded to the issues. 
Each case study will be presented in a separate chapter. 
 
In the Arctic, waterways including the NWP and the NSR may become 
commercial transit areas as sea ice decreases and climate changes meet with 
technological advancements. These waterways will in turn play a role in the 
transportation and offshore development of Arctic resources yet their status as 
international straits or under the jurisdiction of a coastal state has been an 
ongoing controversial issue. This issue is discussed within the context of the 
Arctic operating system in Chapter 2.  
 
In the Antarctic, the issue of jurisdiction over offshore mineral resources will 
be crucial to any potential development. The previous negotiation of the 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
                                                
83 Ibid. 
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(CRAMRA), a regulatory regime for mineral resource development that 
included offshore oil and gas development, provides an excellent case study. 
CRAMRA did not enter into force and the ATCPs turned from CRAMRA to a 
comprehensive environmental regime. Chapter 3 includes an examination of 
the development of CRAMRA and the turn towards the Madrid Protocol and 
provides evidence of the capacity of the Antarctic operating system.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the current process of continental shelf delimitation in the 
Arctic and the Antarctic. In terms of the delimitation process, national interest 
and regional concerns converge within the operating systems. The process 
undertaken by the Russian Federation, an Arctic coastal state, will be set 
against the Arctic operating system and interests of other Arctic states 
including Canada, Denmark and the United States (US). The process 
undertaken by Australia concerning the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT) 
and sub-Antarctic islands will similarly be placed within the context of the 
Antarctic operating system. Similar to the Arctic, the position and dynamic 
between other Antarctic claimant states will be considered. 
 
Chapter 5 sets the scene of the polar offshore oil and gas context, examining 
variables that influence industry decisions and development. The rights and 
obligations of the states in pursuing offshore oil and gas development are 
discussed in relation to the Arctic coastal states and the states with interest in 
the Antarctic, including claimants, non-claimants and third party states.84 The 
‘reality’ of oil and gas development in the Arctic and Antarctic provides a 
platform from which to analyze and compare the current polar operating 
systems and their ability to contend with offshore oil and gas development.  
  
Chapter 6 analyzes the variables of operating system robustness. Participant 
confidence and acceptability will be related to the ability to avoid prejudice 
the rights of other states. Variables of state authority, legitimacy and 
effectiveness will also be identified within the analysis. The capacity of the 
Arctic and Antarctic operating systems will be identified and compared, 
                                                
84 Third party states are defined as non-Arctic states, states not party to the LOSC or states not 
party to instruments of the Antarctic Treaty System, which is outlined in Chapter 1. 
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providing a platform from which to discuss potential future operating system 
challenges and likely outcomes.  
 
Chapter 7 investigates contemporary issues linked to marine based activities 
and offshore oil and gas development faced by the polar operating systems. 
An increase in marine based activities will include industry-related scientific 
research, onset or acceleration of offshore resource development, and 
shipping. Although the activities will challenge the operating systems at 
different times and will increase at varying rates, the Arctic and Antarctic 
operating systems will each eventually have to contend with issues related to 
these developments. This chapter considers the affect these issues will 
possibly have on operating system robustness. Responses of the operating 
systems are considered along with the effect these responses may have on the 
variables of robustness. Following this discussion, Chapter 8 provides the 
thesis conclusions.  
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Chapter One: The Polar Operating Systems 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Governance is the activity of governing without necessarily utilizing a specific 
government and is, at the international level, comprised of the application of 
international law, customary law and international relations. Hence, 
governance is based on the practical application of an operating system. Prior 
to examining issues related to governance in the Arctic and Antarctic, it is 
necessary to describe the operating systems. Components that relate to both 
operating systems will be described in this chapter, followed by a description 
of the components specific to each region. Table 1, located at the end of this 
chapter, provides an overview of the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems. 
 
As described in the introduction, there are four components to an operating 
system. These include (1) sources of law; (2) actors; (3) jurisdiction; and (4) 
institutions.1 Sources of law and legal practice that are applicable to both the 
Arctic and Antarctic operating systems include elements of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),2 customary 
international law, International Maritime Organization (IMO) Conventions 
and the United Nations Convention the Law of the Sea (LOSC).3 Specific 
sources of law also exist for each operating system and include hard law, such 
as the Antarctic Treaty and soft law,4 such as the Arctic Council.  
 
As Diehl, Ku and Zamora describe, ‘international law provides the framework 
for political disclosure among members in the international system.’5 Thus, 
rules of general international law relating to, inter alia, international legal 
                                                
1 P. Diehl, C. Ku and D. Zamora, 'Dynamics of International Law: Interaction of Normative 
and Operating Systems' (2003) 57 (Winter) International Organization 43, at 47. 
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature Vienna 23 May 1969, 1155 
UNTS 331, entered into force 27 January 1980 (Vienna Convention). 
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC), opened for signature 10 
December 1982, 21 ILM 1261, entered into force 16 November 1994. 
4 In the Vienna Convention, the definition of a treaty covers the broad array of international 
agreements. Under this definition, soft law arrangements and agreements between states can 
be considered treaties and relevant sources of law for an operating system. See discussion 
below relating to the Vienna Convention and the sources of law for the Arctic operating 
system.   
5 Supra n. 1, at 43. 
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personality, international agreements, international organizations, jurisdiction, 
and state responsibility apply for any region in which states interact on a 
political and diplomatic level. This includes the Arctic and Antarctic. General 
rules of international law construct the base of the operating system, onto 
which treaty law and customary international law are added. Although the 
United Nations Charter6 will not be discussed in detail here, it is recognized as 
the foundation on which the described conventions have developed.7  
 
An introduction to international customary law will be provided along with a 
brief overview of its application in the polar regions. Common sources of 
polar law include the 1969 Vienna Convention and the LOSC and will be 
discussed in more detail below. These conventions may not entail institutional 
mechanisms or formal structures for all of their normative principles; 
however, these conventions codify the various normative principles in 
operational rules. The member states are responsible for the 
operationalization. Numerous other broad-spectrum international treaties, such 
as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),8 the Convention on Long 
Range Transboundary Air Pollution9 and the Convention on Persistent 
Organic Pollutants10 have far-reaching influence of the polar regions.11 While 
these are important instruments, particularly for the Arctic, given the focus of 
this thesis, their application in this context will not be discussed in detail.  
 
                                                
6 Charter of the United Nations, YUN, 1946-47, p. 831, entered into force 24 October 1945. 
7 Bruno Simma, The United Nations Charter: A Commentary, Oxford University Press 
(2002). 
8 Convention on Biological Diversity, done at Rio de Janeiro, 05 June 1992, 31 ILM 818, 
entered into force 29 December 1993 (CBD). 
9 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, done at Geneva, 13 November 
1979, 18 ILM 1442, entered into force 16 March 1983. 
10 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, done at Stockholm, 22 May 2001, 
40 ILM 532, entered into force 17 May 2004. 
11 Wolfgang E. Burhenne, 'The Arctic: Towards a New Environmental Regime?' (2007) 37(2-
3) Environmental Policy and Law 249, at 253 for discussion on multilateral environmental 
agreements for the Arctic and the development of regional initiatives.  
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1.2 Common sources of polar law 
Vienna Convention 
The Vienna Convention specifies operational rules about treaties and therefore 
also entails parameters of lawmaking. The term treaty is defined in the Vienna 
Convention as ‘an international agreement concluded between states in a 
written form and governed by international law’.12  Thus, a broad array of 
agreements and arrangements, including soft law arrangements can be 
considered treaties and sources of law for the operating systems. General 
principles of international law codified in the Vienna Convention are part of 
the foundation of the operating systems. For example, the Vienna Convention, 
along with Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, tries to deal with cases 
of successive treaties with similar subject matter, outlining the conditions for 
an existing treaty or new treaty to prevail and the conditions of compatibility 
of the provisions for an earlier treaty to remain operative.13 Often treaties that 
seek to succeed earlier ones have provisions inserted into them to resolve 
possible conflict. For example, Article 311 of LOSC clearly provides that 
LOSC shall prevail over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 
April 1958.14 The Vienna Convention also deals with the potential for 
conflicting treaties. However, in the case of conflict, the later treaty shall 
prevail only in the case when the parties make it clear that their relationship 
shall be governed by the later treaty, terminating the application of the earlier 
treaty.15 A treaty will also become void if it is in conflict with a new 
peremptory norm of general international law, in a situation referred to as jus 
                                                
12 Article 2, Vienna Convention. 
13 Ibid., Article 30. 
14 The Geneva Conventions include: Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, opened for signature Geneva 29 April 1958, 559 UNTS 285, 
entered into force 20 March 1966; Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature 
Geneva 29 April 1958, 15 UST 471 TIAS No. 5578, 499 UNTS 311, entered into force 10 June 
1964; Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Geneva 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 
11 and 82, entered into force 30 September 1962; Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Geneva 29 April 1959, 516 UNTS 205 (TSC), entered 
into force 10 September 1964. 
15 Article 59, Vienna Convention. 
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cogens.16 Where a new fundamental norm has been crystallized in a global 
convention or into customary international law this provision could apply.17  
 
The principle of pacta tertiis is an important concept of international law in 
which, according to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty binds the 
parties and only the parties. It does not create obligations for a third party 
without consent.18 Any acceptance by a third party state of being bound to the 
provisions of a treaty must be expressed and written, becoming quasi-
contractual.19 A third state exercising a right granted through a treaty is under 
an obligation to comply with the conditions for its exercise provided for in the 
treaty.20  
 
In some situations third party obligations may be invoked through the doctrine 
of erga omnes, in which certain international legal duties are owed by all 
states. A treaty that provides for an ‘objective regime’ may bind third parties 
to its provisions. Treaties that provide for objective regimes are characterized 
by obligations that limit the applicability of countermeasures against 
internationally wrongful acts.21 These are agreements that define the status of 
a state, a certain territory or an international waterway through a legal regime 
that is intended to be valid and binding erga omnes.22 Objective regimes 
develop norms applicable to others and establishment may or may not be 
limited to cases in which the rules established by a state (or states) apply to 
territory over which they have sovereignty.23 Thus, the status of objective 
regimes in the polar operating systems is not completely definitive and is 
discussed in further detail in subsequent sections. 
                                                
16 Ibid., Article 64. 
17 Donald R. Rothwell, 'The Relationship Between Global and Regional Regimes' in B.W. 
Davis (ed), Overlapping Maritime Regimes: An Initial Reconnaissance, Cooperative Research 
Centre for the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Environment (Antarctic CRC) and Institute of 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies (1995) 27, at 37.  
18 Article 34, Vienna Convention. 
19 Ibid., Article 35. 
20 Ibid., Article 36(2). 
21 Bruno Simma, 'The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing for an Objective Regime' (1986) 
19(2) Cornell International Law Journal 189, at 189, fn 1. 
22 Ibid., at 189. 
23 Discussed in Jonathon I. Charney, 'The Antarctic System and Customary International Law' 
in Francesco Francioni and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), International Law for Antarctica, Kluwer 
Law International (1996) 51, at 62-63 and fn 27-28. 
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Through the development of customary international law, rights as well as 
obligations granted under treaties may be exercised, erga omnes, by third 
party states in the absence of consent to be obligated to a specific treaty. 
Customary law is one of two principles sources of international law (along 
with treaty law).  Therefore, customary international law must be given 
structural status within the polar operating systems. Many of the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention,24 the LOSC,25 and aspects of polar governance are 
considered to have become part of customary international law. For example, 
the establishment of maritime zones and the principle of protection of the 
marine environment have become customary. Customary international law 
captures the normative rules and accepted practice within the international 
system. It is founded on community acceptance and the need for stability and 
predictability.26  While it is beyond the scope of this examination to identify 
all of the issues with respect to the development of customary law, the 
following section will touch on some points of interest.27 
 
Customary international law 
Over time, and consistent with state practice and accepted legal 
interpretations, norms become customary in nature. These norms, as custom, 
do not require further provisions for their interpretation or application and are 
binding on all states. Anything derogating from that norm would be 
unacceptable and constitute a breach in international law.28 Two elements 
                                                
24 Supra n. 17, at 35. 
25 For example, the concepts of the maritime zones and the continental shelf, codified in the 
LOSC are considered rules of customary international law. The concept of ‘common heritage 
of mankind’, established as a peremptory norm in international law codified in the LOSC may 
also be considered customary international law. See Ian Bezpalko, 'The Deep Seabed: 
Customary Law Codified' (2004) 44(Summer) Natural Resources Journal 867-905.  
26 Gillian Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices, LexisNexis 
Butterworths (2006), at 43. 
27 Ibid. For further information refer to the Committee on the Formation of Customary 
(General) International Law, 'Final Report of the Committee: Statement of Principles 
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law' (2000) London 
Conference (Final report) 1-66 and Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: 
International Relations and Customary International Law, Cambridge University Press 
(1999). 
28 See, among others, the ‘working definition’ from ibid., Committee on the Formation of 
Customary (General) International Law, at 8. 
 38 
have been identified as necessary for the development of customary law, 
including an objective element of state practice and a subjective element often 
referred to as opinion juris sive necessitatis (opinio juris).29 The subjective 
elements refer to the consent of states or their belief in the legally permissible 
or obligatory nature of the conduct in question, relying on state practice and, 
often, on statements from the ICJ to imply the two elements.30 The committee 
defines customary law as follows: 
A rule of customary international law is one which is created and 
sustained by the consent and uniform practice of States and other 
subjects of international law…in circumstances which give rise to a 
legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future. If a sufficiently 
extensive and representative number of States participate in such a 
practice in a consistent manner, the resulting rule is…binding on all 
States. Where a rule of general customary international law exists, for 
any particular State to be bound by that rule it is not necessary to 
prove either that a State’s consent to it or its belief in the rule’s 
obligatory or (as the case may be) permissive character.31  
 
The process of customary international law is ongoing – it does not stop when 
a rule has emerged. Conforming practice after the rule has emerged helps to 
strengthen it, while contrary practice can undermine or destroy an existing 
customary rule.32 Existing customary rules are not, however, destroyed 
without the majority of states engaging in contrary practice and the 
withdrawal of opinio juris.33 State practice must be uniform, extensive and 
representative in creating customary law and although normally some time 
will elapse before there is sufficient practice to satisfy these criteria, no 
precise amount of time is required.34 In the North Seas Continental Shelf 
Cases the ICJ observed that the ‘passage of only a short period of time is not 
necessarily…a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international 
                                                
29 Ibid., at 6-7 and supra n. 26, at 47-50. 
30 Supra n. 27, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, at 7. 
31 Ibid., at 8. 
32 Ibid., at 8, fn 21. 
33 Supra n. 26, at 50. 
34 Ibid., at 51-52. 
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law’.35 In contrast, the development of customary law concerning the 
continental shelf required state practice over time, although the time frame 
between the 1945 Truman Declaration,36 which initiated rights over the 
continental shelf for coastal states, and the 1958 Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, which codified the customary principle, was relatively 
short.37 Concrete understanding of when a norm or normative conduct has 
become custom is not always forthright and establishing that, in fact, the 
custom has developed into international customary law may only occur on a 
case by case analysis or inquiry.38 Often, but not always, decisions of the ICJ 
or other tribunals are involved in such inquiry and analysis.  
 
Treaties may contain specific provisions that represent existing customary 
law; however, there is no general presumption that a treaty codifies existing 
customary international law.39 Multilateral treaties can provide a model for the 
formation of new customary rules through state practice and can assist in the 
crystallization of emerging rules of customary international law, but there is 
no presumption that they do.40 In the same manner, resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) may in some instances constitute 
evidence of the existence of a customary rule, help to crystallize emerging 
customary law or contribute to the formation of customary international law; 
however, they do not create new rules of international law.41 
 
If a state persistently and openly dissents from a rule, it will not be bound by 
it. This is known as the ‘persistent objector rule’42 and its application to 
customary international law raises some doubt. Persistent objection may 
                                                
35 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgement of 20 February 1969, International Court of 
Justice Reports 1969, at 3, para 74. 
36 In 1945, President Harry S. Truman of the United States declared that the United States’ 
jurisdiction extended to all natural resources on its continental shelf, creating the basis for 
states to claim a continental shelf.  
37 Supra n. 27, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, at 20.  
38 The Committee comments that the time element may be implicit in the notion of customary 
law. See ibid., at 21. 
39 Ibid., at 45. 
40 Ibid., at 45 and 46. 
41 Ibid., at 59. 
42 Ibid., at 27. For further commentary see Jonathon Charney, 'Universal International Law' 
(1993) 87(4) American Journal of International Law 529, at 538, fn 38 and supra n. 26, at 54-
58.   
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prevent the requisite state practice, necessary in the formation of customary 
law, from being fulfilled particularly if states of sufficient importance or 
political power in an area of activity manifest dissent.43 The difficult question, 
however, is whether an objection by a state can deny the application of a 
customary rule against itself. Some commentators agree that states are able to 
‘opt out’ of a customary rule whereas others doubt the asserted right of a state 
to remain beyond the rule of law is tenable.44 
 
Treaty law 
Treaty law plays a significant role in the exercise of the general duties, 
including responsibilities affiliated with exploitation and conservation of 
resources as well as preservation and protection of the marine environment. In 
response to growing international concern, from 1969 onwards, a significant 
amount of international law relating to marine pollution and protection of the 
marine environment is contained in treaties. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has played a significant role in the development of treaty 
law and international standards related to maritime activities. The Convention 
establishing the IMO was adopted in Geneva in 1948 and the IMO first met in 
1959.45  Two important treaties, the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter (London 
Convention)46 and the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL Convention),47 were adopted and have come 
to represent accepted general international standards concerning marine 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Supra n. 23, at 92 and fn 109. See also supra n. 26, at 57, n. 42, Charney, at 538-542; and n. 
27, Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) Law, at 27. 
45 Convention on the International Maritime Organization, adopted at Geneva 06 March 
1948, 289 UNTS 48, entered into force 17 March 1958. 
46 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter, done at London, 13 November 1972, 11 ILM 1291, entered into force 30 August 1975 
and its related 1996 Protocol to the London Convention, done at London, 08 November 1996, 
36 ILM 1, entered into force 24 March 2006. 
47 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done at London, 02 
November 1973, 12 ILM 1319 and its related Protocol of 1978, done at London, opened for 
signature 01 June 1978, 17 ILM 546, entered into force 02 October 1983 (MARPOL). 
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pollution. Many other multilateral and bilateral treaties have also been 
adopted48 and the continued influence of the IMO cannot be underestimated.  
 
London Convention 
First adopted in 1972, the London Convention drew upon three lists of 
substances and matter and defined dumping permissibility and restrictions 
accordingly. Dumping of substances on the blacklist, which include 
substances such as organohalogens, mercury, cadmium, oils, plastics and 
radioactive material, is prohibited.49 Dumping of substances on the grey list, 
including arsenic, lead, copper, zinc and others, is permitted only if a prior 
special permit has been obtained.50 The third category contains all substances 
not on the first two lists but dumping is still only permitted if a prior general 
permit is obtained.51 Annex III of the Convention sets out factors that national 
authorities take into account when issuing special or general permits. 
 
Since its adoption, global standards and rules regarding dumping at sea have 
been further developed. LOSC now reflects the customary rule to regulate 
dumping at sea. According to Article 210, ‘states shall adopt laws and 
regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution to the marine environment 
by dumping’. States acting through competent international organizations or 
diplomatic conferences shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, 
standards and practices that shall be re-examined from time to time.52 
Dumping shall not occur in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
or on the continental shelf without express prior approval of the coastal 
                                                
48 For example, on a regional level, the Baltic States adopted the Convention on the Protection 
for the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, done at Helsinki, 22 March 1974, 13 ILM 
546, entered into force 03 May 1980. In 1976, states adopted the Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, done at Barcelona, 16 February 1976, 
15 ILM 290, entered into force 12 February 1978. For others examples, refer to infra n. 55, at 
333-337. 
49 Article IV(1), London Convention. 
50 Ibid., Article IV(1). 
51 Ibid., Article IV(1). 
52 Article 210 (4), LOSC. 
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state.53 Any national legislation shall be no less effective than global rules and 
standards.54 
 
Enforcement provisions are rather imprecise in the London Convention, but 
customary international law plays a significant role.55 For example, a coastal 
state can take action against any ship illegally dumping waste in its territorial 
sea and EEZ, or against a ship leaving its ports for the purposes of dumping 
without a permit. Since the 1990s, there have been efforts to phase out 
dumping, moving the London Convention towards a ‘precautionary approach’ 
and ‘holistic approach towards waste management’.56 In 1996, the Parties to 
the London Convention adopted a Protocol re-affirming the precautionary 
approach, banning the dumping of all but five substances,57 prohibiting 
incineration completely, and banning the export of waste to non-parties for 
dumping or incineration. The Protocol currently co-exists with the London 
Convention; however, it is envisioned that when the Protocol enters into force, 
it will supersede the phased out Convention. 
 
MARPOL 73/78 
In 1954, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the 
Sea by Oil was drawn up to deal with the various manners in which oil from 
tankers may enter the sea. The Convention was of limited effectiveness and is 
now superseded by the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships – the MARPOL 73/78 Convention.58 MARPOL 73/78 
was adopted in 1973 under the auspices of the IMO to deal with all forms of 
intentional pollution, other than dumping. MARPOL 73/78 sets detailed 
pollution standards in six Annexes concerned with oil, noxious liquid 
substances, harmful substances carried by sea, sewage, garbage, and air 
                                                
53 Ibid., Article 210(5). 
54 Ibid., Article 210(6). 
55 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester University Press (3rd ed, 
1999), at 364. 
56 Ibid., at 365. 
57 These included dredged materials, sewage sludge, fish-processing wastes, vessels, and 
continental shelf oil and gas installations.  
58 See supra n. 55, at 339. 
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pollution added in 1997. In 1978, a Protocol was adopted to enable states to 
become parties to the MARPOL 73/78 Convention by initially accepting only 
Annex I. Annex I, therefore, entered into force in 1983 and Annex II in 1987. 
Eventually all of the Annexes entered into force.59 Since 1978, all the 
Annexes have been amended and the IMO has adopted numerous resolutions 
providing guidance on the interpretation and application of the convention, its 
annexes and protocol.60  
 
MARPOL 73/78 is the main multilateral convention regulating the pollution 
from ships but there are other conventions such as the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life on the Sea (SOLAS Convention) and the 
IMO’s International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG), which 
complement the MARPOL 73/78 Convention.61 The Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal also has some relevance although not primarily concerned with 
marine transport. For example, Article 4.6 prohibits transporting hazardous 
goods south of 60˚S.Various regional conventions deal with pollution from 
ships in a very general way, simply referring their parties to the general 
multilateral provisions.62 As the Annexes of MARPOL 73/78 Convention 
entered into force, the regulations in regional conventions were replaced with 
a cross reference to the relevant Annex. The exception is Annex IV of the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid 
Protocol), discussed below, which prohibits almost all forms of pollution from 
ships within the Treaty Area.63 
 
The MARPOL 73/78 Convention and London Convention were first 
developed prior to the LOSC in response to concern raised internationally 
                                                
59 Annex III entered into force in 1992, Annex IV in 2003, Annex V in 1988 and Annex VI in 
2005. Summary of the status of the conventions as at 30 November 2008 under the 
International Maritime Organization is available from 
<http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=247> at 29 December 2008.  
60 Supra n. 55, at 339-342. 
61 Ibid., at 342. 
62 Ibid., at 343. 
63 Ibid. 
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over the state of pollution in the oceans. LOSC codifies the general duties of 
states to protect the marine environment, and prevent, reduce and control 
pollution, taking into account previously developed international rules and 
standards. The legislative and enforcement jurisdiction is set out in LOSC for 
flag, coastal and port states. LOSC refers to international standards and 
competent international organizations for further elaboration of the general 
duties, calling on all states to work individually or cooperatively in the 
development and implementation of rules and standards. The ability of states 
to engage in regional coordination for the purposes of protecting the marine 
environment is further outlined in LOSC.64  
 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The LOSC entered into force on 16 November 1994. LOSC represents a 
consolidation of evolving legal principles and state practice over time, 
attempting to bring together, under one framework, obligations and principles 
that have developed over time and through state practice.65 The convention 
contains 320 articles, outlines freedoms of the high seas,66 the maritime zones 
of the territorial sea,67 contiguous zone,68 EEZ,69 continental shelf,70 and 
embodies a comprehensive framework for the oceans.71 Aspects of the 
Convention integral to this discussion on polar regions and offshore 
development include the continental shelf regime in Part VI of LOSC, the 
regime governing the deep seabed area in Part XI (which also includes the 
1994 Implementing Agreement), Part XII concerning protection of the marine 
environment, and Part XIII on marine scientific research (MSR). 
 
                                                
64 Articles 117, 123, 194 and 197, LOSC. 
65 Four official attempts to codify the rules for the law of the sea were made between 1924 
and 1982, including The Hague Conference of 1930 and three United Nations Conferences on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I-III). By 1982, LOSC was opened for signature, consolidating 
the 1958 Geneva Conventions and evolving maritime norms (supra n. 14). A further 
implementing agreement was developed between 1990 and 1994. refer to infra n. 95. 
66 Article 87, LOSC. 
67 Ibid., Article 3. 
68 Ibid., Article 33(2). 
69 Ibid., Article 57. 
70 Ibid., Article 76. 
71 For commentary, refer to Churchill and Lowe (1999), supra n. 55. 
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Part VI – Continental shelf regime 
Part VI of LOSC outlines the regime concerning continental shelf 
delimitations and rights, setting apart area that is under national jurisdiction of 
the coastal state and that which is global commons.72 The outer limit of the 
continental shelf established in accordance to Article 76 represents the 
boundary of the deep seabed. According to Article 76, states party to the 
convention are able to claim a legal continental shelf comprised of ‘the sea-
bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of 
the continental margin’. Where the outer edge is located less than 200 nautical 
miles (NM) from a state’s baseline, the rights associated with a legal 
continental shelf can still proceed to 200 NM,73 the same limit as the EEZ.74 
Rights associated with the legal continental shelf are outlined in Article 77, 
providing coastal states the ability to exercise sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural 
resources. These rights do not depend on occupation, effective or notional or 
on any express proclamation. However, the sovereign rights allocated to the 
continental shelf are also conditional and the terms of the continental shelf 
regime reflect a balance of compromise between states.75 
 
For a coastal state to define its continental shelf in areas where the continental 
margin extends beyond 200 NM, a state must invoke the formulas of Article 
76(4-7). The coastal state must locate the foot of the continental slope and 
measure distance or sedimentation thickness from such point. These 
calculations are submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS or the Commission), in accordance with Article 76(8) and 
                                                
72 This will be discussed further in Chapter 4. 
73 Article 76(1), LOSC. 
74 Ibid., Article 57. 
75 Discussed in, among others, Alex G. Oude Elferink, 'The Outer Continental Shelf in the 
Arctic: The Application of Article 76 of the LOS Convention in a Regional Context' in Alex 
Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime 
Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001) 139, at 145. See also Michael 
W. Lodge, 'International Seabed Authority and Article 82 of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea' (2006) 21(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 323, at 324 
and George Mingay, 'Article 82 of the LOS Convention - Revenue Sharing - The Mining 
Industry's Perspective' (2006) 21(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
335, at 339.  
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Annex II of LOSC. The Commission examines the technical details, makes 
recommendations to the coastal state regarding the submission and on the 
basis of these recommendations the limits of the continental shelf established 
by the coastal state shall be final and binding.76  
 
In the negotiating period prior to the adoption of LOSC developing and land-
locked states were suspicious that the continental shelf regime primarily 
served the interests of developed and broad margin coastal states, possibly 
reducing the amount of international seabed area so much so that it was 
questionable whether such a truncated area would warrant the establishment 
of an international authority to administer it.77 Some states felt coastal states 
were entitled to the full extent of the continental margin but that they should 
share a portion of their natural resources with the international community 
while other states perceived sharing as a potential erosion of their property 
rights.78 Agreement was finally reached during UNCLOS III that coastal 
states should make contributions related to development occurring on the 
extended continental shelf, that beyond 200 NM. In accordance with Article 
82, the benefits derived from exploitation of the extended continental shelf 
area are to be distributed to States Parties to the convention along equitable 
criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing and land-
locked states.79 After 5 years of development, payments must be made to the 
International Seabed Authority (ISBA or Authority) in proportion to resource 
exploitation in this area, after which contributions would be made at one 
percent increasing by another one percent each year until the tenth year of 
production and capping at seven percent.80 The initial grace period was 
thought to allow costs to be recovered. Payments or contributions in kind shall 
be distributed by the Authority. Developing and land-locked states would be 
able to receive contributions for developments beyond 200 NM while coastal 
states maintain sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting 
                                                
76 Article 76(8), LOSC. 
77 Aldo Chircop and Bruce A. Marchand, 'International Royalty and Continental Shelf Limits: 
Emerging Issues for Canadian Offshore' (2003) 26(Fall) Dalhousie Law Journal 273, at 287. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Article 82(4), LOSC. 
80 Supra n. 77, at 290. 
 47 
those resources. The contributions are a state responsibility,81 not the 
responsibility of the enterprise or operator carrying out the development 
although costs may be passed on to the operator through lease or royalty rate 
changes in the sixth year of operation.82 The costs are according to the gross 
value, rather than net, of the total production at the development site. The use 
of lateral wells and remote equipment used to access reservoirs outside 200 
NM from sites within 200 NM does not depreciate the obligation or allow the 
coastal state to escape its obligation to make contributions representative of 
the exploitation of the non-living resource from the continental shelf beyond 
200 NM.83  
 
In the end, the continental shelf regime reflects compromise negotiated 
between states.84 Article 76 provides a definable limit to national jurisdiction 
and a boundary for the seabed considered part of the global commons. A 
framework for regulating activities in the region beyond national jurisdiction, 
which is dedicated to the common heritage of mankind (CHM), is located in 
Part XI of LOSC and its Implementing Agreement, described below. 
 
The continental shelf regime was developed in the interests of providing 
property rights over the resources of the continental shelf; however, a right not 
to exploit living resources must also be consistent with the regime. A narrow 
interpretation of Article 77 would limit the purposes for which states may 
exercise rights over the continental shelf and outer continental shelf to 
exploring and exploiting the resources. However, Mossop remarks that ‘the 
fact that conservation is not listed as a purpose…should not be 
                                                
81 International Law Association (ILA), 'Outer Continental Shelf' (2008) Rio De Janeiro 
Conference 1, Conclusion 1, at 4. 
82 Article 82 is still a dormant provision of the LOSC and several issues will need to be 
resolved concerning its implementation. Unresolved issues are reviewed in the ISBA 
Technical Study No: 4, 'Issues Associated with Implementation of Article 82 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea' (International Seabed Authority, Jamaica, 
Kingston, 2009).  
83 Supra n., 81, Conclusion 3, at 5. 
84 For discussion on the development of Article 82 and its terms of compromise see supra n. 
75 and n. 77. For discussion on the CLCS see Ted L. McDorman, 'The Role of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World' 
(2002) 17(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 301. 
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determinative.’85 Within LOSC there is a general obligation to ‘protect and 
preserve the marine environment’86 across all maritime zones and even if 
states reject that there is an obligation to protect marine biodiversity on the 
outer continental shelf, states may still take actions to ‘conserve and manage 
that biodiversity voluntarily.’87 In support of responsibilities concerning 
voluntary conservation on the part of the coastal Mossop states: 
As a corollary of the exclusive right to exploit the sedentary species on 
the shelf, a coastal state must also have the right to protect those 
resources from actions by other states that would damage them or 
prevent the coastal state from exercising its rights.88  
 
Part XI – Regime of the Area 
Part XI, the regime of the Area, represents more substantial political 
accommodation towards developing states’ interests established by the third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The regime no longer 
depends on coastal state jurisdiction, establishing the Area as the CHM.89 The 
Area is defined as the ‘seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.’90  Activities in the Area shall be carried out 
for the ‘benefit of all mankind as a whole’.91 Resource exploitation is 
specifically regulated through the ISBA, which is the ‘body through which 
States Parties are to organize and control all activities concerned with sea-bed 
minerals beyond national jurisdiction’.92 The ISBA is also responsible for the 
redistribution of economic benefits accrued from mineral resource 
exploitation93 and shall promote and encourage MSR in the Area as well as 
disseminate the results of such research.94  
                                                
85 Joanna Mossop, 'Protecting Marine Biodiversity on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles' (2007) 38(3) Ocean Development & International Law 283, at 290. 
86 Article 192, LOSC. 
87 Supra n. 85, at 289. 
88 Ibid., at 291. 
89 Article 136, LOSC. 
90 Ibid., Article 1(1). 
91 Ibid., Article 140(1). 
92 Supra n. 55, at 240. See Articles 156, 157, LOSC and Section 1(1) of the Annex to the 
Implementing Agreement (infra n. 95). 
93 Article 140(2), LOSC. 
94 Ibid., Article 143(3)(c). 
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Prior to the entry into force of LOSC, negotiation of an Agreement Relating to 
the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (Implementing Agreement)95 was required. Among other criticisms of 
the original provisions, financial burdens to operators and pioneer investors as 
well as provisions regarding transfer of technology were major obstacles to 
acceptance of the original regime by developed states, especially the US.96 
The Implementing Agreement was adopted on 28 July 1994 and entered into 
force 28 July 1996. The provisions of the 1994 Implementing Agreement and 
the LOSC are to be ‘interpreted and applied together as a single instrument’.97 
However, in the event of any inconsistencies, provisions of the Agreement 
will prevail.98  
 
The Implementing Agreement simplified the structure of the Authority, 
adopting an evolutionary approach, remaining small and cost effective at the 
beginning and expanding in structure only when the need arises.99 Provisions 
of the transfer of technology were disabled, promoting transfer on ‘fair and 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions on the open market, or through 
joint-venture arrangements’100 and ‘consistent with effective protection of 
intellectual property rights’101. States Parties are no longer under any 
obligation to fund one mine site of the Enterprise or to finance any of the 
operation of the Enterprise or its joint-ventures.102 Initial mining operations of 
the Enterprise will be through joint ventures, with the Secretariat performing 
                                                
95 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, done at New York, 28 July 1994, 33 ILM 1309, 
entered into force 28 July 1996 (Implementing Agreement). 
96 Supra n. 55, at 229. 
97 Article 2, Implementing Agreement. 
98 Since LOSC does not permit reservations (Articles 309, 310) and the procedures for its 
amendment are open only to state parties (Articles 311-317), the Implementing Agreement, 
by implying that it was concerned to put into effect the provisions of the original regime 
rather than change them, bypassed these obstacles. However, the Implementing Agreement 
does stipulate that several provisions ‘shall not apply’ and ‘modifies the effects of others’. See 
Tullio Scovazzi, 'Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and 
Bioprospecting: Some Considerations on the Role of the International Sea-Bed Authority' 
(2004) 19(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 383, at 388, fn 20 and supra 
n. 55, at 20.   
99 Section 1(3), Annex to the Implementing Agreement. 
100 Ibid., Section 5(1)(a). 
101 Ibid., Section 5(1)(b). See also supra n. 98, at 389. 
102 Ibid., Section 2(3) modifies provisions of Annex IV, Article 11(3), LOSC. 
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the functions of the Enterprise until the Council decides that the Enterprise is 
able to begin to operate independently.103 Thus the ‘parallel system’ is delayed 
by the provisions of the Implementing Agreement.  
 
Several other aspects of the Implementing Agreement demonstrate a market-
based approach, which had become increasingly favoured104 following the 
collapse of the Eastern Bloc countries with centrally-planned economies. The 
sea-bed mining regime was brought in line with World Trade Organization 
(WTO)/General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)105 provisions, and 
no discrimination or preferential access to markets would occur.106 No 
subsidization of sea-bed mining would occur and there would no longer be a 
cap on production; the regulation of production would be left to the market.107 
 
Following the adoption of the Implementing Agreement, LOSC has achieved 
almost universal participation, with the exception, still, of the US.108 The 
present day situation is one of continued uncertainty with regard to the 
economic validity of deep seabed mining although eight pioneer investors are 
currently active in the Area.109      
                                                
103 Supra n. 55, at 244. 
104 See supra n. 98, at 389, fn 23. 
105 GATT consists of the text of the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened 
for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 187, together with a number of instruments and 
decisions of the contracting parties to GATT as maintained in force by the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 
1867 UNTS 3, 33 ILM 1125 (1994) (entered into force 1 January 1995) (Marrakesh 
Agreement). 
106 Section 6(1), Annex to the Implementing Agreement. See supra n. 55, at 250-251. 
107 Ibid., Churchill and Lowe. 
108 Refer to the chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the 
Convention and the related Agreements as at 01 March 2010 available at: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#Agree
ment%20relating%20to%20the%20implementation%20of%20Part%20XI%20of%20the%20
Convention> at 08 December 2008. 
109 There are currently two areas being explored for polymetallic nodules. In the Clarion-
Clipperton Zone in the Equatorial North Pacific Ocean there are seven contractors, including 
China Ocean Mineral Research and Development Association (COMRA), Deep Ocean 
Resources Development Company (DORD) (Japan), Government of Korea, Institut Français 
de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer (IFREMER)/Association Française pour l’étude et 
la recherche des nodules (AFERNOD) (France), Interoceanmetal Joint Organization 
Consortium, State Enterprise Yuzhmorgeologiya (Russian Federation) and Federal Institute 
for Geosciences and Natural Resources (FIGNR) (Germany). In the Central Indian Basin in 
the Indian Ocean the Government of India is the sole contractor. For details refer to the 
website of the International Seabed Authority at: <http://www.isa.org.jm/en/home> at 08 
August 2010. 
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Nevertheless, the regime of the Area ensures that the CHM seabed will be 
exploited for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Benefits will arise from the 
distribution of payments made to the Authority by the commercial operators 
and by the Enterprise itself once it engages in resource development. 
However, the Convention does not stipulate the manner in which these 
financial benefits are to be shared. It states only that sharing should be 
‘equitable’. Similar to Article 82, issues related to payments will have to be 
resolved when the time arrives. For now, the ISBA remains occupied with 
other matters that are more or less related to mining. These include the 
development of the aforementioned regulatory guidelines, but also elements 
such as protection of underwater cultural heritage, protection of the marine 
environment and MSR.110 
 
The Authority has an important role to play in relation to protection of the 
marine environment. According to Article 145, the ISBA shall adopt 
appropriate rules regulation and procedures for, inter alia, the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution to the marine environment, including the 
coastline, and of interference with the ecological balance, with particular 
attention paid to the harmful effects of such activities related to resource 
exploitation.111 As well, regulations shall be adopted for the protection and 
conservation of the natural resources of the Area and the prevention of 
damage to the flora and fauna.112 The regulatory powers of the Authority are 
not limited to the harmful effects of mining, but are ‘enlarged to encompass 
the protection and conservation of every kind of natural resource and all fauna 
and flora which can be found in the Area’.113 In the ‘Mining Code’114, the 
Authority has integrated considerable provisions regarding protection of the 
                                                
110 Supra n. 98, at 391. 
111 This includes, but is not limited to, drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, 
construction and operation or maintenance of installations, pipelines and other devices related 
to such activities. See Article 145(a), LOSC. 
112 Ibid., Article 145(b). 
113 Supra n. 98, at 393. 
114 On 13 July 2000, the Assembly, consisting of all ISBA members, approved Regulations on 
Prospecting and Exploration of Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, referred to as the ‘Mining 
Code’. See ISBA/6/A/18 of 13 July 2000, Decision of the Assembly on the Regulations for 
Exploration and Exploitation for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (2000) 
<http://www.isa.org.jm/en/sessions/2000> at 11 December 2008. 
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marine environment and the ‘precautionary approach’.115 Recommendations 
from the Legal and Technical Commission regarding exploration of 
polymetallic nodules also devote provisions for environmental impact 
assessment.116 Other provisions in LOSC also confirm the competence of the 
ISBA concerning the protection of the marine environment; these 
competences are not exclusive.117  According to Article 209(2), states shall 
‘adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the 
marine environment from activities in the Area undertaken by vessels…flying 
their flag’. According to the convention, such national legislation shall be no 
less effective than ‘international rules, regulations, and procedures established 
in accordance with Part XI’,118 granting preference, not exclusivity, to the 
ISBA in regards to its role in the field of protection of the marine environment 
in the Area.119  
 
Part XII – Protection of the marine environment 
Following the development of international treaty law, including MARPOL 
73/78 and the London Convention, LOSC did not need to provide for detailed 
standards or elaborate technical matters. Rather, LOSC provided for the first 
time the codification of a general duty to protect and preserve the marine 
environment from all sources.120 Article 193 reinforces that states have 
sovereign rights to exploit natural resources ‘pursuant to their environmental 
policies in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine 
environment’. States shall take measures individually or jointly where 
appropriate to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment using the ‘best practicable means at their disposal’121 Part XII of 
                                                
115 See supra n. 98, at 393-394 for further discussion. 
116 Based on two lists of activities, those activities which have no potential for causing serious 
harm to the environment do not require an EIA while those which do have potential to cause 
serious harm do require an EIA. See ISBA/7/LTC/1/Rev.1** of 13 February 2002, 
Recommendations for the Guidance of the Contractors for the Assessment of the Possible 
Environmental Impacts Arising from the Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area 
(2002) <http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/7Sess/LTC/isba_7ltc_1Rev1.pdf> at 20 
December 2008, at paragraphs 9-10. 
117 See Article 165(2)(c) and Article 17(1)(b)(xii) of Annex III, LOSC. 
118 Ibid., Article 209(2). 
119 Supra n. 98, at 394. 
120 Article 192, LOSC. 
121 Ibid., Article 194(1). 
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LOSC proceeds to set down further general principles (Articles 192-196) and 
concentrates on defining jurisdictional rights and obligations of flag, coastal 
and port states, global and regional cooperation (Articles 197-201), technical 
assistance (Articles 202-203), monitoring and environmental assessment 
(Articles 204-206), international rules and national legislation (Articles 207-
212), enforcement (Articles 213-222) and responsibility and liability (Articles 
223-233, and 235).122  
   
Under LOSC, States Parties are obliged to create legislation for the purposes 
of managing and conserving the natural resources of their EEZ123 and have 
jurisdiction with regard to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.124 A coastal state is permitted to enforce its pollution legislation 
in its territorial sea over foreign ships, with the ability to arrest and institute 
legal proceedings. However, the regulations must not apply to the design, 
construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless giving effect to 
generally accepted international standards, must be non-discriminatory and 
must not hamper the innocent passage of foreign vessels.125  
 
A coastal state may adopt pollution legislation for its EEZ, applicable to 
foreign vessels, which gives effect and conforms to ‘generally accepted 
international rules and standards’.126 The coastal state may adopt regulations 
implementing international rules or practices that the IMO has made 
applicable to special areas, such as the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) 
or the nomination of an area as a Special Area under MARPOL 73/78.127 For 
example, the Antarctic (south of 60˚S) has been listed as a Special Area under 
                                                
122 Supra n. 55, at 338. Article 234 deals with ice-covered area and is discussed below. 
123 Article 56 (1)(a), LOSC. 
124 Ibid., Article 56 (1)(b)(ii-iii). 
125 Ibid., Articles 21(2), 24, 211(4). 
126 Ibid., Article 211(5). 
127 See IMO Assembly Resolution A.927(22) of 29 November 2001, Annex 2: Guidelines for 
the Designation of Special Areas under MARPOL 73/78 and Guidelines for the Identification 
and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas. Also Annex, I, II, and V, MARPOL 
73/78. A “Special Area” is defined as ‘a sea area where for recognized technical reasons in 
relation to its oceanographical and ecological condition and the particular character of its 
traffic the adoption of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea pollution is 
required’. 
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Annex I, II and V of MARPOL 73/78 since 17 March 1992.128 The coastal 
state may also adopt additional regulations provided these do not impose on 
the design, construction, manning or equipment standards of foreign vessels. 
Article 234 provides that for ice-covered areas lying within the limits of the 
EEZ, the coastal state may adopt non-discriminatory pollution regulations.129 
There is no requirement that design, construction, manning or equipment 
standards must conform only to generally accepted international rules 
although due regard for navigation must be observed.  
 
The coastal state has no general right to arrest foreign vessels in its EEZ for 
breach of anti-pollution regulations unless the alleged violation has resulted 
‘in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the 
coastline or related interests of the coastal state, or to any resources of its 
territorial sea or exclusive economic zone’.130 Where a ‘substantial discharge’ 
occurs, not necessarily causing major damage, the coastal state may only 
undertake a vessel inspection. The distinction between a ‘substantial 
discharge’ and a ‘discharge causing damage’ may not be clear-cut in 
practice.131 Where a coastal state has prescribed anti-pollution regulations for 
ice-covered areas under Article 234, it may enforce such regulations without 
limitations or qualifications attached to the enforcement competence. 
 
                                                
128 The Antarctic was adopted as a Special Area for Annex I (oil) and V (garbage) on 16 
November 1990 and for Annex II (noxious liquid substances) on 30 October 1992. These 
listings entered into force on 17 March 1992. See Special Areas under MARPOL at 
<http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=760 > at 10 August 2010. For 
discussion, Donald R. Rothwell, 'Global Environmental Protection Instruments and the Polar 
Marine Environment' in Davor Vidas (ed), Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law 
and Policy for Pollution Prevention, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge University Press 
(2000) 57, at 62. 
129 Article 234 reads:  
Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels 
in ice-covered areas within the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe 
climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year 
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine 
environment could cause major harm or irreversible disturbance of the ecological 
balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available 
scientific evidence.  
130 Article 220(3-8), LOSC. 
131 Supra n. 55, at 349. 
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Port states may adopt anti-pollution legislation for foreign vessels in its ports. 
A port state may exercise enforcement jurisdiction against a foreign vessel 
that has violated the port state’s anti-pollution legislation either in one of its 
ports or in its territorial sea. The port state may not take any action before the 
ship enters its territorial sea. However, port states may arrest in one of its 
ports, and prosecute, a vessel which is alleged to have violated that state’s 
pollution legislation or applicable international rules in its territorial sea or 
EEZ. As well, Article 218 provides that port states may institute legal 
proceedings against a vessel in one of its ports that allegedly discharged 
polluting matter outside that state’s territorial sea or EEZ ‘in violation of 
applicable international rules and standards’.132 This innovative port state 
enforcement ability is subject to a number of safeguards, including, inter alia, 
that arrests may be made only by government officials, and must not endanger 
navigation, or the marine environment.133 However, Churchill and Lowe point 
out that ‘curiously, and possibly as a result of an oversight in drafting, not all 
of these safeguards apply to enforcement action taken by a coastal State in 
ice-covered areas’.134  
 
The flag state is obligated to adopt pollution regulations, prescribing 
legislation for their vessels wherever they may be that ‘at least have the same 
effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards 
established through the competent international organization or general 
diplomatic conference’.135 A flag state is obligated to enforce violations of its 
pollution legislation and may arrest its vessel on the high sea, in its EEZs, 
territorial seas or at port. Where the vessel is in the EEZ, territorial sea or port 
of another state, it may not arrest the vessel but may institute legal 
proceedings against it. The provisions in LOSC related to the prescription and 
enforcement of pollution standards do not apply to warships or other state-
owned ships used on government, non-commercial services. However, each 
state shall ensure that, by adopting appropriate measures, such vessels act in a 
                                                
132 Article 218, LOSC. 
133 Ibid., Articles 223-232. 
134 Supra n. 55, at 350. 
135 Article 211(2), LOSC. 
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manner consistent, ‘so far as reasonable and practicable’, with the 
Convention.136 
 
For pollution measures established by the competent international 
organization, there is no definition of ‘generally accepted international rules’. 
Presumably generally acceptable rules account for those in the MARPOL 
Convention and at least the first two of its six Annexes that have been widely 
ratified.137 The competent international organization is the IMO but there are 
no further guidelines to as to whether ‘standards’ apply to only those 
provisions found in conventions or include non-binding provisions such as the 
IMO Assembly resolutions.138 Some non-binding provisions of IMO, such as 
the designation of an area as a PSSA, must be partnered with binding IMO 
measures, in this case, Associated Protective Measures (APMs).139 Measures 
that are accepted by the IMO are de facto in conformity with LOSC as LOSC 
defers to IMO on navigational rules, regulations and standards. However, 
proposed or existing APMs and the application for a PSSA must consider the 
impact on navigation – any measure that violated the principle of freedom of 
navigation is not acceptable. Consideration must also be given as to whether 
measures might result in increased potential for significant adverse effects by 
international shipping activities on the environment outside the proposed 
PSSA.140 
 
                                                
136 Ibid., Article 236. 
137 Supra n. 55, at 346. 
138 Ibid., at 347. 
139 The PSSA designation serves only as a qualification and basis on which protective 
measures through the IMO can be taken in accordance with Article 211(6)(a) which states 
‘…where international rules and standards…are inadequate to meet special circumstances’, 
special mandatory measures may be adopted for a ‘particular, clearly defined area of their 
respective exclusive economic zone’ provided that the adoption of measures is ‘required for 
technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological conditions… and the 
particular character of its traffic’. Proposed APMs must accompany the nomination for a 
PSSA. For an overview of the PSSA process see Julian Roberts et al, 'The Western European 
PSSA Proposal: A "Politically Sensitive Sea Area"' (2005) 29(5) Marine Policy 431, at 432-
434. 
140 The designation and associated measures are restricted to within the EEZ of the coastal 
states and can be established for areas where there is existing or a real prospect of a problem 
arising because of vulnerability to damage by international shipping and recognized 
significance ecologically, socio-economically or for scientific/educational reasons. See supra 
n. 127, IMO Assembly Resolution A.927(22), para 8.2. 
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In general, LOSC provisions should provide for more effective enforcement 
of international pollution standards. Where flag state enforcement is lax, the 
opportunity exists for port and coastal states to step up. The recent shift in 
international pollution conventions away from discharge standards to 
construction standards (which have to be certified) will facilitate port state 
jurisdiction. This shift is particularly evident in the MARPOL Convention. 
The existence of port state jurisdiction may persuade flag states to take a more 
effective line in the future. However, universal implementation of these 
provisions is difficult to achieve.141   
 
Part XIII – Marine scientific research 
The marine scientific research (MSR) regime of LOSC (Part XIII) promotes 
the understanding the world’s oceans.142 The regime evolved from provisions 
of the 1958 Geneva Conventions; however, its interpretation is still evolving. 
All states have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the 
rights and duties of other states as provided for in the LOSC.143 Freedom of 
MSR is guaranteed in Article 87 relating to activities on the high seas; 
however, MSR must be conducted in conformity with Part XIII. Coastal states 
have the right to ‘regulate, authorize and conduct’ MSR within the territorial 
sea,144 EEZ and on their continental shelf.145 With respect to research in the 
EEZ and continental shelf, the LOSC attempts to distinguish between pure 
and applied research, although neither of these precise terms are used in the 
Convention.146 ‘Applied’ research is that which is of direct significance for 
                                                
141 Supra n. 55, at 351. There is significant literature on the marine environment and anti-
pollution issues, measures, legislation and enforcement. See among others Harry N. Scheiber 
and David D. Caron, Bringing New Law to Ocean Waters, Publications on Ocean 
Development, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2004); Davor Vidas, Protecting the Polar Marine 
Environment: Law and Policy for Pollution Prevention, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge 
University Press (2000); David Freestone, Richard Barnes and David M. Ong, The Law of the 
Sea: Progress and Prospects, Oxford University Press (2006). 
142 See discussion in ibid., n. 55, Churchill and Lowe, at 400-412, on the development of the 
MSR regime. For information on marine scientific research of the deep seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction refer to Lyle Glowka, ‘Putting Marine Scientific Research on a 
Sustainable Footing at Hydrothermal Vents’ (2003) 27(4) Marine Policy 303-312. 
143 Article 238, LOSC. 
144 Ibid., Article 245. 
145 Ibid., Article 246(1). 
146 See discussion in supra n. 55, at 405-411. 
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the exploration and exploitation of natural resources.147 Research that involves 
drilling into the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of 
harmful substances into the marine environment, along with research that 
involves the construction, operation or use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures are also considered applied research.148 Research that is carried 
out ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes and in order to increase scientific 
knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of mankind’ is 
considered ‘pure’ research. Consent to conduct MSR should not be 
unreasonably delayed or denied for pure research.149  
 
Beyond 200 NM, research conducted on the continental shelf also requires 
prior consent of the coastal states,150 whereas research on the water column in 
this ocean space is a freedom of the high seas. It is not clear whether coastal 
state consent is required for research conducted in the superjacent water to the 
seabed (beyond 200 NM) or for research directed at the seabed, but not 
necessarily occurring on the seabed, requires consent.151 According to Article 
246(6) a coastal state may not withhold consent for research of direct 
significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, whether 
living or non-living (applied research), to be undertaken on its extended 
continental shelf (beyond 200 NM) outside specific areas designated by the 
coastal states as ‘areas in which exploitation or detailed exploratory 
operations…are occurring or will occur within a reasonable period of time.’ 
Within those designated areas, the problem of the interpretation of ‘on’ could 
become more acute.152  
 
Beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, all states also have the right to 
conduct MSR in the water column153 and seabed, in conformity with the 
LOSC.154 According to Article 256, conduct of MSR in the Area shall occur 
                                                
147 Article 246(5)(a), LOSC. 
148 Ibid., Article 246(5)(b)(c). 
149 Ibid., Article 246(3). 
150 Ibid., Article 246(2). 
151 Supra n. 55, at 407. 
152 Ibid. 
153 As a freedom of the high seas, Article 87(f), subject to Part VI and XIII, LOSC. 
154 Ibid., Article 257. 
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‘in conformity with the provisions of Part XI’.155 According to Part XI, MSR 
in the Area shall be carried out ‘exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole’,156 in accordance with Part XIII. This 
provision implies MSR is not limited to only minerals.157 However, by 
deferring to Part XI, which relates specifically to mineral resources of the 
seabed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction,158 a more narrow 
interpretation could limit research to minerals, excluding living resources of 
the Area from the MSR regime.159 Oude Elferink suggests that it is ‘clear that 
the freedom of scientific research that is guaranteed by Article 87 is only 
applicable to the water column’.160 Alternatively, the interpretation can be 
applied more broadly to encompass the Area, including its seabed and 
superjacent waters, in general. Scovazzi remarks that the LOSC is ‘rather 
ambiguous’ and that if there were a conflict it would be difficult to determine 
which Part (XI or XIII) prevailed.161 
 
The approach taken by the ISBA promotes MSR in the water column, 
superjacent waters and seabed in order to promote protection of fragile 
ecosystems, such as, for example, those located around black smokers.162 
Article 143(3) requires states to ‘promote international cooperation’ in MSR 
in the Area by ‘effectively disseminating the results…through the 
[International Seabed] Authority or other international channels when 
appropriate’. Thus the legal condition of the Area, as CHM, grants the ISBA 
broad competences that are ‘cooperative, and not exclusive [in] character’.163 
The Report of the Secretary-General of the ISBA in 2003 remarked that the 
Authority will benefit from ‘close collaboration with those who are already 
                                                
155 Ibid., Articles 256. 
156 Ibid., Article 143(1). 
157 Supra n. 98, at 397. 
158 Article 133, LOSC. 
159 Alex G. Oude Elferink, 'The Regime of the Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of 
the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of the High Seas' (2007) 22(1) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 143, at 154. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Supra n. 98, at 397, fn 46.  
162 Black smokers are hydrothermal vents found on the ocean floor where water from below 
the earth’s crust comes into contact with the cold ocean water at these vents. Minerals within 
the water precipitate, forming black chimney-like structures around each vent. Black smokers 
support a variety of unique organisms and are fragile, poorly understood ecosystems.  
163 Supra n. 98, at 389. 
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conducting scientific research on hydrothermal vents’.164 Moreover, the 
Authority ‘has the potential to provide a clearing house for exchange of 
information’.  
 
Scientific research conducted in the Area is expensive, technically demanding 
and limited in scope thus far. No single state has the capacity to undertake a 
global programme required for understanding this ocean space and the ISBA 
provides a platform for international collaboration. In 2006, an Endowment 
Fund was created through the ISBA165 to promote and encourage MSR in the 
Area for the benefit of mankind as a whole; in particular supporting and 
providing opportunities for the participation by scientists and personnel from 
developing countries in scientific and training programmes. As at 2008, 
several institutions have indicated interest in cooperating with the Authority in 
relation to the Fund.166 Further progress has been described in the annual 
ISBA Secretary-General reports.167 It appears that although a significant 
amount of basic and applied research has been done (or is still in progress), 
‘the current level of knowledge and understanding of deep sea ecology is not 
yet sufficient to allow conclusive risk assessment of the effects of large scale 
commercial seabed mining, as opposed to exploration’.168  
 
While MSR is not clearly defined, LOSC does try to differentiate between 
‘applied’ and ‘pure’ scientific research carried out within national jurisdiction. 
There are, however, no precise guidelines to distinguish between ‘research,’ 
                                                
164 ISBA/9/A/3 of 04 June 2003, Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed 
Authority Under Article 166, Paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (2003) <http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/9Sess/Assembly/isba9A_3.pdf> at 
19 December 2008, para 63. 
165 ISBA/12/A/11 of 16 August 2006, Resolution Establishing an Endowment Fund for 
Marine Scientific Research in the Area (2006) 
<http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/12Session/Assembly/ISBA12-A11.pdf> at 19 
December 2008. 
166 These include the National Oceanography Centre (UK), National Institute of Ocean 
Technology (India), French Research Institute for the Exploitation of the Sea, Federal 
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (Germany), Natural History Museum (UK) 
and InterRidge (hosted by the National Oceanography Centre, UK).  
167 See for example ISBA/14/A/2 of 14 April 2008, Report of the Secretary-General of the 
International Seabed Authority Under Article 166, Paragraph 4 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (2008) 
<http://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN/14Sess/Ass/ISBA-14A-2.pdf> at 19 December 
2008, paras 33-38. 
168 Ibid., at para 70. 
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‘prospecting’, or ‘exploring’ carried out beyond national jurisdiction.169 
Where research moves to the stages of prospecting or exploring in the Area, 
research is no longer as unrestricted and must occur in conformity with Annex 
III of LOSC.170 Within the ‘Mining Code’ established for the Area, specific 
research on mineral resources for the potential development of an exploration 
site is defined as prospecting.171 However, prospecting under this regime 
applies to non-living mineral resources, and specifically with relation to 
polymetallic nodules.172 No further clarification exists in the LOSC 
framework itself and pressure to clarify the MSR regime has emerged in 
relation to prospecting for methane hydrates and cobalt rich sulphides, as well 
as genetic material through bioprospecting.173 
 
                                                
169 Supra n. 55, at 404. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Regulation 1(3)(e) of the ‘Mining Code’, developed by the ISBA, defines prospecting as, 
‘the search for deposits of polymetallic nodules in the Area, including estimation of 
composition, sizes and distributions of polymetallic nodule deposits and their economic 
values, without any exclusive rights.’ (Regulation 1(3)(e)). This is a very specific preliminary 
phase towards exploration and production of polymetallic nodule resources and the definition 
cannot be easily applied to genetic resources. See discussion on biological prospecting 
(bioprospecting) and scientific research in supra n. 98, at 401-404. 
172 It does not, for example, encompass genetic resources, or microscopic organisms, which 
are the target of bioprospecting for the application in biotechnologies and pharmaceuticals. 
Small extraction techniques can produce significant commercial gains, which are often kept 
confidential until commercialization is secured. Marine scientific research and the concept of 
the benefit of mankind and equitable sharing is explored in Yoshifuma Tanaka, ‘Reflections 
on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed Beyond 
the Limits of National Jurisdiction’ (2008) 39(2) Ocean Development and International Law 
129, at 131 and 138.   
173 Applied, or commercial, MSR carried out on the continental shelf and throughout the EEZ 
of a coastal state is more readily regulated through the provisions of the CBD, supra n. 8. In 
contrast, the lack of specific regulation beyond coastal state jurisdiction invites a wide range 
of interpretation. See for example, United Nations Informal Consultative Process on Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea, An Update on Marine Genetic Resources: Scientific Research, 
Commercial Uses and a Database of Marine Bioprospecting (Eighth Meeting, New York, 25-
29 June 2007) . Divergent views exist regarding whether marine genetic resources were part 
of the CHM and fell under the regime for the Area, similar to mineral resources, or whether 
these resources were part of the regime for the high seas. See, among others, the discussion in 
Dagmar Lohan and Sam Johnston, 'Bioprospecting in Antarctica' (United Nations University 
Institute of Advanced Studies, 2005), at 25; S. Arico and C. Salpin, 'Bioprospecting of 
Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed: Scientific, Legal and Policy Aspects' (United Nations 
University Institute of Advanced Studies, 2005), at 31-33; and more recently, UNGA/A/63/79 
of 16 May 2008, Letter Dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-
ended Informal Working Group of the Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and 
Sustainable use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction 
Addressed to the President of the General Assembly (2008) 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/344/16/PDF/N0834416.pdf?OpenElement
> at 12 December 2008, at paras 32-49. 
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Regional coordination under LOSC 
Article 194 of Part XII relates to vulnerable seas, stating that measures ‘shall 
include those necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as 
well as habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms 
of marine life.’ Accordingly, a duty not to pollute the oceans, including the 
Southern and Arctic oceans, may be derived, and given legal strength, from 
this provision.174 Article 197 provides that ‘states shall cooperate on a global 
basis and, as appropriate, regional basis…for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional 
features.’ Thus, cooperation on a regional basis takes into account the 
geographical realities of the area but also the decision to deal specifically with 
maritime activities in a particular ocean space.175 
 
Alongside regional cooperation provisions of Part XII, the concept of regional 
cooperation exists elsewhere in the LOSC framework. Part IX describes 
obligations and rights pertaining to enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, providing 
for the ability of states to adopt special rules in relation to marine living 
resources, marine scientific research and the protection of the marine 
environment.176 Article 123 states that bordering states of an enclosed, or 
semi-enclosed sea, should cooperate with each other requiring that states shall 
endeavour directly, or through an appropriate regional organization to 
coordinate their activities.177 Although restricted to management of marine 
living resources, MSR and protection of the marine environment, there is still 
wide scope for coordination. The nature of the article does not impose strict 
legal obligation to coordinate but rather the legal obligation to try to 
coordinate (‘shall endeavour’). Any systematic rejection of negotiations on the 
protection of the marine environment, for example, could represent a 
                                                
174 Budislav Vukas, 'United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Polar Marine 
Environment' in Davor Vidas (ed), Protecting the Polar Marine Environment: Law and 
Policy for Pollution Prevention, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge University Press (2000) 
34, at 42 and fn 16. Christopher C. Joyner, 'The Antarctic Treaty System and the Law of the 
Sea - Competing Regimes in the Southern Ocean' (1995) 10(2) International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 301, at 314-315. 
175 Ibid., Vukas, at 44. 
176 Article 123, LOSC. 
177 Ibid.  
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contravention to the Convention.178 Once cooperation is established, states 
must provide bona fide cooperation including inter alia accurate information, 
permitting access to resources and engaging in the cooperation.179 
 
In summary, there are numerous provisions of the LOSC that apply to the 
Arctic and Antarctic regions. With respect to the Arctic Ocean, each of the 
five Arctic states is in its own right a coastal state, with complementary rights 
and obligations. As of 2010, Canada, Denmark, Norway and the Russian 
Federation have all ratified the LOSC while the US has not. With respect to 
the Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties, 25 of 28 Consultative Parties and 14 
of 19 non-Consultative Parties have either ratified, acceded or succeded to the 
LOSC. Of the Consultative Parties, the US, Peru and Ecuador have not.180 The 
LOSC reflects and articulates many customary rules applicable to the 
maritime area. These include the 12 NM Territorial Sea, the 200 NM EEZ, 
coastal sovereign rights over resources of the EEZ and continental shelf and 
the juridical concept of the continental shelf as a natural prolongation of land 
territory.181 Therefore, states that have yet to ratify/accede to the LOSC are 
still bound to many of its provisions through customary international law. 
Customary law also imposes an obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment. Sovereign rights to resources are thus subject to this duty.182 In 
light of the substantive discussion on many of the issues, the number of 
ratifications,183 and the state practice that has come to unfold around many 
issues, many of the provisions of the convention represent and articulate 
customary rules applicable to maritime areas.184 However, the invocation of 
the rule of general customary international law is not carte blanc. Debate and 
uncertainty persists on numerous issues, including the application of 
                                                
178 Supra n. 174, Vukas, at 42. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Supra n. 108. 
181 See supra n. 26, at 268-342 and Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, Oxford 
University Press (6th ed, 2007), at 208-235. 
182 Ibid., Triggs, at 233. 
183 As of 01 March 2010, 160 states had ratified, acceded or succeded to the Convention and 
related Agreements. See supra n. 108. 
184 For general discussion, see supra n. 26, at 268-342 and n. 181, Dixon, at 208-235. For 
more specific discussions in relation to the outer continental shelf regime, see, among others, 
Ted L. McDorman, 'The Entry into Force of the 1982 LOS Convention and the Article 76 
Outer Continental Shelf Regime' (1995) 10(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law 165, at 167 and fn 8-9 and supra n. 75, Oude Elferink, at 142-143 and fn 19-20. 
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international customary law to the continental shelf regime and the effect the 
CHM regime has on customary law.185  
 
1.3 Arctic operating system 
At present, Arctic governance is a mixture of sovereign state initiatives and 
cooperative efforts, rather than a single, comprehensive and integrated regime. 
Initiatives range through non-binding, soft law measures to binding, hard law 
instruments. Each of the Arctic states (Figure 1, Introduction) enacts its own 
legislation in accordance with international law, regional initiatives and 
national interests. Thus, the laws that govern the Arctic can vary across 
territorial borders.186 Nevertheless, transnational cooperation does exist within 
the mosaic of issue-specific arrangements.187 Development of pan-Arctic 
governance has been described as a dynamic process of downstream domestic 
legislation and upstream relevant global instruments creating a network of 
bilateral, sub-regional and regional arrangements.188 The most prominent 
upstream region-specific initiative discussed in this thesis is the Arctic 
Council, which developed subsequent to the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS).189  
 
                                                
185 While the concept of the continental shelf as a natural prolongation of land territory was 
given customary recognition from 1969 ICJ judgment on the North Seas Continental Shelf 
Cases, some authors distinguish this custom from the process through which to define the 
outer limits and consider the technical details and process of Article 76 to not have the ability 
to become customary. See for instance, ibid., McDorman, at 167, and fn 9; supra n. 84, 
McDorman, at 303 and fn 9; B. Kwiatkowska, 'Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Miles in 
Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice' (1991) 22(2) Ocean 
Development & International Law 153, at 157; and D.N. Hutchinson, 'The Seaward Limit to 
the Continental Shelf in Customary International Law' (1985) 56 British Yearbook of 
International Law 133, at 184-188. See also supra n. 181, Dixon, at 220 and 227. 
186 Melissa A. Verhaag, 'It Is Not Too Late: The Need for a Comprehensive International 
Treaty to Protect the Arctic Environment' (2003) 15(3) Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 555, at 556. 
187 Oran R. Young, 'Governing the Arctic: From Cold War Theater to Mosiac of Cooperation' 
(2005) 11 Global Governance 9, at 10. See also Timo Koivurova and Erik J. Molenaar, 
'International Governance and Regulation of the Marine Arctic: Overview and Gap Analysis' 
(WWF International Arctic Programme, 2009) which provides an overview of instruments 
and institutions related to the Arctic 
188 Wolfgang E. Burhenne, 'The Arctic: Towards a New Environmental Regime?' (2007) 
37(2-3) Environmental Policy and Law 249. 
189 Supra n. 187, Young, at 10. 
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Sources of law 
The sources of law and law making of the Arctic operating system are 
founded on general principles of international law, customary international 
law, and treaty law. The most significant global, multilateral treaty for the 
Arctic and the Arctic Ocean is the 1982 LOSC, described previously.190 
Implementation of regulatory measures related to the Arctic by states is 
through national legislation in accordance with international law, including 
customary international law and as reflected in LOSC.191  
 
Soft law arrangements are prominent features of the Arctic operating system 
and include the AEPS,192 Arctic Council,193 Northern Forum,194 and Barents 
Euro-Arctic Regional Council (BEAC/BEAR).195 As mentioned, the most 
prominent Arctic-specific initiatives include the AEPS and Arctic Council. 
Within the operating system these provide sources of law and law-making 
through the influence they have on state practice. Soft law arrangements do 
not impose legal obligations; however, they may fall within the definition of a 
treaty, providing another avenue of influence.196 Nonetheless, the lack of 
intent for the initiatives to be treaties of international law signifies that the 
initiatives do not carry the same legal fortitude as treaties which are intended 
to be treaties.197  
 
                                                
190 Supra n. 3. 
191 See, for example, Section 1 of the AEPS which describes this obligation.  
192 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) adopted 14 January 1991, 30 ILM 1624. 
193 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), 19 
September 1996, 35 ILM 1382-1390. 
194 Tromsø Declaration of the First General Assembly of the Northern Forum, done at 
Tromsø, Norway, 03 October 1993. 
195 Kirkenes Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, done at the 
Conference of Foreign Ministers in Kirkenes, 11 January 1993. At the same time as the 
BEAC was created, the Regional Council for the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) was 
created as a separate inter-regional Barents cooperation forum under the same objectives as 
the BEAC. For information see the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and Barents Regional 
Council at <http://www.beac.st/in_English/Barents_Euro-Arctic_Council.iw3> at 20 August 
2009.  
196 See above discussion concerning treaties and the Vienna Convention. 
197 See discussion in Donald R. Rothwell, The Polar Regions and Development of 
International Law, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge (1996), at 240. 
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There are also region-specific multilateral treaties, which are both products of 
the operating system and provide sources for further law-making within the 
operating system. For example, the 1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago 
of Spitsbergen198 awarded sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago to 
Norway, allowed other states maintain equal rights to Svalbard resource 
exploitation199 and kept the islands demilitarized.200 Another example is the 
1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears.201 Signed by all five of 
the Arctic Coastal states with polar bears, the agreement recognized the role 
of habitat protection by advocating actions be taken not only within the 
sovereign territory of the parties but also in the international waters, requiring 
joint efforts by neighboring states to protect polar bears.202 While the region-
specific multilateral treaties relate to some aspect of the Arctic, they do not 
come together in one regime, such as that of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Nonetheless, these treaties provide normative foundations, exemplify 
cooperative efforts and provide further sources of law making within the 
Arctic operating system.203  
 
                                                
198 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, signed 09 February 1920, Paris, 41 
UNTS 2, 2 LNTS 7, entered into force 14 August 1925 (Spitsbergen Treaty). Original 
signatories include Denmark, France, Great Britain (including the overseas dominions of 
Australia, Canada, India, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa), Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United States. There are now over 40 signatory states including 
Russia, Iceland, and Finland. 
199 Ibid., Article 3. 
200 Ibid., Article 9. 
201 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done at Oslo, 15 November 1973, 13 ILM 
13, entered into force 30 September 1976. Signatories are Canada, Denmark, Norway, former 
Soviet Union and the US. 
202 Supra n. 186, at 566. Another example is the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR), done at Paris, 22 September 1992, 32 ILM 
1069, entered into force 25 March 1998.  
203 There are also numerous bilateral treaties not discussed in this context. Some examples 
include the Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Denmark Relating to Marine Environment, done at Copenhagen, 26 August 1983, 
1348 UNTS 121, entered into force 24 August 1983; Agreement between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Arctic Cooperation and 
Exchange of Notes Concerning Transit of Northwest Passage, 11 January 1988, Ottawa 
[1989] 28 ILM 142, 144, entered into force 11 January 1988 and Agreement between the 
Governments of the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation on Cooperation in 
Environmental Matters, Oslo, 03 September 1992. In force same day; Overenskomster med 
fremmede makter (Oslo, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1992), pp. 1532-1535. 
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Numerous broad spectrum international treaties, while not specific to the 
Arctic, have far-reaching influence on the Arctic204 and contribute to the 
operating system. These include, inter alia, the United Nations Convention on 
Biological Diversity,205 the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution206 and the Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.207 In light 
of the absence of an overarching Arctic-specific treaty to consolidate regional 
efforts in a binding platform, these instruments and their institutions provide 
different platforms for raising the prominence of issues that impact on the 
Arctic, as well as a means of establishing a level of transnational compliance. 
For example, as Stokke comments: 
[t]he authority of coastal States, as confirmed in LOSC to regulate the 
exploitation of shelf resources, means that there is little to constrain 
regional States from agreeing on more stringent environmental 
standards for hydrocarbon exploration and production than those laid 
down globally, should they wish to do so.208 
 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was signed by 
all eight Arctic States in 1991, created a platform for Arctic-specific 
environmental issues.209 Pursuant to soft-law principles, its adoption did not 
impose legally binding obligations.210 The governments of the Arctic states 
committed themselves to international cooperation along a number of 
                                                
204 Supra n. 11, at 253 for discussion on multilateral environmental agreements for the Arctic 
and the development of regional initiatives.  
205 Supra n. 8, CBD. 
206 Supra n. 9, Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution. 
207 Supra n. 10, Stockholm Convention. 
208 Olav Schram Stokke, 'A Legal Regime for the Arctic? Interplay with the Law of the Sea 
Convention' (2007) 31(4) Marine Policy 402, at 405. 
209 For a history of the development of Arctic regional cooperation and the AEPS initiative 
see supra n. 197, at 231-242 and more recently, Timo Koivurova and David VanderZwaag, 
'The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects' (2007) 40(1) University of British 
Columbia Law Review 121-194. 
210 David VanderZwaag, Rob Huebert and Stacy Ferrara, 'The Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy' in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell (eds), The Law of the 
Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001) 225, 
at 236. Because the Arctic Council has further formalized the AEPS, decision-making 
authority, participation and meetings are discussed in relation to the Arctic Council. See 
discussion around n. 222, 233 and 271.   
 68 
objectives geared towards protecting the Arctic ecosystem, the achievement of 
which is carried through national legislation and in accordance with 
international and customary law.211 The AEPS committed members to hold 
regular meetings; include and promote cooperation with Arctic indigenous 
people; and established four working groups to carry out scientific work on 
the Arctic environment. The four working groups are: Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP); Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME); Emergency, Prevention, Preparedness and Response 
(EPPR); and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF). In the 1993 
Nuuk Declaration, a further task force on sustainable development was 
added.212  
 
The AEPS can be seen as the first precautionary approach towards 
considering the long-term protection of the Arctic environment,213 the 
sustainable and equitable development of natural resources and the respect 
and protection of indigenous culture, rights and traditions.214 The AEPS 
contained very ambitious objectives including identifying, reducing and 
ultimately eliminating pollution. Six pollution areas were chosen as priorities. 
A review of international mechanisms, treaties and other normative 
instruments was also included and action plans were formulated to combat the 
identified problems. Arctic states were obligated to establish working groups 
and meet regularly in order to review progress and coordinate actions.215 
Terms of cooperation established between states in the AEPS were subject to 
the laws and regulations of the countries. Each country will make its ‘best 
efforts to provide resources adequate to carry out its responsibilities’.216 By 
the 1993 Nuuk Ministerial meeting, the involvement of Senior Arctic Affairs 
Officials (SAAO/SAO) was formally recognized and the ministers requested 
                                                
211 Supra n. 192 and Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Rovaniemi Declaration on the 
Protection of Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, June 1991) <http://arctic-
council.npolar.no/Archives/AEPS%20Docs/artic_environment.pdf> at 01 May 2009.  
212 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Nuuk Declaration (1993) <http://www.arctic-
council.org/Archives/AEPS%20Docs/Default.htm> at 03 October 2007. 
213 Supra n. 186, at 567. 
214 Supra n. 212, Nuuk Declaration, Introduction, at 7. 
215 Subsection 10, paragraph 1, at 1668, AEPS.  
216 Ibid., at section 9.1(viii-ix), at 1667-1668. 
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that the SAOs convene at least once a year.217 These high-level officials were 
responsible for monitoring and providing guidance in the implementation of 
the AEPS. Importantly, the AEPS provided a foundation for the elevation of 
its objectives through the establishment of a governing body: the Arctic 
Council.218 
 
Arctic Council 
In 1996, the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council absorbed 
the AEPS,219 and supplemented its Working Groups with the initiation of a 
Sustainable Development Programme.220 As a multi-stakeholder forum, the 
Arctic Council provides a mechanism and platform for international 
cooperation on key issues concerning the Arctic.221 The Arctic Council 
expanded the AEPS’s terms of reference to include a broader mandate 
covering ‘common Arctic issues’. Common issues cover almost any issue 
except ‘matters related to military security’.222  
 
Decisions on key issues, such as the adoption of specific mandates for a 
Working Group or cooperative strategic plans, are taken by consensus by 
delegates of the eight Arctic Council Member States.223 This unique forum 
also recognizes the important relationship and contributions of indigenous 
people to the Arctic and has afforded Permanent Participant status to six 
                                                
217 Supra n. 212, Nuuk Declaration. The name Senior Arctic Affairs Official (SAAO) was 
changed in the 1996 Iqualuit Declaration to Senior Arctic Official (SAO). See The Arctic 
Council Rules of Procedure as adopted by the Arctic Council at the First Arctic Council 
Ministerial Meeting, 17-18 September 1998 (Iqaluit, Canada), <http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/official%20rules%20and%20procedures.pdf> at 10 July 2010. 
218 Supra n. 188, at 251. 
219 The AEPS cooperation process was not immediately integrated into the Arctic Council. 
The final AEPS Ministerial Meeting took place in Alta, Norway in June 1997 where the Alta 
Declaration was adopted and the SAAOs produced their final ‘Report to the Ministers’. 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Alta Declaration (1997) <http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/The%20Alta%20Declaration.pdf> at 06 April 2009. 
220 Supra n. 193, Ottawa Declaration. 
221 Supra n. 188, at 251-253 and n. 210, at 225-248. 
222 Supra n. 193, Article 1(a), Ottawa Declaration. 
223 Member states are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Sweden, and the United States.  
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indigenous organizations.224 Permanent Participants must be consulted on all 
issues prior to being voted on by the Council Member States and are in 
attendance alongside Member State SAOs. SAOs have carried on their role 
from the AEPS of guiding and monitoring Arctic Council initiatives. 
Observers also participate in the Council and may include non-Arctic States, 
intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, and non-
governmental organizations that span regional and global enterprises.225  
 
Arctic Council Working Groups have individual secretariats and objectives. 
These groups also collaborate on larger projects and initiatives, such as the 
Arctic Council’s Action Plan to Eliminate Pollution in the Arctic (ACAP) and 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). ACAP was adopted at the 
2000 Barrow, Alaska, Ministerial Meeting.226  Priorities of the first phase of 
ACAP related to findings of the AMAP concerning persistent organic 
pollutants (POPs), heavy metals, radioactivity and depletion of the ozone 
layer.227 Ongoing projects have focused on pollution reduction, in particular 
from the Russian Federation. However, a lack of clear legislation, limited 
coordination between federal and regional administration, and general 
implementation problems has hindered ACAP’s progress.228  
 
ACIA was also endorsed at the Barrow Ministerial Meeting as a joint project 
between AMAP, CAFF and the International Arctic Science Committee 
                                                
224 The six indigenous groups are: the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North; Inuit Circumpolar Conference; Saami Council; Aleut International Association; 
Gwich’in Council International and Arctic Athabaskan Council. See supra n. 188, at 251. See 
also Arctic Council, Notes from the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council, 
Barrow, Alaska (12-13 October 2000) (2000) <http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/barrow_notes.pdf> at 19 August 2009, at 2-4.  
225 Observers include non-Arctic states: France, Germany, Poland, Spain, The Netherlands, 
and the UK; international organizations such as the North Atlantic Marine Mammal 
Commission and the Nordic Council of Ministers; and NGOs, such as the Northern Forum 
and the Circumpolar Conservation Union. A complete list of all the observers can be found at 
Observers to the Arctic Council <http://arctic-council.org/section/observers> at 21 August 
2009. 
226 Arctic Council, Barrow Declaration (2000) <http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/The%20signed%20Barrow%20Declaration.pdf> at 21 April 2009.  
227 For a detailed review of ACAP and the Working Groups and initiatives of the Arctic 
Council see supra n. 209, Koivurova and VanderZwaag, at 137-155. 
228 Ibid., at 152-153. 
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(IASC).229 The ACIA Synthesis Report was published in 2004, identifying 
prevailing climate change trends and implications for Arctic warming.230 In 
2004, the Reykjavik Meeting endorsed PAME to develop the Arctic Marine 
Strategic Plan (AMSP). The AMSP includes a comprehensive assessment of 
Arctic shipping, protected areas, port facilities and the adequacy of oil and gas 
guidelines under its mandate.231 In 2009, an ‘Arctic Report Card’ tracking 
recent environmental changes was published from collaborative work of the 
Climate Experts Group of AMAP and the Circumpolar Biodiversity 
Monitoring Program of CAFF.232 Together, these projects report on Arctic 
specific issues and highlight areas where government action at the state level 
may be beneficial.   
 
Based on international soft law, the Council does not enjoy the same legal 
personality as an international organization or have the regulatory powers and 
decision-making authority of an institutional regime.233 Governments 
voluntarily engage with each project and the informal structure of cooperation 
has many advantages to states. Participation can be priority focused, 
minimizing wasteful expenditure of resources and granting assurances that 
there is no limitation on a state’s ability to act in its national interest.234 Soft 
law can often contain content that states would not accept in a legally binding 
instrument, encompass activities of a range of non-state actors and be easier to 
adjust or even restructure in response to changing circumstances, adjusting 
‘nimbly and without great political cost’.235 Consensus can be more readily 
                                                
229 Supra n. 226. 
230 See ACIA, 'Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Scientific Report' (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); ACIA, 'Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
Overview Report' (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
231 PAME, Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) (24 November 2004) 
<http://arcticportal.org/uploads/vx/IW/vxIWcyCi_7UnSBwZDbPVug/AMSP-Nov-2004.pdf> 
at 06 April 2009. 
232 J. Richter-Menge and J.E. Overland, Arctic Report Card 2009 (2009) 
<http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard> at 02 November 2009. 
233 The absence of legal personality served as a compromise to the United States’ reluctance 
to be involved in any new multilateral organization and to enter into any new international 
financial commitments. Supra n. 210, at 239 and n. 188, at 251 and 254. 
234 Ibid., n. 188, at 254. 
235 Oran R. Young, 'Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North' 
(2009) 45(232) Polar Record 73, at 76. 
 72 
achieved in a forum that is non-binding in nature,236 and can move practical 
issues forward. Whereas more formalized obligations may reduce the 
willingness of certain states, such as the US, to sign in,237 or reduce the 
capacity to move a practical matter forward at all. Nonetheless, moving from 
discussion to action is also challenging in light of the Council’s limited role as 
a ‘discussionary and catalytic forum’ with laws and policy dependent on the 
goodwill of individual national governments. It has been suggested that the 
profile of the Arctic Council and its practical implementation as a ‘high level 
forum’ needs to be enhanced.238 Limited funding and a lack of a permanent 
secretariat may also be considered problematic for the Council.239 
 
Regional fora 
Other non-binding fora such as the Northern Forum and the BEAC/BEAR 
also facilitate discussion and policy directives. The Northern Forum, founded 
in 1991 as an international organization, is now composed of 24 sub-national 
or regional governments from countries near the Arctic Circle, as well as 
commercial institutions known as ‘Business Partners’.240 While the Arctic 
Council has a top-down perspective on issues such as sustainable 
development, the Northern Forum has potential to adopt a bottom-up 
approach, with a greater capacity to implement effective programmes at a 
community level and bridge levels of social organization such as between 
national and territorial governments.241 The BEAC is a non-binding 
multilateral agreement involving the European Arctic states of Finland, 
                                                
236 Ibid. 
237 The US, with Russian concurrence, has insisted that Arctic agreements exclude matters 
relating to security and has resisted the idea to provide the Arctic Council with decision 
making authority. However, the soft law arrangements made practical cooperation politically 
feasible. Ibid. See also, supra n. 197, at 242. 
238 See supra n. 235, in general. 
239 Supra n. 209, Koivurova and VanderZwaag, at 191. 
240 For example, the governments of theYukon and Nunavut Territories of northern Canada 
are members of the Northern Forum. Local provinces of the Russian Federation, China, 
Iceland, the Republic of Korea and Finland are also represented. Business Partners include 
EPL Diamond, Alaska Sealife Center, Makarov Clean Water JV and Yugra Timber Holding. 
Refer to Regional Members and Business Partners of the Northern Forum 
<http://www.northernforum.org/servlet/content/memberregions.html> at 02 November 2009. 
See also, Oran R. Young, 'Can the Arctic Council and the Northern Forum Find Common 
Ground?' (2002) 38(207) Polar Record 289, at 289. 
241 Ibid., Young, at 295. 
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Norway, Russia and Sweden.242 Established through a Declaration in 1993 as 
a device to heighten regional cooperation,243 it arose from the AEPS and 
provides a platform for European cooperation – one that can be used prior to 
the states’ collaboration within the Arctic Council.244  
 
Arctic and customary international law 
An overarching treaty does not exist to pull common rights and obligations 
under one umbrella within the Arctic operating system. Customary 
international law can, therefore, contribute significantly as a source of law.  
Development of customary international law is unaffected by the absence of 
an Arctic specific umbrella treaty. It is applied in the Arctic as elsewhere.245 
However, exceptional conditions may evoke a basis for special treatment in 
international law, alongside customary rights and freedoms.246 
 
For customary law to develop, it is necessary that state practice be extensive 
and representative and that states generally believe that practice is in 
conformity with, or a general obligation within, international law (opinio 
juris). It is not necessary, however, that the conduct should arise strictly from 
tacit treaty law. Multilateral treaties can provide a model for the formation of 
new customary international law and assist in its ‘crystallization’; however, 
                                                
242 The Council endeavours to promote sustainable development in a forum for considering 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, 
tourism, the environment, infrastructure, educational and cultural exchange as well as projects 
aimed at improving the situation of indigenous people in the North. The Council does not 
duplicate or replace ongoing work in other bilateral or multilateral fora. See supra n. 195, 
Kirkenes Declaration. 
243 Ibid. The Kirkenes Conference, attended by representatives of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the Commission of the European Communities 
in 1993 was the founding conference of the BEAC. 
244 Supra n. 186, at 569. 
245 For example, maritime zones, the existence of a continental shelf as a natural prolongation 
of the coastal state as well as the concept of common heritage of mankind existing with 
respect to the resources of the seabed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction apply as 
customary international law. Freedoms of the high seas exist for the Arctic Ocean as 
elsewhere irrespective of the year round sea ice that covers a significant amount of the high 
seas area. 
246 Rayfuse discusses that the Arctic Ocean has been argued to not possess the traditional 
characteristics of a high seas area since the presence of sea ice does not permit surface 
navigation. See Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans 
Governance in a Warming World' (2007) 16(2) Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 196, at 209. 
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there is no general presumption that they do so.247 Thus, there is equal room 
for the normative practice and opinio juris to develop from state practice 
reflected from and in conformity with soft law instruments as hard law 
instruments. It is dependent on state practice and the norm creating character 
of the conduct or belief rather than its origin in a treaty.248 The Arctic 
operating system therefore has the capacity for developing and implementing 
international customary law through state practice and the confluence of 
binding and non-binding instruments and institutions. 
 
For example, with respect to Arctic maritime activities, relatively consistent 
state practice within the coastal Arctic waters and waterways exists between 
the states.249 Objections have been declared by the US to extensive coastal 
state prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction for ice-covered areas and to the 
assertion of the waterways as internal waters of Canada and the Russian 
Federation. These have been declared, however, in the absence of 
contradictory state practice. 250 Moreover, in 1983, the US expressly 
acknowledged Part XIII of the LOSC, which includes Article 234, as 
customary international law.251  Irrespective of the persistent objector rule 
exercised by the US, so far, a broad interpretation of Article 234 is being 
practised through substantial compliance. Should such compliance continue, 
‘it would seem difficult to argue that customary international law is not being 
formed for the Arctic’.252 It may, therefore, be determined that the application 
of Article 234 has developed into customary law.253  
                                                
247 Supra n. 27, at 46 and 49. 
248 See supra n. 26, at 48 and n. 35, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para 77, in which 
the ICJ found that a provision should be of a ‘fundamentally norm creating character’ to be 
binding on all states as custom. 
249 Issues related to the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route in the Arctic are discussed 
in Chapter 2. See also Douglas R. Brubaker, 'Regulation of Navigation and Vessel-Source 
Pollution in the Northern Sea Route: Article 234 and State Practice' in Davor Vidas (ed), 
Protecting the Polar Marine Environment, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge 
University Press (2000) 221, at 224. 
250 Brubaker also considers the practice of the Russian Federation and the US to be ‘especially 
important sources of customary law due to their status as great powers’. See, Douglas R. 
Brubaker, 'Law of the Sea Convention Article 234 and Other Regimes' in Douglas Brubaker 
(ed), Russian Arctic Straits, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2004) 43, at 46. 
251 Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, Federal Register, Vol 48, p605, 1983 (Code of 
Federal Rules, Vol. 3, section 5030). See supra n. 249, at 224, fn 10. 
252 Ibid., at 241. 
253 Ibid. See also supra n. 250, at 43-77.  
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Nevertheless, it may be determined that this is a particular circumstance in 
which an assumption, belief, or the taking of a position on the part of a state, 
that certain conduct cannot or does not give rise to a legal obligation or right, 
may prevent that conduct from contributing to the formation of customary 
law.254 Similar to elsewhere and other circumstances, the ability to assess 
whether customary law has emerged occurs on a case by case basis. There can 
be no doubt that protection of the Arctic marine environment has become 
custom as a principle and norm. However, it is more difficult to determine or 
measure the degree to which methods of implementation whether through 
hard law or soft law initiatives are capable of producing customary law, 
binding on all states.   
 
Actors 
In the Arctic operating system, the actors are comprised primarily of the five 
Arctic coastal states and secondarily of the three Arctic States that are not 
among the Arctic basin coastal states: Iceland, Finland and Sweden. 
Therefore, all of the eight Arctic Council Member States are included as the 
primary actors. For this discussion, Indigenous groups, though prominent and 
influential within the Arctic Council, are not included as primary actors. At 
present, they do not possess the same authority as a state. Retaining the status 
of the Indigenous Peoples within the Arctic Council is, however, essential and 
has vast significance from the perspective of legitimizing the environmental 
protection mandate of the Council.255  
 
Non-Arctic states that have interest in the Arctic such as the European 
Community are represented in the fora of the operating system such as the 
                                                
254 See discussion in supra n. 27, at 34.  
255 According to Koivurova, the popular image of the indigenous peoples’ ability to live in a 
sustainable manner, in a close relationship with the environment (whether true or not) has a 
significant presence in legitimizing the Arctic Council and safeguarding the special 
relationship the Indigenous people have to the still relatively undisturbed environment. See 
Timo Koivurova, 'Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty - Evaluation and a New Proposal' (2008) 
17(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 14, at 
25. Further discussion on this matter is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Northern Forum, and the BEAC/BEAR. However, as these states are neither 
Arctic states geographically, nor coastal states to the Arctic basin, they are 
less likely to have national legislation implemented specifically in the interest 
of maritime zones that encompass Arctic marine environment and are not 
included as actors for the definition of this operating system. Similar to the 
influence of non-claimant states in the Antarctic, the external influence of 
non-Arctic states on the operating system is appreciated. 
 
Jurisdiction 
The third component of the Arctic operating system is jurisdiction. Coastal 
state, flag state and port state jurisdiction prevails over the maritime space, as 
outlined in the LOSC, and through customary international law. Arctic coastal 
state jurisdiction is generally limited to the maritime zones. In a regional 
sense, however, there is scope for states to sign into regional treaties and 
agreements that commit them to the management of specific areas and 
activities which cross jurisdictions.  
 
Regional measures, according to Article 194 of LOSC, may include those 
necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, threatened 
species or vulnerable seas. Accordingly, a duty not to pollute the polar oceans, 
including the Arctic Ocean may be derived, and given legal strength, from this 
provision.256 Article 197 also provides that states ‘shall cooperate on a global 
basis and, as appropriate, regional basis…for the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment’. Thus, regional cooperation may arise from 
extended or cooperative jurisdiction to protect the Arctic environment.257 For 
example, the Barents Sea ‘Loop Hole’ Agreement assisted with the regulation 
of fisheries within a contested maritime area.258 While interest lies most 
                                                
256 Supra n. 174. 
257 Articles 117, 123, 194 and 197, LOSC. See Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Protecting Marine 
Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction' (2008) 17(1) Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 3, at 10. 
258 Agreement between the Government of Iceland, the Government of Norway and the 
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the 
Area of Fisheries, done at St. Petersburg, 15 May 1999, 2070 UNTS 203. See R.R. Churchill, 
'The Barents Sea Loophole Agreement: A "Coastal State" Solution to a Straddling Stock 
Problem' (1999) 14(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 467-490 and Olav 
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significantly with the Arctic coastal states, due to proximity and economic 
activity, any state party to LOSC can exercise these rights through multilateral 
cooperative arrangements. For example, the Treaty of Spitsbergen,259 signed 
by numerous non-Arctic states, outlines a regional management agreement 
concerning Svalbard.  
 
LOSC also provides for the cooperation of states surrounding an enclosed, or 
semi-enclosed, sea.260 Because of the nature of the Arctic Ocean, being 
surrounded by several states with limited exchange with other oceans, the 
central Arctic Ocean Basin may be considered a semi-enclosed sea.261 Article 
123 states that bordering states to a semi-enclosed sea should cooperate for the 
management of marine living resources, marine scientific and the 
conservation and protection of the marine environment. Complexity of 
navigation, growing danger of pollution and concern over the conservation 
and exploitation of the marine living resources in the Arctic provide clear 
justification for regional cooperation. 
 
Arctic coastal states are also granted a wider responsibility for jurisdiction 
concerning the protection of ice-infested waters through Article 234 of LOSC. 
This article recognizes the special importance of ice-covered waters that are 
within the limits of national jurisdiction, providing the adjacent coastal states 
the ability to implement and enforce extensive marine pollution provisions 
potentially above those of generally accepted international standards.262 
Practice in the Arctic has developed favouring extensive coastal state 
jurisdiction and Arctic states have claimed ‘special privileges with respect to 
the control of Arctic waters which may include the high seas’.263 The vague 
application to ice-covered areas has been broadly interpreted in the Russian 
                                                                                                                          
Schram Stokke, 'Managing Fisheries in the Barents Sea Loophole: Interplay with the UN 
Fishstocks Agreement' (2001) 32(3) Ocean Development and International Law 241-262. 
259 Supra n. 198, Spitsbergen Treaty. 
260 Article 117, 123, 194, and 197, LOSC. See discussion above on regional cooperation under 
the LOSC. 
261 Discussed in supra n. 197, at 222 and 251. The Arctic Ocean has long been accepted as 
being high seas however there is discussion on the whether it can also be classified as a semi-
enclosed sea for the purposes of Articles 122-123. 
262 Article 234, LOSC. See supra n. 129. 
263 Supra n. 249, at 231. 
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regime as applying to ice-covered areas within the Northern Sea Route (NSR), 
possibly including those sections of the NSR that extend into the high seas.264 
In contrast, the US and Canada more appropriately define regulations within 
their EEZs.265 The ability to implement measures beyond the limits of the 
coastal state EEZ through Article 234 is doubtful.266 Nonetheless, through the 
existence of Article 234, the Arctic Council developed special navigational 
rules for Arctic waters that have since been adopted as non-binding Arctic 
Guidelines by the IMO.267 
 
Institutions 
The fourth component of the Arctic operating system encompasses the 
institutions of the system, such as Ministerial Meetings of the Arctic Council, 
meetings of the SAOs, Meetings of the States Parties to LOSC and other 
multilateral treaty and forum meetings. With respect to the Arctic Council, the 
Arctic Council Rules of Procedure provides further guidance on how the 
cooperative bodies work together in practice.268 Currently, the Chair of the 
Arctic Council and its secretariat rotate between each Member States every 
two years.269 Recently, the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish Chairs decided to 
maintain a semi-permanent secretariat in Norway for the duration of the three 
chair terms from 2006-2012.270 Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings are held 
biannually while SAOs meet annually and report to the Ministerial Meetings. 
                                                
264 Ibid., at 226 and 231. 
265 Ibid., at 232-233. The Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), 
discussed in Chapter 2, originally applied to 100 NM from the Canadian coastline and has 
now been extended to apply to the entire 200 NM EEZ in accordance with LOSC. The US Oil 
Pollution Act applies to the EEZ and to navigable waters, vaguely defined as waters of the 
US, including those of the Territorial Sea. 
266 Donald R. Rothwell and Christopher C. Joyner, 'The Polar Oceans and the Law of the Sea' 
in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar 
Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001) 1, at 18. 
267 See supra n. 255, at 19 and fn 46 reviewing the development and adoption of the Arctic 
Guidelines. The Arctic Guidelines and subsequent POLAR Code are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
268 Supra n. 217, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. 
269 A 2005 report emphasized Norway’s position that the Arctic Council should have a 
permanent secretariat rather than rotating every two years. During Norway’s Chair period 
between 2006 and 2008 emphasis was taken on the structure of the Arctic Council. See supra 
n. 209, Koivurova and VanderZwaag, at 176.  
270 Ibid., at 193 and Norwegian, Danish, Swedish Common Objectives for their Arctic Council 
Chairmanships 2006-2012 (27 November 2007) <http://arctic-
council.org/article/2007/11/common_priorities> at 04 January 2009. 
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Decisions of the Arctic Council are to be by consensus271 of the Members 
with full consultation of the Permanent Participants. Permanent Participants 
do not have formal decision-making power; however, ‘they are in a position to 
exert much practical influence on the decision-making of the Council’. 272 In 
light of the fact that there is no overarching treaty within the Arctic operating 
system, the system relies on these numerous fora, institutions and 
significantly, the relations between the actors within the system. At any time 
meetings can and are held to discuss issues and develop action plans. For 
example, the five Arctic States met in May 2008, adopting the Ilulissat 
Declaration, which confirmed the efforts of the states to implement the rights 
and obligations of LOSC and maintain cooperative efforts available through 
different international fora such as the Arctic Council.273 A follow up meeting, 
Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting occurred in 2010, furthering these, 
and other, commitments.274  
 
Dispute resolution in the Arctic operating system is established under separate 
instruments for specific issues. Under the LOSC, mandatory dispute 
resolution exists in Part XV through the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, the ICJ or Arbitral Tribunals. For non-party states to the LOSC, the 
ICJ and Arbitral Tribunals are still available for third party dispute resolution. 
Moreover, third party dispute resolution does not have to be the primary 
means of issue resolution or dispute settlement. In regional efforts, diplomatic 
channels and international relations play an important role beyond formal 
procedures. 
 
                                                
271 Consensus within the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems is defined in this thesis as 
‘the absence of formal objection’. Consensus is not defined in the Arctic Council Rules and 
Procedures. This definition is described in Article 22(5) of the Convention on the Regulation 
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), infra n. 280.  
272 Supra n. 209, Koivurova and VanderZwaag, at 129. 
273 Ilulissat Declaration (29 May 2008) <http://www.cop15.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BE00B850-
D278-4489-A6BE-6AE230415546/0/ArcticOceanConference.pdf> at 11 June 2008. 
274 Discussed further in subsequent chapters. Commitments included the timely adoption of 
mandatory guidelines for polar shipping, a legally binding Arctic Search and Rescue 
instrument and the development of an Arctic Regional Hydrographic Commission. See The 
Honourable Lawrence Cannon (Chairman), Chairman's Summary of the Arctic Ocean: 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting (29 March 2010, Chelsea, Canada) 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/arctic-meeting_reunion-arctique-
2010_summary_sommaire.aspx?lang=eng> at 30 March 2010.  
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Conclusion to the Arctic operating system 
The Arctic operating system does not include a binding regional regime. 
Alongside the LOSC, the Arctic specific regime is non-binding, built on the 
cooperative and regional efforts of the AEPS and Arctic Council most 
significantly, but also other fora such as the Northern Forum and the 
BEAC/BEAR. The LOSC provides a pivotal foundation for coastal and 
maritime issues. The LOSC provides the framework for maritime jurisdiction 
and sovereign rights. LOSC also suggests opportunities for further 
collaboration and/or expansion of jurisdiction in the areas of marine 
environmental protection. In the Arctic operating system, non-binding 
initiatives and instruments work to satisfy these responsibilities and 
opportunities. These initiatives are considered sources of law in this thesis 
because of the ability for the implementation of their objectives to supplement 
existing international law and influence state practice. Nonetheless, the 
responsibilities imposed under the non-binding initiatives are not legally 
binding obligations as found with formal treaties. Their soft law nature does 
provide scope for further engagement of Arctic coastal states. In particular, 
the Arctic Council has successfully made it possible to ‘perceive the Arctic as 
a distinct political region’.275 
 
Decisions on issues within the Arctic operating system may occur at any 
number of fora. This process is driven by the actors and the politicization of 
issues. The implementation of decisions occurs at a national legislative level 
and there are many opportunities for unilateral, bilateral and/multilateral 
initiatives to develop within the system. Thus, cooperation can occur at many 
different levels and across jurisdictions. The lack of sovereignty disputes 
enables enforcement to be more clearly defined and tolerated. 
 
1.4 Antarctic operating system 
At present, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) provides an Antarctic specific 
regime within the operating system. Under provisions of the Antarctic Treaty 
the seven claimant states, Australia, Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
                                                
275 Supra n. 209, Koivurova and VanderZwaag, at 159. 
 81 
Norway the UK (Figure 2, Introduction), are able to maintain their right to 
make a territorial claim while other signatory states also preserve the right to 
not recognize these claims. Thus, the legal basis exists onto which sovereign 
rights apply for claimant states. The practical application is, however, affected 
by the norms of behavior that have evolved surrounding Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty, discussed below. The ATS does not exist in isolation of 
other instruments of law, both hard and soft. Regional collaboration therefore 
is founded through an Antarctic specific regime but can manifest through 
many different types of initiatives and instruments. 
  
Sources of law 
Similar to the LOSC and the Vienna Convention, the Antarctic Treaty276 is a 
multilateral treaty. Its formal provisions embody normative principles and 
elements of lawmaking that were specifically designed and negotiated for the 
Antarctic. The Antarctic Treaty is also the foundation of an Antarctic regime, 
known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Based on the Antarctic Treaty 
and its 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
(Madrid Protocol)277 the ATS contains two stand-alone conventions – the 
1972 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS)278 and the 
1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR).279 A third instrument, the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)280 was developed by the 
ATCPs in the 1980s. CRAMRA did not enter into force and is not an active 
part of the ATS; however, it is an instrument negotiated within the Antarctic 
                                                
276 Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 01 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71, entered into 
force 23 June 1961. 
277 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol), opened 
for signature 04 October 1991, 30 ILM 1455, entered into force 14 January 1998, Annex V 
entered into force 24 May 2002, Annex VI was adopted 14 June 2005. 
278 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), opened for signature 01 June 
1972, 1080 UNTS 175, entered into force 11 March 1978. 
279 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), 
opened for signature 20 May 1980, 19 ILM 837, entered into force 07 April 1982. 
280 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), 
opened for signature 25 November 1988, 27 ILM 859, not entered into force. 
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operating system. The Antarctic Treaty, its associated Measures281 and stand 
alone conventions provide Antarctic-specific instruments within the Antarctic 
operating system.  
 
Numerous scholars have isolated the ATS as the Antarctic governing 
regime.282 This examination differs slightly by considering the ATS as a 
regime within the larger operating system. The elements of the ATS regime 
are nonetheless important to understand as sources of law and lawmaking. For 
the purposes of providing relevant background to this discussion, the 
Antarctic Treaty, CCAMLR, CRAMRA and the Madrid Protocol are briefly 
described. CCAS is not relevant to this thesis and will not be discussed. Since 
the Antarctic Treaty and its affiliated instruments have been comprehensively 
described elsewhere, for further details of the various ATS instruments the 
reader should refer to the Antarctic Treaty Handbook.283 
 
The Antarctic Treaty  
The Antarctic Treaty designates Antarctica as a continent for peace and 
science in the interests of mankind through fostering open access, cooperation, 
information exchange and the preservation and conservation of Antarctic 
living resources.284 It promotes freedom of scientific investigation in 
Antarctica285 and to that end Article III of the Treaty mandates scientific 
exchanges.286 The Treaty applies to the area south of 60˚S, including all ice 
                                                
281 Measures are decisions that are made by consensus during Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meetings (ATCMs) that create legally binding obligations for all Contracting Parties of the 
Antarctic Treaty. 
282 Among others, a description of the Antarctic legal regime can be found in supra n. 197, at 
110-154. See also Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons, University of 
South Carolina (1998), at 54-82. 
283 Harlan K. Cohen, Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty, US Department of State (Ninth ed, 
2002). 
284 Preamble, Articles I, II, III, IX(f), Antarctic Treaty. 
285 Ibid., Article II. 
286 Ibid., Article III: Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable: 
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be 
exchanged to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations; 
(b) scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and 
stations; and 
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made 
freely available. 
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shelves and adjacent regions.287 However, in its application the Treaty does 
not derogate from rights and freedoms under international law with regard to 
the high seas (ocean area beyond national jurisdiction).288 Article IV of the 
Treaty conditions the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the 
Antarctic continent and maritime zones.289 Nothing in the Antarctic Treaty 
constitutes a renunciation of previously asserted rights or claims to territorial 
sovereignty, a renunciation or diminution of any basis of claim, or prejudices 
the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-
recognition of a state’s right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica.290 No acts or activities constitute a basis for 
asserting, supporting or denying a claim.291 No new claim or enlargement of 
an existing claim may be asserted while the Treaty is in force.292 Therefore, 
claimant states have rights as claimant states that do not derogate from the 
rights of non-claimant states in the recognition of those claims and associated 
rights. As well, the US and the former Soviet Union reserve the right to a 
basis to claim. As Jabour and Weber comment, the ‘simplicity of Article IV 
gives all…contracting parties carte blanche to interpret its provisions in any 
way they wish, within the spirit and intent of the Treaty, [but] without 
jeopardizing the stability of the treaty as a whole.’293 Ambiguity and broad 
interpretation may actually build stability while no activities are inherently 
threatening.  
 
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty provides a mandate for contracting parties 
to consult together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, 
and formulate and consider measures in furtherance of the principles and 
objectives of the Antarctic Treaty. This includes, inter alia, the preservation 
                                                
287 Ibid., Article VI. 
288 Ibid. 
289 For a discussion, see among others, supra n. 197, at 75-80, Gillian D. Triggs, International 
Law and Australian Sovereignty in Antarctica, Legal Books Pty (1986), at 192-196 and 
Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1992) 
at 75-106.  
290 Article IV(1), Antarctic Treaty. 
291 Ibid., Article IV(2). 
292 Ibid. 
293 Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber, 'Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of Polar Sovereignty?' 
(2008) 17(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 
(RECIEL) 27, at 35. 
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and conservation of living resources294 and questions relating to the exercise 
of jurisdiction in Antarctica.295 By virtue of this mandate, the parties have 
brought the Antarctic Treaty from 1959 to the twenty-first century.296 
Numerous decisions, measures, and resolutions have operationalized the 
founding principles. Two stand alone conventions and the Madrid Protocol 
have entered into force and measures have been taken to progress the regime. 
Importantly, the ATS has moved forward from the Malaysian-led initiative, 
which coincided with the negotiations of CRAMRA and challenged the 
regime within the UN General Assembly.297  
 
While the regime of the ATS operates inside the larger operating system, each 
development accrued from its operation adds to the larger sources of law 
within the Antarctic operating system. The relationship between the Antarctic 
Treaty and other international instruments has evolved since the inception of 
the Antarctic Treaty. This evolution has provided considerable flexibility with 
respect to its interpretation and application when considering coastal and 
maritime issues.  
 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
CCAMLR, adopted in 1980, entered into force in 1982 and provided the first 
ecosystem-based approach to resource management. It established 
conservation principles as key doctrines around which to proceed with 
resource activities.298 The necessity of using the best scientific information 
available prior to making decisions on harvest activities was firmly 
established in a precautionary approach.299 Importantly, the concept of 
                                                
294 Article IX(1)(f), Antarctic Treaty. 
295 Ibid., Article IX(1)(e). 
296 Supra n. 293, at 37. 
297 For further discussion of this initiative see, among others, Moritaka Hayashi, 'The 
Antarctica Question in the United Nations' (1986) 19(2) Cornell International Law Journal 
275-290 and R. Tepper and M. Haward, 'The Development of Malaysia's Position on 
Antarctica: 1982 to 2004' (2005) 41(217) Polar Record 113-124. See also Peter Beck, 'The 
United Nations and Antarctica, 2005: The End of the 'Question of Antarctica'?' (2006) 
42(222) Polar Record 217-227 and Peter J. Beck, 'Twenty Years On: The UN and the 
'Question of Antarctica,' 1983-2003' (2004) 40(214) Polar Record 205-212. 
298 Article II, CCAMLR. 
299 According to Article IX, describing the functions of the Commission of CAMLR, the 
Commission shall take full account of the recommendations and advice of the Scientific 
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‘rational use’ was introduced and elaborated in Article II(3)(a-c) to the 
definition of conservation.300 CCAMLR extended the Antarctic Treaty 
principles north of 60˚S by following an ecosystem boundary of the Antarctic 
Convergence, also referred to as the Antarctic Polar Front.301 The CCAMLR 
area contains both marine areas around islands with established jurisdiction 
and marine areas beyond national jurisdiction.302 These areas are, therefore, 
subject to a combination of national, regional and international jurisdiction 
through a bifocal approach or invocation of the Chairman’s Statement.303 
  
CCAMLR Conservation Measures give effect to conservation principles. 
These include, inter alia, rules and procedures to facilitate information 
exchange while protecting information that has commercial value to a harvest 
industry304 and obligations concerning fishing licensing or other such 
domestic permit systems/schemes.305 Decisions of the CCAMLR Commission 
on matters of substance are taken by consensus, whereas a simple majority 
takes all other decisions.306 Participants must all agree on whether the matter 
                                                                                                                          
Committee in that scientific research assists in the establishment of conservation measures 
pursuant to the conservation principles established in Article II.  
300 Ibid., Article II(2) and II(3)(a-c). 
301 Ibid., Article I. The Antarctic convergence, which is more accurately referred to as the 
polar front, is an identifiable biological zone where the cold Antarctic waters meet the warmer 
waters of the sub-Antarctic. The front extends across the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans 
between 48˚S and 61˚S Latitude and is associated with particular water mass features such as 
salinity and temperature. See Serguei Sokolov and Stephen R. Rintoul, ‘Circumpolar 
Structure and Distribution of the Antarctic Circumpolar Fronts: 1. Mean Circumpolar Paths’ 
(2009) 114(11) Journal of Geophysical Research: Oceans, C11018, pp 1-19. 
302 Article I(1) and I(4), CCAMLR. For example, Kerguelen Island (France) and Heard Island 
(Australia) are sovereign islands within the CCAMLR Area of application. 
303 The bifocal approach is described in supra n. 289, Triggs, at 195. The ambiguity built into 
the text of the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR allow claimant and non-claimant states to 
interpret Article IV differently. Dual interpretation may provide some stability, depends on 
the goodwill of the participant states and can give effect to exercising coastal state jurisdiction 
without denying or accepting sovereignty. In terms of maritime zones and activities, states 
can exercise jurisdiction over sub-Antarctic islands while fulfilling obligations under 
CCAMLR. See A. Fabra and V. Gascon, 'The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources and the Ecosystem Approach' (2008) 23(3) International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 567-598. 
304 ‘Rules and Procedures’ available at: http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/bd/pt3.pdf > 09 
August 2009. 
305 For example, see Conservation Measure 10-02(2008): Licensing and inspection obligations 
of Contracting Parties with regard to their flag vessels operating in the Convention Area, 
wherein ‘[E]ach Contracting Party shall prohibit fishing by its flag vessels in the Convention 
Area except pursuant to a fishing license…to give effect to CCAMLR conservation measures 
and requirements under the Convention.’ Available from the internet at http: 
<//www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/cm/09-10/10-02.pdf> at 09 March 2010.   
306 Article XII (1 and 2), CCAMLR. 
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discussed is one of substance.307 Participants may also ‘opt out’ of an agreed 
Conservation Measure308 or invoke the Chairman’s Statement for Measures 
dealing with sub-Antarctic islands for which sovereignty is undisputed.309 
These provisions are not invoked frequently but serve to add both flexibility 
and stability to the CCAMLR approach.310 In light of the consensus 
requirements of CCAMLR, it is possible that new issues may progress 
through the discussions and decision making process only as fast as all 
participating nations consider them to be ‘matters of substance’. This is an 
issue for all institutions of the ATS that make use of consensus decision-
making.311  
 
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
In respect to Antarctic mineral resources, specific regulatory concern began as 
early as 1975. The issue gained salience throughout the late 1970s and once 
the CCAMLR was concluded, focus was shifted towards this issue with much 
greater intensity. The Convention on the Regulation of Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA)312 was the focus of six years (1982-1988) of 
negotiation by the ATCPs. While CRAMRA has lapsed, it is relevant to any 
discussion on non-living resource issues in the Antarctic and provides the only 
                                                
307 Ibid., Article XII (1). 
308 According to Article IX, a Member has 90 days to notify CCAMLR that it is unable to 
accept an agreed Measure. In Jacquelyn Turner, Julia Jabour and Denzil Miller, 'Consensus or 
Not Consensus: That is the CCAMLR Question' in Aldo Chircop, Scott Coffen-Smout and 
Moira McConnell (eds), Ocean Yearbook, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2008) vol 22, 117, at 
132-135, the authors discussed this procedure. Though criticized for weakening 
implementation, it has been suggested that it can also protect a state from being bound to a 
decision that is inconsistent with its domestic legislation or beyond its current capacity to 
implement. These provisions provide stability and flexibility into the consensus approach and 
have been used only rarely. 
309 The Chairman’s Statement is attached to the Convention and serves to reconcile 
sovereignty arrangements within the Antarctic Treaty Area and the CCAMLR Area. ‘The 
Statement preserves juridical rights of all coastal states over their maritime zones surrounding 
sub-Antarctic territories located within the CCAMLR’ Discussed in ibid., at 144. 
310 For further discussion see ibid., at 143-151. Of note, consensus in terms of the ATS 
decision-making processes is defined as the lack of formal objection (supra n. 271). 
311 Article IX, Antarctic Treaty, Article IX, CCAS, Article XII, CCAMLR, Article 9 and 25, 
Madrid Protocol (through Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty). 
312 More detail on CRAMRA is provided in Chapter 3. Refer also to, among others, 
Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities and Its Future' in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall and M.G. Haward (eds), Antarctica's 
Future: Continuity or Change?, Australian Institute of International Affairs (1990) 47-60; and 
Peter J. Beck, 'Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Activity: A Major Addition 
to the ATS' (1989) 25(152) Polar Record 19-32. 
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effort on the part of the ATCPs to conclude a regulatory mechanism that dealt 
with difficult issues of exclusive title over resources, related jurisdictional, 
sovereignty and appropriation issues, as well as enforcement and liability 
issues.  
 
Rather than taking a resource or ecosystem-based approach (such as the 
precautionary approach in CCAMLR), CRAMRA approached the issues from 
the perspective of regulating the activities involved in mineral resource 
extraction and industry development, breaking down the activities into three 
stages. To undertake either prospecting, exploration or development, 
CRAMRA established a range of specific criteria that had to be met,313 
including, for example, management schemes under exploration 
requirements314 and development permits.315 CRAMRA’s institutions were 
given the authority to prevent progression of activities in the event that these 
obligations under the Convention were not met.316 Harm to the environment 
was assumed to correspond with the activities in all stages.  This assumption 
led to the development of a mechanism to evaluate and judge the acceptability 
of the pending harm, including the introduction of environmental impact 
assessment and the mandatory adoption of a regime of liability for 
environmental damage.317  
 
CRAMRA did not enter into force but it did serve to heighten the awareness 
of the ATCPs to issues concerning property rights, liability, environmental 
protection and confidentiality of commercial scientific information, and much 
of CRAMRA contributed to the Madrid Protocol.318 CRAMRA negotiations 
also served to open the ATS to the international community and the ATS 
                                                
313 Chapter III: Prospecting (Articles 37, 38), Chapter IV: Exploration (Articles 39-52), 
Chapter V: Development (Articles 53, 54), CRAMRA. 
314 Ibid., Article 46. 
315 Ibid., Article 53. 
316 For example, according to Article 31(1)(c) and Article 32, approval of Management 
Schemes and issuance of exploration and development permits is a function of Regulatory 
Committees undertaken by two-thirds majority. Refer also to Article 21: Functions of the 
Commission.  
317 According to Article 4(2) ‘no mineral resource activity shall take place until it is judged, 
based upon assessment of its possible impacts on the Antarctic environment and on dependent 
and on associated ecosystems’ and 8(9) ‘no application for an exploration or development 
permit shall be made until the [Liability] Protocol…is in force’. 
318 See supra n. 174, Joyner, at 301-338. 
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emerged with a wider membership including developing nations319 and non-
governmental organization involvement in the ATCMs.320  
 
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
The Madrid Protocol emerged as a response to the debate regarding 
environmental accountability for activities in the Antarctic, which were 
heightened by the negotiations of CRAMRA. The Madrid Protocol provides a 
mechanism alongside the Antarctic Treaty, for the ‘comprehensive protection 
of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems’, 
while designating Antarctica as a ‘natural reserve devoted to peace and 
science’.321 It applies environmental principles to all activities occurring in the 
Antarctic Treaty Area.322 As mentioned, mineral resource activities aside from 
scientific research are prohibited under the Madrid Protocol.323  
 
The Madrid Protocol introduced an obvious presence of environmental 
stewardship to the ATCPs, binding all Treaty signatories to its obligations and 
reaffirming the conservation principles of other instruments. The Final Act of 
the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting, which is attached 
to the Madrid Protocol, notes that ‘nothing in the Protocol shall derogate from 
the rights and obligations of Parties under the CCAMLR, CCAS and the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)’.324 
 
The Madrid Protocol includes 27 articles and six Annexes. The Annexes are 
integral to the Protocol and include: 
                                                
319 China acceded to the Antarctic Treaty 08 June 1983. India and Brazil acceded 12 
September 1983, available at: <http://www.ats.aq/membership_signatories.php>09 January 
2009. 
320 For example, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) has been an invited 
expert to the ATCMs since 1990. See R. Herr, 'The Changing Roles of Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the Antarctic Treaty System' in Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds), 
Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, 
Cambridge University Press (1996) 91, at 101. 
321 Article 2, Madrid Protocol.   
322 Ibid., Article 3: Environmental Principles.  
323 Ibid., Article 7: Prohibition of Mineral Resource Activities states that ‘Any activity 
relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall be prohibited.’ 
324 See para 7 of the Final Act of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting, 
Madrid, 04 October 1991, 27 ILM 1455.   
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 Annex I: Environmental Impact Assessment 
 Annex II: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora 
 Annex III: Waste Disposal and Waste Management 
Annex IV: Prevention of Marine Pollution  
Annex V: Area Protection and Management 
Annex VI: Liability Arising From Environmental Emergencies  
(not yet in force) 
 
The Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) is the central institution 
of the Madrid Protocol,325 reporting to the ATCM and making 
recommendations for the ATCPs to consider. The CEP is obliged to review 
the Annexes and make recommendations further to these reviews, including 
the interaction of emergent activities to the operation of the Madrid 
Protocol.326  
 
Provisions of the Madrid Protocol may be modified at any time through 
procedures in Article XII(1) of the Antarctic Treaty.327 This requires 
unanimous agreement of the ATCPs. Alternatively, a Review Conference may 
be convened fifty years after the entry into force of the Protocol. A 
modification requested through the review process must be adopted by ¾ 
majority, including a ¾ majority of the Consultative states present at the 
adopting of the original Protocol.328 The entry into force requires ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession of ¾ of the parties, including all of the 
parties present at the adoption of the original. With respect to the prohibition 
on mineral resource activities, special provisions were included for its 
amendment. The prohibition shall continue unless there is ‘in force a binding 
                                                
325 See Articles 11: Committee for Environmental Protection and Article 12: Functions of the 
Committee, Madrid Protocol. 
326 Ibid., Article 25(1). All CEP recommendations are tabled through the ATCMs for decision 
according to Article IX and XII of the Antarctic Treaty. The CEP began by reviewing Annex 
II: Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. Recommendations were tabled by Argentina, 
'Working Paper (WP) 17: Final Report of the Intersessional Contact Group on Annex II 
Review' (Paper presented at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXVIII - 
CEP VIII, 06-17 June, Stockholm, 2005). This Review was concluded at ATCM XXXII. See 
Australia, 'Working Paper (WP) 039: Annex II: Finalising the Review' (Paper presented at the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXXII - CEP XII, 06-17 April, Baltimore, 
2009). 
327 Article 25(1), Madrid Protocol. 
328 Ibid., Article 25(3). 
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legal regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities that includes an agreed 
means for determining whether, and, if so, under which conditions, any such 
activities would be acceptable’.329 Therefore, if a modification of the 
prohibition on mineral resource activities is proposed in a Review Conference, 
such Review Conference shall include a relevant binding regime.330 If a 
modification is proposed at any time prior to the fifty years, under provisions 
of Article XII(1) of the Antarctic Treaty, it is not similarly stated that a 
binding regime would have to accompany any proposed modification. 
However, the first sentence of Article 25(5)(a), establishing the requirement of 
the regime, does suggest its necessity in either modification mechanism. If 
any such amendment (with respect to the prohibition) has not entered into 
force within 3 years of the date of adoption, any party may at any time 
thereafter notify the Depository of its withdrawal from the Protocol.331 The 
withdrawal would take effect two years after the receipt of notification. These 
provisions are sometimes referred to as the ‘walk-away clause’ of the Madrid 
Protocol. Since the Madrid Protocol is integral to the Antarctic Treaty it 
would seem that any withdrawal from the Madrid Protocol may be interpreted 
as tantamount to withdrawal from the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
In summary, the ATS is an intricate arrangement of international agreements 
centered on the Antarctic Treaty.332 The Treaty itself establishes a framework 
of principles as well as the obligation for Consultative Parties to consult 
together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica and to 
consider, formulate and recommend to their governments measures in 
furtherance of the objectives and principles of the Treaty. Two separate but 
complimentary conventions with conservation principles that regulate harvest 
activities in and around Antarctica now exist (CCAS, CCAMLR), while the 
Madrid Protocol pulls together the 1964 Agreed Measures333 with other 
conservation Decisions and Measures, ensuring that comprehensive 
environmental protection is a consideration for all activities in the Treaty area. 
                                                
329 Ibid., Article 25(5)(a). 
330 Ibid., Article 25(5)(a). 
331 Ibid., Article 25(5)(b). 
332 Supra n. 282, Joyner, at 56. 
333 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Rec. III/8, Third 
Consultative Meeting, 1964, (‘Agreed Measures’). 
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The drafting of CRAMRA was a useful process through which the ATCPs 
evaluated access to resources, mechanisms for exchanging commercially 
valuable scientific information and the potential need for benefit sharing 
arrangements.  
Antarctic and customary international law 
The relationship between customary international law and the ATS is not 
clear. Yet the application of customary practice and normative rules is 
important when considering the activities of parties not bound to instruments 
within the ATS.334 Similar to the Arctic, customary international law also 
contributes as a source of law within the Antarctic operating system alongside 
the ATS regime, initiatives and other legal instruments.  
 
The provisions of the Antarctic Treaty may represent an intention by the 
original states to create obligations and rights relating to a particular area.335 
This intent, however, has never included binding obligations to those other 
than signatory parties. The use of ‘appropriate efforts’, mentioned in Article X 
of the Treaty, to be exerted by states to ensure that no one engages in activities 
contrary to the principles and purposes of the Antarctic Treaty does not 
translate to the ability to bind third parties. As well, Simma concluded that the 
Contracting Parties ‘never intended to grant third states sweeping rights’, such 
as participation in the amendment of the Treaty or exercise of any general 
right for which conditions and terms may confer in the Treaty.336 The 
application of the Antarctic Treaty as an objective regime, binding on all 
states, is, therefore, uncertain. Charney concluded in 1996 that Contracting 
Parties have also never attained the authority as a group to bind all third party 
                                                
334 See supra n. 23, 51-102. Charney, in particular, examined three theories through which 
Antarctic law could be considered a special body of international law, binding on all states 
The first theory relates to whether the Antarctic Treaty has established a legal regime binding 
on all states through an objective regime, the provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning 
third parties, and/or the special duty of cooperation granted to states under the UN Charter. 
Second, if Antarctica is considered a common heritage of mankind, the related doctrine would 
bind all states. Third, if the Antarctic Treaty and the ATS has obtained the necessary degree 
of international acceptance, there could be enough evidence to support the existence of a 
special international law for Antarctica, binding on all states. 
335 Such as Article I(1) and (2), II, III(1), V(1) and (2), VI and X, Antarctic Treaty. See ibid., 
at 66. 
336 Supra n. 21, at 195. 
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states that seek to take action in the Antarctic and it remains uncertain whether 
this authority has since developed.337  
 
The status of the Antarctic Treaty as an objective regime through its authority 
as a regional organization under Article 52 of the UN Charter has also been 
refuted. Charney remarks that regional organizations authorized by the 
Charter serve limited purposes, addressing the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and few of the ATS norms serve those purposes.338 
Moreover, the ICJ determined that before a treaty rule could be binding on all 
states, certain elements had to be satisfied and it is necessary that the 
provision should ‘be of a fundamentally norm creating character’.339 The 
unique situation of sovereignty in the Antarctic, under this criterion, weakens 
the argument for the Antarctic Treaty providing an objective regime, although 
it could be argued that appropriate efforts in accordance with Article X could 
promote norm development.340 While there are some situations where norms 
can be applicable to other states, these situations are most applicable to cases 
in which sovereignty is expressly recognized.341  
 
The Vienna Convention requires that rights under a treaty may be accepted by 
third parties by implication derived from failure to indicate a contrary view.342 
In the case of obligations, states have to expressly accept the obligations to be 
bound by them.343 While a number of states have expressed the acceptability 
of the principles of the Antarctic Treaty in the UNGA,344 no third parties have 
expressly communicated their consent to be bound directly to any obligations 
under the ATS. Nevertheless, obligations under the Antarctic Treaty may have 
become binding on those third parties that declared their acceptance of 
                                                
337 Supra n. 23, at 65. 
338 Ibid., at 64. 
339 Supra n. 26, at 48. 
340 Supra n. 23, at 63. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Article 36, Vienna Convention. 
343 Ibid., Article 35. 
344 See supra n. 23, at 68 and in particular fn 42 which details different statements of support 
for the application of norms of the ATS by both party and third party states, including 
developing states. 
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specific Antarctic norms during the UN debates.345 Furthermore, statements 
made through the UNGA and the informal acceptance of the application of 
norms will lend support to the consideration of the norms forming rules of 
customary international law.346 According to Triggs, lack of state practice can 
be compensated by the ‘commitment of states to the normative of the asserted 
rule’.347 
 
Customary status is more likely to arise from binding third parties through the 
application of principles of general international law for in respect to certain 
rights and obligations within the ATS. Certain norms for the Antarctic, such 
as promotion of scientific research, demilitarization and protection of the 
environment, have been articulated and have become accepted as law. The 
Antarctic Treaty Parties have sought, through Article X, to make these norms 
applicable to the entire community.348 As well, so far, every state interested in 
pursuing activities in the Antarctic has become a member to various 
instruments within the ATS under their own initiatives or in conjunction with 
other member states.349 As a consequence, to quote Charney, ‘a number of 
international norms originally derived from the ATS have become assimilated 
into rules of general international law binding on all states.’350 These include 
non-nuclearization, non-militarization, freedom of scientific research and 
open access.351  
 
                                                
345 Ibid., at 71. 
346 See above discussion on customary international law, supra n. 27, Committee on the 
Formation of Customary (General) Law, at 59. 
347 Supra n. 26, at 50. 
348 According to Article X, Antarctic Treaty, 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity 
contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
349 A possible exception would be Malaysia. Malaysia has not yet signed the Antarctic Treaty. 
Since 2002, however, Malaysia has been invited to observe the ATCMs and has benefited 
from collaborative scientific expeditions and support from Contracting Parties. Each year a 
similar invitation may be extended to third party states in the same manner that invitations are 
extended to non-governmental organizations. See, for example, Final Report of ATCM XXVI - 
CEP VI (2003) Madrid, Spain 
<http://www.ats.aq/documents/atcm_fr_images/ATCM26_fr001_e.pdf> , at 13 May 2008, at 
para 172. 
350 Supra n. 23, at 81. 
351 Ibid., at 95-96. 
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Charney also recognizes that a special obligation to protect the Antarctic 
environment has become increasingly clear. This norm has been given 
substance through recommendations and measures over time and has been 
assimilated into the Madrid Protocol, in force since 1998. Several norms are 
identified within the Madrid Protocol including the duty to perform 
environmental impact assessments, the duty to continually monitor impact and 
take remedial action, the obligation to protect and preserve the Antarctic 
environment, the obligation to facilitate scientific research there, and possibly 
the ban on mineral resource activity.352 Implementation of the general norm of 
environmental protection may require detailed attention not readily realizable 
by customary law and ‘while the basic principles may be merged readily into 
general international law, it is more difficult to consider the entire convention 
as general international law.’353  
 
Similarly, it is difficult to apply the general principle of CHM across the 
Antarctic. The reference in the Treaty’s preamble to the ‘progress of all 
mankind’ may be interpreted to mean that Antarctic resources constitute some 
form of common heritage, implying that equal access and shared-benefit 
should accompany commercial involvement.354 This interpretation is not 
universally recognized.355 The common heritage doctrine cannot simply be 
applied to areas subject to or claimed to be within the territory of states356 and 
Article IV does not expressly render the Antarctic beyond national jurisdiction 
for claimant states.357 Although political support (by non-Parties and non-state 
actors) for the application of CHM has, in the past, been apparent with respect 
                                                
352 Ibid., at 97. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Supra n. 282, Joyner at 222 and Alan D. Hemmings, 'A Question of Politics: 
Bioprospecting and the Antarctic Treaty System' in A. Hemmings and M. Rogan-Finnemore 
(eds), Antarctic Bioprospecting, Gateway Antarctica Special Publication Series 0501, 
Gateway Antarctica (2005) 98, at 98. 
355 The doctrine of CHM has been applied to the Antarctic through two theories. The first 
theory is that the international community has created a doctrine that is applicable to all areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. In light of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, Antarctica may be 
considered an area beyond national jurisdiction and therefore susceptible to application of 
such doctrine. The second theory relies on the idea that regardless of general applicability, the 
CHM doctrine has been established as a fundamental rule of law for the Antarctic. 
356 Supra n. 23, at 79. 
357 In light of the presence of claimant states, whether recognized or not, rights and 
obligations associated with the common heritage doctrine cannot be assumed to apply for 
parties interested in activities in the Antarctic. 
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to the Antarctic,358 evidence relating to its application is lacking.359 As well, 
since the CHM doctrine is in force through only two applications in 
international law, the necessary opinio juris and state practice in support of its 
general application is also missing.360 
 
State practice regarding the obligation to protect and preserve the 
environment, as a general rule, does not have to stem from all states to be 
applicable to all states through the formation of customary international law. 
The norm also does not have to be derived from treaty law.361 However, given 
that only states interested in pursuing activities in the Antarctic have 
demonstrated practice related to this norm, it may be difficult to assume the 
norm is transferable to all states. It may also be difficult to interpret the 
prohibition on mineral resource activities as normative and capable of 
developing into customary international law. Can the practice of not 
practicing something be considered evidence of state practice towards the 
norm? The Madrid Protocol also specifically provides for the obligation to 
develop an appropriate regulatory regime in the event that interest in mineral 
resource activities become more substantial and the ban is to be lifted.362 If a 
provision exists for the exercise of a right in contrast to the assumed norm, 
does that nullify the ability of that rule to be normative, as required for its 
evolution into customary international law? 
 
With respect to the sovereignty provisions, there may be a case against 
development as customary international law. If Article IV(2) of the Antarctic 
Treaty were applied as a general rule, the ambiguity constructed out of the 
provisions stating that no acts or activities constitute a basis for asserting, 
                                                
358 In particular, the African Unity declared Antarctica the CHM in 1985 and Malaysia 
continued to press the issue through the UN debates on the Question of Antarctica from 1983 
until 1993. However, subsequent debate in the UNGA failed to incorporate any support for 
this declaration. See supra n. 23, at 78. 
359 Ibid. 
360 The Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 
opened for signature 18 December 1979, 18 ILM 1434, entered into force 11 July 1984 and 
the LOSC with the Implementing Agreement are the two applications of the common heritage 
doctrine. See ibid., at 77. 
361 Supra n. 26, at 50. 
362 Article 25, Madrid Protocol. 
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supporting or denying a claim,363 could work in favour of third party states.364 
Third party states often do not support the view that Antarctica can be subject 
to territorial sovereignty, therefore, the claims may have a questionable basis 
in international law.365 While the Antarctic Treaty does not purport to settle 
the sovereignty question, any entitlement to third parties in this field would be 
detrimental to the ATS and could be the ultimate challenge to sovereignty 
claimed by the claimant states.366 
 
In summary, it is safe to assume that certain norms developed through the 
ATS have evolved into general rules of customary international law, binding 
on all parties. However, specific provisions of the Antarctic Treaty may not 
evolve into customary law. While normative rules have evolved from the 
conventions and treaties of the ATS regime, the conventions and treaties 
themselves do not provide for objective regimes and are not binding on third 
parties unless consent to be bound is expressed.367 Statements within and 
outside the UNGA lend support to normative principles within the ATS and to 
the authority of the ATCPs in the development of instruments and initiatives 
towards the operation of norms. However, the ATCPs cannot confer rights 
and obligations on third party states, or establish law for all states. 
Nonetheless, the combination of leadership by the ATCPs and acceptance of 
norms developed through the ATS by the rest of the international community 
does create generally applicable law for Antarctica, specific to Antarctica, but 
in conformity with general international law.  
 
                                                
363 Article IV(2), Antarctic Treaty. 
364 Supra n. 21, at 195. 
365 Supra n. 23, at 92. 
366 Charney discussed statements made by the United Kingdom during the 1980s, the time 
during which the ATS received significant criticism from developing states through the UN 
debates. The UK stated that the purpose of the Antarctic Treaty was not to purport to confer 
rights on States Parties but that rights created are in principle limited to what is necessary to 
achieve certain objectives. The UK supports all norms developed by the ATS but (the UK) 
opposes its evolution into customary international law. This could perhaps constitute an 
example of the persistent objector rule. See ibid., at 91-92. 
367 In general, third party states have not readily consented to being bound by its obligations. 
Malaysia is the only possible exception. Malaysia, as a third party, has been invited to observe 
the ATCMs and voluntarily appreciates the terms of the Antarctic Treaty without having 
consented to be bound to it. 
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Actors 
The actors are the second component of the Antarctic operating system and 
are comprised of all of the signatory states of the Antarctic Treaty, CCAS, and 
CCAMLR. This examination, however, focuses primarily on the Contracting 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty that are claimant states. Their interaction with 
other key ATCPs within the system is an important element of this discussion. 
Key ATCPs include claimant and non-claimant states. These actors are 
engaged in the Antarctic operating system through their commitment to the 
Antarctic Treaty and the rules and procedures set forth by that commitment. 
ATCPs have demonstrated significant interest in the Antarctic and have the 
ability to contribute to decisions taken within the ATCM. Article IX(2) of the 
Antarctic Treaty establishes that each Contracting Party shall appoint a 
representative to participate in ATCMs. A representative shall attain voting 
privileges in the ATCM once the party attains Consultative Party status 
through a demonstration of its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial 
scientific research.368 Through revisions to guidelines and procedures for 
recognition of new Consultative Parties in 1987 and again 1997, scientific 
interest was given a wider interpretation.369  
 
Often the role of non-signatory states or third party states is considered within 
the Antarctic regime. However, in accordance to the Vienna Convention, a 
state is not under the obligations of a treaty unless it is a signatory party to 
such treaty. Therefore, in this examination, third party states are not viewed to 
exist within the operating system. Nonetheless, the interaction of rights 
between third party states and the ATCPs will be discussed. 
 
                                                
368 Article (IX)(2), Antarctic Treaty. 
369 Guidelines in respect of Consultative Party recognition recommended that information 
describing previous, existing and future scientific programs and their relationship to long term 
scientific objectives should be included in information supporting Consultative Party states. 
The description should also include information regarding governmental and non-
governmental programs and activities. See ATCM XIV(1987), 05-16 October, Rio de Janeiro: 
Guidelines on notification with respect to Consultative status and Decision 2(1997) – ATCM 
XXI, 19-30 May, Christchurch: Revised procedures for the recognition of new Consultative 
Parties which acknowledged that scientific research and environmental efforts would be 
considered in granting Consultative status. See also Decision 1(2008) ATCM XXXI - CEP 
XI, 02-13 June, Kyiv: Amendment to the Rules and Procedures. 
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Jurisdiction 
The third component of the operating system is jurisdiction, which defines the 
rights of actors to deal with legal problems and violations.370 In the Antarctic, 
all states have jurisdiction over their nationals for activities conducted in the 
Antarctic.371 States can make and enforce laws concerning conduct of their 
nationals in Antarctica. Claimant states, as claimants, believe in their 
jurisdiction over their claimed area but this jurisdiction is conditioned by the 
provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. In light of Articles IV(2), 
which states that no acts or activities will constitute a basis for asserting, 
denying or supporting claims to territorial sovereignty, the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the claimed areas cannot limit or prejudice the rights and 
exercise of rights of other signatory states. Claimant states do not have the 
authority to enforce laws on other states and their nationals. In light of the fact 
that this provision exists only within the Antarctic Treaty and for Contracting 
Parties, the ability of ATCPs to enforce laws over other states is unclear. 
Under the discussion of customary law, the acceptance of the leadership of the 
ATCPs and normative principles still did not grant authority to the ATCPs in 
a manner that would occur under a joint jurisdictional regime, joint 
sovereignty regime or condominium.372  
 
As long as the exercise of coastal state rights and obligations – specified 
through the LOSC or customary in nature, for example – does not create 
exclusivity or limit the ability of other states signed onto the Antarctic Treaty, 
the jurisdictional differences can co-exist in an operating system. By signing 
into the Antarctic Treaty states agree to these conditions and legislate 
accordingly. As mentioned above, if a state has not become a Contracting 
Party to the Antarctic Treaty, the state is considered external to the operating 
system. Only Contracting Parties are bound by Article IV of the Treaty. Non-
                                                
370 Supra n. 1, at 47. 
371 Article VIII(1), Antarctic Treaty. 
372 The different jurisdictional options were discussed at length during the minerals 
negotiations in light of the need for jurisdiction for the assignment of property rights and 
benefits accrued from mineral exploitation. See in particular, William E. Westermeyer, The 
Politics of Mineral Resource Development in Antarctica: Alternative Regimes for the Future, 
Westview Press (1984), at 56-97 and S.K.N. Blay, R.W. Piotrowicz and B.M. Tsamenyi, 
'Antarctica After 1991: The Legal and Policy Options' (1989) 2 Antarctic and Southern Ocean 
Law and Policy Occasional Papers 1-28.  
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contracting states are not bound by the provisions of the ATS, and may prefer 
to perceive the Antarctic as a global commons (terra communis) or a land 
owned by no one (terra nullius). However, resulting norms of the ATS and 
the leadership of the ATCPs has been accepted, or at least not denied, by the 
international community, so any perception would potentially fall in line with 
normative principles. Alternately, third party states may choose to recognize 
the Antarctic Treaty as a jurisdictional regime even thought the exercise of 
jurisdiction is limited. After almost fifty years of being in force, it would be 
difficult to deny the significance of the ATS; its acceptance in the 
international community was discussed previously. However, a state is able to 
leave its opinion and recognition mute until such time that recognition or non-
recognition becomes useful. 
 
Within Antarctic governance, there is the possibility that jurisdiction may 
overlap with other international organizations. For example, it has been 
suggested that the ISBA has jurisdiction over the entire seabed south of 
60˚S.373 Alternatively, the amount of Area managed by the ISBA may be 
reduced by the continental shelf claims of Antarctic claimant states even 
though coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf appurtenant to the 
Antarctic continent may not be recognized.374 It could also be argued that the 
ISBA could have authority and jurisdiction over the seabed off the unclaimed 
sector, with the ability to exploit the seabed right up to the low water mark.375 
These types of jurisdictional uncertainties exist within the operating system 
and may not be settled until the need arises. 
  
Institutions 
The fourth component of the operating system includes the institutions within 
the system that create fora and rules to hear disputes and decisions. The 
Antarctic Treaty establishes that ATCPs are entitled to participate in decision-
                                                
373 See discussion in supra n. 197, at 282-285 on the consideration as to whether parts of the 
Southern Ocean are classified as ‘Area’. See also supra n. 246, at 209. 
374 Ibid, n. 246. 
375 Supra n. 195, at 283. 
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making while other Contracting Parties do not.376 Other NGOs such as the 
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Reseacrh (SCAR), the Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) and the International Association of 
Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) are invited experts, which are able to 
contribute expert factual information to the meetings.377 The Antarctic Treaty 
establishes that Decisions, Resolutions, and Measures of the ATCMs are 
taken by consensus by the ATCPs.378 While only Measures are legally 
binding,379 Resolutions and Decisions still highlight the dynamic process of 
the system, including integration of realpolitik and diplomacy.380 The agenda 
of each ATCM is agreed to by consensus, thus it is driven and changed by the 
influence of the Parties. The ATS has an Antarctic Treaty Secretariat, 
established in 2004, following ATCM XXVI Measure 1(2003),381 which 
functions as a central depository for all treaty and related documents as well 
as a central clearing house mechanism for information. CCAMLR has its own 
Executive Secretary heading the CCAMLR Commission whereas CCAS does 
not currently have an overarching institutional body.382  
 
Within the ATS, momentum for regulatory action is built through 
consideration and debate of information tabled in ATCM Information Papers 
(IPs) and Working Papers (WPs) as well as informal discussions amongst 
parties.383 ATCPs return to agenda items through intersessional arrangements 
                                                
376 In accordance with Article IX(2), Antarctic Treaty. 
377 Non-governmental organizations and international organizations can be invited to observe 
the ATCMs as ‘experts’. For a list of attendance refer to Part A of the ATCM Final Reports 
available from the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat Home Page <http://www.ats.aq/ > at 13 
August 2009. Non-Consultative Contracting states were invited to attend ATCM XII (1983) 
in Canberra and a Recommendation to continue this invitation was done at ATCM XIII in 
Brussels. See Recommendation XIII-15 (1985) - ATCM XIII, 08-18 October, Brussels: Non-
Consultative Parties Invited to ATCMs and supra n. 283, at 181-187.  
378 Article IX(4), Antarctic Treaty. 
379 In accordance with Decision 1(1995) - ATCM XIX, 08-19 May, Seoul: Recommendations 
divided into Measures, Decisions and Resolutions. 
380 See supra n. 320, at 91-110 for further discussion on ATCM rules and procedures. 
381 Measure 1(2003) - ATCM XXVI - CEP VI, 09-20 June, Madrid: Secretariat of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Refer also to the. 
382 CCAS is under the wing of the British Government but is a dormant instrument. Sealing no 
longer takes place and the Madrid Protocol and CCAMLR provide current measures of 
environmental protection to the marine ecosystem. 
383 Working Papers (WPs) are translated into the four official Treaty languages and can only 
be tabled by State Parties and agencies of the Parties such as the Secretariat, SCAR and 
Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) at the ATCM. Only WPs 
provide a sound basis for discussion at the meetings whereas Information Papers (IPs) are 
 101 
and subsequent ATCMs to allow ongoing discussion. Issues related to the 
marine environment may have a platform of discussion within CCAMLR 
Meetings as well as ATCM and the CEP.  
 
With respect to dispute settlement, according to Article VIII(2) of the 
Antarctic Treaty, Contracting Parties ‘concerned in any case of dispute with 
regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult 
together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.’ Article XI 
establishes that if a dispute arises the Contracting Parties involved in the 
dispute shall consult amongst themselves ‘with a view to having the dispute 
resolved by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice.’ Any dispute not 
resolved through these processes shall be referred to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). Similar provisions are established in CCAMLR, Article 
XXV.384 State Parties to LOSC can also access the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea and other arbitral tribunals as designated upon signature, 
accession or ratification of LOSC.385   
 
Conclusion to the Antarctic operating system 
The Antarctic operating system is a complex mixture of sources of law that 
evolve from general international processes such as treaty law and the 
formation of customary law. Amongst these sources of law is the Antarctic 
specific regime, the ATS. The ATS regime functions alongside, and in 
conformity with, general international law while also providing a source of 
normative rules specific to the Antarctic. Sovereignty and jurisdiction are 
established through the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. This 
provision establishes a consistent approach within the system but only applies 
                                                                                                                          
essentially for information only and are not ordinarily translated. Discussion rarely becomes 
substantive unless an agenda item attracts at least one WP. Refer to supra n. 354, Hemmings, 
at 123, fn 22. 
384 According to Article XXV(1), Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves with a 
view to resolving the dispute. Any dispute not resolved shall be referred to an arbitral tribunal 
for which provisions are established in Annex I of CCAMLR or for settlement by the ICJ in 
accordance with Article XXV(2), CCAMLR. 
385 Article 287, LOSC. 
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to Contracting Parties and cannot be considered customary international law, 
though possibly normative for the Antarctic.  
 
Decisions regarding matters under the ATS are taken by consensus between 
ATCPs for the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol, CCAMLR Commission 
and Contracting Parties for CCAS. Measures are binding whereas Resolutions 
and Decisions, or even instruments such as guidelines, are voluntarily 
implemented. The ATCM provides a pivotal forum bringing parties and 
observers together for both formal and informal discussions. Decisions or 
initiatives can evolve on unilateral, bilateral or multilateral terms. As in every 
operating system, diplomacy is an important aspect of the international 
relations between Contracting Parties within the operating system and for 
interaction with third states outside of the operating system. As well, because 
the ATS co-exists within the operating system with other sources of law, the 
platforms of discussion will reflect not only provisions associated with the 
ATS but those connected to other treaties and regimes. 
 
Thus, the Antarctic operating system includes various institutions as platforms 
for discussion of issues and the resolution of disputes that may arise. 
Decisions, initiatives, outcomes or measures sought through the operating 
system contribute to the structure and the stability of the system over time. 
This capacity is a carried out through an array of characteristics unique to the 
Antarctic operating system. In the following chapters, case studies will further 
examine these characteristics as they contribute to or undermine operating 
system robustness. 
 
1.5 Chapter conclusion 
In each operating system, international law provides the foundation of law 
making and sources of law, onto which treaty law, customary international 
law and various instruments and initiatives are added. Diplomacy and 
international relations on both formal and informal levels play a crucial role 
for the actors within the system. Each operating system has a unique 
arrangement of sources of law, actors, jurisdiction and institutions. The 
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sources of law include elements specific to each region. In the Arctic, the 
regional initiatives are non-binding. In the Antarctic a binding regime has 
been created based on the Antarctic Treaty. The predominant actors within the 
system, for the purposes of this examination, include claimant or coastal 
states. Jurisdiction plays a more traditional role in the Arctic where territorial 
sovereignty is not under question and maritime boundaries are, for the most 
part, agreed upon. Jurisdiction in the Antarctic has a bifocal nature, being 
recognized and asserted by the claimant states while at the same time not 
recognized by other Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty or third party 
states.  
 
The balance of sources of law, actors, jurisdiction, institutions and 
international relations affects how issues and initiatives unfold in each 
operating system. The non-binding nature of the Arctic Council, as well as 
other regional fora, gives context to Arctic issues and debates. Similarly, the 
balance of Decisions, Resolutions and Measures with the ATCMs, and the 
influence of other hard law instruments set the stage for Antarctic issues. 
Regional responsibilities and transparency exist for each system.  
 
Meanwhile, the examination of regional governance must also acknowledge 
the physical characteristics of the regions, such as isolation, frigid 
temperatures, hostile winds and dangerous maritime conditions. For example, 
impracticality can contribute to problems with compliance and enforcement in 
the polar regions. Hence, the capacity or robustness of the operating system 
may not be adequately assessed by the ability to implement, comply with or 
enforce measures. The following case studies provide a broader perspective of 
the manner in which each operating system accommodates challenging 
debates or controversial issues. State practice, legal rights and responsibilities, 
political will and diplomacy are combined in a web of elements discussing 
participant confidence and effectiveness in a test of robustness. 
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Table 1: Components of the polar operating systems 
 
 
1. Sources of law and law-making  
ARCTIC ANTARCTIC 
International Law – principles through 
Vienna Convention and United Nations 
Charter 
 
LOSC 
IMO Conventions 
 
Various multilateral, bilateral, unilateral 
arrangements 
International Law – principles through 
Vienna Convention and United Nations 
Charter 
 
LOSC 
IMO Conventions 
ATS 
Various multilateral, bilateral, unilateral 
arrangements 
2. Actors 
Arctic States, including the Coastal States, 
Iceland, Finland and Sweden (Member 
States of the Arctic Council) 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties 
and Contracting Parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty 
3. Jurisdiction 
In accordance with LOSC Applied through Article IV, VIII and IX 
of the Antarctic Treaty in conformity 
with the LOSC 
4. Institutions 
Arctic Council Meetings, Meetings of 
Regional Fora 
ICJ, ITLOS, Arbitral Tribunals 
 
ATCM, CEP Meetings, COMNAP  
Meetings, CCAMLR Meetings, ICJ, 
ITLOS, Arbitral Tribunals 
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Chapter Two: Arctic Waterways 
 
2.1 Arctic waterways 
Arctic shipping already exists to supply northern communities and support 
hydrocarbon and mineral resource production of the Canadian, Norwegian 
and Russian Arctic.1 As known reserves of oil and gas begin to diminish and 
the need to secure future energy supply continues, access to, from and through 
the Arctic will become increasingly important. Two Arctic waterways link 
Asia with Europe; the Northwest Passage (NWP) through the Canadian 
archipelago and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) off the northern coast of the 
Russian Federation (Figure 1). Use of traditional carriers in these waterways 
and throughout the Arctic depends on the condition of the sea ice and the 
surrounding marine environment. Thus far, the capacity for transit passage 
through these passageways has been limited. With the recent notable decline 
in sea ice extent through the northern summer,2 questions have resurfaced 
regarding the potential for Arctic shipping through these waterways and its 
regulation.3 Following this review of the Arctic waterways debate, further 
discussion on the potential for Arctic shipping alongside offshore oil and gas 
development will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
                                                
1 Approximately 6000 vessels were reported to have been active in the Arctic in 2004 with 
most oil and gas related activities occurring in the Barents region north of Norway and 
Russia. PAME, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (2009) Arctic Council 
<http://pame.arcticportal.org/images/stories/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf> 
at 10 November 2009, at 72-76. 
2 Ibid., at 25-30. 
3 For an excellent review of issues regarding Arctic Shipping see Aldo Chircop, 'The Growth 
of International Shipping in the Arctic: Is a Regulatory Review Timely?' (2009) 24(2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 355-380. 
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Figure 1: Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route4 
 
The legal status of the waterways has not been universally recognized. The 
debate remains whether the waterways are international straits, through which 
transit passage exists, internal waters with the right of innocent passage, 
internal waters in the absence of the right of innocent passage, or water under 
the regime of the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone under provisions 
of Article 234.5 Canada and Russia claim that the NWP and NSR, 
respectively, are internal waters on a number of bases of international law 
including historic internal waters, the enclosure by straight baselines, and 
                                                
4 Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route 
<http://maps.grida.no/library/files/arctic_sea_routes_northern_sea_route_and_northwest_pass
age_003.png> at 02 December 2009. 
5 See Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde, 'Who Controls the Northwest Passage?' (2009) 
42(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1133-1210; Ted L. McDorman, Salt Water 
Neighbors: International Ocean Law Relations Between the United States and Canada, 
Oxford University Press (2009), Chapter Six, at 225-253, and Donat Pharand, 'The Arctic 
Water and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit' (2007) 38(1&2) Ocean Development and 
International Law 3-69 for excellent overviews of the Northwest passage debate. The 
Northern Sea Route and Northeast passage are discussed comprehensively by Douglas R. 
Brubaker, 'Regulation of Navigation and Vessel-Source Pollution in the Northern Sea Route: 
Article 234 and State Practice' in Davor Vidas (ed), Protecting the Polar Marine 
Environment, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge University Press (2000) 221-243; 
Douglas R. Brubaker, 'Straits in the Russian Arctic' (2001) 32(3) Ocean Development & 
International Law 263-287; and Douglas R. Brubaker and Willy Østreng, 'The Northern Sea 
Route: Exquisite Superpower Subterfuge?' (1999) 30(4) Ocean Development and 
International Law 299-331. 
Canada 
US 
Russian 
Federation 
Greenland 
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similarity to the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case.6 These arguments are 
supplemented and expanded by other claims and provisions.7 The US claims 
that straits of the NWP and NSR are international straits used for international 
navigation, protecting their freedom of navigation doctrine. Although 
numerous protests from the US have arisen regarding particular incidents in 
the Canadian and Russian Arctic, state practice of the US also undermines the 
protests in a number of areas.8 Controversy remains as to the strength of the 
US claim as opposed to the Canadian and Russian claims. Resolving the 
debate, in as much as labelling the waterways definitely internal waters or 
definitely international straits, is far from simple. Ambiguity and lack of 
judicial precedent, resting solely on the ICJ’s Corfu Channel Case of 1949,9 
provides little in the way of definitive guidance or answers.  
 
Nonetheless, issues related to Arctic navigation within these waterways have 
been integrated into the Arctic operating system by relevant actors in the 
absence of prejudice towards the rights of other states. Interests that appear 
divergent can be absorbed within the Arctic operating system without 
compromising the varying positions or perspectives. Beyond the formalization 
of sources of law and jurisdiction, the ability to not prejudice the rights of 
other states is possible. Participant confidence within the system is also 
paramount. By examining the evolution of the issues surrounding the NWP 
and the NSR within the operating system, with a particular focus on the 
                                                
6 The issue between Norway and the United Kingdom in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
Case was whether the baselines drawn in the Royal Decree of 1935 for the delimitation of the 
fisheries zone were drawn in accordance with international law. From this case it became 
apparent that baselines must not depart from the general direction of the coast, sea areas 
enclosed must be sufficiently linked to land and certain economic interests in the area have 
occurred over time. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (Norway vs United Kingdom), ICJ 
Reports (18 December 1951), at 120, 122, 124-125, 132 and 142. Supra n. 5, Brubaker 
(1999), at 194, Brubaker (2001), at 265 and fn 6, and Byers and Lalonde, at 1146-1178. 
7 Ibid., Brubaker (2001) and supra n. 5, Pharand, for a comprehensive review of the Canadian 
claims. 
8 US practice conforms to existing Canadian and Russian regulations with respect to 
commercial and state vessels undertaking surface passage in the NSR and NWP. Under 
Article 236 of LOSC, state vessels undertaking non-commercial passage are exempt under 
sovereign immunity. Examining US practice, it appears that rather than the ownership of the 
vessel, it is the mode of transit that dictates compliance to the transit regime and freedom of 
navigation. Freedom of navigation for submarines is unconditional whereas the US accepts 
that environmental regulations restrict freedom of surface passage. For further examination of 
this issue see supra n. 5, Brubaker and Østreng, at 313 and 318, and Brubaker (2001), at 279. 
9 Corfu Channel Case (Merits), Summaries of Judgement of 09 April 1949 (UK vs Albania) 
[1949] International Court of Justice Reports. 
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sources of law, law-making, state practice, and diplomatic channels amongst 
the key actors (Canada, Russia and the US) variables of participant 
confidence, non-prejudicial measures/outcomes and flexibility within the 
operating system can be identified, contributing to the examination of 
operating system robustness. 
 
2.2 Northwest Passage 
The NWP is comprised of a collection of alternative maritime transit routes 
linking Europe and the Atlantic Ocean with Asia and the Pacific Ocean 
through the northern archipelago of Canada from the Canada Basin between 
Greenland and Canada to the Beaufort Sea and Bering Strait between Alaska 
and the Russian Federation (Figure 1). Incidentally, seven different routes 
have been used for transit of the Northwest Passage, described in Pharand.10 
The passage, if used, can save up to 9000 km as compared to the Panama 
Canal and 17 000 km as compared to the Cape Horn route around the southern 
tip of South America. The deepwater route of the NWP can also accommodate 
super-tankers and container ships that exceed Panama Canal dimension 
restrictions.11 Surface transit through the NWP has always been limited to the 
summer months because of the extent of sea ice and even in the summer 
transits encounter varying degrees of sea ice both in thickness and extent.12 As 
a result, so far, very infrequent transits occur. For example, between 1906 and 
1987 there were only 36 recorded surface transits.13 Between 1903 and 2005, 
a total of 69 foreign transits were recorded, not including any Canadian 
                                                
10 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 29. Five of these routes are also described in supra n. 1, at 21. 
11 Vessels are restricted to dimensions of 294 m x 32 m and maximum draft of 12 m in the 
Panama Canal. As Byers and Lalonde report, more and more vessels are being built that 
exceed these dimensions. The relatively calm, protected regions of the Arctic archipelago may 
become increasingly attractive for transit. Supra n. 5, Byers and Lalonde, at 1142. 
12 See ACIA, 'Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Scientific Report' (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), at 454-457 and corresponding predictions for future impacts in ACIA, 'Impacts 
of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Overview Report' (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), at 82-84. High year to year variability in sea ice extent in the NWP is 
also described in supra n. 1, at 27 and supra n. 5, Byers and Lalonde, at 1138. Byers and 
Lalonde describe the Arctic Oscillation which can push ice away from the Russian coast 
while pressing sea ice in the Canadian Arctic against the northwest flank of the archipelago, 
trapping multi-year ice and congesting waterways. 
13 James Kraska, 'The Law of the Sea Convention and the Northwest Passage' (2007) 22(2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 257, at 263. 
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transits.14 Recent reports on climate change in the Arctic have indicated that 
the transit route may become more favourable as sea ice extent decreases.15 
Models used in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, published in 2004, 
provide a range of predictions from increased volatility in the nature of the sea 
ice present to relatively similar conditions as experienced now, to completely 
ice free summers.16 As sea ice extent declines and environmental conditions 
change, interest in transit through the NWP will increase. Already in 2007, 
small ships were able to traverse parts of the NWP previously inaccessible.17   
 
2.3 Northern Sea Route 
The Northern Sea Route (NSR) is a waterway located north of the Russian 
Federation that provides a transit route between islands offshore Russia and 
the northern coast of mainland Russia (Figure 1).18 It connects the northwest 
of Russia with the Bering Strait, covering roughly 2,200 to 2,900 miles of 
often ice-covered and shallow waters. It is part of the larger Northeast 
                                                
14 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 31-33; Table 1: Foreign Transits of the Northwest Passage (1903-
2005). 
15 Supra n. 1, at 25-34, supra n. 12, ACIA Overview Report and J. Richter-Menge and J.E. 
Overland, Arctic Report Card 2009 (2009) <http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/reportcard> at 02 
November 2009, at 9-12. 
16 The AMSA integrates findings of the ACIA, more recent research from 2006-2008 and the 
2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), reporting that the 
Arctic Ocean may be ice free for part of the summer as early as 2015, consistently ice free by 
2040-2050 and that even though sea ice extent will continue to decline, regional variability 
will continue to present challenges to Arctic shipping. As well, models indicated that the 
Arctic Ocean would never be completely free of sea ice in an annual cycle. Supra n. 1, at 24-
34 and supra n. 12, ACIA Overview Report, at 82-84. See also Rob Huebert, Northern 
Interests and Canadian Foreign Policy (2003) Paper prepared for Canadian Defence and 
Foreign Affairs Institute, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary 
<http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Northern%20Interests%20and%20Canadian%20Foreign%20Poli
cy.pdf> at 03 July 2007, at 4. 
17 Supra n. 3, at 355. 
18 There are numerous different definitions of the NSR. See for example, Leonid Tymchenko, 
'The Northern Sea Route: Russian Management and Jurisdiction over Navigation in Arctic 
Seas' in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R. Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar 
Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001) 269, at 271 which 
provides the definition reproduced from the Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the 
Northern Sea, (1991) 29 Izveshcheniya moreplavatelyam, MO SSSR, GUNiO. Article 1(2) 
states: 
The Northern Sea Route – the essential transportation line of the USSR that is 
situated within inland seas, territorial sea (territorial waters), or exclusive economic 
zone adjacent to the USSR Northern Coast and includes seaways suitable for leading 
ships in ice, the extreme points of which are limited in the west by the western 
entrances to the Novaia Zemilia Straits and the meridian running north through Mys 
Zhelaniia, and in the east (in the Bering Strait) by the 66˚N and the meridian 
168˚59’37”W.  
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Passage, which comprises an aggregate of seaways connecting the ports of 
Europe, Asia and America.19 Use of the NSR can potentially halve the 
distance between Europe and northeast Asia. For example, a voyage between 
Hamburg and Yokohama would be 6,600 miles through the NSR as compared 
to 11,400 miles through the Suez Canal. There is no single channel of transit 
through the sea route. The NSR crosses a series of individual seas that are 
linked by almost 60 straits running through the northern archipelago and the 
presence and condition of sea ice often determines the course.20 Shallow 
sections, sometimes only 8-13 m in depth, choked by sea ice provide ample 
opportunity for hazardous navigation. Nevertheless, the western section of the 
NSR has been navigable year round since the 1978/79 winter.21 After six 
years (1993-1999) of investigating the possibilities for commercial navigation, 
the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP),22 concluded that 
in spite of climatic, technological and political constraints, an increase in 
commercial shipping is feasible in economic, technological and environmental 
terms.23 Concluded in 1999, INSROP had not included climate change and sea 
ice retreat variables in feasibility assessments. In work published in 2000, 
Brubaker comments that the international shipping community had ‘thus far, 
never seriously contemplated acquiring the necessary capability for using the 
NSR.’24 However, alterations in the presence and pattern of sea ice now 
indicate that an increase in marine shipping and commercial use of the NSR 
are a real possibility.25 In August/September 2009 the first successful 
                                                
19 Ibid. See also supra n. 1, at 23 and 34 for descriptions of the Russian Maritime Arctic and 
NSR. 
20 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000), at 221. 
21 History of transit through the Northeast Passage and NSR is described in supra n. 1, at 43-
47. The PAME report gives a detailed account of transit developments, the changes in 
administration, as well as describing the International NSR Programme. 
22 INSROP began in 1993, comprised of mutual cooperation between the Fridtjof Nansen 
Institute (Norway), the Central Marine Research and Design Institute (Russia) and the Ship 
and Ocean Foundation (Japan). The programme lasted six years and produced 167 Working 
Papers. See supra n. 18, at 275 for a brief overview of the programme and results. 
23 Ibid., and fn 35 for the INSROP Newsletter 3(2) June 1995. 
24 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000), at 223. 
25 Supra n. 12, ACIA Overview Report: Key Finding #6: Reduced Sea Ice is Very Likely to 
Increase Marine Transport and Access to Resources, at 83. For a comprehensive synopsis of 
the effect of sea ice retreat on Arctic marine shipping see supra n. 1. 
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commercial transit of the NSR and Northeast Passage from Asia to Europe 
was reported.26 
 
2.4 Varying positions available to states 
Straits used for international navigation 
Under the regime of international straits, transit passage maintains the 
freedom of navigation within the strait used for international navigation. An 
international strait connects one part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone.27 Following the Corfu Channel Case of 194928 an international strait 
must also meet ‘functional criteria’ of being used for international navigation 
to be considered an international strait. The majority of states, with the 
exception of the US appear to accept actual use rather than potential when 
determining the functional criteria of an international strait.29 Bordering states 
to an international strait have certain rights to legislate (prescribe) regulations 
regarding safety and regulation of maritime traffic and the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution, giving effect to generally accepted 
international standards.30 Generally accepted international standards relate to 
traffic schemes and sea lane separation schemes that are charted, publicized 
                                                
26 A German company, the Beluga Group, has sent ice classed vessels through the NSR in the 
summer of 2009. Having received official approval by the Russian authorities, the company 
officials remark that this voyage would be the first time a vessel has crossed from Asia to 
Europe through the Arctic on a commercial passage. The expectation is for increased trade as 
Arctic sea ice decreases. See BarentsObserver.com, German Vessels Ready for the Northern 
Sea Route (05 August 2009) 
<http://barentsobserver.com/index.php?pid=719423&cat=116320&id=4616626&find=&foru
mpage=0&showall=#719423> at 23 August 2009; LogisticsManager.com, Beluga Shipping 
Completes First Northeast Passage Commercial Transit (02 October 2009) 
<http://www.logisticsmanager.com/Articles/12410/Beluga+Shipping+completes+first+Northe
ast-Passage+commercial.html> at 21 October 2009; Janet Nodar, Beluga Shipping's Vessels 
Travel Northeast Passage (21 August 2009) The Journal of Commerce Online - News Story 
<http://www.joc.com/node/413026> at 21 October 2009. 
27 Article 37, LOSC. 
28 Supra n. 9, at 3. In the Corfu Channel Case, the Court was of the opinion that Albania was 
justified in view of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in issuing regulations in respect of the 
passage, but not in prohibiting outright the passage of ships.   
29 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 267 and Byers and Lalonde, at 1170-1175. See in particular 
p. 1173 regarding the US position. The US has asserted that the potential for international 
navigation in the NWP and the NSR fulfil the functional requirement as an international strait. 
However, this view is widely unsupported. 
30 Article 42 1(a) and (b), LOSC. 
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and possibly endorsed by the IMO.31 Generally accepted standards also exist 
for navigational and safety aids,32 or marine pollution regulations defined in 
the MARPOL 73/78. Such laws may not discriminate among foreign ships or 
have the practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of 
transit passage.33 Even though foreign ships exercising the right of transit 
passage are obligated to comply with such laws and regulations,34 bordering 
states have no direct enforcement against foreign flag vessels in breach of 
national regulations and laws and there is no capacity to suspend the transit 
passage.35 There is some capacity under Article 233 for states bordering straits 
to take ‘appropriate enforcement measures’, if a foreign vessel has violated 
laws and regulations referred to in Article 42 causing or threatening major 
damage to the marine environment of the straits.36 State owned or operated 
ships on government, non-commercial service are exempt from these and 
other provisions regarding the protection and preservation of the environment 
under sovereign immunity outlined in Article 236.  
 
Internal waters 
As internal waters, the right of innocent passage may still apply however 
some characteristics of innocent passage differ from those described for 
transit passage of an international strait. In accordance with Article 5(2) of the 
                                                
31 Ibid., Article 41(1-7). Article 41(3) states that sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall 
conform to generally accepted international standards. Article 41(4) states that before 
designating such sea lanes or traffic schemes, bordering states shall refer the proposals to the 
IMO with a view to their adoption. A more restrictive interpretation suggests that the 
proposals must meet recommendations of the IMO and be endorsed prior to their full 
prescription whereas a more broad interpretation suggests that, once referred, the IMO will 
adopt the proposals without review or recommendations. For discussion see Mary George, 
'Transit Passage and Pollution Control in Straits under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention' 
(2002) 33(2) Ocean Development & International Law 189, at 196 for the broad interpretation 
vs supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 268, supporting a more narrow view. 
32 Ibid., Article 43(a), LOSC. 
33 Ibid., Article 42(2). 
34 Ibid., Article 42(4). 
35 Article 44, LOSC. See supra n. 31, at 189-205 for a comprehensive description of the 
provisions of the transit passage regime.  
36 Article 233, LOSC is the link between the international straits regime in Part III and Part 
XII relating to preservation and protection of the marine environment. Its interpretation and 
implementation with particular respect to the Straits of Malacca and the Malaysian 
Interpretative Statement used to advance regulation on Under Keel Clearance deemed 
necessary in these straits, but absent in generally accepted international standards, is discussed 
further in ibid., at 198-202.    
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1958 Territorial Sea Convention37 and Article 8(2) of LOSC, where the 
establishment of straight baselines encloses, as internal waters, areas that had 
not previously been considered as such, the right of innocent passage is 
preserved. In accordance with LOSC, coastal states may also prescribe 
regulations affecting innocent passage through territorial sea and enclosed 
internal waters relating to, inter alia, navigation, maritime traffic, navigational 
aids and preservation of the marine environment under Article 21(1). In the 
designation of sea lanes and traffic schemes, coastal states must take into 
account recommendation of the IMO and any laws and regulations prescribed 
in accordance with Article 21(1) must not apply to the design, construction, 
manning or equipment of foreign ships unless giving effect to generally 
accepted international standards.38 Coastal states can exercise civil and 
criminal jurisdiction within the territorial sea and even request that a ship 
normally exempt from the application of environmental provisions through 
sovereign immunity to leave the territorial sea if noncompliant with 
regulations39 or if transit is deemed to be non-innocent under criteria 
established in Article 19(2). Transit must be continuous and expeditious and 
submarines are required to surface for innocent passage through territorial 
waters.40  
 
If, prior to the concept of innocent passage being applied to newly enclosed 
internal waters, the area being enclosed by straight baselines was previously 
considered internal waters, there is some room for argument that the right of 
innocent passage provided to newly enclosed water does not apply. The status 
of the water area would not have changed by the enclosure, thus the innocent 
                                                
37 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Geneva 29 
April 1959, 516 UNTS 205 (TSC), entered into force 10 September 1964. 
38 Article 21(2), LOSC. 
39 Article 31, LOSC. See also supra n. 31, at 196. 
40 Article 20, LOSC is very specific that submarines and other underwater vehicles must 
navigate on the surface and show their flag. Under the transit regime, the status of submarine 
transit is more ambiguous. Article 39(1)(c) states that during transit ships shall ‘refrain form 
any activities other than those incident to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious 
transit’ which Brubaker, in a number of publications interprets to mean that submarines may 
stay submerged as this is their normal mode of transit. See supra n. 5, Brubaker and Østreng, 
at 313 and Brubaker (2001), at 269. 
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passage, applied to internal waters that was not previously considered internal, 
would not apply.41    
  
Application of Article 234 
Article 234 of LOSC for ice-covered areas addresses the possibility that the 
waterways are neither international nor internal exists under the legislative 
effects of the exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea. During the 
negotiation of LOSC, an unlikely collaboration of Canada, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States (US) resulted in the 
negotiation of Article 234 (sometimes referred to as the Arctic article) as part 
of the bargain struck to permit coastal states some level of authority to prevent 
pollution from vessels.42 The article addressed coastal state authority to adopt 
and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations to control vessel-sourced 
pollution in ice-covered areas. Following the unilateral implementation of the 
1970 Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA)43 
(discussed below), the USSR and the US apparently agreed with some sort of 
custodial role for ice-covered areas and for coastal states bordering straits so 
long as the freedom of navigation was retained.  
 
For the NWP and the NSR, both of which are partly or wholly ice-covered 
waters, Article 234 has the effect of legitimizing unilateral regulations and 
providing a means to create and possibly enforce more stringent rules related 
to the protection of the marine environment in ice-covered areas. Article 234 
still provides that regulations shall have ‘due regard to navigation’ however 
there is no explicit obligation that regulations must be restricted to generally 
accepted international standards (including those for the design, construction, 
manning and equipment of foreign ships)44 or that the regulations must not 
                                                
41 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 43-44 for this discussion in the case of the NWP. 
42 Supra n. 13, at 274. See also Douglas R. Brubaker, 'Law of the Sea Convention Article 234 
and Other Regimes' in Douglas Brubaker (ed), Russian Arctic Straits, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (2004) 43, 43-44. 
43 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), R.S.C. 1970, c. 2 (1st Supp.) and as 
amended 1985 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12. 
44 Kraska considers that regardless of Article 234 or Canada’s assertion of sovereignty over 
the NWP, Canadian regulations should reflect internationally accepted standards, be non-
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deny or impair the right of innocent passage. The prescription and 
enforcement of such measures, created in reference to Article 234 may, in 
fact, exceed generally accepted international standards on the grounds that 
ice-covered areas require special consideration and stewardship.45 Whether 
these standards or special considerations will continue once these waters are 
ice-free for lengthy periods is another matter to consider.46   
 
2.5 Evolution of NWP issues in the Arctic operating system 
Canada has a long history of asserting sovereignty over her northern 
territories, sovereignty that is now widely recognized. What debate remains 
concerns Canada’s alleged claims of sovereignty over the NWP as internal 
waters rather than as an international strait. Lack of transits and difficulty in 
transit due to the ice-infested waters meant little attention was devoted to the 
Arctic waterway or the authority over its regulation until the late 1960s. 
Nonetheless the Canadian Government has always conceded the importance 
of making this waterway available for transit, subject to compliance with the 
Canadian regulatory regime.47  
 
Recent debate over the NWP can be traced back to S.S. Manhattan’s transit in 
1969-1970 and Canada’s response.48 The S.S. Manhattan became the first oil 
tanker to transit the passage, proving transit for commercial shipping was 
                                                                                                                          
discriminatory and endorsed by the IMO. See supra n. 13, at 261 and 272-273. In contrast, 
supra n. 5, Pharand, at 47, states that ‘Article 234 stands in an independent position and is 
unaffected by the other provisions on standards, enforcement, and safeguards.’ Article 234 is 
silent on the matter of having to comply only along generally accepted international 
standards. See also supra n. 42, at 54-58 on this matter. 
45 Pharand considers that since Article 234 is a separate section, it exists independently but 
also in conformity with other provisions, creating a special provision for an area that should 
be given independent consideration from limitations associated with application of Article 42 
and 233. See ibid., n. 5, Pharand.   
46 Discussed in supra n. 5, Byers and Lalonde, at 1200-1201. The authors remark that there is 
nothing to suggest that waters which used to be ice-covered for most of the year but have 
since become ice-free retain the status granted through Article 234. 
47 In 2007, Defence Minister Gordon O’Conner repeated the sentiments of Prime Minister 
Trudeau who, in 1969, stated that Canada has always been welcome to transit through the 
NWP. See Adam Lajeunesse, 'The Northwest Passage in Canadian policy' (2007-2008) 63(4) 
International Journal 1037, at 1039. See also Douglas M. Johnston, 'The Northwest Passage 
Revisited' (2002) 33(2) Ocean Development & International Law 145, at 149. 
48 See, among others, Rob Huebert, 'Polar Vision or Tunnel Vision: The Making of Canadian 
Arctic Water Policy' (1995) 19(4) Marine Policy 343. 
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possible (though not economically viable). At that time, the breadth of 
Canada’s territorial sea was only 3 NM and straight baselines around the 
archipelago had not been drawn. As such, the gateways into the NWP and 
water within the passage, except where Canadian waters overlapped in the 
McClure Strait, fell within the freedom of the high sea and, overall, Canada 
had little control over the transit.49  
 
In its aftermath, Canada implemented two legislative measures to fill some of 
the authoritative gap within the Canadian archipelago’s maritime area. The 
first was to extend the breadth of its territorial waters from 3 to 12 NM, 
amending the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zone Act on 17 April 1970.50 The 
effect of this bill was to enclose straits within the NWP including Barrow 
Strait and Prince of Wales Strait within the breadth of the territorial sea, 
providing gateways of territorial waters and concurrent sovereignty. This 
measure did provide undisputed (in a legal sense) control over the two 
gateways of the NWP however the legislation did not provide for the 
waterway to be considered internal.51 Since the regime of the territorial sea is 
still subject to the right of innocent passage, this did not provide Canada with 
complete jurisdictional control over the transit through the waterway.52 
Secondly, Canada extended environmental enforcement by implementing the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act that same year, 1970.53  
 
                                                
49 However, Canada had been informed of the transit and surveyed part of the transit. The 
Canadian icebreaker, John A. MacDonald, escorted the Manhattan for some of its voyage, 
demonstrating some ice breaking techniques and generally surveying the Manhattan’s 
progress. See archived report and television broadcast by Norman dePoe, S.S. Manhattan 
Breaks Through (08 September 1969) Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
<http://archives.cbc.ca/science_technology/transportation/topics/2349-13648/> at 14 January 
2009. 
50 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 10. 
51 Ibid., at 11. 
52 Ibid., at 10, 42-43. 
53 For a history of the lead up to the Act see supra n. 48, at 352. 
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The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 
The AWPPA asserts Canadian regulatory control over pollution within, 
originally, a 100 NM zone from the claimed baselines in the interests of 
ensuring that:  
the natural resources of the Canadian Arctic are developed and 
exploited and the Arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of 
the Canadian Arctic are navigated only in a manner that takes 
cognizance of Canada's responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit and 
other inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic and the preservation of the 
peculiar ecological balance that now exists in the water, ice and land 
areas of the Canadian Arctic.54  
 
Transit was encouraged to give due regard to new provisions in safeguarding 
the Arctic environment. Minimal standards and shipping zones were 
implemented to assist with navigation and prevent catastrophic incidents from 
occurring within the Arctic environment. The provisions provided better 
understanding of Arctic conditions, improved coordination between the 
Canadian Coast Guard and ships navigating Arctic waters.  
 
Since nothing in customary law gave a state the right to legislate for pollution 
protection in areas beyond its territorial sea, the 200 NM EEZ had not yet 
been created, and no precedent existed, the Act was an innovative challenge to 
international law.55 Canada was aware of this challenge. Along with its 
implementation in 1970, Canada chose to also withdraw its acceptance of the 
ICJ jurisdiction with respect to disputes arising from this pollution prevention 
legislation.56 
 
As well, in light of the fact that the waters within the Arctic archipelago had 
not yet been enclosed through straight baselines or officially claimed as 
internal, there was a risk that the AWPPA did not apply within the 
                                                
54 Preamble, AWPPA. 
55 Supra n. 48, at 353. 
56 Supra n. 5, Byers and Lalonde, at 1150 and Pharand, at 11. See also supra n. 48, at 352. 
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archipelago but, rather, to only a 100 NM strip outside the archipelago. 
Immediately following Canada’s 1970 policy announcements, the US 
protested both pieces of legislation.57 Canada followed this legislation and 
protests with the first official claim of internal waters in 1973.58 In 1975, 
Canadian External Affairs leant further support for the claim by stating that 
NWP is not used for international navigation and since the area is considered 
by Canada as internal waters, the transit regime does not apply.59  
 
Following the AWPPA implementation, Canada established a voluntary 
reporting system in July 1977 to correspond with 16 Shipping Safety Control 
Zones,60 encompassing all of the Arctic waters under the Arctic (Northern) 
Canada Traffic System (NORDREG). Within these zones ships must meet 
specific standards of construction, navigational aids, manning, pilotage, and, 
depending on the ice conditions, icebreaker assistance. The ship master 
provides pre-arrival reporting in accordance with the NORDREG system. 
Reports include projected sailing plans and assistance requirements. Reports 
are also required before entry into shipping zones, at scheduled intervals while 
in the zone and immediately before exiting the zone. NORDREG distributes 
ice information and ice routing for individual ships, co-ordinates requests for 
icebreaker assistance and can request further information or suggest route 
changes in order to facilitate a safe and expeditious maritime transportation in 
Arctic waters and safeguard the environment.61 The Canadian Coast Guard 
offers an acknowledgement that the projected route of the ship is appropriate 
but this does not, in any manner, constitute the granting of permission for 
entering the Arctic waters. The ship master remains solely responsible for 
operational decisions while navigating Arctic waters. While originally 
                                                
57 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 11. 
58 The Bureau of Legal Affairs, in a letter, stated that ‘Canada also claims that the waters of 
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal waters of Canada, on historical basis, although 
they have not been declared as such in any treaty or by legislation’. Reproduced in supra n. 5, 
Pharand, at 11, fn 71. 
59 Ibid., fn 72. 
60 Shipping Safety Control Zones, adopted 23 August 1972, (amended 1978) S.O.R./72-203, 
Canada Gazette, Part II, vol. 106, no. 14, at 1468. 
61 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 49. 
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voluntary in nature, the system, as of 2006, had achieved 99% compliance.62 
For the safety of the vessel and its crew and to reduce risk to the Arctic 
environment, ship masters voluntarily complied with these operational and 
practical measures. In August 2008, Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen 
Harper, announced that the Government of Canada would extend jurisdiction 
for the AWPPA and NORDREG to 200 NM in line with LOSC and move 
from ‘encouraged’ to mandatory reporting for all incoming shipping.63 These 
changes were implemented and entered into force under the AWPPA on 10 
June 2010.64 The mandatory Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Service Zone 
Regulations were adopted 10 June and came into force 01 July 2010.65 
 
Legal enforcement may improve compliance even further. Nonetheless, the 
circumstances leading up to these recent changes demonstrates that within an 
Arctic operating system, divergent positions regarding the NWP can co-exist 
without prejudice, operational measures can be provided for and confidence 
within the system can be attained. The entry into force of recent changes to 
the regulations reinforces the acceptability of divergent positions and 
progresses the operating system in line with norms relating to environmental 
protection and security.   
 
Overall, the AWPPA and associated regulations demonstrated that Canada 
considered itself custodian of the Arctic waters adjacent to its shores and 
desired that others recognize this fragile ecosystem and are cognizant of 
Canada’s responsibility and custodianship.66 While Canadian national interest 
was unquestionably an aspect of the AWPPA, had this interest and 
acquiescence in its implementation not occurred, Article 234 in LOSC might 
                                                
62 Ibid., at 50. 
63 Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, Extending the Jurisdiction of 
Canadian Environment and Shipping Laws in the Arctic (27 August 2008) 
<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2246> at 02 February 2009. 
64 Order Amending the Shipping Safety Control Zones Order, adopted 10 June 2010, 
S.O.R./2010-736, Canada Gazette, Part II, vol. 144, no. 3, entered into force the same day. 
65 Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Service Zone Regulations, adopted 10 June 2010, 
S.O.R./2010-127, Canada Gazette, Part II, vol. 144, no. 13, entered into force 01 July 2010. 
66 Regardless of the US protests and the UK’s reservation of its rights related to the AWPPA, 
interested states, including the US and UK, appear to be compliant with the Canadian regime. 
See supra n. 42, at 61 and 66. 
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not have been created. Russian and US support was crucial in attaining this 
custodial arrangement. Since implementation, the Act, and the numerous 
regulations and legislative measures, such as the Arctic Shipping Pollution 
Prevention Regulations, the Arctic (Northern) Canada Traffic System, 
Navigation Safety Regulations, and Shipping Safety Control Zones have since 
gained validation through Article 234, LOSC as well as through similarity to 
existing Russian and US legislative measures.67 In support of its custodial 
role, Canada declared its rights to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws 
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution 
from vessels in ice-covered waters during its accession to MARPOL 73/78 on 
16 November 1992.68 Canada also considered that its accession is without 
prejudice to existing Canadian laws (including the AWPPA) or to those that 
may be implemented in the future in respect of Arctic waters within or 
adjacent to Canada.69 In 1993, Washington filed with the IMO its 
understanding of Canada’s declaration related to MARPOL – that Canada 
may enact and enforce laws in respect to foreign shipping in the Arctic waters 
that are within 200 NM from the baselines, having due regard to navigation 
and otherwise consistent with international law and Article 234 of LOSC. At 
the same time, Washington accepted that its commercial vessels were subject 
to the 1970 AWPPA.70  
   
Canadian Arctic straight baselines 
By 1982, LOSC had produced, among other provisions, Article 234, the 
transit regime, and the provisions for drawing straight baselines along the 
coastline of states. The Arctic operating system continued to assimilate these 
new provisions. Meanwhile, oil and gas development activities, for which the 
1969 NWP commercial shipping transit was tested, significantly declined. In 
                                                
67 A list of the various measures under the AWPPA is available from 
<http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/A-12///en> 06 February 2009. 
68 Supra n. 42, at 61. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., at 62. The US understanding of Canadian legislation was that Canada could enact and 
enforce legislation consistent with international law, including Article 234 and other relevant 
provisions of LOSC and that Canadian legislation shall be enforced out to 200 NM from 
baselines established under international law. 
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1985, prior to entry into force of LOSC (for Canada), another transit by a US 
vessel occurred through the NWP, triggering further appraisal by Canada of 
the current legislative framework for the issues and area. This transit was 
prompted by the need to facilitate a more direct and immediate return of a US 
Coast Guard vessel, the Polar Sea, to its fleet and was not intended as a 
challenge.71 The US contacted Canada to inform her of the plans to transit, 
pointing out the operational rationale, acknowledging the different positions 
that the two states held regarding the status of the waterway and inviting 
Canadian participation in order to undertake mutual research. The voyage was 
deemed acceptable in principle. Canada’s response asserted her position that 
the passage was part of Canada’s internal waters, which could never be 
assimilated into the regime of high seas or international straits. Canada 
expressed regret that the US remains unwilling to accept this position but 
welcomed the US offer to proceed with the transit on a cooperative basis.72 
Canada agreed that the voyage did not prejudice the legal position of either 
state but insisted still on officially granting consent for the voyage even 
though consent was never requested in the last diplomatic exchange prior to 
the voyage.73  
 
The voyage was unremarkable except for the media attention it received. By 
September, following public outcry, Canada announced that six policies had 
been selected to form the basis for Canadian Arctic maritime policy.74 
Implementation began with drawing of straight baselines around the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago, enclosing the Northwest Passage as historic internal 
                                                
71 Supra n. 48, at 345. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., at 346. Huebert recalls that just prior to the voyage, ‘the Canadian position [towards 
the transit] began to shift’. 
74 Ibid., at 347 describes the six policy initiatives:  
1) establishing straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago 
2) adoption of Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act 
3) talks with the US on cooperation in the Arctic and recognition for Canadian 
sovereignty 
4) increase surveillance overflights and planning for naval surveillance 
5) withdrawal of the 1970 reservation to Canada’s acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction 
6) construction of Polar Class 8 icebreaker and consideration of other means for 
more effective control of Arctic waters 
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waters. The establishment of baselines was declared 10 September 1985 and 
came into effect on 01 January 1986.75  
 
The US protested the order in 1985 and 1986; and while the European Union 
also protested the enclosure by straight baselines,76 the order stands 
unchallenged today.77 There are three criteria along which the validity of 
baselines can be tested.78 Pharand (2007) considers that the Canadian 
baselines are valid along the two geographical and mandatory criteria, and are 
supported by the third criteria of long-standing economic interests of the local 
inhabitants – ‘if a coastal state meets those two criteria, its baselines are 
internationally valid.’79 The consistent exercise of authority, passage of time, 
security in the vital interests of the state, and the general toleration of the 
Canadian straight baselines by the international community also consolidate 
the title for the straight baselines.80  
 
While the straight baselines may be valid, if a state wishes to claim historic 
internal waters, certain other criteria must be met.81 Certain American and 
European views of the Northwest Passage suggest that the waterway does not 
constitute historic internal waters based on the absence of required foreign 
state acquiescence.82 Pharand agrees that Canada is not in a good position 
claim historic internal waters, listing four reasons that lead to this 
                                                
75 Territorial Sea Geographical Coordinates (Area 7) Order, SOR/85-872, 10 September 
1985, Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol 119, No 20. 
76 Supra n. 42, at 65 and supra n. 5, Pharand, at 12. 
77  Ibid., Pharand, at 36. 
78 Baselines must 1) follow the general direction of the coast; 2) there must be a close link 
between land and sea and; 3) certain economic interests shall be evidenced by long usage. 
These criteria, developed by the ICJ are found in Article 4 of the 1958 Territorial Sea 
Convention and were incorporated unchanged into Article 7 of LOSC. See, among others, 
ibid., at 17. 
79 Ibid., at 21. 
80 Ibid., at 24. 
81 As quoted in Pharand, supra n. 5, at 7, fn 32, according to L.J. Bouchez, ‘[h]istoric waters 
are waters over which the coastal state, contrary to the generally applicable rules of 
international law, clearly, effectively, continuously, and over a substantial period of time, 
exercise sovereign rights with the acquiescence of the community of states’. Thus, the criteria 
for historic internal waters includes: 1) exclusive exercise of state jurisdiction; 2) long usage; 
and 3) acquiescence by foreign states.  
82 The three factors to be considered when examining whether a body of water constitutes 
historic internal waters include: 1) exercise of authority; 2) continuity in the exercise of 
authority and; 3) foreign state acquiescence. See supra n. 13, at 265. 
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conclusion.83 The inability of Canada to achieve foreign state recognition of 
their claim to historic internal waters was one such reason. Pharand also 
points out, however, that in the 1985 Gulf of Maine Case, the ICJ refused to 
ascribe any decisive weight to historic waters claimed by the states.84   
 
For Canada, enclosure by straight baselines provides greater legitimacy to the 
claim as internal waters. Nonetheless, under customary law today, for water 
that had not been enclosed previously, a right of innocent passage still exists. 
So while the NWP may be enclosed as internal waters by valid straight 
baselines, the transit regime may still apply.85 The custom of retaining the 
right of innocent passage developed from the 1951 Fisheries Case,86 the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention and was codified in Article 8(2) of LOSC.87 In 
1985, at the time that Canada established baselines Article 5(2) of the 1958 
Territorial Sea Convention employing the right of innocent passage for newly 
enclosed water had not become part of customary law.88 Canada was also not 
a party to the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention and was not bound strictly by 
those provisions, nor had the 1982 LOSC come into force generally or for 
Canada specifically. Canada was able to proceed with the straight baselines 
and while the right of innocent passage in favor of all ships did exist in the 
NWP prior to establishing straight baselines, once these baselines were 
established in 1985 (taking effect in 1986), all enclosed water became strictly 
internal waters, no longer subject to the right of innocent passage.89 The 
LOSC came into force 16 November 1994 and Canada became a party to the 
convention 07 November 2003. Nearly twenty years had elapsed before 
Canada was bound to the applicable treaty provision (Article 8(2)) and in that 
time Canada’s straight baselines, in the absence of the right of innocent 
                                                
83 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 13. 
84 Ibid. 
85 This is the opinion of Kraska in supra n. 13, at 272. 
86 Supra n. 6. 
87 Supra n. 5, Pharand, at 43 for discussion on this custom and its codification. 
88 Ibid., at 43. Pharand comments that Canada was never a party to the 1958 Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone Convention from which the provision was derived and that customary 
law had not evolved when the baselines were drawn, lacking the necessary general practice 
and uniformity. 
89 Ibid. 
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passage, was generally tolerated by the international community. Therefore, 
as Pharand concludes,  
the waters enclosed by these baselines had already acquired the firm 
status of internal, not subject to the right of innocent passage, and this 
status has not changed.  
 
In contrast, Kraska considers that the right of innocent passage is retained, 
applicable to the NWP. Pharand also admits that regardless of the status, it 
might still be possible for the NWP to become an international strait if Canada 
does not appropriately prevent internationalization. In his article, twelve 
measures are recommended, including, inter alia, the establishment of a 
‘transit agreement’ with the US, mandatory rather than voluntary reporting 
established under the NORDREG,90 and the development and employment of 
submarine detection and control capabilities.91  
 
Other 1985 Canadian policy measures 
The main catalyst for the Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act can be 
traced back to concern that prior to 1985 the Canadian legal system 
inadequately covered offshore activity beyond 12 NM. However, following 
the Polar Sea voyage it was also conceived as a means of further protecting 
sovereignty. 92 The Act essentially provided Canada the legislation to apply its 
law to any activity that occurs in its offshore area. The adoption of the Act 
was one of the six policy measures identified in September 1985 however the 
                                                
90 Mentioned in supra n. 60, the Arctic (Northern) Canada Traffic Regulation System 
(NORDREG) is a component of the ASPPR compiled under the AWPPA, Arctic Shipping 
Pollution Prevention Regulations (ASPPR), C.R.C., c. 353; under the AWPPA enabling Act 
1970 R.S.C.. c. 2(1st Supp.) 1985, c. A-12. Mandatory reporting and requirements entered 
into force for NORDREG on 01 July 2010. See supra n. 65. 
91 Other measures include, operation of year round icebreaker in all safety zones, a full range 
of sea- and land-based services to enable safe navigation, completion of Radarsat II for 
surveillance (this was announced in 2007 by the Harper government), extended radar 
coverage beyond the North Warning System, increased number of long-range patrol aircraft, 
increased number of Canadian Rangers (indigenous sovereignty guards), year round search 
and rescue capabilities, construction of a deep water sea-port in Iqualuit, and adequate 
presence of Canadian security ad intelligence personnel. See supra n. 5, Pharand, at 51-52 and 
ibid. 
92 Supra n. 48, at 349-352. 
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Act had a shaky start and was eventually passed in the Senate in 1990.93 
Another impact of the Polar Sea voyage was to raise the profile of defense 
and surveillance programmes.94 Moreover, since legislative authority was now 
reinforced by the legitimacy of Article 234 and the formation of the EEZ in 
LOSC, the 1970 reservation to Canada’s acceptance of the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which was implemented to 
avoid challenge to the innovative AWPPA, was withdrawn.95  
 
Arctic Cooperation Agreement 
Amongst the six 10 September 1985 policy initiatives, the initiation of 
negotiations with the US was the only decision that was made specifically as a 
result of the Polar Sea voyage.96 The primary goal of negotiations was to 
reach agreement with the US that Canadian claims to the Arctic waters were 
recognized. Alternatively, Canada sought increased control of US 
Government and commercial transit. The result of negotiations was the 
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the United States on 
Arctic Cooperation (Arctic Cooperation Agreement).97 The US did not accept 
or acquiesce to Canada’s claim but agreed to cooperate in the Arctic ‘to not 
adversely affect the unique environment of the region and the well-being of its 
inhabitants’.98 The US agreed to notify the Canadian Government whenever it 
sends an icebreaker through the Northwest Passage, pledging that ‘all 
navigation by US icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal 
will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada’.99 The 
Agreement does not prejudice the position of either state regarding the 
classification of the waterway and captures the opportunity to increase 
                                                
93 Ibid., at 349. 
94 Ibid., at 350. 
95 In 1970, the AWPPA had no precedent in international law and cabinet would not allow the 
newly enacted Act to be challenged in the ICJ. With the formulation of Article 234 and the 
creation of the Exclusive Economic Zone through the negotiations of LOSC, challenge to the 
AWPPA was minimized and the reservation was no longer necessary. See ibid., at 352-353. 
96 Ibid., at 356. 
97 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America on Arctic Cooperation and Exchange of Notes Concerning Transit of Northwest 
Passage, 11 January 1988, Ottawa [1989] 28 ILM 142, 144, entered into force 11 January 
1988 (Arctic Cooperation Agreement). 
98 Article 1, Arctic Cooperation Agreement. 
99 Ibid., Article 3. 
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knowledge of the Arctic marine environment through research conducted 
during icebreaker voyages and the shared interest in safe, effective icebreaker 
navigation in the Arctic. Within the Arctic operating system these actors 
engaged in diplomatic exchanges, entering into an agreement that provided 
security to the Arctic environment and did not prejudice their respective 
positions. Canada’s authority to regulate against vessel sourced pollution 
along the Arctic coast was not denied, nor was the freedom of navigation. 
Protection of the Arctic environment gained practical salience yet the 
classification of the waterway remained undetermined.  
 
The inclusion of only icebreaker transit in the Agreement reflects the class of 
vessel most likely to conduct passage and the multi-purpose of icebreakers for 
navigation and marine scientific research. The rights of passage of warships, 
commercial vessels and other government vessels are not affected by the 
Agreement. As McDorman points out, under the terms of the Agreement, the 
US essentially agreed that icebreakers transiting the NWP would be 
conducting research and that for such activity consent would be required. 
Whereas, under the same terms, Canada may see that consent is required for 
the transit which is supporting research.100 Since other commercial vessels as 
at 1988 required icebreaker accompaniment, by capturing icebreakers within 
the agreement, under Canada’s position, most commercial transits were 
accounted for within the Agreement. However, with a predicted change in the 
conditions of the passage, the possibility of increased commercial transit in 
the absence of icebreaker support may increase. Under these circumstances 
the terms of the agreement are likely to be further tested.  
 
Since 1988, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement has been employed on 
numerous occasions, with the US Government seeking permission for its 
icebreakers to transit the NWP.101 Under the knowledge that this consent does 
not equate to acceptance or acquiescence in the issue of the classification of 
                                                
100 Supra n. 5, McDorman, at 250. 
101 For example, the Arctic Cooperation Agreement was invoked in 1988, 1989 and 1990. See 
supra n. 48, at 359.  
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the NWP, any consent requested or granted does not prejudice the divergent 
positions but maintains practical cooperation and, importantly to the Arctic 
operating system, maintains a high level of participant confidence. 
 
Recently, then President George W. Bush of the US chose to comment on 
Arctic policy as one of his last policy position announcements.102 The content 
of the statement reiterated the position of the US, which asserts that the NWP 
and the NSR are not internal waters of Canada and the Russian Federation 
respectively, but are straits used for international transit. Internationalization, 
as mentioned above, may be prevented if Canada is able to appropriately ramp 
up its authority over the NWP. Alternatively, if the authority and measures 
taken by Canada are deemed to be accepted international standards for 
regulating the Arctic and are endorsed by the IMO the status of the NWP can 
remain uncertain. The NWP will be regulated in a practical manner as both (or 
either) an internal passage and (or) an international strait without prejudicing 
the rights of states. Regulatory provisions will provide for conditional transit, 
maintaining the right of transit but only in accordance with enforceable 
Canadian regulations. Insofar as regulating the NWP, Canada would be in a 
position to be considered either a bordering state of an international strait or 
the regulatory authority over internal waters. While the politico-legal debate 
would not be necessarily resolved, practical measures within the operating 
system would be attained. 
 
2.6 Evolution of NSR issues in the Arctic operating system 
In a similar manner to the NWP, the Russian Straits between the northern 
coast of mainland Russia and the Russian Arctic islands have been the focus 
of attention for potential commercial shipping routes. Substantial offshore oil 
and gas development already exists in the area of the Kara, Laptev and 
Barents Seas with the potential for ongoing/further development. The Arctic 
                                                
102 President of the United States of America George W. Bush, National Security Presidential 
Directive (NSPD 66) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD 25), Arctic 
Region Policy (09 January 2009) <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm> at 24 August 
2009. 
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waters have been consistently perceived as highly strategic for military 
purposes (especially throughout the Cold War) and Russian militarization 
along the NSR has been longstanding.103 Using several different bases of 
international law, Russia claims virtually all Russian Arctic Straits as internal 
waters.104 Similar to the NWP, the US has also been firm on its position that 
straits within the NSR are international straits, subject to transit passage.105 
The interrelationship between different aspects of historic state practice, 
codified treaty law of 1958 and of the 1982 LOSC, as well as customary 
practice related to Article 234, transit passage and Part XII contributes to what 
Brubaker considers a ‘confused legal order’. Nevertheless, the rest of the 
international community has shown less protest to the Russian regime. 
Substantial compliance, even by the US, has been demonstrated.106 
 
Up until 01 July 1991, the NSR had been effectively closed to international 
shipping traffic and functioned as a national transportation route. Following 
the intentions of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech of 01 October 
1987,107 under the regime of the Russian Federation the NSR was opened to 
international shipping with amended regulations.108 Unilateral practice, now 
supported by Article 234, has evolved and significant compliance with 
                                                
103 The perception of strong militarization along and through the NSR has been an obstacle for 
multilateral use. Effectively closing the NSR portrayed an image of tighter security 
throughout the Cold War yet its military-strategic utility ranks low in objective or actual 
operational terms. The perception of its importance was, according to Brubaker and Østreng, 
highly over-rated. See supra n. 5, Brubaker and Østreng, in general and at 311 specifically. 
Question remains whether new technology and a strengthened Russian regime will increase 
the military-strategic utility. Nonetheless, the perception of the Arctic as a strategic 
stronghold has been maintained. See P. Baev, Russia's Race for the Arctic and the New 
Geopolitics of the North Pole (2007) Occasional Paper, The Jamestown Foundation 
<http://jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-BaevRussiaArctic.pdf> at 19 March 2008 and Rob 
Huebert, 'The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment' (Canadian Defence and Foreign 
Affairs Institute, Calgary, March 2010). 
104 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 264. 
105 In accordance with Articles 34-45, Part III, LOSC. See ibid., at 265. 
106 See, in general, supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000) and more specifically Brubaker (2004), at 60. 
107 Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech in Murmansk at the Ceremonial Meeting on the Occasion of 
the Presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star to the City of Murmansk (01 October 
1987) <http://www.barentsinfo.fi/docs/Gorbachev_speech.pdf> at 01 February 2009. See also 
supra n. 5. Brubaker and Østreng, at 310 and supra n. 18, at 286. 
108 New NSR Regulations entered into force on 01 July 1991. See Regulations for Navigation 
on Seaways of the Northern Sea Route, adopted 14 September 1990, (1991) 29 
Izveshchenniya Moreplavatelyam, MO SSSR, GUNiO, entered into force 01 July 1991. 
English translation published in Guide to Navigating Through the Northern Sea Route (St. 
Petersburg: Head Department of Navigation and Oceanography, Russian Ministry of Defence, 
1996), pp. 81-84. 
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Russian regulations has been demonstrated.109 Yet debate persists over the 
status of the route. Questions also remain as to whether Russian legislation 
oversteps jurisdictional entitlement and whether the transit regime for 
international straits, with the corresponding right of innocent passage, takes 
precedence over Russian regulations. 
 
In the Soviet era, special rights over Arctic seas were based on the doctrine of 
historic waters and the USSR considered the NSR as national.110 Tacit 
recognition of historic waters has never been fulfilled111 and from the 1980s 
the concept of historic waters has declined.112 State practice has shifted in line 
with general principles of modern law of the sea. The Russian Federation now 
maintains that straight baselines enclose the waters in the Russian Arctic as 
internal. Consequently, the straits of the NSR are under its national 
jurisdiction and authority. The Russian government also retains (from the 
Soviet era) the notion that certain special features apply in relation to the 
NSR.113 
 
In the 1960s, several incidents occurred between the US and the USSR 
involving the Russian straits and Arctic waters. While no official transits 
occurred along the NSR, US icebreakers entered the Kara Sea, proceeding 
towards the Vil’kitskii Straits. In 1964, the US vessel, Burton Island, 
conducted oceanographic research in the East Siberian Sea. In response, the 
Soviet Union forwarded an aide-memoire to the US indicating that the Laptev 
and East Siberian Seas were historic waters of the Soviet Union, implying that 
innocent passage of the strait uniting these waters is prohibited. The US 
denied being aware of a basis to claim these waters on historic grounds in so 
far as historic title can be applied to an international strait.114 In 1965, US 
                                                
109 Supra n. 5, Brubaker and Øtreng, at 319; Brubaker (2000), at 224; and Brubaker (2001), at 
272. 
110 Supra n. 18, at 277. 
111 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 266. 
112 Supra n. 18, at 278-279. 
113 Ibid., at 279 and fn 60. 
114 Similar to the NWP, the US claims the straits of the NSR are international straits based on 
the potential that these straits can be used for international transit. The ‘functional criteria’ for 
international straits evolved from the Corfu Channel Case, supra n. 9, at 3 and exists in 
LOSC Part III (Articles 34-45) on International Straits. There remains, however, limited 
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vessel Northwind sought to pass through Vil’kitskii Strait, but received 
instruction not to attempt the transit.115 Two years later, USCG icebreakers 
Edisto and Eastwind also attempted to enter the Vil’kitskii Strait, but the 
USSR refused passage on the basis that the strait was part of territorial 
waters.116 While actual surface transit did not occur, the US persisted with its 
claim to transit passage through international straits. 
 
During and following UNCLOS III, the Soviet Union took steps to bring 
legislation into conformity with contemporary law of the sea principles 
without diminishing its claim to internal waters. For example, in 1983, the 
Rules Concerning Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign War Vessels in the 
Territorial Waters (Territorial Sea) of the USSR, the Internal Waters and 
Ports of the USSR117 were adopted under the basis of the 1982 LOSC 
provisions. In 1984, the Edict on the EEZ118 and the Edict On Strengthening of 
Protection of Nature in the Extreme North and Marine Areas Adjacent to the 
Northern Coast of the USSR119 were adopted. Provisions for ice-covered areas 
(Article 14 of the Edict) were based mostly on the newly recognized Article 
234 of LOSC. Shipping would be tolerated but special requirements for ship 
navigation as well as special regulatory and enforcement powers for the 
coastal state in the ice-covered areas were provided for.120 In 1985, the decree 
on straight baselines121 justified more of the previous rules created by the 
Soviet Union, since all the waters were enclosed as internal. 
                                                                                                                          
evidence that ‘potential use’, as opposed to actual use, can be sufficient to meet the criteria 
stating that the strait does function as an international transit route.   
115 Supra n. 18, at 280. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Rules Concerning Navigation and Sojourn of Foreign War Vessels in the Territorial 
Waters (Territorial Sea) of the USSR, the Internal Waters and Ports of the USSR (1983) 34 
Izveshcheniia moreplavateliam, MO SSSR, GUNiO 42-47; for an english translation, see 
(1985) 24 ILM 1715-1722. 
118 Edict on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the USSR, (1984) 9 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo 
Soveta SSSR Item 137. 
119 Edict On Strengthening of the Protection of Nature in the Extreme North, and Marine 
Areas Adjacent to the Northern Coast of the USSR of 24 November (1984) 48 Vedomosti 
Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR Item 863. 
120 Article 2 on special areas and Article 3 on regulatory and enforcement powers of the above 
Edict.  
121 On Confirmation of a List of Geographic Coordinates Determining the Position of the 
Baseline in the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea and Black Sea from which the Width of the 
Territorial Waters, Economic Zone and Continental Shelf is Measured, Decree of the Council 
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Russian Arctic straight baselines 
Under the 15 January 1985 decree for the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf of the USSR,122 straight baselines were 
established in the Russian Arctic enclosing, among other areas, three large 
Arctic islands groups and corresponding straits.123 Following the decree, rules 
developed in 1965 regarding compulsory pilotage and icebreaker convoying 
through certain Russian straits were finally published in 1986.124 The US 
protested the 1985 Russian decree,125 yet the Russian declaration has been 
largely unopposed by other states even though many of the enclosures failed 
to meet the traditional criteria for establishing straight baselines. In fact, the 
US has been the only state to officially protest the Russian straight baselines 
in the Arctic.126 Brubaker concludes that Russian practice cannot, therefore, 
be said to be inconsistent with international law.127  
 
US/USSR joint statement 
On 23 September 1989, a bilateral agreement between the US and the USSR 
concerning Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of International Law 
                                                                                                                          
of Ministers of the USSR, adopted 15 January 1985, (1986) Prilozhenie k vypusku No. 1 
Izveshchenii moreplavateliam, MO SSSR, GUNiO 24-29. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Supra n. 42, at 59 describes the enclosure of Novaya Zemlya and the Kara Gates Strait; 
Severnaya Zemlya and its four corresponding straits, including the Vil’kitskii Strait and the 
Shokal’ski Strait; and Novosibirskiye Ostrova and the enclosure of Sannikov, Eterikan and 
Dmitrii Laptev Straits. 
124 Supra  n. 18, at 283. 
125 The US also protested Canada’s straight baselines, which were declared later that same 
year. Douglas R. Brubaker, 'The Legal Status of the Russian Baselines in the Arctic' (1999) 
30(3) Ocean Development and International Law 191, at 206. 
126 Concern raised by the US with respect to the Russian baselines has been recently reiterated 
with respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Russian Arctic. See: 
Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, United States of 
America: Notification regarding the submission made by the Russian Federation to the 
Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf (2002) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__US
Atext.pdf> at July 24 2007. In work by Skaridov and Skaridova, it is stated that the Russian 
Federation used baselines approved by the Council of Ministers decree of 1984 and 1985 and 
that applying LOSC baseline rules to ice-covered areas is a complex task. See Alexander S. 
Skaridov and Mariya A. Skaridova, 'Legal Aspects of Russian Perspectives on Continental 
Shelf Issues in the Arctic Areas' in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Alexander 
S. Skaridov (eds), International Energy Policy, the Arctic and the Law of the Sea, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2005) 79, at 83-84.  
127 Supra n. 125, at 218. 
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Governing Innocent Passage128 was signed. The signing of this agreement 
confirmed the Soviet Union’s acceptance of the generally recognized 
principles of innocent passage established in 1982 LOSC.129 The 1983 Rules, 
mentioned previously, were subsequently adjusted – eliminating customary 
use of sea lanes and the exclusive list of traffic separation schemes for 
warships under Article 12(1) of the 1983 Rules.130 Generally recognized rules 
for innocent passage were agreed upon as applicable to the northern seas of 
the USSR.131 The claim to internal waters was not adjusted; however, the 
preservation of the right of innocent passage as outlined in Article 5(2) of the 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (TSC)132 and 
Article 8(2) of LOSC was confirmed through this agreement. This agreement 
arranged a practical understanding towards one of the aspects of Russian 
regulation. Thus, the US gained confidence that, at minimum, the rights of 
innocent passage would be upheld and the USSR maintained its claim to 
internal waters. Meanwhile, the broad scope of Article 234 and provisions 
available for regulating innocent passage meant the Russian regulations did 
not necessarily create a prejudicial arrangement against foreign ships 
transiting the NSR. 
 
NSR Regulations 
In 1990, the Russian Federation adopted the Regulations for Navigation on 
the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route (NSR Regulations).133 The entry into 
force of these regulations in 1991 marked the opening of the NSR to 
international shipping.134 These regulations have since been supplemented by 
                                                
128 USSR - USA Joint Statement of Uniform Interpretation of the Rules of International Law 
Governing Innocent Passage, signed 23 September 1989, 28 ILM 1444, entered into force the 
same day. 
129 Supra n. 18, at 282. 
130 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 273. 
131 Supra n. 18, at 282. 
132 Supra n. 37. 
133 Supra n. 108.  
134 Supra n. 18, at 274-275 and 284. Prior to this, when the Suez Canal was closed as an effect 
of the Arab-Israel crisis in 1967, the USSR had offered the NSR, with Soviet icebreaker 
assistance, as a transit route. The offer was not, however, accepted by the foreign shipping 
companies and the USSR subsequently closed the NSR. 
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numerous other measures regarding the Arctic maritime area.135 Most 
provisions in the Russian legislation far exceed limitations to innocent 
passage, and encompass the territorial sea, the EEZ and possibly beyond.136 
As such, Russian legislation has been criticized, especially by the US, for 
overstepping the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdictional entitlement set 
out in Article 234.137  
 
Application of the Russian rules to ‘marine areas adjacent to the northern 
coast’ may appear to extend its application to the high seas adjacent to the 
northern coast.138 The Russian regime may invoke fees for services rendered, 
apply rules to state vessels and hamper or deny passage if safety, 
environmental or other requirements are not met.139 These features of the NSR 
regulations and the mandatory payment of fees for transit and the introduction 
of specially protected areas within the ice-covered area may appear to 
contradict terms of customary law and LOSC.140 However, a wider 
interpretation of Article 234 and consistent state practice has prevented the 
prejudice against the rights of other states in their interpretation. For example, 
though NSR Regulations may appear to encompass high seas, the regulations 
also specify that their application to the northern coast is within the Soviet 
                                                
135 Russia has adopted a plethora of legislation regarding the Arctic maritime area. Refer to 
supra n. 42, at 58 for a list of some of the legislation. See, as well, discussions in supra n. 5, 
Brubaker (2000). 
136 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 274. 
137 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000), at 224. 
138 See discussion in supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000), at 224-225 and supra n. 18, at 283. 
139 Interestingly, according to a news article in October 2009, the German company Beluga 
Shipping delayed their planned 2008 transit of the NSR because ‘necessary approvals from 
Russia [were] not procurable in due course’. The following year, the shipping company spoke 
directly with Russian administration authorities to facilitate the approval process. According 
to the media report, ‘official permission’ was granted by the Russian Ministry of Defence, the 
Ministry or Agriculture, the Secret Service, and the Russian government for the August 2009 
transit. See news report produced by LogisticsManager.com in supra n. 26. For discussion on 
the interpretation of regulations see supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000), at 228-229 and Brubaker 
(2001), at 274. 
140 Russian legislation and enforcement measures encompass mandatory notification and 
authorization, possible application on the high seas, five forms of leading in ice, fees, liability, 
discharge and safety standard, design, equipment, crewing and construction standards, special 
areas, reporting, inspection, stopping, detention and arrest, suspension, removal, criminal 
liability, and application to state vessels. For further review see supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000) 
and (2001). 
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(Russian) economic zone.141 The scope may be appropriately interpreted as 
limited to the EEZ.  
 
Furthermore, there is substantial support for the Russian regime from 
Canadian legislation (under the Canadian AWPPA) and by the US.142 Nearly 
all Russian rules for vessels carrying oil coincide with the 1990 US Federal 
Oil Pollution Act (OPA)143 and Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental 
Oversight and Monitoring Act (Monitoring Act).144 The 1990 OPA legislative 
measures were taken following the devastating oil spill of the Exxon Valdez 
off Alaska’s Prince William Sound. In applying to Prince William Sound and 
Cook’s Inlet, the OPA implements several elements of Article 234 (although 
it does not specifically to refer to ice-covered area) and arguably contains 
similarities to the Canadian and Russian regimes.145  
 
US legislation implements standards for safety, crewing, design, construction, 
and equipment.146 Noncompliance with financial responsibilities regarding 
strict and limited liability imposed to cover removal costs and damages for 
discharges of oil from vessels and facilities may result in denial of clearance, 
denial of entry, detention, suspension of passage, forfeit or seizure.147 
Crewing requirements must be met before entry into the US and forms of 
assistance by radio, aircraft, and conventional pilot may be required.148 
                                                
141 See discussion in supra n. 18, at 283. The author compares the provisions of the 1984 
Edict on Intensifying Protection of Nature in the Northern Coast of the USSR (Environmental 
Edict) which applies to marine areas adjacent to the northern coast of the USSR to the 1990 
Decree on strengthening the implementation of the 1984 Edict. The 1990 Decree refers to the 
economic zone in its area of application, but is also closely connected to the 1984 Edict, 
applying to adjacent areas. The NSR regulations were developed and adopted from this 1990 
Decree and as such, the area of application, while definitely within the EEZ, may extend 
further through the provisions applying to adjacent marine areas. See also supra n. 5, 
Brubaker (2000), at 224-226.  
142 Supra n. 88. For a more comprehensive analysis and comparison see supra n. 5, Brubaker 
(2000) and supra n. 42, at 43-77. 
143 United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), adopted 18 August 1990, 33 United States 
Code (USC) 2701, Public Law 101-380. 
144 United States Oil Tanker Environmental Oversight and Monitoring Act (Monitoring Act), 
adopted 18 August 1990, 33 USC 2732, Public Law 101-380. Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000), at 
229. 
145 Supra n. 42, at 63. 
146 For example, see Section 5005, OPA. 
147 Ibid., Section 1002(a). 
148 Ibid., Section 4106. 
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Russian regulations align with those set by the US for commercial vessels 
carrying oil. It is only the requirement for fees and obligatory ice-breaker 
assisted pilotage and ice-breaker leading that is not found in the US 
legislation.149  
  
As with Canadian and US legislation, charges under the NSR regulations are 
permitted for specific services such as pilotage or rescue.150 Apparent 
‘mandatory payment for services rendered’ of the Russian regime confers a 
prejudice against the freedom of navigation within EEZs, unless subject to 
pollution prevention measures. Mandatory blanket fees in the absence of 
circumstances necessitating their introduction could invoke discrimination and 
would likely exceed even a liberal interpretation of due regard for 
navigation.151  It may, however, be argued that fees are always necessary for 
the protection of the marine environment within the NSR giving consideration 
to the shallow waters and ice conditions. Moreover, Russia, similar to the US 
and Canada, has also not actively enforced certain legislation (such as 
mandatory fees in the absence of requiring icebreaking assistance).152 The US 
may staunchly support and advance the freedom of navigation, yet it appears 
to accept Part XII of LOSC with its restrictions on complete freedom. Along 
with other states, it appears the US appreciates that environmental benefits are 
necessary and that negotiated limits are acceptable.153 Given the terms of 
Article 234 and consistency amongst states, Russian Regulations (as well as 
regulations set by Canada and the US) may be considered consistent to 
international law.154  
 
There is also the opportunity for standards set in relation to challenging Arctic 
navigation to become ‘generally accepted international standards’, endorsed 
                                                
149 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 278. 
150 Ibid., Brubaker (2000), at 228-230. 
151 Ibid., at 229. Brubaker points out that if fees were enforced in relatively ice-free seasons, 
when ice breaking was not required, this practice is likely to exceed even a liberal 
interpretation of due regard for navigation and provisions levying fees. 
152 Ibid. As at 2004, the US Coast Guard had not been actively enforcing the 1990 OPA 
legislation in the Arctic exclusive economic zone but has indicated that intervention would 
likely align with the Canadian Coast Guard intervention. Supra n. 42, at 64.  
153 Ibid., at 64. 
154 Supra n. 5, at 229.  
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through the IMO and consistent state practice and compliance over time. In 
fact, the consistency between Arctic state regimes, practice and norm-setting 
indicates that the process of developing customary international law for the 
Arctic is underway.155 Furthermore, as international shipping demand 
increases, there will be increased pressure to ‘allow for a more liberal 
application of passage rights’ than those confined by the status of internal and 
territorial waters.156 As well, ‘over time Russia may “soften” its position 
regarding passage in the exclusive economic zone, subject to a “harmonized” 
Article 234, innocent passage in the Arctic territorial sea and transit passage 
through its straits.’157  
 
As Arctic shipping traffic increases there is opportunity to harmonize the 
Russian regime to other Arctic state regimes alongside international demand 
without completely undermining Russian authority. Meanwhile, given the 
compliance achieved for surface vessel passage, as well as the potential for 
increased coastal state measures for states bordering straits, Russia (and 
Canada) could enforce domestic legislation more stringently.158 The lack of 
enforcement may reflect the associated high cost. However, it also 
demonstrates that current levels of compliance and enforcement, although not 
strict or complete, complement actual use and provide an appropriate balance 
for interested states within the Arctic operating system. 
 
2.7 Cooperative arrangements and industry involvement 
Given the increased salience of Arctic issues, Arctic regional cooperation 
within the Arctic operating system is provided for through the terms of LOSC 
as well as under the mandate of the Arctic Council and numerous bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives. There is ample opportunity for states to harmonize 
provisions established under Article 234 into regional cooperative 
arrangements. Under LOSC, regional cooperation for the prevention of marine 
                                                
155 Ibid., at 243 and supra n. 42, in general and specifically at 53-54. 
156 Supra n. 5, Brubaker (2001), at 267. 
157 Supra n. 42, at 60. 
158 Supra n. 5, Brubaker and Østreng, at 319. 
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pollution is made possible. Regional rules, under Article 197, 211(2), (4) and 
(5) are required to be ‘no less effective’ for vessel sourced pollution than 
generally accepted international standards. Special consideration has 
nonetheless been granted for seas with diverse ecological and oceanographic 
characteristics.159 Harmonization of initiatives in the Arctic could provide 
practical results while still maintaining consistency with obligations under 
Article 197 and 211, and national interests. The non-binding Guidelines for 
Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters (Arctic Guidelines)160 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 offers such an example.  
 
Alongside state initiatives, other organizations have the potential to assist in 
harmonization. Initiatives that cooperatively bring international shipping 
standards into practical application, for example, can also be derived from 
industry bodies, inter-governmental organizations and NGOs, including ship 
classification societies or ship owners. For example, the International 
Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has created ‘Unified 
Requirements for Polar Ships’ which pertain to polar ships and complement 
the Arctic Guidelines.161 These requirements, also discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 5, apply to Member Societies rather than states. IACS, however, 
captures over 90% of the world’s shipping industry through design and 
construction rules and standards. As Jensen remarks, ‘when it comes to 
                                                
159 For example, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Special Area status has been granted to the 
Antarctic under MARPOL 73/78, Annex I, II and V. The North Sea and Baltic Sea have also 
been designated a Special Areas for Annex V and Annex I (Baltic Sea only). As well, PSSA 
designation has been granted to the Wadden Sea (Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands) 
MARPOL 73/78 Special Area and PSSA status information available at 
<http://www.imo.org/environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=760> and 
<http://www.imo.org/Environment/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1357> at 10 August 2010. 
160 The Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters, IMO MSC 
Circular/Circ. 1056, MEPC/Circ. 399 (23 December 2002), adopted by IMO in 2002 (Arctic 
Guidelines), bring together the technical rules for shipping and provide non-binding 
recommendatory provisions. Member States of IMO are encouraged to bring these guidelines 
to the attention of ship owners and other parties concerned with Arctic shipping operations. 
Non-binding initiatives provide a non-threatening approach to harmonizing what may become 
normative practice or acceptable international standards. 
161 See Øystein Jensen, 'Arctic Shipping Guidelines: Towards a Legal Regime for Navigation 
Safety and Environmental Protection' (2008) 44(229) Polar Record 107, at 110. The Unified 
Requirements and Arctic Guidelines are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 138 
classification of ships for polar navigation, practical needs seem to have 
prevailed over political perspectives.’162  
 
In terms of further coastal state cooperation towards resolving the Arctic 
Waterways debate, a statement by the now former President of the US, 
George W. Bush, on US Arctic policy directives reasserted the US position 
that the NWP and NSR are straits used for international transit.163 While 
implying classification as international strait was the only acceptable 
conclusion, the Government of the US acknowledged that the Arctic Council 
has produced positive results in its current mandate164 and that by working 
through the IMO, new measures can be created and existing measures 
strengthened to improve the security and safety of maritime transport and 
protect the Arctic environment. Measures may include, inter alia, ship routing 
and reporting systems such as traffic separation and vessel traffic management 
schemes in Arctic choke points; updating and strengthening the Arctic 
Guidelines; and reviewing shipping insurance, hazardous material response 
agreements and environmental standards.165  
 
Although freedom of the seas is a top priority, the US acknowledges that in 
coordination with other Arctic states and international organizations, this 
priority can co-exist with practical implementation measures such as those 
geared to facilitate protection of the Arctic environment in the event that 
trans-Arctic shipping increases. Furthermore, the US stated that in relation to 
the geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region, an ‘Arctic Treaty’ of 
broad scope is not appropriate or necessary.166 This followed in line with other 
Arctic coastal states, which, in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, adamantly 
opposed the creation of an Arctic specific treaty.167 In this declaration 
representatives of the Arctic coastal states reaffirmed their commitment to 
                                                
162 Ibid., Jensen. 
163 Supra n. 102, at Section III(B)(5). 
164 Ibid., at Section III(C)(2). 
165 Ibid., at Section III(F)(3). 
166 Ibid., at Section III(C)(3). 
167 Ilulissat Declaration (29 May 2008) <http://www.cop15.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BE00B850-
D278-4489-A6BE-6AE230415546/0/ArcticOceanConference.pdf> at 11 June 2008. 
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working together through the IMO to strengthen existing measures and 
develop new measures to improve safety and environmental protection in the 
Arctic waters.168 In 2010 the Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 
followed the Ilulissat Declaration and reiterated the commitment of Arctic 
coastal states, including the US, to the existing extensive international legal 
framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean.169 Representatives of the Arctic 
coastal states agreed on the value of cooperating through the IMO on the 
timely adoption of mandatory regime for shipping in polar waters and the 
value of developing a legally binding Arctic search and rescue instrument 
through the Arctic Council.170 The representatives acknowledged the excellent 
work underway by the Arctic Council and acknowledged that Arctic Ocean 
coastal states have an important stewardship role to maintain. The value of 
exploring ways to ‘share information and strengthen cooperation, consistent 
with national law’ was also reiterated in the summary statement by the Chair, 
the Honourable Lawrence Cannon of Canada.171 Thus, the US has 
demonstrated a preference towards the enhancement of the Arctic Council in 
its current mandate and coordination through the LOSC and IMO for 
furtherance of the US interest in conformity with customary norms towards 
cooperation and protection of the environment. The US acknowledges the 
need for cooperation in this arena, indicating that it will, for example, need to 
improve coordination with the Russian Federation on scientific terms and 
continue to encourage peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic.172 
 
2.8 Discussion of Arctic robustness 
These sea routes have significant strategic interest for, and are critical to, 
military defense and security, the success of increased oil and gas 
development in the Arctic, and potentially shorten the commercial transit from 
                                                
168 Ibid. In relation to Arctic shipping, see also supra n. 1, at 58.  
169 The Honourable Lawrence Cannon (Chairman), Chairman's Summary of the Arctic Ocean: 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting (29 March 2010, Chelsea, Canada) 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/arctic-meeting_reunion-arctique-
2010_summary_sommaire.aspx?lang=eng> at 30 March 2010. 
170 Ibid.  
171 Ibid.  
172 Supra n. 102, at Section III(E)(1) and (B)(6)(e). 
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European markets to Asian markets. The status of the NWP and NSR has 
been subject to considerable debate. Canada and the Russian Federation claim 
regulatory authority over the NWP and NSR, respectively, as internal waters. 
Other states, the US in particular, consider the straits within the waterways as 
international. Thus far, divergent positions have been accommodated in the 
Arctic operating system through the broad interpretation of the sources of law 
and law-making. As well, a degree of confidence has been demonstrated 
amongst the actors that these sources, and the system itself, can provide for 
and absorb the divergent positions. 
 
The Canadian claim over the NWP has been subject to protest by the US and, 
less so, by the European Community. Acquiescence to the validity of 
Canadian straight baselines has also occurred and yet the NWP may still be 
subject to the regime of international straits, regardless of its enclosure to 
internal waters. Over the years, Canadian legislation has been compiled in a 
manner that has challenged international law but has carefully avoided 
prejudicing the rights of other states through minimizing enforcement 
procedures. Protection of the Arctic environment and minimizing the hazards 
associated with surface travel in Arctic ice-covered waters has gained salience 
within the Arctic operating system. Interested states seem in practice to be 
substantially complying with the Canadian regime, including the US public 
and commercial vessels in surface navigation. Actors within the Arctic 
operating system, including the US, have appreciated Canadian stewardship in 
this regard despite declarations condemning aspects of the Canadian 
legislation.  
 
Enforcement of regulatory control designed under the Russian regime for the 
NSR has not been fully realized173 and classification of the straits as 
international has not been clarified. The Russian regime over the NSR is well-
supported by the Canadian regime. In terms of surface travel the regime is 
also supported by further international compliance, including by the US. 
                                                
173 See discussion below and supra n. 5, Brubaker (2000). 
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Although divergent positions remain on the status of the NSR and its future 
use, the comparable regimes offer evidence that state authority and national 
interest can be maintained within the existing operating system without the 
prejudice of any states’ rights as to their interpretation and application of the 
sources of law.  
 
Canadian and Russian authority to regulate for the protection of the marine 
environment in a non-discriminatory manner has been widely accepted while 
regulations and this authority have been understood to not prohibit the 
freedom of transit. Canada and the Russian Federation are able to assert that 
the NWP and NSR respectively are internal waters. Although the historic 
nature of their argument never accumulated significant credibility, other 
sources of law within the operating system have supported their positions 
including, inter alia, the enclosures by straight baselines. The Russian 
Federation may accept that the right of innocent passage is upheld while 
Canada may consider this right to not apply. Irrespective, these states have 
taken steps to regulate all passage in the straits, including innocent passage, 
and these measures have validity under certain terms of the LOSC convention. 
With validity, legitimacy is apparent within the operating system. Whether 
prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction extended beyond the limits of the 
LOSC acquires similar legitimacy remains undetermined.  
 
In contrast to the Canadian and Russian positions, the US stridently protects 
the right of freedom of navigation and asserts that the Arctic waterways are 
international straits. However, the US also acknowledges that protection of 
the marine environment may conflict with the traditional freedom of 
navigation. Their own regulations apply similar environmental standards and 
enforcement as the Canadian and Russian regimes. As described earlier, US 
legislation mirrors the Russian regime in many ways. US state practice 
reinforces normative principles developing with regard to ice-covered areas 
and regulations have been openly applied to not only commercial vessels, but 
state vessels as well. Their state practice, along with the majority of other 
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foreign shipping interests has been predominantly in conformity with existing 
regulations. Thus, for surface passage, the operating system has effectively 
provided for norms regarding passage through ice-covered waters in the 
Arctic and states have been compliant with regulatory measures.  
 
Where the US adamantly asserts the freedom of navigation and sovereign 
immunity is with respect to submarine travel. The transit regime allows 
submarines to remain submerged for transit passage through straits used for 
international navigation whereas they are required to surface through internal 
waters and territorial seas.174 Regardless of the position of Canada or the 
Russian Federation, the US has consistently kept submarines submerged 
throughout the Arctic waterways. This consistent practice may support the 
idea of transit passage through these straits.  If the submarine transits are, 
however, not publicized, as they are often not, the international community 
cannot either acquiesce or protest. Unnoticed submarine transits would not 
actually provide much support.175 Nonetheless, the US position is retained in 
concert with Russian and Canadian positions without prejudice, but also 
without acquiescence or recognition. 
 
Moderating the active enforcement and interpreting provisions on a case by 
case basis for the NWP and the NSR, rather than making broad but strict 
applications, permits the divergent positions to co-exist without active 
discrimination or prejudice of other states’ rights. Practical and even 
cooperative solutions in the NWP have evolved despite divergent positions. 
Overcoming specific challenges to the status of the NWP in 1969 and again in 
1985 in a manner that did not abandon the existing structure of the operating 
system exemplifies resilience of the system. On these occasions, the system 
was effective at creating non-prejudicial outcomes that while not completely 
satisfying any one position, enabled the positions to continue to co-exist. 
States have continued to apply and create regulations that satisfy national 
interest but also do not derogate from the interests and rights of other states in 
                                                
174 See Transit Passage regime, Articles 37-44, LOSC. 
175 Supra n. 5, Brubaker and Østreng (1999), at 321-322 and 324. 
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their interpretation of legal foundation. Activities have also remained 
consistent with developed regulations. Recognized classification of the straits 
as internal, international or neither has been avoided. Similar to previous 
times, in the current situation, classification of the waterways may remain 
unnecessary due to the acceptability and legitimacy granted under the 
accommodation of issues within the operating system thus far. While 
speculation may indicate urgency in resolving the classification, as 
demonstrated, there is ample opportunity to continue along these lines without 
the prejudice of rights and the deterioration of the Arctic operating system. 
Until international shipping activity increases and regulations are actualized, 
debate will persist as to whether prescriptive regulations and apparent 
extensive jurisdictional entitlement are indeed passing into customary 
international law or whether the regulations are prejudicial and in violation of 
international law. At such time, regulations may be further challenged, leading 
to amendments.  
 
Overt disagreement has not resulted in the abandonment of the operating 
system. States have not only protected their national positions but contributed 
to the formation of Arctic specific provisions within an international 
convention and have carried initiatives forward through international 
organizations. Provisions under Article 234 provide state authority to the 
Arctic coastal states alongside regional cooperative provisions and 
international law regarding pollution mitigation and environmental measures. 
The Arctic Guidelines demonstrate the leadership of Arctic states in their 
determination to create Arctic specific measures through the international 
forum of the IMO, thus capturing a larger representation of states. Their 
recent commitment to cooperating through the IMO on timely adoption of 
further mandatory guidelines for shipping activities in polar waters and their 
commitment to developing an Arctic Search and Rescue instrument through 
the Arctic Council reflects coastal state stewardship and the importance of the 
Arctic Council in fostering cooperation. In terms of the Arctic waterways, the 
Arctic Council provides a venue through which Arctic shipping can be 
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assessed and monitored as well as a venue for the possible development of 
appropriate instruments that can be implemented by states. 
 
State practice supports norm-setting with regard to the interpretation of 
Article 234 in terms of providing extensive coastal state authority, 
stewardship and custodianship. Arctic coastal states acknowledge the ability 
to implement measures that protect national interest, uphold state authority 
and do not undermine regional cooperation or normative principles. Through 
implementation, these initiatives justify and possibly strengthen existing 
individual legislative measures without undermining any one position 
regarding the classification of Arctic Waterways. For example, protecting the 
Arctic waterways from environmental damage caused by inappropriate or ill-
equipped ships trying to navigate the ice-covered waters is assisted not only 
by the national legislation of the Arctic coastal states but through 
standardization mechanisms including the Arctic Guidelines and IACS 
Unified Requirements. The operating system thus provides opportunities to 
regulate activities without jeopardizing state authority or creating hegemonic 
positions. Normative principles as well as normative interpretations gain 
support through these processes while not creating prejudice of any one state’s 
rights. Actors capitalize on each actor’s interests without the dominance or 
ensuing prejudice. If no one party stands out to gain more than the next and 
international and cooperative initiatives continue to support existing 
legislation, acceptability, legitimacy and participant confidence remain.  
 
Regardless of the divergent positions concerning the Arctic waterways, states 
have individually and collectively reinforced the desire to uphold the existing 
operating system. Recent statements such as the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, 
the 2009 statement from the former President of the US, and commitments 
expressed at the 2010 Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting reflect the 
interest of states to avoid dismantling the existing system in an effort to create 
an Arctic specific treaty.176 This demonstrates acceptance, legitimacy and 
overall confidence in the Arctic operating system. Alongside the ability to 
                                                
176 See supra n. 102, 167, and 169. 
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create non-prejudicial measures concerning the Arctic waterways, these 
statements reinforce the political willingness within the operating system and 
highlight the acceptability of the system by the actors. The individual and 
collective support of the existing system granted through joint or unilateral 
statements contributes to greater legitimacy being afforded to the system 
(internally as well as externally) and further participant confidence. 
 
2.9 Chapter conclusion 
With respect to the Arctic waterways, mutual respect of divergent positions 
under the framework of international law has ensued. Divergent positions 
have been absorbed within the Arctic operating system, but not necessarily 
recognized, protecting national interest, upholding state authority and 
providing acceptability for actors within the system. No prejudice has 
occurred within the system and participant confidence has been demonstrated 
through concurrent unilateral practice, acceptance of over-arching guidelines 
and statements reiterating commitments to existing cooperative frameworks 
within the operating system. Overt challenges, those that might create the 
ability to prejudice the rights of at least one of the states involved, have been 
avoided thus far, providing evidence of resilience and contributing to the 
robust nature to the operating system. 
 
As international law within the Arctic operating system evolved, the positions 
of each actor were absorbed within the new and existing legal provisions as 
well as other sources of law-making. Through national implementation, 
diplomatic exchanges, bilateral commitments and multilateral negotiations, 
practical solutions and even consistent state practice has evolved. The 
practical implementation does not take away from or deny the various 
positions but acknowledges that while different interpretations of the same 
legal provisions provide for these varying positions, norm-setting behavior 
and measures can be implemented. Irrespective of divergent positions, 
cooperation has persisted amongst the Arctic actors through various 
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instruments such as the Arctic Guidelines, industry standards, IMO 
participation and support for ongoing work of the Arctic Council.  
 
For the Arctic waterways, as international shipping interest increases, the 
issues of jurisdiction and enforcement will continue to be revisited within the 
operating system. The ability of the Arctic coastal states to transform their 
norm-setting principles into internationally accepted standards, whether 
through the creation and endorsement of non-binding guidelines, such as the 
Arctic Guidelines or binding instruments, will help determine whether the 
current, unilaterally prescribed jurisdictional scope can prevail or whether the 
existing regimes will have to narrowed. Ample opportunity exists within the 
operating system through international law and organizations such as the 
Arctic Council and, in particular, the IMO, to standardize international 
practice. Standardization may further legitimize existing unilateral practice 
and even engage states on more cooperative initiatives. Nonetheless, as 
evidenced by the evolution of the issues thus far, the Arctic operating system 
has provided for the ability to maintain divergent positions in the absence of 
prejudice and having demonstrated acceptance of this capacity, Arctic coastal 
states have demonstrated confidence in the operating system.  
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Chapter Three: Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The negotiation, design and outcome of the Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA)1 provide many insights 
into the Antarctic operating system, offering a case study into participant 
confidence and non-prejudicial outcomes to an intricate issue. As the minerals 
issue progressed it was particularly challenging to the Antarctic operating 
system. The operating system had to integrate complex issues associated with 
mineral resource exploitation as well as respond to and accommodate (absorb) 
pressure from external variables such as the growing concern regarding 
environmental accountability and the presence of developing state interests in 
securing rights over global commons resources.  
 
CRAMRA presented a regime solution to the possibility of mining within the 
Antarctic Treaty Area. It has been defined as a pre-emptive ‘assessment 
regime’ for assessing the possible impacts, determining acceptability and 
regulating accordingly.2 It has also been criticized as a license to invoke 
mining.3 Despite CRAMRA not entering into force following six years of 
formal negotiations (1982-1988), it still represents the only concentrated 
efforts of the ATCPs to negotiate and agree on terms deemed appropriate for 
safeguarding Antarctica against unregulated mineral resource development.4 
CRAMRA represents a possible solution for jurisdictional and property rights, 
accommodating different sovereignty positions, and amalgamating the 
interests of divergent interest groups within a framework for regulating set 
                                                
1 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), opened 
for signature 25 November 1988, 27 ILM 859, not entered into force. 
2 Christopher Beeby, 'The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities and Its Future' in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall and M.G. Haward (eds), Antarctica's 
Future: Continuity or Change?, Australian Institute of International Affairs (1990) 47, at 49. 
3 Anthony Bergin, 'The Politics of Antarctic Minerals: The Greening of White Australia' 
(1991) 26 Australian Journal of Political Science 216, at 223. 
4 For a comprehensive review of CRAMRA refer to supra n. 2, at 47-60. See also Peter J. 
Beck, 'Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Activity: A Major Addition to the 
ATS' (1989) 25(152) Polar Record 19-32. 
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activities. The ‘package deal’ embodies accommodation, compromise and the 
ability to reach these attributes without creating untoward prejudice 
concerning the rights of the states involved and divergent views.     
 
CRAMRA was eventually shelved in favour of a comprehensive 
environmental protection regime in the form of the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol).5 This 
outcome, however, also provides insight into the nature and capacity of the 
system and the commitment of its actors. Over the course of the minerals 
issues, participant states worked hard to maintain internal cohesion and 
confidence in the system. Turning from the ATS to invoke further authority 
through the UN would have represented abandonment of the structure of the 
system and a failure of the system to accommodate the rights of all states. In 
the end, the system proved robust. It upheld the rights, positions and authority 
of states and demonstrated legitimacy, resilience and effectiveness.  
 
3.2 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities 
History of the negotiations 
The potential for minerals exploitation was first considered informally at the 
sixth ATCM in 1970 and was raised formally in 1972 with Recommendation 
VII-6.6 In 1975 the ATCPs agreed to a policy of ‘voluntary restraint while 
seeking agreed timely solution’ to the question of Antarctic mineral resource 
activities.7 In 1976, a special meeting on minerals, which convened in Paris, 
agreed upon a set of principles to govern future minerals negotiations. 
Adopted in 1977 at the ninth ATCM,8 these principles, along with the policy 
                                                
5 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol), opened for 
signature 04 October 1991, 30 ILM 1455, entered into force 14 January 1998, Annex V 
entered into force 24 May 2002, Annex VI was adopted 14 June 2005. 
6 Recommendation VII-6 (1972) - ATCM VII, 30 October-10 November, Wellington: 
Antarctic Resources - Effects of Mineral Exploration. 
7 Recommendation VIII-14 (1975) - ATCM VIII, 09-20 June, Oslo: Antarctic Resources - 
Effects of Mineral Exploration. 
8 Recommendation IX-1 (1977) - ATCM IX, 19 September-07 October, London: Future 
Regime on Antarctic Mineral Resources. 
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of voluntary restraint,9 shaped the negotiations that extended through the 
1980s. By 1979, the ATCPs had agreed that a regime which determines what 
mineral resource activities are acceptable and regulates these activities should 
incorporate environmental impact assessments and cover the ecological, 
technological, political, legal and economic aspects of the activities.10 The 
participation of other states (non-ATCPs) in mineral resource activities was 
also considered.11 Through 1979 and 1980, the perception that a minerals 
regime was essential grew from informal meetings between states.12 Thus the 
negotiation of CRAMRA evolved from concern over the possible effects of 
unregulated mineral resource exploration and deleterious effects to the 
environment.13 In 1981, the ATCPs established a basis for the negotiations of 
a minerals regime, setting five core principles.14 These principles included: 
engaging an active and responsible role for the ATCPs regarding mineral 
resource activities; preserving the Antarctic Treaty in its entirety; protecting 
the unique Antarctic environment and its dependent ecosystems; ensuring the 
interests of all mankind are not prejudiced; and ensuring that Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty is safeguarded.15  
 
Official negotiations began in 1982 through a series of Special Consultative 
Meetings on Antarctic Minerals, chaired by Ambassador Chris Beeby of New 
Zealand. In total, eleven separate sessions were hosted by a number of 
different Consultative Parties.16 The structure of the negotiations was both 
formal and informal, owing to the lack of an overarching secretariat, the small 
number of states engaged in the negotiations and the personality and Parties’ 
                                                
9 Recommendation IX-1 reaffirmed voluntary restraint by ATCPs and urged their nationals 
and other states to ‘refrain from all exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral 
resources while making progress towards the timely adoption of an agreed regime concerning 
Antarctic mineral resource activities’. 
10 Recommendation X-1 (1979) - ATCM X, 17 September-05 October, Washington: 
Preparation for an Antarctic mineral resources regime. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Christopher C. Joyner, 'The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process' (1987) 81(4) The 
American Journal of International Law 888, at 891. 
13 Rolf Trolle Andersen, 'Negotiating a New Regime: How CRAMRA Came Into Existence' 
in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng (eds), The Antarctic Treaty System in World 
Politics, MacMillan Academic & Professional Ltd. (1991) 94, at 95. 
14 Recommendation XI-1 (1981) - ATCM XI, 23 June-07 July, Buenos Aires: Regime on 
Antarctic Mineral Resources. 
15 Ibid., See also supra n. 12, at 891. 
16 Supra n. 13, at 103. 
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confidence in the Chairman.17 Meetings contained a formal plenary session 
with supplementary open-ended working groups and contact groups.18 Once 
issues were resolved and successfully incorporated into the running text of the 
convention, the working groups and/or contact groups became dormant. By 
1987, the Prospecting Group and the Environmental Group had satisfactorily 
addressed their work program. The Legal Group and Exploration and 
Development Group, tackling more difficult issues of dispute settlement, 
liability and approvals of exploration and development management schemes, 
continued for the duration of the negotiations.19 Separate, but intertwined with 
the outcome of these Groups, were the concerns raised by NGOs and 
developing states. As the negotiations advanced, participation and criticism by 
these actors influenced progress of the negotiations and ATS regime stability.  
 
New Zealand was the host state to the opening of negotiations in 1982 and the 
final sessions in 1988. The convention was adopted by consensus on 02 June 
1988 and open for signature by the states that participated in the final session 
of the Fourth Special ATCM. The convention was then subject to ratification 
by Signatory States.20 For entry into force to occur, signatures, followed by 
ratification, were required from all of the claimant states as well as 
participants in the final meeting. The number of signatures also had to be 
sufficient to ‘…establish all of the institutions of the convention in respect of 
every area of Antarctica (emphasis added)’.21 So, although it was not essential 
that the claimant states sign the convention in the year that it opened for 
signature (they could, of course, accede later under the terms of Article 61), 
there was a high level of expectation that they would do so. The adherence of 
the claimants to the convention was also crucial for its entry into force.22  
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Supra n. 12, at 892 and 897. 
19 Ibid., at 897. A somewhat less formal group on confidentiality of data and information also 
continued to consider the issues of release of information to the public and protection of 
proprietary data. 
20 Article 61(1) and 62, CRAMRA. 
21 Ibid., Article 62(1). 
22 Blay and Tsamenyi review and the final provisions of CRAMRA and debate the ability of a 
claimant state to veto the convention given these final provisions. See S.K.N. Blay and B.M. 
Tsamenyi, 'The Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activity 
(CRAMRA) Can a Claimant Veto It?' (1989) 1 Antarctic and Southern Ocean Law and 
Policy Occasional Papers 1-18.  
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The convention failed to acquire all of the signatures of the claimant states in 
the year it was open for signature. In May 1989, two claimant states, Australia 
and France, indicated unwillingness to accept the convention. By the Paris 
ATCM in October 1989, the implementation of CRAMRA was very 
uncertain. The ATCPs moved towards considering an alternative. Various 
proposals for a comprehensive environmental protection instrument were 
considered.23 By October 1991, the Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) was adopted.  
 
The Protocol prohibited mining. For its adoption, compromise between the 
various proposals occurred and occurred quickly. The result was a framework 
instrument that safeguarded environmental concerns regarding Antarctica, 
safeguarded the ATS from UN intervention, and safeguarded the ATS from a 
formalized review process under the Antarctic Treaty (which could have been 
initiated in 1991).24  
 
Components of CRAMRA 
CRAMRA consists of seven Chapters, 67 articles, and one Annex on the 
establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal. These chapters include: 
Chapter I: General provisions 
Chapter II: Institutions 
                                                
23 Australia/France/Belgium/Italy proposed a comprehensive ‘Convention for the Protection 
of the Antarctic Environment’ that would establish Antarctica as a natural reserve, land of 
science; the United States proposed comprehensive measures building on the components of 
the Antarctic Treaty System; Chile proposed comprehensive measures, which include the 
development of the concept of Antarctica as a Special Conservation Area; New Zealand 
proposed comprehensive measures constituting an integrated and binding environmental 
protection regime; and Sweden proposed measures relating to common elements for 
environmental protection. See Recommendation XV-1 (1989) - ATCM XV, 09-20 October, 
Paris: Comprehensive System for the Protection of the Antarctic Environment. Some of the 
proposals were framed such that they could co-exist with the Minerals Convention, whereas 
others included a prohibition on mineral resource activity.   
24 In accordance with Article XII(2)(a) of the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 01 
December 1959, 402 UNTS 71, entered into force 23 June 1961, any ATCP could call for a 
review conference concerning the operation of the Treaty after the expiration of thirty years 
from the entry into force of the Treaty. Andrew Jackson suggested that the intense debate on 
the future of Antarctica that occurred between 1989 and 1991 became a de facto review and 
that by 1991 the ATCPs had effectively ‘side-stepped’ the review process. See Andrew 
Jackson, 'Modern Politics of the Antarctic' (Paper presented at the Australians in Antarctica, 
National Museum of Australia, 05 October 2001). 
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Chapter III: Prospecting 
Chapter IV: Exploration 
Chapter V: Development 
Chapter VI: Disputes Settlement 
Chapter VII: Final Clauses 
 
Article 2, in the General Provisions, reiterates the principles of the Antarctic 
Treaty, ensuring that the convention is an integral part of the Antarctic Treaty 
System and acknowledging a special responsibility of the ATCPs in the 
protection of the environment and the respect for other uses of Antarctica, 
particularly the scientific value and the interests of all mankind.25 The 
convention provides a method of assessing the environmental impact of 
Antarctic mineral resource activities prior to commencement of any activities, 
determining whether activities are acceptable, governing the conduct as may 
be found acceptable and ensuring that activities are undertaken only in strict 
conformity with the convention.26  
 
As a framework convention, the guidelines and the means for assessment and 
regulation were to be established through the institutional bodies created 
following its entry into force. However, mineral resource activities were not to 
take place except in accordance with the convention,27 nor until it was judged 
that these activities would not create adverse impacts or significant changes to 
the environment and dependent and associated ecosystems.28  
 
CRAMRA regulates the three stages of mineral resource exploitation rather 
than focusing on a conservation or ecosystem approach. In order to undertake 
either prospecting, exploration or development,29 provisions under CRAMRA 
such as, inter alia, environmental impact assessments, management schemes30 
                                                
25 Article 2(3), CRAMRA. 
26 Ibid., According to Article 2(1) and Article 4(2). 
27 Ibid., Article 3. 
28 Ibid., Article 4. 
29 Ibid., defined in Article 1(8-1). See also provisions in Chapter III: Prospecting (Articles 37, 
38), Chapter IV: Exploration (Articles 39-52), Chapter V: Development (Articles 53, 54). 
30 Ibid., Article 46. 
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and development permits31 must be met. Article 4 of CRAMRA outlines the 
environmental criteria that had to be met including, inter alia, that the activity 
would not cause significant changes in the atmospheric, terrestrial or marine 
environments32 and that no activities would take place until technology exists 
for safe operation, monitoring and emergency response.33 
 
CRAMRA establishes four institutions – a Commission; Regulatory 
Committees; Special Meeting of Parties; and an Advisory Committee – that 
would have become operational at varying times to guide the process of 
assessing and regulating potential mineral resource activity. The Commission 
is the overarching body that judges whether to open an area for exploration 
and development or not. This body would have consisted of the ATCPs at the 
time the convention was signed and at least three developing states.34 At the 
time of signing the ATCPs acknowledged that this reflected the balance 
between developed and developing Consultative Parties but that in the event 
of an increase in size of the Commission in the future there would be a case 
for considering, by way of amendment, the balance of states in the 
Commission and Regulatory Committees.35  The Commission required a ¾ 
majority on most decisions and consensus on the decision to identify an area 
for exploration.36  
 
Regulatory Committees were to be created once an area was opened for 
exploration and development. These bodies would also have had decision-
making capabilities to create and modify guidelines, management schemes 
and moderate ongoing activities. Regulatory Committees would have 
consisted of ten members: four claimants, including the claimant whose 
territorial claim corresponded with the area opened for exploration and 
development, and six non-claimants. Of the six non-claimants, the US and the 
                                                
31 Ibid., Article 53. 
32 Ibid., Article 4(2)(b). 
33 Ibid., Article 4(4)(a-c). 
34 Ibid., Article 18. 
35 Final Act of the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral 
Resources, Wellington, 25 November 1988, 27 ILM 859. 
36 Article 22(1) and 22(2)(c), CRAMRA. 
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Soviet Union would have always been members,37 as well as at least three 
developing states.38 Voting occurred by majority, requiring 2/3 majority for 
both the claimant and non-claimant states when considering guidelines 
comprised for mineral resource activities and management scheme decisions. 
A simple majority vote would have occurred for procedural matters and a 
simple 2/3 majority for all other matters of substance.39 
 
Unlike the Commission and the Regulatory Committees, the Special Meeting 
of the Parties and the Advisory Committee are not to be decision-making 
bodies. The Advisory Committee would have played an important role 
throughout the life cycle of mineral resource activities, advising the 
Commission and Regulatory Committees as required by the convention or as 
requested on the scientific, technical and environmental aspects of Antarctic 
mineral resource activities.40 Membership to the Advisory Committee would 
have been open to all Parties.41 The Special Meeting of the Parties would have 
occurred only in relation to opening an area as discussed below. It would also 
have been open to all Parties and would have convened to consider the 
identification of an area for possible exploration and development.42 
 
Operators interested in Antarctic mineral resource activities had to be 
associated with a Sponsoring State through all of the phases of prospecting, 
exploration and development. This link had to be substantial and genuine.43 In 
the application of CRAMRA, it is the Sponsoring State that is responsible for 
invoking the institutions and provisions. Once the convention was operational, 
the Operator would have gained a sense of how to apply, how to pay for 
applications and what levies would have been expected from pending 
development. For example, applications and permits made by the Sponsoring 
States on behalf of Operators were granted through the Regulatory 
                                                
37 Ibid. The US and the Soviet Union assert a basis of claim in Antarctica and shall be 
included in all Regulatory Committees in accordance with Article 29(2)(b). 
38 Ibid., Article 29(2) and 29(3)(b). 
39 Ibid., Article 32. 
40 Ibid., Article 26. 
41 Ibid., Article 23(2). 
42 Ibid., Article 28. 
43 Ibid., Article 1(12) defines Sponsoring State and Article 37(7)(a-f) explain the terms of 
prospecting, outlining roles of Sponsoring States and Operators. 
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Committees44 while the Commission provided for fees to be levied from 
successful development.45 Sponsoring States had also to ensure that Operators 
would have the capacity to meet environmental criteria and carry out activities 
related to all phases of prospecting, exploration and development in 
conformity with the convention. Operators had to be able to prove their case.   
 
Throughout the terms of the convention and each stage of prospecting, 
exploration and development, scientific research continued to be encouraged. 
The convention also attempts to distinguish between industry activity and 
scientific research in its definitions. ‘Prospecting’, is defined as scientific 
research with a distinct commercial purpose, aimed at identifying areas of 
resource potential for possible exploration and development.46 Activities such 
as dredging and excavations are not included except for the purpose of small 
scale sampling or shallow drilling not exceeding 25 m depth into the 
sediment.47 Prospecting consistent with the provisions of the convention 
would have been permitted throughout the Antarctic Treaty Area without 
authorization by the Commission, a decision-making institution of the 
convention. However, a proposed activity could have been drawn into 
question by the Commission regarding its consistency with the convention. 
The environmental impact assessment, provided to the Commission for 
proposed Prospecting activities, would have targeted any concerns. The 
Commission would have been able to request modification of the proposed 
activities to bring the activities in line with the convention. Failure to do so by 
the Party proposing the activity would have been seen as acting contrary to the 
provisions of the convention and due notice would have been given by all 
Contracting Parties. 
 
‘Exploration’ includes activities aimed at identifying and evaluating specific 
occurrences or deposits to determine the nature and size of mineral resource 
                                                
44 Ibid., Article 31 provides for the functions of the Regulatory Committees. See in particular, 
Article 31(1)(b-c). 
45 Ibid., Article 21 provides for the functions of the Commission, See in particular, Article 
21(1)(q-r), relating to levies and disposition of revenues. 
46 Ibid., Article 1(8). 
47 Ibid., Article 1(8). 
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deposits and the feasibility of their development.48 ‘Development’ includes 
pilot projects, processing, storage, transport, and any activities aimed at or 
associated with exploitation of specific mineral resources.49 Exploration and 
development could have only occurred with the opening or identification of an 
area by the Commission. Request by a state to open an area would have 
triggered a cascade of regulatory steps aimed at ensuring that opening the area 
for exploration and any associated activities would only have occurred in 
conformity with the convention and through its institutions.  
 
At the notification of intent to explore for potential economically viable 
mineral resources, mechanisms would have been set into motion to identify or 
open the area of interest. An Advisory Committee would have been formed 
once the Commission was approached regarding identification of an area. This 
Committee considers and reports to the Commission on scientific, technical 
and environmental issues relating to the specific area in question but does not 
have decision-making authority. Following this report, a Special Meeting of 
the Parties, open to every state to the convention to participate, would have 
occurred. The Special Meeting of the Parties examines whether opening of the 
area is consistent with the provisions of the convention, taking into account 
the report of the Advisory Committee. This Meeting would have reported its 
findings to the Commission, which votes on whether to open or identify such 
area. In taking its decision, the Commission would have considered all the 
available information, including the environmental impact assessment for the 
proposed area and activities, the ability of such activities to occur in 
consistency with all provisions of the convention and the reports of the 
Advisory Committee and the Special Meeting of the Parties.  
 
If the area is identified, a Regulatory Committee would have been formed. 
The Regulatory Committee reports to the Commission and provides 
preparatory work for exploration and development including, inter alia, 
establishing guidelines, and assigning application fees and procedures for 
                                                
48 Ibid., Article 1(9). 
49 Ibid., Article 1(10). 
 157 
Operators and Sponsoring States.50 The Committees are responsible for 
dividing the identified area into manageable blocks with associated 
exploration and development permits as well as creating appropriate 
Management Schemes. Regulatory Committees are also granted particular 
authority to revoke permits, delay operations or invoke fines and penalties.51 
As exploration, and then development, occurred, a system of reporting would 
have been activated to assist with compliance efforts of the Regulatory 
Committees. 
 
Management Schemes prescribe specific terms and conditions for exploration 
and development including duration of the permits, measures and procedures 
for environmental protection, provisions for necessary and timely response 
(such as prevention, contingency plans, clean-up, removal and restoration), 
performance requirements for the Operator, provisions for monitoring and 
inspections as well as financial obligations and dispute settlement provisions. 
Management Schemes also prescribe terms for data collection, reporting, 
notification, confidentiality, and enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Both Operator and Sponsoring States have responsibilities to ensure that 
operations occur in conformity with permits and Management Schemes. Their 
relationship is important. Sponsoring States must ensure that Operators are 
qualified to undertake resource activities without violating terms of the 
convention, ensuring that Operators have the financial capacity and technical 
competence to respond to threats or harm to the environment.52 Sponsoring 
States are also responsible for ensuring that the activities of the Operator do 
not infringe on the rights of other Operators.53 Sponsors must also support and 
defend their Operators, giving advance notice to the Commission of 
prospecting, and promoting interest in identifying an area for exploration and 
development. Operators would need a supportive Sponsor to facilitate their 
interests but must also improve their capacity to carry out activities in 
                                                
50 Ibid., Article 31 outlines the functions of the Regulatory Committees. 
51 Ibid., Article 51-52. 
52 Ibid., Article 37(3)(a-b). 
53 Ibid., Article 37(4). 
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conformity with the convention and respond to environmental threat or 
damage.  
 
Preliminary liability measures were established in CRAMRA along with the 
obligation to create a separate liability Protocol to address liability resulting 
from environmental damage.54  Small-scale prospecting activity with minimal 
intended environmental impact could have proceeded in accordance with 
these preliminary measures. However, no application for exploration or 
development could have been made until the separate liability Protocol was in 
force for the party lodging the application.55 Liability rests primarily on the 
Operator under strict terms,56 but the Sponsoring State is responsible for 
ensuring liability is covered by the Operator.57 The Operator is not liable for 
damage that would not have occurred had the Sponsoring State adequately 
supervised the Operator.58 
 
In relation to disputes that may arise concerning the interpretation and 
application of CRAMRA, the convention provides two options for binding, 
third-party dispute settlement.59 These include the ICJ and the Arbitral 
Tribunal constituted in accordance with an annex to the convention.60 A state 
may exempt itself from categories of disputes. CRAMRA does, however, 
include a list of non-exceptionable items which covers a large share of 
potential disputes that may arise.61 At any time, any Party to a dispute, which 
cannot be exempt from dispute settlement, may request that the Arbitral 
Tribunal be constituted as a matter of urgency to indicate or prescribe 
provisional measures to preserve the rights of states and/or to prevent serious 
harm to the Antarctic environment.62 The Arbitral Tribunal is not competent 
to decide or otherwise rule on matters relating to Article IV of the Antarctic 
                                                
54 Ibid., Article 8. 
55 Ibid., Article 8(9). 
56 Ibid., Article 8. 
57 Ibid., Article 37(3)(b). 
58 Ibid., Article 8(3). 
59 Ibid., Article 56-58. 
60 Ibid. Choice of procedure is outlined in Article 56(1). 
61 Ibid., Article 58(1). See also comments in Lee A. Kimball, 'Special Report on: The 
Antarctic Minerals Convention' (International Institute for Environment and Development-
North America, A Center of the World Resources Institute, Washington, July 1988), at 20. 
62 Article 6 of the Annex for an Arbitral Tribunal, CRAMRA. 
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Treaty.63 Nothing in the convention can confer competence or jurisdiction of 
the ICJ or the Arbitral Tribunal in dealing with matters related to Article IV or 
with regard to the exercise of discretionary powers of the institutions.64 
Compulsory, binding, dispute settlement that can be instituted at the request of 
only one party on an emergency basis for the protection of the environment as 
well as the preservation of states rights was a new addition to international 
agreements at that time.65 
 
CRAMRA applies to the Antarctic Treaty Area (below 60˚S) including all 
Antarctic islands, ice shelves and seabed and subsoil of adjacent offshore 
areas up to the deep seabed.66 The deep seabed is defined as the seabed and 
subsoil beyond the geographical extent of the Antarctic continental shelf as 
defined in accordance with international law.67 The geographical extent of the 
continental shelf would have been ‘determined by reference to all the criteria 
and rules embodied in paragraphs 1 to 7 of Article 76’ of LOSC.68 However, 
the manner in which this would have occurred between the ATCPs and the 
CLCS is not alluded to. At the final session of the Fourth Special Consultative 
Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources, which adopted the convention, it 
was also agreed that the area of application ‘does not extend to any 
continental shelf appurtenant…to islands situated north of 60˚ south 
latitude’.69 Areas completely off limits to any mineral resource activities 
included Specially Protected Areas and Sites of Special Scientific Interest as 
designated by the Commission.70 
 
Negotiating the ‘package deal’ 
CRAMRA was successfully negotiated during a time of significant pressure 
on the ATS and was adopted by consensus after six years of negotiations. Part 
                                                
63 Article 57(4), CRAMRA. 
64 Ibid., Articles 57(4) and (5). 
65 The Madrid Protocol incorporates compulsory, binding dispute settlement (Articles 18-20). 
According to Article 20(2) the compulsory procedures may not decide or rule on any matter 
within the scope of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. 
66 Article 5(2), CRAMRA. 
67 Ibid., Article 5(3). 
68 Supra n. 35. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Article 21, CRAMRA. 
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of the success of CRAMRA came from the small number of participants in the 
negotiations, the style of negotiations, the personality of the Chairman and the 
cooperation of delegations with him, the continuity of the negotiations, and, 
importantly, the philosophy behind the negotiations. Safeguarding Antarctica 
against unregulated development was a cornerstone of the negotiations. 
Unregulated development had the potential to have devastating effects on the 
Antarctic environment and jeopardize the stability of the Antarctic Treaty 
within the larger operating system. While perhaps not an immediate threat, 
interest was increasing and it was recognized that the issues deserved pre-
emptive attention. As well, the ATCPs were just finishing the CCAMLR 
negotiations regarding living resources71 when the non-living resource issue 
became an agenda item.  
 
Overcoming the difficult issues invoked by the concept of mineral resource 
activity became part of the drive to succeed. Even though the debate around 
Antarctic mineral resource activity seemed ‘removed from reality’,72 having a 
mechanism in place inside the ATS, one consistent with the Antarctic Treaty, 
was important for the longevity of the ATS and the principles of the Antarctic 
Treaty, including freedom of scientific research and the sovereign discretion. 
The fact that mineral resource activity was not occurring and was not likely to 
occur for the next thirty years contributed to the success of negotiating 
CRAMRA. The issues might have been just too big to create this kind of 
accommodation if resource development had already begun or was looming in 
the immediate future. Andersen notes that,  
it was believed that precisely the lack of knowledge regarding possible 
occurrences of minerals and the absence of a commercial interest in 
activity might make it possible to reach agreement in this very 
complicated field.73 
 
                                                
71 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), opened 
for signature 20 May 1980, 19 ILM 837, entered into force 07 April 1982. 
72 Tucker Scully, 'The Antarctic Treaty as a System ' in R.A. Herr, H.R. Hall and M.G. 
Haward (eds), Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change, Australian Institute of International 
Affairs (1990) 95, at 100. 
73 Supra n. 13, at 96. 
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Important to the negotiations were the personalities within the delegations and 
the personality of the Chairman. Ambassador Chris Beeby of New Zealand 
was the Chairman of the negotiations for their duration. His ability to engage 
all the delegations individually and collectively was a key factor in the 
success of the negotiations. Throughout the negotiations, Chairman Beeby 
assumed the role of ‘honest broker’, taking draft text and communication he 
received and placing it together into written text known as the ‘Beeby Texts’. 
These texts did not represent formal negotiating instruments but represented 
the Chairman’s ‘best guess as to what language will move the negotiations 
forward’74 according to information received by the delegations through direct 
communication or submitted draft text. He represented the ‘common memory 
bank’ of the negotiations.75 He had a full overview of all of the sessions and 
personally followed the developments between all of the discussion groups 
and delegates. Accordingly, the Chairman could identify what points were 
preventing the negotiations from moving forward and engage those working 
groups, individual states or groups of states on a formal and also informal 
basis. As Joyner noted, ‘informal diplomacy in the Antarctic minerals 
negotiations assumed a salient, even vital role.’76 Coffee breaks, lunch 
discussions and ‘corridor diplomacy’ engaged smaller groups, on a more 
personal basis, facilitating the search for practical solutions.  
 
Special intersessional meetings of the Parties, held in Whangaroa, New 
Zealand, were also convened by invitation by Chairman Beeby. These 
meetings provided opportunities for the invited heads of delegations to refine 
issues and troubleshoot particularly difficult negotiating points in settings less 
formal and cumbersome than the full ATCP mineral negotiation sessions. 
These meetings were also important for maintaining consistency during the 
corresponding phase the rapid growth in participation by states in the ATCMs 
and negotiations.77 The Whangaroa meetings were convened three times 
                                                
74 Supra n. 12, at 900. 
75 Supra n. 13, at 103. 
76 Supra n. 12, at 898. 
77 Between 1982 and 1988 seven states, including several developing states, became 
Consultative Parties: China, Ecuador, Finland, India, Korea (ROK), Spain and Sweden. Six 
other states signed onto the Treaty as non-Consultative Parties: Austria, Canada, Cuba, 
Greece, Hungary and Korea (DPRK). This was a time of rapid growth that had to be 
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between 1985 and 1987 and generally accelerated the negotiating process. 
Through this process delegations gained confidence that their position had 
been acknowledged and accommodated, in some manner, into the draft texts. 
Acceptable compromise could occur in one aspect of the convention as long 
as a balance was achieved to counter that compromise somewhere else in the 
convention. For example, a claimant state might have come to terms with the 
ability of non-claimants to be Sponsoring States only through appreciating the 
balance attained by the presence of claimant states in Regulatory Committees 
corresponding to their claimed territory.  
 
A sense of negotiating finesse was attained from those directly involved; a 
very cooperative, trusting and engaged group of states.78 New participants 
were assimilated into the process and every effort went into ensuring that each 
state’s understanding was clear and that each state’s position was granted due 
consideration. However, the unfamiliarity with, and complexity of, the system 
meant that negotiations were still driven by key players.79 As with any system, 
new participants required time and assistance in learning the intricacies tied to 
the Antarctic.80 New participants, especially those less developed states, were 
disadvantaged by jumping into the negotiations without prior experience in 
the ATS. Not all states were as familiar with all the issues, such as emerging 
environmental concepts and ‘environmental impact assessments’.81 While 
different views were assimilated into the text through the numerous contact 
and working groups, new participants were, to some extent, dependent on 
                                                                                                                          
accommodated within the ATCMs and the CRAMRA negotiations. For a list of Consultative 
and non-Consultative Party status see <http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e> at 
6 September 2010. 
78 See supra n. 13, at 103-106. 
79 Ibid, see especially p. 105. Key participants included, in particular, the US, New Zealand, 
the UK, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and also the Federal Republic of Germany played a 
significant role in the negotiations. 
80 There was a collective recognition of the desirability of certain forms of assistance being 
given to those states with less Antarctic experience. See Christopher D. Beeby, 'The Antarctic 
Treaty System: Goals, Performance and Impact' in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng 
(eds), The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics, MacMillan Academics & Professional 
Ltd. (1991) 4, at 14. 
81 Supra n. 13, at 98. 
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linkages with other states to provide platforms for their interests within the 
negotiating process.82 
 
Mutual respect for opposing views was a prerequisite for successful 
negotiation of CRAMRA.83 Claimants wanted to secure property rights over 
their claimed territory and continental shelf and exercise coastal state 
jurisdiction. Non-claimants wanted to ensure claimants could not assert 
exclusive jurisdiction over the resources in their claimed (but not recognized) 
sectors and that open access to any area of the Antarctic remained. Developed 
states wanted secure title and property rights but also desired a level of control 
over the potential for development and conservation. Developing states 
wanted, as a minimum, a voice in the decisions and regulations. All members 
of the ATS, whether consultative or not, wanted varying degrees of 
environmental protection, while NGOs fought a two-pronged battle.84 NGOs 
recognized the need to fight for the most stringent environmental criteria 
possible within the regime while also maintaining a voice to stop the 
negotiations in favour of a total ban on any mineral resource activity.85 
External to these interests, but intrinsically related to the success of the 
negotiations, was the pressure from some developing states inside the forum 
of the United Nations. Question existed as to whether the UN was a more 
appropriate body for the regulation of the Antarctic, taking into consideration 
their needs and the emergence of a new world order.86  
 
Throughout the negotiations, the draft texts sought to accommodate these 
positions while setting criteria for a regulatory framework for an activity. 
                                                
82 Ibid. Andersen states that ‘the burden of carrying forward demands for a practical 
recognition of their commitment to the Antarctic treaty System thus fell on a few shoulders.’  
83 Ibid., at 95. 
84 Lyn Goldsworthy, Senior Advisor of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 
Non-Governmental Organization during the CRAMRA campaign and co-director of ASOC 
1986-1990, Personal Communication (06 October 2008). See also Lee Kimball, 'The Role of 
Non-Governmental Organizations in Antarctic Affairs' in Christopher C. Joyner and Sudhir 
K. Chopra (eds), The Antarctic Legal Regime, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1988) 33, at 39. 
85 Ibid. After some disagreement that efforts towards improving environmental standards of 
the minerals negotiations would undermine the primary objectives of a world park, ASOC 
embraced both efforts. 
86 R. Tepper and M. Haward, 'The Development of Malaysia's Position on Antarctica: 1982 to 
2004' (2005) 41(217) Polar Record 113, at 113-124. Malaysia played a pivotal role in 
initiating the “Question of Antarctica” within the UNGA. See also supra n. 80, at 13. 
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Checks and balances occurred within the negotiating process, acknowledging 
divergent positions while not offering any one dominant or prejudicial 
position throughout the text. The result was a total of 67 interconnected 
provisions that only together attempted to accommodate the interests of all 
participants. It was a ‘package deal’.87 Its adoption by consensus at the 25 
November 1988 Wellington meeting88 indicated that its components and 
organization were accepted as compatible with claimant and non-claimant 
positions, including those of developing states. A degree of mutual 
dissatisfaction experienced at the end of the negotiations indicated that no one 
participant gained a higher degree of representation of their position in the 
package.89 
 
3.3 Components of the ‘package deal’ 
Institutions 
The balance of participation afforded to the Regulatory Committees was one 
of the most difficult negotiated aspects of the convention and included several 
political accommodations.90 The eventual decision to include 10 members 
within these committees arose from the desire to accommodate all of the 
interests.91 Each claimant state wanted to represent their interests if 
exploration was opened in their claimed area. Obligatory membership in the 
Regulatory Committees whose area of competence lies within their claimed 
area secured an important role for the claimant states. However, non-
claimants did not want the claimant to have over-arching authority or a means 
to assert their jurisdiction within the claimed area and thus the claimant 
participation was balanced with non-claimant participation within the 
Committees. Majority voting split between the two chambers of claimants and 
non-claimants provided intrinsic balance against the claimant role, although 
claimants could likely have still vetoed decisions by aligning themselves with 
                                                
87 See, among others, supra n. 13, at 96. 
88 Supra n. 80, at 17. 
89 Supra n. 13, at 106. 
90 Ibid., at 100-102. 
91 Ibid., at 101. Andersen notes that for political reasons the size of the Regulatory 
Committees had grown so much that further smaller, more practical bodies were created for 
the detailed examination of the applications and negotiations of Management Schemes. 
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other claimant interests.92 The two states with a basis of claims, the 
‘superpower’ states of the US and the Soviet Union, were granted automatic 
participation in the Regulatory Committees. At the same time, developed 
states were balanced with developing states, represented through both the 
claimants and non-claimant groups. 
 
Interests of the developing states were also taken into consideration through 
participation in the Meeting of the States Parties, which was open to all 
Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.93 Even though the Meeting of 
States parties by design could only express views on fundamental decisions, 
the positions of non-Consultative states, and therefore some further 
developing states, would still be heard by the Commission. In Andersen’s 
opinion, this body would have ‘prove[n] to carry considerable weight, should 
the Minerals Convention ever become operational.’94  
  
While the claimant states opted for more discretionary powers within the 
Regulatory Committees and through Article 46 that afforded relevant claimant 
and Sponsoring States a special role in examining an application and 
preparing a management scheme, membership in the Commission was 
predominantly non-claimant. The Commission had authority to set parameters 
of rule making for the Regulatory Committees and review that actions of the 
Committee are in conformity with the convention.95 This prevented 
Sponsoring States or claimant states in alliance with Sponsoring States from 
having ‘blanket discretion to negotiate their own deal’.96 The Commission 
could establish general regulations defining terms and conditions of the 
                                                
92 Bush, W.M. lists concessions granted within CRAMRA provisions, indicating that claimant 
states within a Regulatory Committee would always be able to configure a blocking vote. See 
William M. Bush, Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and National 
Documents, Oceana Publications (2003), Binder III, Booklet AL88D, at 132. See also 
William M. Bush, 'The Antarctic Treaty System: A Framework for Evolution' in R.A. Herr, 
H.R. Hall and M.G. Haward (eds), Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change?, Australian 
Institute of International Affairs (1990) 117, at 150. 
93 Non-Consultative states had been granted observer status in the 1985 ATCM and 
participated in CRAMRA from 1985 onwards. See Recommendation XIII-15 (1985) - ATCM 
XIII, 08-18 October, Brussels: Non-Consultative Parties Invited to ATCMs and supra n. 13, 
at 98. 
94 Ibid., Andersen, at 98. 
95 Article 21(1)(k)(l), CRAMRA. 
96 Supra n. 61, at 24. 
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Regulatory Committees functions, however this was not mandatory.97 
Management schemes and regulatory initiatives would have been developed 
within the context of the powers and functions assigned to the Commission 
and subject to the Advisory Committee. There was, however, some leeway 
left to the Regulatory Committees in interpreting the provisions of the 
convention in terms of management schemes for different minerals and 
projects. Claimant and Sponsoring States could have also come to additional 
understandings, subject to Regulatory Committee approval. 98 
 
The mixture of consensus and majority decision-making within the 
Commission and Regulatory Committees further demonstrates acceptance that 
the institutions were representative of the divergent interests.99 Decisions on 
opening an area to exploration and development and other decisions 
concerning key economic questions required consensus while majority 
decision-making for other issues. Consensus on the most important decisions 
provided political legitimacy to the decisions, the inclination to comply with 
provisions towards and in support of these decisions, and impinged less on the 
national sovereignty of the members.100 Majority decision-making revoked the 
ability for one state to veto a decision of the Commission and compelled states 
to look cooperatively at its decisions and functions, thereby, providing an 
authoritative role for the Commission.  
 
These institutions managed to encapsulate varying interests and positions, 
creating a combined jurisdiction possible only within the ATS. Participation 
was guaranteed to claimants in a manner that did not apparently disadvantage 
non-claimants. Developing states and developed states were proportionally 
represented.101 Voting procedures, while seemingly still able to grant, in the 
claimants’ views, a special position to claimant states, this view did not have 
                                                
97 Article 41, CRAMRA. 
98 See supra n. 61, at 24. 
99 Supra n. 13, at 100. 
100 Olav Schram Stokke, 'The Relevance of the Antarctic Treaty System as a Model for 
International Cooperation' in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng (eds), The Antarctic 
Treaty System in World Politics, Palgrave MacMillan (1991) 357, at 365. 
101 See supra n. 13, at 100-101 for a discussion on the political accommodation and 
composition of the Regulatory Committees. 
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to be shared by other states, providing a bifocal means through which their 
special position was diluted.102  
 
Collective authority 
The package was constructed into an international regime with formalized 
institutions that held legal personality and wider enforcement capabilities.103 
This differed from previous conventions, such as CCAMLR, which depends 
on national authority and flag state jurisdiction for enforcement. Out of 
CRAMRA, a sense of acceptance emerged that the ATCPs, as a system of 
states, were the authority over regulation of Antarctic activities.104 Growing 
acceptance of this authority is evident from a number of agreed terms within 
the convention, including the elaborately balanced composition and voting 
procedures of the institutions.  
 
CRAMRA also included several suggestions of ATCP assertion of collective 
authority over third parties and the international community. Intent by the 
ATCPs to bind third parties is evident in a number of provisions. Beginning 
with the preamble, which bears in mind the ‘special responsibility of the 
[ATCPs] to ensure that all activities in Antarctica are consistent with the 
purposes and principles of the Antarctic Treaty’105, Article 2 reiterates that 
Parties ‘acknowledge the special responsibility of the ATCPs for the 
protection of the environment’ and other related issues.106 Article 3 states that 
‘[n]o Antarctic mineral resource activities shall be conducted except in 
accordance with this convention…’ and Article 7 provides strong text in 
support of that cause. To that end, Article 7(5) states that ‘[e]ach party shall 
exert appropriate efforts…to the end that no one engages in any Antarctic 
mineral resource activities contrary to the objectives and principles of this 
                                                
102 For further discussion on this see supra n. 92, Bush (1990), at 149-154. 
103 Ibid., at 150. 
104 Watts describes the minerals regime as providing an ‘assertion of jurisdiction over the 
continental shelf areas of Antarctic on the part of the Antarctic States acting collectively, so 
giving rise to a jurisdiction which is “national” even if also collective’ In Arthur Watts, 
International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System, Grotius Publications Ltd (1992), at 160.   
105 Preamble, CRAMRA. 
106 Ibid., Article 2(3) lists a number of areas for which the ATCPs are responsible such as (c) 
ensuring respect for other legitimate uses of the Antarctic and (g) taking into account the 
interests of the international community as a whole. 
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convention’ (emphasis added). Acceptance of these provisions suggests 
overwhelming support for the organized, institutionalized regulation of 
mineral resource activities through a condominium-style convention.107  
 
A level of cooperation, inspired by Article 6 also contributes to the collective 
authority of the ATCPs. Claimant states of the Antarctic Peninsula 
(Argentina, Chile and the United Kingdom) recognized that various practical 
problems associated with their overlapping claims would have to be 
satisfactorily resolved for effective regime operation.108 In signing the 
convention, these states issued assurances of cooperation to that end.109  
 
The scope of CRAMRA also suggests an extensive claim of competence by 
the ATCPs, beyond that legitimate for a single nation state.110 The Convention 
applies to the Antarctic Treaty Area and shall regulate Antarctic mineral 
resource activities that take place on the continent, all Antarctic islands 
located south of 60˚S and in the seabed and sub-soil of adjacent offshore areas 
up to the deep seabed.111 In describing the area, Article 5(2) also indicates that 
the description is ‘without prejudice to the responsibilities of the [ATCPs] 
under the Antarctic Treaty and measures pursuant to it’. Bush (2003) indicates 
that this constitutes an assertion of competence of the ATCPs to impose 
environmental restrictions on deep seabed mining, including the prohibition 
established in Article 3 of CRAMRA.112 The competence of the International 
Seabed Authority (ISBA) under LOSC Part XI may have been excluded under 
these terms. At the same time, states are not prevented from acknowledging 
                                                
107 Among others, see William Bush, 'The 1988 Wellington Convention: How Much 
Environmental Protection?' in Joe Verhoeven, Phillipe Sands and Maxwell Bruce (eds), The 
Antarctic Environment and International Law, Graham & Trotman (1992) 69, at 81. 
108 Supra n. 92, Bush (2003), Binder III, Booklet AL88D, Document AL02061988B, at 133. 
The three overlapping claimant states reported in the final session of the SATCM IV-12 that 
discussions undertaken on issues concerning overlapping claims would continue even after 
the adoption of the convention which took place at that final session. 
109 Ibid. The assurance was in the form of a declared intention by the states to consult with 
each other. 
110 Ibid., at 19. 
111 Article 5, CRAMRA. 
112 Supra n. 92, Bush (2003), Binder III, Booklet AL88D, Document AL02061988B, at 19. 
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the competence of the ISBA for mining activities taking place on the deep 
seabed area beyond the extent of the continental shelf south of 60˚S.113  
 
The ATCPs were able to circumvent the issues regarding the manner in which 
the ISBA and the ATCPs would have orchestrated deep seabed mining while, 
at the same time, leaving several possible approaches open for 
consideration.114 Lack of clarification (or intentional ambiguity) in the final 
text of CRAMRA provides a bifocal approach and demonstrates the ability of 
the ATCPs to accommodate, but leave unresolved, divergent positions. 
 
Environmental harm 
Within the ‘package deal’ was the ability to mine only if and when the activity 
met the prerequisite regulatory criteria. This approach differed from 
CCAMLR’s precautionary approach, which enabled activities to proceed 
cautiously, altering the activities in accordance with identified harm.115 
CRAMRA assumed harm would accompany the activity and provided for 
some judgement of the activity prior to proceeding. Article 4, for example, 
states that no Antarctic mineral resource activities shall take place until it is 
judged that the activity in question would not cause significant adverse effects 
on the air and water quality or significant changes in, inter alia, the 
distribution, abundance or productivity of populations of species of flora or 
fauna.116 Bush (1992) quite accurately points out that limited guidance was 
given as to what defined significant as opposed to insignificant effects or 
change and that a notable shortcoming of CRAMRA was possibly its inability 
                                                
113 See supra n. 104, at 161. 
114 Ibid., at 161-162 for further discussion. 
115 The application of the precautionary approach in CCAMLR was revolutionary for the 
conservation of marine living resources. See Denzil G.M. Miller, Eugene N. Sabourenkov and 
David C. Ramm, 'Managing Antarctic Marine Living Resources: the CCAMLR Approach' 
(2004) 19(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 317-363 for further discussion 
of the CCAMLR approach. Bush highlights the differences between the approaches, 
commenting that the minerals negotiations broke new ground by seeking to prevent an 
activity occurring unless shown not to cause significant harm. Supra n. 92, Bush (1990), at 
146. 
116 Article 4(2)(a-b), CRAMRA. 
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to establish the level of acceptable or tolerable harm.117 Whether the 1988 
definition of significant change or the threshold of acceptability would hold 
true today is difficult to determine given that the provisions and definitions 
were not tested. In negotiating CRAMRA, procedure was not guided by 
already occurring industry activity in the area, so a benchmark was not able to 
be defined within the convention. Nevertheless, these definitions and levels 
would have evolved through the establishment of the institutions, guidelines 
and judgements related to the potential of activity.  
 
Liability 
The establishment of liability criteria within CRAMRA was also a difficult 
issue, lacking benchmarks or clear definitions. Parties recognized that the 
provisions within CRAMRA would need to be supplemented with a further 
Protocol. Article 8 of CRAMRA provides that an Operator shall be strictly 
liable for damage to the Antarctic environment. Damage is defined as ‘any 
impact on the living or non-living components of that environment or those 
ecosystems, including harm to the atmospheric, marine, or terrestrial life, 
beyond that which is negligible or which has been assessed and judged to be 
acceptable pursuant to this convention.’ Once again, debate amongst the 
members of the institutions would have been required to actually define 
acceptable levels of harm as a benchmark for damage. Nonetheless, parties 
did agree that this framework was an acceptable starting point. Providing 
strict and unlimited liability as the convention standard meant that any 
dilution that occurred during the negotiation of the separate liability protocol 
and guidelines would have had to stand up against the provisions in the 
convention. The Final Act of the Fourth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources also indicates a level of urgency and 
necessity towards immediate commencement on provisions of liability, stating 
                                                
117 Supra n. 107, at 74-75. Article 1(15) does broadly define ‘damage’. Though potential 
shortcomings, general definitions also allowed for terms of the convention and their 
application to evolve over time. 
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that ‘it would be desirable to begin work on its elaboration at an early 
stage.’118  
 
Title to resources 
The package also sought to secure Operators with title over the resources. 
Security provided by the exclusive ability to develop mineral resources is an 
important industry element. Without security, the potential for fiscal returns 
following large investments in expensive technology and lengthy 
development timeframes is at risk. In an ordinary situation where sovereignty 
is understood, rights and responsibilities are enforced through a jurisdictional 
system. In the Antarctic context, enforcing both rights and responsibilities 
depended on CRAMRA affording some system of jurisdiction that did not 
compromise the sovereign discretion assigned in the Antarctic Treaty. This 
was successfully done through a combination of the institutions and the 
concept of a Sponsoring State within the convention as well as the integration 
of the convention within the existing system based around the Antarctic 
Treaty.  
 
Coastal state jurisdiction 
Article 9 of CRAMRA strengthens the legal positions of the claimants while 
not derogating the rights of non-claimants. This article also provided the first 
indication in the ATS of how coastal state jurisdiction might apply. Article 9 
upholds Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty by repeating that ‘[n]othing in the 
convention and no acts or activities taking place while the convention is in 
force shall…constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to 
territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area or create any rights of 
                                                
118 Supra n. 35. Discussion on liability provisions began in the 1989 ATCM in Paris even 
though the status of CRAMRA was uncertain. Discussions carried forward to the negotiations 
over the Madrid Protocol, which provided for the negotiation of an annex concerning liability. 
The annex was eventually adopted 13 years after negotiations began and implementation for 
many states is still pending. The Protocol’s annex on liability represents only emergency 
response and preparedness, rather than true liability. Following Decision 1(2005) - ATCM 
XXVIII - CEP VIII, 06-17 June, Stockholm: Annex VI (Liability), ATCPs will take a 
decision no later than 2010 on the establishment of a time-frame for the resumption of 
negotiations to elaborate further rules and procedures relating to liability. 
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sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area.’119 In the same provision, nothing 
shall prejudice any right or claim or basis to claim ‘to exercise coastal state 
jurisdiction under international law’,120 which acknowledged the status of 
claimant states as coastal states, entrusted with the rights and responsibilities 
connected to maritime zones and the legal continental shelf.121  
 
In previous ATS negotiations, such as CCAMLR, jurisdiction over resources 
was able to fit without prejudice into the sovereignty situation through a 
bifocal approach and principles of flag state jurisdiction. Statements included 
in CCAMLR that ‘nothing would be interpreted as prejudicing any rights to 
exercise coastal state jurisdiction under international law’122 could be 
interpreted by claimant states as referring to maritime areas within the entire 
scope of the convention while non-claimants could interpret the words as 
permitting national jurisdiction only in areas inside the scope of CCAMLR 
that are north of the Antarctic Treaty Area. CRAMRA’s area of application 
was limited to inside the Antarctic Treaty Area so the bifocal approach could 
not be applied in the same manner. While a bifocal approach was still used 
regarding recognition of claims, a different concept of collective jurisdiction 
had to be applied that clearly enabled coastal state jurisdiction to exist off the 
Antarctic without providing exclusivity which would have been and is 
unacceptable to non-claimants. 
 
Sponsoring States 
CRAMRA came to grips with jurisdictional questions by making it clear that 
an Operator had to have a Sponsoring State to the law of which the Operator 
would be subject.123 However, the convention did not give the Sponsoring 
State exclusive jurisdiction. Subjection to the law of the Sponsoring State was 
without prejudice to any other law that might be applicable.124 Because states 
                                                
119 Article 9(a), CRAMRA. 
120 Ibid., Article 9(b). 
121 At the time of signature of CRAMRA, LOSC had been signed (in 1982), but had not 
entered into force. 
122 Article IV(2)(b), CCAMLR. 
123 Article 1(12), CRAMRA, defined the “Sponsoring State” concept. 
124 Ibid., Article 1(12)(c)(i), CRAMRA. 
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had to be party to the Antarctic Treaty,125 the sovereign discretion of Article 
IV automatically applied to the Operator through the Sponsoring State. The 
convention, therefore, outlined an entitlement for the Sponsoring States to 
regulate but not assert exclusive jurisdiction.  
 
A Sponsoring State did not have to be a claimant state but there had to be a 
significant and genuine link between the Sponsoring State and the Operator. 
Rights and responsibilities in the convention crossed all parties. In this 
manner, the convention took advantage of the bifocal approach to sovereignty. 
In formulating this solution, CRAMRA also protected such an approach. Bush 
observes that in light of the bifocal approach to sovereignty, territorial 
jurisdiction applied by a non-claimant state can still be consistent with the 
objective of regulating an activity and protecting the environment whereas 
claimants can regard their application of territorial jurisdiction as consistent 
with their claim as well as their responsibilities and objectives.126 In principle, 
this accommodates all of the positions of the states and provides a mechanism 
of enforcement and accountability. 
 
3.4 The shift from CRAMRA 
Final agreement on the text occurred during the Fourth Special Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Mineral Resources on 02 June 
1988.127 This meeting opened the convention for signature as of 25 November 
1988 and adopted a ‘Final Act’, clarifying a few points of the meeting and 
convention. As part of the operation of the convention and its institutions, the 
convention required that each of the ATCPs present at the final meeting sign 
the convention for it to be adopted.128 A year was provided for signing. 
However, by May of 1989 it became apparent that not all the signatures would 
be attained. In a public declaration on 20 April 1989, French Prime Minister 
Rocard stated that France would not sign the convention as it stood, hinting of 
a possible change. On 22 May 1989, Prime Minister Hawke of Australia 
                                                
125 Ibid., Article 61(2). 
126 Supra n. 107. 
127 Supra n. 35.  
128 Article 60, CRAMRA. 
 174 
announced a decision not to sign the convention. France followed this with its 
own similar announcement in June. Together, Australia and France proposed 
a new convention on comprehensive protection of the Antarctic, including a 
complete ban on mineral resource activity and the dedication of Antarctica as 
a ‘wilderness reserve’.129  
 
Australia and France had been fully committed to the task of completing the 
text of CRAMRA. Their shift from CRAMRA can be linked to potential 
shortcomings in the text,130 and to circumstances occurring around and after 
the negotiations. Not the least of these circumstances was the environmental 
devastation that occurred following the grounding of the Bahia Paraiso off 
the Antarctic Peninsula on 28 January 1989 and the Exxon Valdez oil spill off 
shore Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 24 March 1989. Even though the 
prohibition present in CRAMRA could only be lifted at such time that 
exploration and development could meet the regulatory criteria and rules 
established in CRAMRA, such prohibition did not represent a complete ban or 
comprehensive protection of Antarctica.131 International and domestic 
environmental awareness, domestic politics and shortcomings in CRAMRA 
                                                
129 The first Working Paper drafted by Australia/France is ATCM XV/WP/2, Item 7 (Paris, 
09-20 October 1989): A Joint Australia/French Proposal in the Form of a Paper Including a 
Draft Recommendation for ATCM XV, Comprehensive Measures for the Protection of the 
Antarctic Environment and its Dependent and Associated Ecosystems. This was followed by 
ATCM XV/WP/3, Item 7 (Paris, 09-20 October 1989): Franco-Australia Draft Working Paper 
on Possible Components for a Comprehensive Convention for the Preservation and Protection 
of Antarctica.  
130 For instance, even before the adoption of the convention, a letter was sent on 21 September 
1988 from Australian Treasurer, Paul Keating, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Honorable 
Gareth Evans urging a decision be made not to sign the convention on the basis of the 
inadequate protection against subsidized mining, incompatible liability provisions and 
insufficient provisions securing revenue, royalties, the nature of taxes or payments in kind. 
This letter is reproduced in supra n. 92, Bush (2003), Binder IV, Booklet AU88-89, 
Document AU21091988, at 12-15. 
131 The relevant provision in CRAMRA requiring consensus to open an area is not phrased in 
terms of a ban but rather in terms of unanimity for a procedural rule. Burgess suggests that if 
one were to consider this a ban, then under the same terms, there would also be a ban on 
approving measures by consensus under Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. The right to refuse 
consent to open an area must also be consistent with the convention and a Party may be 
challenged under dispute settlement provisions for withholding its consent if reasons are not 
sanctioned under the convention. See John Burgess, 'Comprehensive Environmental 
Protection of the Antarctic: New Approaches for New Times' in Grahame Cook (ed), The 
Future of Antarctica: Exploitation versus Preservation, Manchester University Press (1989) 
53, at 64.  
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regarding financial links for claimant, and in Australia’s case, mining states, 
were also some of the reasons for the abrupt change.132  
 
By the Paris ATCM in October 1989 several other states had passed 
resolutions or motions in their parliaments to prohibit nationals from 
undertaking mineral activities, committing to not ratify the convention and 
move towards a conservation approach.133 With the uncertain implementation 
of CRAMRA looming, the ATCPs moved towards considering an instrument 
dedicated to comprehensive environmental protection. Proposals were made 
by Australia/France, New Zealand, the US, Sweden, and Chile on varying 
mechanisms for the achievement of comprehensive protection.134 The first 
session of the 11th Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting was held in 
Viña Del Mar, Chile (19 November – 06 December 1990), followed by three 
further sessions in Madrid during 1991.135 During the first session a joint 
proposal by Australia/Belgium/France and Italy and proposals by New 
Zealand, Argentina/Norway/United Kingdom, the United States and India 
                                                
132 See supra n. 130 on the letter from Keating. See, in general, supra n. 3, at 216-239. There 
were also indications that French Prime Minister Rocard’s search for a relatively strategically 
safe issue to win him popularity due to the Pacific nuclear testing issue was found in unease 
with the Minerals Convention. See Tim Bowden, The Silence Calling: Australians in 
Antarctica 1947-97, Allen & Unwin (1997), at 411 for discussions between Rocard and 
Australian Treasurer Paul Keating.  
133 Belgium Parliament passed legislation on 30 June 1989 prohibiting nationals or 
corporations from undertaking Antarctic mineral activities and in July 1989 the UK Labour 
Party voted against legislation to implement the convention, denying bipartisan support for 
Antarctic issues. Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament carried a motion unanimously 
on 28 September 1989 committing not to ratify the convention and supporting the proposal to 
transform Antarctica into a world natural park. European Parliament, Sweden, France, 
Belgium, the UK and Italy prior to the 1989 Paris ATCM had made indications towards 
moving away from the convention. The US and New Zealand followed in 1990 with 
announcements to move constructively towards proposals and an agreement on environmental 
protection. See supra n. 131, at 55-56. 
134 See supra n. 23 on the proposals by Australia/France/Belgium/Italy, the US, Chile, New 
Zealand and Sweden. Each of the proposals is outlined in Working Papers. See supra n. 129 
for ATCM XV/WP/3 (1989). See also ATCM XV/WP/4, Item 7 (Paris, 09-20 October 1989): 
New Zealand: Working Paper on the Protection of the Antarctic Environment; ATCM 
XV/WP/7, Item 7 (Paris, 09-20 October 1989): Working Paper Submitted by Chile; ATCM 
XV/WP/8, Item 7 (Paris, 09-20 October 1989): United States: Comprehensive Measures for 
the Protection of the Antarctic Environment and Dependent and Associated Ecosystems; 
ATCM XV/WP/14, Item 7 (Paris, 09-20 October 1989): Sweden: Comprehensive Measures 
for the Protection of the Antarctic Environment and Dependent and Associated Ecosystems.   
135 Consecutive sessions were held in Madrid on 22-30 April, 17-22 June, and 03-04 October 
1991. 
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were considered.136 These proposals drew together the environmental norms 
and practices that had been adopted over the years into one comprehensive 
instrument. 
 
The Australia/Belgium/France/Italy proposal advanced the idea of a 
comprehensive convention and the dedication of Antarctica as a ‘Natural 
Reserve – Land of Science’ which would ban mining.137 The proposal was a 
substantial document containing indicative convention text. The text included 
significant amounts of CRAMRA provisions, adapted to apply to not just 
mineral resource activities, but all activities. The draft convention tried to 
maintain the authoritative presence of the ATCPs gained through the text of 
CRAMRA using a similar two tiered system of an operator and, in this case, a 
‘Party’, rather than a ‘Sponsoring State’ and an activity classification and 
authorization mechanism, prohibiting activities that are not permitted under 
these classifications and terms, providing a type of collective determination. 
The proposed convention also tried to incorporate a fault-based liability 
regime,138 create a permanent secretariat and define damage.139 Other states 
were, however, more in favour of a protocol or agreed measures able to be 
attached to the Antarctic Treaty, rather than another stand alone convention.140  
 
Overall, there was widespread support for the protocol and attached annexes 
approach which would integrate and consolidate the variety of existing 
Antarctic Treaty Recommendations with emerging environmental principles. 
Placing detailed regulatory requirements under an annex to a protocol meant 
that the need for parliamentary approval and concomitant delays in 
                                                
136 Lee A. Kimball, 'Report on Antarctica' (International Institute for Environment and 
Development-North America, A Center of the World Resources Institute, Washington, 
January 1991), at 3. 
137 SATCM XI -1 (Viña Del Mar, 19 November - 06 December 1990): 
Australia/Belgium/France/Italy: Indicative Draft of a Convention for the Comprehensive 
Protection of the Antarctic Environment. 
138 Fault-based liability requires proof of fault in a violation as opposed to strict liability that 
makes a person or juridical entity responsible for damage and loss caused by acts and 
omissions regardless of culpability or fault. There may be genuine ignorance of factors 
influencing the loss or damage however under strict liability the responsibility to cover those 
losses and damage is inescapable. For further discussion on liability see ATCM XXII/WP1, 
Item 9 (Tromsø, 25 May - 05 June 1998): Liability: Report of the Group of Legal Experts. 
139 See supra n. 137. 
140 See supra n. 136, at 3. 
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implementation associated with treaty amendments could also be avoided.141 
A protocol with annexes overcame the problem of non-Consultative Party 
compliance by requiring all Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty to 
become party to the protocol. Under the Antarctic Treaty, non-Consultative 
Parties are not able to take part in decisions to adopt and approve Antarctic 
Treaty Recommendations142 and are therefore not necessarily obliged to give 
them effect. Through obligation under a protocol, this concern is diminished 
for Recommendations regarding protection of the environment.143 As well, 
any non-Consultative Party seeking Consultative status would be required to 
attain a standard of practice inline with the protocol.  
 
A draft protocol was eventually developed from the Viña Del Mar sessions 
with unresolved issues negotiated in subsequent Madrid sessions.144 
Collective authorization for activities, specific terms of liability, and the 
establishment of an inspectorate or further institutions for decision-making145 
represented some of the unresolved issues following Viña Del Mar. Collective 
authorization provided ATCPs with authority in the region; however, concern 
existed whether this collective authorization or determination, including 
classifying activities, was necessary or whether it was inconsistent with 
Antarctic Treaty provisions on freedom of scientific research.146  
 
The minerals issue had also been far from resolved. Opinions differed on the 
most suitable means of prohibiting activities; whether a permanent, indefinite 
ban was in order, whether voluntary restraint on activities pending timely 
entry into force of CRAMRA would be appropriate, or whether a temporary 
prohibition should be set in place with provisions securing the development of 
minerals only with the establishment of regulatory regime.147 It was difficult 
to reconcile approaches capable of satisfying the concern for a prohibition and 
                                                
141 Ibid., at 5. 
142 Article IX(1), Antarctic Treaty. 
143 See supra n. 136, at 5 and 10. 
144 Rolf Trolle Andersen, head of the Norwegian delegation, played a significant role in 
drafting, on a personal basis, a framework protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. This framework is 
reproduced and discussed in Kimball’s report. See ibid., at 3-19 and Appendix 2 (pp24-34).  
145 Ibid., at 4 and 6. 
146 Ibid., at 6. 
147 Ibid., at 19. 
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concern that when the prohibition is no longer in place, there should exist an 
internationally-agreed arrangement for taking decisions on proposed activities 
– one that would be no less effective or stringent than provisions in 
CRAMRA.148 Aware of this possible lacuna, the Viña Del Mar meeting 
confirmed that the present, voluntary restraint clause on mineral resource 
activities contained in the Final Act of CRAMRA would continue.  
 
In 1989 there may still have been some optimism that irrespective of the 
development of a further measure for the comprehensive protection of the 
environment, CRAMRA would still be adopted.149 However, after the Viña 
Del Mar meeting, with the signatory year of CRAMRA having passed, the 
ATCPs had come to agree that a protocol would be an effective instrument to 
automatically capture signatory parties into environmental principles. By July 
1991, the ATCPs had agreed to a regime that prohibited mining. By the fourth 
session of the 11th Special ATCM in Madrid in October 1991, negotiations 
were complete, insofar as they could be at that time,150 and the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was adopted.151  
 
                                                
148 Ibid., at 4. 
149 See, in particular, supra n. 134, ATCM XV/WP/8, United States, at 3. The US comments 
that in creating a list of activities for which further comprehensive measures would apply, this 
list rests on the assumption that the acceptability and specific control of possible resource 
activities in Antarctica will be carried out pursuant to CCAS, CCAMLR and CRAMRA. The 
permanent ban approach was supported by Australia, Belgium, France, Italy, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Denmark, Greece, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. During the 
signatory year, 19 states had signed the convention and of those, Japan and the UK, in 
particular, still supported the voluntary restraint pending entry into force of CRAMRA. For 
discussion see supra n. 136, at 19.  
150 The Madrid Protocol contains conservative approaches to many of these unresolved issues 
and several of the issues were left unresolved and simply not included. Possibly this was to 
help expedite adoption. For example, the Committee for Environmental Protection (CEP) was 
not provided authority to determine or prevent activities from occurring but rather was 
indirectly able to do so through reporting recommendations to the ATCM and providing 
greater transparency of issues. The issue of liability was still not decided in detail but rather 
was left for further negotiation of a specific annex. Inspections were continued under the 
same criteria as provided for in the Antarctic Treaty but no further institutions or decision-
making bodies were created.  
151 Final Act of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting, Madrid, 04 
October 1991, 27 ILM 1455 and supra n. 5. 
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3.5 The minerals prohibition and the ‘walkout clause’ 
In the adopted Protocol, Article 7 places a prohibition on Antarctic mineral 
resource activity aside from scientific research. However, unlike CRAMRA, 
there is no definition associated with separating scientific research from 
prospecting. Discretion is accounted for at the national scientific program 
level. The difficulties in agreeing to an appropriate type of prohibition also 
lead to the inclusion of Article 25(5)(b), sometimes referred to as the ‘walkout 
clause’. Some states, in particular the US, were adamant that there be a means 
of lifting the prohibition in the future.152 States also recognized the desire to 
have in place an immediate, appropriate, and stringent regulatory regime to 
avoid unregulated mineral resource activities. The compromise unfolded in 
the five sections of Article 25.  
 
Section 1 asserts that modifications and amendments to the Protocol may 
occur at any time in accordance with Article XII of the Antarctic Treaty.153  
Accordingly, provided that there is consensus, the mining prohibition may be 
lifted at any time. Section 2 provides for a review of the Protocol fifty years 
after entry into force, if requested by any of the ATCPs.154 It is important to 
note that a review does not have to be undertaken and if a review is requested 
it need not necessarily address the mining prohibition. Any modification or 
amendment proposed at such Review Conference must be adopted by 
majority, including at least a three quarters majority of the ATCPs that were 
involved at the adoption of the original Protocol in 1991.155 For entry into 
force, the adopted modifications must also be ratified by three quarters of the 
Consultative Parties; however, this majority had to include all the ATCPs at 
the time of the Protocol’s adoption.156  
 
                                                
152 The US was so adamant about having a means for governments to unilaterally withdraw 
from the Madrid Protocol and unwilling to agree to the terms of the Madrid Protocol without 
such provision that the US delegation left the June meeting as the only government to not 
approve the Protocol, prompting a further meeting in October and the addition of terms of 
Article 25.  
153 Article 25(1), Madrid Protocol. 
154 Ibid., Article 25(2). 
155 Ibid., Article 25(3). 
156 Ibid., Article 25(4). 
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Article 25(5)(a) provides special rules should amendment of the mining 
prohibition be considered. It stipulates, firstly, that the ban on mineral 
resource activity shall remain. If, however, the parties agree to a change in 
this provision, there must be, as part of the amendment or modification 
undertaken at a Review Conference, a binding legal regime established that 
determines whether activities can occur, sets conditions for the activities and 
safeguards Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. To counter the possibility of a 
veto at the ratification process, section 5(b) of Article 25 was added. 
According to Article 25(5)(b), if any such modification has not entered into 
force (perhaps because of a potential veto) within 3 years of its adoption, any 
Party may at any time thereafter withdraw from the Protocol and such 
withdrawal shall take effect after a further two years. So, if an amendment to 
lift the prohibition is adopted at a Review Conference but does not enter into 
force within three years, any party could unilaterally ‘walkout’ of the Protocol 
and begin conducting mineral resource activities under its own accord. The 
approach combining Article 7 and 25 safeguarded the Antarctic from 
immediate onset of activities while providing for future flexibility and 
accountability within the system. 
 
3.6 Discussion of Antarctic robustness 
CRAMRA can be criticized for trying to do too much. It did, however, 
accomplish what the negotiating parties set out to do.157 As Rothwell suggests, 
‘it had the potential in 1988 to become the most sophisticated addition to the 
ATS’.158 It created both permanent and ad hoc institutions to regulate and 
monitor Antarctic mineral resource activities, an activity that so obviously 
challenged the balance of sovereignty. Within a system that denies absolute 
authority through Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, the institutions, 
Sponsoring States, and voting procedures allocated a type of collective 
jurisdiction to the ATCPs. In doing so, the convention suggested an 
entitlement to regulate and enforce vis-à-vis third parties while maintaining 
                                                
157 See, in general, supra n. 13. 
158 Donald R. Rothwell, The Polar Regions and Development of International Law, Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge (1996), at 138. 
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states’ rights and state authority. Bush suggests that CRAMRA secured for the 
ATCPs ‘some advance in setting out rules concerning jurisdiction’159 within 
the context of regional collaborative governance. 
 
CRAMRA set new trends concerning the protection of the environment and 
state responsibility through its liability provisions.160 The environmental 
protection afforded by the convention was unprecedented, offering at the time, 
the best regulatory solution for future interest. In the end, environmental 
principles integral to the CRAMRA text contributed to the development of 
normative principles now elucidated within the Madrid Protocol.  
 
The negotiations of CRAMRA effectively accommodated interests of 
claimant, non-claimant and developing states. The text provided a ‘package 
deal’ that if unravelled could not accommodate all the divergent interests, but 
that together did not prejudice the rights of one state or interest group above 
another. The text and the institutions did not unacceptably prejudice or wholly 
satisfy any one position. As part of a ‘package’, no one party could be 
completely happy that all of their concerns were answered immediately, and 
as with most conventions, questions remained for the institutions to answer as 
the activities and processes began. State authority was maintained and 
confidence could be shared amongst the participants. Its adoption indicates 
satisfaction and acceptability with respect to the text and negotiation 
outcomes.  
 
The ATCPs also demonstrated confidence during the negotiations through 
their persistence and determination towards meeting the objective and 
upholding the system. As the ATS adapted, so too did the negotiations. For 
example, in the face of new participation by states (developing states in 
particular), longstanding delegations, which understood, more intimately, the 
complexities of the minerals issues, worked to familiarize new delegations 
while continuing to solve unresolved issues of the text. Commitment to the 
                                                
159 Supra n. 92, Bush (1990), at 149. 
160 Rudiger Wolfrum, 'The Unfinished Task: CRAMRA and the Question of Liability' in 
Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy Ostreng (eds), The Antarctic Treaty System in World 
Politics, MacMillan Academics & Professional Ltd (1991) 120, at 126-128. 
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process reiterates acceptability from the participants and provides further 
legitimacy to the operating system and its processes. Instability provoked 
from challenge to the ATS regime by some developing states and NGOs161 
was absorbed intrinsically within the operating system while negotiations 
continued. The fact that challenges did not falter the objectives of the 
negotiations or cause the structure of the operating system to fundamentally 
change provides evidence of the resilience and thus confidence in the 
Antarctic operating system.  
 
Although delegations had reached consensus on the final text of CRAMRA 
and had opened the convention for signature, during the allocated signature 
year seeds of uncertainty emerged from unanswered questions.162 At such a 
late stage of the process towards accepting CRAMRA, and in light of the 
pressure extended from within the UN, any unilateral move away from the 
convention would have left the ATS even more vulnerable to external 
criticism. Thus, the alliance of Australia, France and later joined by Belgium 
and Italy, was integral to the shift away from the convention. The alliance 
helped disperse consequences on the individual states as well as the ATS as a 
regime. In moving quickly towards the Madrid Protocol, the collective 
political will of the ATCPs was reinforced. Nonetheless, the standing of 
Australia, as well as France, within the ATS was compromised. For many 
years to follow Australia chose to reduce its prominence in the ATCMs and 
Antarctic institutions163 while France worked to shift from its previous poor 
environmental reputation in the Antarctic.164  
                                                
161 NGO pressure had been present in previous CCAMLR negotiations. Pressure from 
developing states was new to the ATS but was relevant given the recent negotiations of the 
1982 LOSC which provided legal provision for the CHM principle. 
162 For example, questions had previously been raised over royalty provisions for claimant 
states and concerning anti-subsidy provisions for states that develop mineral resources 
domestically. Concern over environmental risks was heightened by environmental disasters in 
1989. 
163 Andrew Jackson, member of the Australian ATCM delegation during this period and 
Principal Policy Advisor, Australian Antarctic Division in 1997 was quoted as saying. ‘Even 
to this day we still feel some of the effects of us having broken ranks’ in supra n. 132, at 414. 
Andrew Jackson has also indicated that most tension was forgiven by the entry into force of 
the Madrid Protocol but that Australia had 6-7 very quiet years within the ATS. Personal 
Communication, (14 May 2008). 
164 For example, in attempting to construct a runway at the Dumont D’Urville Station, 
completed in 1984, the French Antarctic Program compromised significant penguin habitat 
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The turn of events, which occurred at the terminus of the CRAMRA 
negotiations, added intrinsic pressure to the Antarctic operating system and 
destabilized the ATS. However, the shift from CRAMRA to the Madrid 
Protocol did not undermine the operating system. The ATCPs worked 
expediently towards restoring consensus and adopting the Madrid Protocol. 
Participants, those who had demonstrated confidence in the promise of 
successful negotiations in the face of external pressure, maintained confidence 
that the system could withstand disruptive forces from within. At no time did 
actors of the system indicate an interest in abandoning the task at hand or the 
system through which CRAMRA or Madrid Protocol negotiations occurred.  
 
That an alliance was necessary to facilitate change may indicate a lack of 
confidence in the system’s ability to absorb change or a sense of rigidity 
within the system. In contrast, the use of an alliance also demonstrates a sense 
of determination by the actors to maintain stability within the system. The pre-
emptive alliance between Australia and France, and others, helped to disperse 
the disruptive forces on the system, indicating acceptance of, and confidence 
in the system, and a desire to maintain it. The ability of states to accept a 
change in direction, without the insecurity that the change was undermining 
the authority of the states within the collective system, reinforces its resilience 
and effectiveness at responding to change and/or instability. Moving quickly 
towards the Protocol’s adoption speaks loudly of the desire to promote 
stability within the ATS and maintain its authority over Antarctic issues and 
prominence within the operating system. Taking the overtly disruptive 
decision to not sign an agreed convention and turning it into an opportunity to 
reinforce the legitimacy of the ATS165 contributed to the larger sense of 
legitimacy within the Antarctic operating system. If confidence in the system 
did not exist amongst the actors, abandoning the system at the height of 
disruptive forces from within and from outside the system may have occurred.  
                                                                                                                          
and rookeries with explosives. The runway was never brought into operation; the French 
government yielding to environmental pressure. The runway is now a wharf. 
165 See P. Gautier’s comments in Andrew Jackson, On the Antarctic Horizon: Proceedings of 
the International Symposium on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty System (Ushuaia, 
Argentina, 20-24 March 1995), at 21. 
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The negotiation of the Madrid Protocol enabled the ATCPs to bring 
governance of the Antarctic in line with trends of the international 
community. The Protocol more closely represented an instrument that upheld 
environmental protection and sustainability, themes of the then upcoming 
1992 Rio De Janeiro United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED). With the adoption of the Madrid Protocol, issues of 
environmental protection and sustainability remained within the ATS rather 
than being placed within UNCED.166 In a similar manner, the refusal on the 
part of the ATCPs to deny South African involvement in the ATCMs during a 
time when the apartheid regime was being admonished in the UN system167 
demonstrated the desire to contain Antarctic governance within the ATS.  
 
Following the adoption of the Madrid Protocol, the question of governing 
Antarctica through the UN began to disperse. The challenge to the legitimacy 
of the ATS and the ATCPs, voiced through the agenda item ‘Question of 
Antarctica’ that began in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1983168 
decreased in frequency becoming a quadrennial agenda item.169 As a result of 
this process there was also little need for a further review of the ATS, which 
could have been called in 1991, 30 years after the Antarctic Treaty entered 
into force. 
                                                
166 This demonstrated the political will of the ATCPs, bringing together the political, public 
and environmental variables to both facilitate protecting the Antarctic environment and bring 
the ATS regime into the direction of environmental preservation. See Christopher C. Joyner, 
Governing the Frozen Commons, University of South Carolina (1998), at 163. 
167 See supra n. 86, at 116 for reference to the question of South Africa’s attendance at the 
ATCMs in relation to the development of Malaysia’s position on the ‘Question of Antarctica’. 
See also Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica: Views from the Southern Oceanic Rim, John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd (1997), at 204-205 on the South Africa, the UN and the ‘Question of 
Antarctica’. 
168 The ‘Question of Antarctica’ opened the discussion on whether Antarctic mineral 
resources were common heritage of mankind, demanded involvement of the developing 
nations (Group of 77) and challenged whether the ATS was the most effective regime for 
managing Antarctica or whether the UN should have further involvement. See supra n. 80, at 
13, n. 166, at 235-258 and ibid., Tepper and Haward, at 113-124 for the perspective of 
Malaysia and Dodds, at 148-151 for a discussion on India and the Question of Antarctica. See 
also Moritaka Hayashi, 'The Antarctica Question in the United Nations' (1986) 19(2) Cornell 
International Law Journal 275. 
169 The latest report on the Question of Antarctica in the United Nations General Assembly 
was UNGA A/60/222 of 11 August 2005, ‘Question of Antarctic’ – Report of the Secretary-
General, prepared by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) (2005) 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/459/71/PDF/N0545971.pdf?OpenElement
> at 20 August 2009. 
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In the end, the Madrid Protocol removed the idea of collective jurisdiction in 
favour of maintaining the ability of states to control their own activities in the 
Antarctic. The Madrid Protocol did, however, answer the question of 
transparent comprehensive environmental protection, pulling existing 
measures and Recommendations alongside with new principles developed 
within CRAMRA into an overarching instrument for all activities occurring 
within the Antarctic Treaty Area. The Madrid Protocol merged internationally 
accepted environmental principles within the Antarctic operating system with 
greater transparency, providing legitimacy and a level of effectiveness within 
the operating system.  
 
In constructing the Madrid Protocol, Article 7 prohibited immediate mineral 
resource development while Article 25 provided for the possibility of 
marrying mineral resource activity with appropriate regulation in the future. 
Thus, the Madrid Protocol safeguarded (and continues to do so) the Antarctic 
from the immediate onset of mineral resource activities. It has also held the 
ATCPs accountable for future consideration of the minerals issue. The terms 
of the ‘walkout clause’ encourage the development of collaborative regulatory 
solutions, perhaps similar to CRAMRA, at a time when development is 
forthcoming. Thus, written into the terms of the Madrid Protocol (Article 25) 
was a sense of confidence held by the actors that the system will be able to 
appropriately respond to future pressures. 
 
The possibility of walking out of the Madrid Protocol and, following that, the 
Antarctic Treaty also exists through Article 25. This provides a gate for 
national interest. The presence and details of the ‘walkout clause’ may 
indicate a lack of confidence or distrust in the ability of the Antarctic 
operating system to absorb the potential need to develop mineral resources of 
the Antarctic. In contrast, these provisions effectively link national interest 
and state authority with collective interest. The presence of a ‘walkout clause’ 
provides added incentive to maintain sufficient political will to not invoke the 
‘walkout clause’. There is built-in incentive to foster the existing system and 
sustain participant confidence. Twelve years on from the entry into force of 
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the Protocol, the provision has not yet been invoked. Once again, exploring 
the terms of the Madrid Protocol and its negotiation demonstrates the capacity 
of the system, the desire of the actors to maintain it and thus, their confidence 
in it. 
 
The growth in the ATS during CRAMRA was the largest experienced thus 
far. This growth may have increased the legitimacy and afforded new breadth 
and transparency to the system,170 and even supported the concept of ATCP 
authority from within the negotiations. However, the addition of participants 
also slowed the negotiations, leaving the ATS more susceptible to external 
criticism.171 As well, given that CRAMRA did not enter into force and the 
innovative jurisdiction and authority of the ATCPs was not tested, the 
increase in participation has also possibly driven a stronger wedge between 
the parties.  
 
CRAMRA tried to collaboratively accommodate the interests of the states 
within the system, and since its rejection, the balance between national 
interests and collaboration has shifted. The ATS has retained its collaborative 
atmosphere but ATCPs have also had to accept the persistence of state-based 
jurisdiction and the loss of possibilities associated with the collective 
authority provided in CRAMRA.172 Protection of national positions 
                                                
170 See comments in Davor Vidas, 'Entry into Force of the Environmental Protocol and 
Implementation Issues: An Overview' in Davor Vidas (ed), Implementing the Environmental 
Protection Regime for the Antarctic, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000) 1, at 3-4. Vidas 
explains that the record pace of the negotiations were in response to political problems and 
that adoption of the Madrid Protocol strengthened the international cooperation within the 
ATS, changed the perception of the broader international community, and weakened external 
criticism which together provided increased legitimacy to the ATS. Joyner comments that 
with the negotiation and adoption of the Madrid Protocol ‘the ATS has proven politically 
resilient and legally flexible in adapting to and accommodating shifting global demands.’ See 
supra n. 166, at 164. 
171 Beeby has commented that decision-making is more cumbersome with increased 
participation. ‘[I]t is much less easy to generate a dynamic that will lead to a consensus 
acceptable by all.’ See supra n. 80, at 14. 
172 The Madrid Protocol does attempt to exercise jurisdiction by applying to all expeditions to 
and within Antarctica (Article VII(5)(a), Antarctic Treaty), however, according to Bush, 
within the Antarctic Treaty, jurisdictional competence is inadequate as an instrument for 
applying the Protocol to third parties and until ATCPs reach a jurisdictional understanding, it 
is not possible to develop cooperative enforcement mechanisms. Other possible approaches to 
binding third parties include third parties consenting to be bound to the ATS under the Vienna 
Convention (Articles 34-37), consideration of the ATS as customary international law and the 
possibility of applying bifocalism through the concept of an objective regime. In this latter 
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underneath a collaborative umbrella might better describe the atmosphere of 
the ATS as states are less concerned with bridging jurisdictional/entitlement 
interests. Hemmings remarks that, ‘[w]hile cooperation is still one of the 
Antarctic verities, it is accompanied now by greater evidence of 
competition.’173  
 
3.7 Chapter conclusion 
The manner in which the operating system overcame challenges reflected in 
the negotiation of CRAMRA and the shift from its implementation effectively 
maintained the non-prejudicial status quo of Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. State authority was upheld alongside the collective authority of the 
ATS within the operating system. The operating system absorbed the issues 
and challenges without abandoning normative principles or operating system 
structure. Actors demonstrated acceptance, determination and confidence in 
the system throughout the process. The system gained legitimacy, 
demonstrated resilience in the face of challenge and resolved immediate 
issues in the absence of prejudice of any states’ individual rights. Through 
examining these variables it is apparent that the Antarctic operating system is 
robust in nature. 
                                                                                                                          
option, claimants exercise jurisdiction on the basis of their claim and non-claimants, including 
third party states, understand the exercise of jurisdiction is on the basis of the ATS being an 
objective regime. See William Bush, 'Means and Methods of Implementation of Antarctic 
Environmental Regimes and National Environmental Instruments: An Exercise in 
Comparison' in Davor Vidas (ed), Implementing the Environmental Protection Regime for the 
Antarctic, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000) 21, at 39-43.   
173 Alan D. Hemmings, 'Globalisation's Cold Genius and the Ending of Antarctic Isolation' in 
Lorne K. Kriwoken, Julia Jabour and Alan D. Hemmings (eds), Looking South: Australia's 
Antarctic Agenda, The Federation Press (2007) 176, at 183. 
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Chapter Four: Continental Shelf Delimitation – 
Russian and Australian Case Studies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Defining the outer limits of the continental shelf appurtenant to coastal states 
in the Arctic and Antarctic determines the extent of resources available under 
exclusive sovereign rights of the coastal state. The outer limit of the 
continental shelf also determines a boundary for the ‘Area’ and defines the 
boundary of global commons governance. The current and future offshore oil 
and gas development (as well as other continental shelf resources) will be 
influenced by the finalization of these outer limits. In the Arctic, defining 
jurisdiction over areas of seabed that extend into or even cross the Arctic 
Basin will influence governance of this marine region formally thought of as 
the high seas and seabed beyond national jurisdiction. The formalization of 
continental shelf boundaries between the opposite and adjacent states will also 
need to be accommodated within the regional governance and operating 
system. Resource development that extends into the Arctic Basin will 
influence regulatory initiatives. In the Antarctic, there is uncertainty 
concerning the ability of claimant states to exercise rights as coastal states, 
including the ability to delimit the continental shelf. Claimant states will not 
wish to undermine their claim or the exercise of their rights. Non-claimants 
may argue that unrecognized claims cannot create coastal states. As well, the 
CLCS cannot be placed in a position to legitimize a territorial claim through 
the validation of the outer limits presented in a submission.  
 
The polar operating systems contain sources of law that relate to the 
delimitation of the continental shelves. States are guided by legal provisions 
and regional initiatives that also relate to normative principles of regional 
governance, cooperation and collaboration. The process by which states 
compile and submit information and finalize their outer limits can reflect the 
robustness of the operating systems. While the assertion of unilateral rights is 
associated with the risk of upsetting the balance of regional cooperation 
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prevalent within the polar operating systems, there is, within these systems, 
occasion to protect a state’s interest concomitant to regional governance and 
unilateral rights.  
 
The process undertaken by the Russian Federation and Australia in 
establishing the outer limits of their respective Arctic and Antarctic (and sub-
Antarctic) continental shelves demonstrates the formalization of rights within 
a polar operating system and a willingness of participants to provide for non-
prejudicial outcomes. Participant willingness to align interests within the 
operating systems indicates confidence in the current system. Though 
differences exist between the submission approaches, the operating systems 
exceed the operating system threshold, and demonstrate an ability to maintain 
stability over time while accommodating issues related to continental shelf 
delimitation. Differences and similarities in the process towards this 
accommodation highlight variables in each operating system that contribute to 
its robustness.  Thus, the approaches to the continental shelf delimitation 
process test the robustness and illustrate the capacity of the Arctic and 
Antarctic operating systems to accommodate regional and unilateral interests.  
 
4.2 Continental shelf delimitation process 
Under the LOSC, all coastal states are entitled to a continental shelf extending 
to 200 NM from the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.1 
Where the continental margin continues beyond 200 NM as a natural 
prolongation of the land territory, a coastal state is entitled to an extended 
shelf.2 Beyond 200 NM, the outer limit of the shelf is derived through the 
application of two formulae described in LOSC Article 76(4). From the foot 
of the slope, the outer limit line must not extend beyond 60 NM or beyond the 
point where the sediment thickness is less than 1% of the distance measured 
back to the foot of the slope.3 As maximum constraints, the outer limit shall 
                                                
1 Part VI, Article 76(1), LOSC. 
2 Ibid., Article 76. 
3 Ibid., Article 76(4). 
 191 
not exceed 350 NM from the territorial baseline4 or 100 NM from the 2500-m 
isobath,5 whichever one is further. These formulae and constraint lines are 
applied in different circumstances, depending on the characteristics of the 
margin, namely its shape (morphology) and structure (geology). The use of 
the range of constraint lines is also at the discretion of the coastal state, 
allowing it to take full advantage of the features and characteristics of the 
appurtenant continental margin and shelf.  
 
Data supporting the outer limits are submitted to the CLCS for consideration 
and recommendations.6 The CLCS examines the merits of each coastal state 
submission, assessing scientific and technical information pertaining to the 
outer limits.7 On the basis of recommendations by the CLCS, the coastal state 
establishes the outer limits of the continental shelf.8 Together, these limit lines 
establish the outer limit of the continental shelf separating continental seabed 
from deep ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. 
 
The CLCS is an institution of the LOS Convention, acting in accordance with 
its provisions. Annex II of LOSC provides the function of the Commission 
and provisions for its establishment and operation. Functions of the 
Commission outlined in Article 3 of Annex II include considering data and 
other material submitted by coastal states in areas where the outer limits of the 
continental shelf extend beyond 200 NM,9 making recommendations in 
accordance with Article 76 and the Statement of Understanding adopted 29 
August 1980 by UNCLOS III,10 and providing scientific and technical 
advice.11 The Commission became operational in 1997. For the benefit of the 
State Parties, as well as the Commission, and to assist with the submission 
                                                
4 Ibid., Article 76(5). 
5 Ibid., Article 76(5). 
6 Ibid., Article 76(8). 
7 Ibid., Article 76(8). 
8 Ibid., Article 76(8) and 76(9). 
9 Article 3(1)(a), Annex II, LOSC. 
10 Ibid. Annex II of the Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, Statement of Understanding Concerning a Specific Method to be Used in Establishing 
the Outer Edge of the Continental Margin (29 August 1980) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/documents/final_act_annex_two.htm> at 24 April 
2008. 
11 Article 3(1)(b), Annex II, LOSC. 
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process and verify the role of the CLCS, the CLCS has promulgated Scientific 
and Technical Guidelines12 as well as Rules and Procedures.13   
  
In the case of a dispute concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf 
between opposite or adjacent states or in other cases of unresolved land or 
maritime disputes, submissions may be made and considered in accordance 
with Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS.14 The Commission 
shall be informed of a dispute and assured by the coastal state that its 
submission will not prejudice matters relating to boundary delimitation.15 The 
Commission ‘shall not consider and qualify a submission’ made by any state 
concerned in a dispute unless prior consent is given by all states that are party 
to the dispute.16 A submission may be made for a portion of continental shelf 
in order not to prejudice questions relating to boundary delimitation17 and 
joint or separate submissions requesting the Commission to make 
recommendations may be made by agreement.18 Annex I(1) establishes that 
[T]he Commission recognizes that the competence with respect to 
matters regarding disputes which may arise in connection with the 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf rests with the 
States.19 
 
States are required to make a submission to the Commission along with 
supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but within 10 years 
                                                
12 UN Document CLCS/11 of 13 May 1999; CLCS/11/Add.1 of 03 September 1999; 
CLCS/11/Corr.1 of 24 February 2000, Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm#Guidelines> at 13 May 
2008. 
13 UN Document CLCS/40 of 02 July 2004, Rules and Procedures of the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm#Rules%20of%20Proce
dure> at 13 April 2008, updated to UN Document CLCS/40 Rev. 1 of 17 April 2008, Rules 
and Procedures of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm#Rules%20of%20Proce
dure> at 20 April 2008. 
14 Ibid., Rule 46. 
15 Ibid., Annex I(2), Rules. 
16 Ibid., Annex I(5). 
17 Ibid., Annex I(3). 
18 Ibid., Annex I(4). 
19 Ibid., Annex I(1). 
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of the entry into force of the Convention for that state.20 While no amendment 
to the Convention has altered this requirement, two decisions have 
subsequently refined the ten year deadline (see discussion below).21 A 
subcommission is assigned to consider the submission and reports to the 
Commission for approval of recommendations by two-thirds majority.22 
Following approval, the Commission submits its recommendations in writing 
to the coastal state which made the submission and to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.23 If the coastal state disagrees with the 
recommendations, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a 
revised or new submission to the Commission.24 As a result of this process, 
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf by proclamation is 
expected, but not necessarily assumed, to conform to the recommendations of 
the Commission (Article 76(8)).25  
 
Since the submitting states are engaged with the Commission’s work, the 
likelihood of a proclamation straying far from the recommendations is low. 
However, it is ultimately up to the coastal state to decide on the contents of its 
proclamation.26 A coastal state is not obliged to proclaim the full extent of the 
limits deemed acceptable by the CLCS, nor does a state have only one 
opportunity to make a proclamation. A proclamation can be made 
                                                
20 Article 4, Annex II, LOSC. 
21 SPLOS/72 of 29 May 2001, Decision Regarding the Date of Commencement of the Ten-
Year Period for Making Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
set out in Article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/387/64/PDF/N0138764.pdf?OpenElement
> at 30 April 2008; SPLOS/183 of 24 June 2008, Decision regarding the workload of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the ability of States, particularly 
developing States, to fulfil the requirements of article 4 of annex II to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as decision contained in SPLOS/72, paragraph (a) 
<http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/398/76/PDF/N0839876.pdf?OpenElement> at 15 June 
2010. 
22 Article 6(1-2), Annex II, LOSC. 
23 Ibid., Article 6(3), Annex II. 
24 Ibid., Article 8, Annex II. 
25 Ibid., Article 7, Annex II. 
26 International Law Association (ILA), 'Committee on the Legal Issues of the Outer 
Continental Shelf' (2006) Toronto Conference (Second Report) 1, Conclusion 10, at 14. Using 
the example of Canada’s ratification of the LOSC, McDorman states that the CLCS plays a 
‘curious role as advisor and watch dog’ but has no authority to impose its view. It is 
ultimately the coastal state (Canada in this example) that establishes its ocean boundaries. Ted 
L. McDorman, 'Editorial - Canada Ratifies the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea' (2004) 35(2) Ocean Development and International Law 103, at 107. 
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incrementally for different areas at different times without diminishing the 
outcome of the recommendations made by the CLCS. Nonetheless, it is 
expected that the proclamation will be done in reference to the 
recommendations made by the Commission.27 Reasons to not make a full 
proclamation might include an awareness of political and diplomatic 
sensitivity, which given more time and distance from the CLCS process, 
would have less reaction from states or political outfall. This consideration 
might arise for the Antarctic Treaty Parties with extended continental shelf 
claims that project south of the boundary of the Antarctic Treaty (60˚S)28 or 
states that met criticism with their submission because of the size of the 
continental shelf claim relative to the territory from which it extends.29 If 
disagreement exists between the recommendations and the state’s original 
submission, the area for which the discrepancy or disagreement exists does 
not have to be proclaimed until such time that the coastal state wishes to do 
so. Accordingly, the coastal state may make a new submission for that area, 
initiating an examination of the new presentation of data to the Commission.30  
 
While there is a positive obligation for a coastal state to make a submission, 
the CLCS does not have the same positive obligation to consider the data 
submitted to it. For example, the CLCS may decide not to examine a 
submission if the coastal state requests that an area not be examined. The 
Commission acknowledges that delimitation of boundaries between opposite 
and adjacent states is a responsibility that rests with the States.31 Accordingly, 
the Commission shall not examine an area that is under dispute and shall not 
prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States.32 
The process of delimiting the outer limits of the continental shelf also decides 
the boundary of the area to be regulated by the International Seabed Authority 
(ISBA) – that of the deep seabed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction – 
                                                
27 Donald R. Rothwell, 'Issues and Strategies for Outer Continental Shelf Claims' (2008) 23(2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 185, at 188. 
28 Article VI, Antarctic Treaty, establishes the Treaty boundary at 60˚S. See discussion below. 
29 An example of this might include the large shelf extending from the external territory of 
Heard and McDonald Islands (HIMI) or the potential shelf for Russia in the Arctic. 
30 Rule 53(4) of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS and Article 8, Annex II, LOSC. 
31 Article 9, Annex II, LOSC and Paragraph 1, Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the 
CLCS. 
32 Rule 46(2) and Paragraphs 2(b) and 5 of Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. 
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known as the ‘Area’.33 If sections of seabed are excluded from an examination 
it also excludes a definitive boundary being established in these areas. 
Allocation of the area to be regulated under the ISBA is essentially delayed 
until the outer limit data can be examined by the CLCS. 
 
According to Article 76(8), on the basis of the recommendations made by the 
CLCS the limits of the continental shelf shall be ‘final and binding’. However, 
Article 76 does not explicitly state whether ‘final and binding’ applies to the 
submitting state, other states excluding the submitting state, or both the 
submitting and other states.34 As well, there is little clarity on whether 
recommendations can also be final and binding on states that are not party to 
LOSC. McDorman addresses this issue by considering that recommendations 
made on a submission can only be relevant, but not necessarily binding, to 
that submission and therefore that coastal state.35 Another argument suggests 
that the ‘based upon’ requirement of Article 76(8) provides certainty and 
consistency for the international community, which might imply that the ‘final 
and binding’ must exist in order to apply to other states.36 The International 
Law Association concludes that if the outer limits are established in 
accordance with Article 76 they will be final and binding on the coastal state 
concerned as well as other States Parties to LOSC.37 Oude Elferink and 
Johnson make the distinction that where the delimitation of the continental 
shelf is concerned, the ‘final and binding and permanent nature of outer limits 
of the continental shelf cannot be invoked against another [s]tate’.38  
                                                
33 In accordance with Part XI of LOSC, the International Seabed Authority (ISBA) is 
responsible for the regulation of exploitation of the ‘Area’ defined in Article 1(1)(1) of LOSC 
as the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof which is beyond national jurisdiction. 
34 R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester University Press (3rd ed, 
1999), at 149. 
35 Ted L. McDorman, 'The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A 
Technical Body in a Political World' (2002) 17(3) International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 301, at 315. 
36 R.W. Smith and G. Taft, 'Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf' in P.J Cook and C.M 
Carleton (eds), Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface, Oxford 
University Press (2000) 17, at 20. See also United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, The Law of the Sea: Definition of the Continental 
Shelf (1993), at 29. 
37 Supra n. 26, ILA, Conclusion 11, at 15. 
38 Alex G. Oude Elferink and Constance Johnson, 'Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf and 
"Disputed Areas": State Practice Concerning Article 76(10) of the LOS Convention' (2006) 
21(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 461, at 464. 
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States may recognize other states’ boundaries made by proclamation. The 
CLCS is a technical and scientific body and as such does not have the 
jurisdiction to recognize a political boundary.39 Therefore, validation of 
scientific and technical data prior to proclamation by the CLCS does not 
equate to a maritime boundary being recognized by states. Furthermore, a 
state cannot be bound to recommendations that do not relate to that state 
specifically. Only the declaration or proclamation of the extended continental 
shelf may be final or binding on other states, not the recommendations. The 
CLCS is also not responsible for evaluating the proclamation made by a 
coastal state on the basis of the recommendations.40 
 
Currently, there is no avenue within the CLCS format for a state (apart from 
the submitting coastal state) to protest the recommendations approved by the 
Commission. Accordingly, the recommendations may be final in terms of that 
examination. The coastal state may or may not accept recommendations with 
which it disagrees when proclaiming the outer limits.41 In the case of 
disagreement, a state may resubmit data for further examination.42 A 
proclamation can be made irrespective of the disagreement. Once the 
proclamation is made another state may protest or acquiesce to the outer limits 
established in that proclamation through the normal avenue of claim and 
counter-claim dynamics between states. Alternately, in a similar process 
invoked by states in response to initial submissions regarding continental shelf 
outer limits, a state may post a note to the Secretary-General of the UN 
requesting that it be circulated and then posted on the Division of Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) website. In this manner, a state has 
the opportunity to not acquiesce to the proclamation and to ensure that its 
                                                
39 Supra n. 26, ILA, Conclusion 10, at 14. The coastal state, not the Commission, has the legal 
capacity to establish maritime boundaries. 
40 See discussion in supra n. 35, at 313-317. 
41 In accordance with Article 8 of Annex II, LOSC in the case of a disagreement with the 
recommendations, a coastal state shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new 
submission to the Commission. 
42 The LOSC does not indicate how a continued disagreement between a state and the CLCS 
is to be resolved. Dispute settlement mechanisms established in Part XV of LOSC can only be 
invoked by states once a proclamation has been made. For discussion of this issue refer to 
supra n. 26, ILA, Conclusion 17, at 21-23. 
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position is publicized. This process is the same for all states irrespective of 
their signatory status to LOSC. In the absence of protest and after due course 
of time, those outer limits may be binding on all states, including those states 
not party to the LOS Convention.43 
 
The LOSC entered into force 16 November 1994, initiating the ten year 
deadline for submission of extended continental shelf claims for a number of 
states. However, in 1999, State Parties to the Convention made a decision 
(SPLOS/72) to extend the ten year deadline. In the case of a state for which 
the Convention entered into force before 13 May 1999, the ten-year period for 
making a submission shall be taken to have commenced on 13 May 1999.44 In 
2008, States Parties also decided (SPLOS/183) that coastal states may satisfy 
the ten year requirement by submitting preliminary information indicative of 
the outer limits of the continental shelf.45 These decisions, however, should 
not be assumed as equivalent to a formal amendment to the provisions of 
LOSC, provided for in Article 312.46 The decision to extend the ten year 
deadline cannot bind subsequently acceding or ratifying states. A later 
submission is still potentially vulnerable to challenge by those states that will 
not have mutually waived their rights in the manner that occurred for State 
Parties in 1999.47  
 
A submission with only preliminary information must still be submitted prior 
to the ten year deadline and accompanied by a description of the status of 
preparation and intended date of making a submission in full accordance with 
the requirements if Article 76, the Scientific and Technical Guidelines and the 
Rules and Procedures of the CLCS.48 Potentially, data that would be 
acceptable in an earlier submission might be considered out dated if the full 
submission is significantly delayed. Lengthening a submission process would 
                                                
43 Supra n. 35, at 317. 
44 Supra n. 21, SPLOS/72. 
45 Ibid., SPLOS/183. 
46 Andrew Serdy, 'Towards Certainty of Seabed Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from 
the Territorial Sea Baseline: Australia's Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf' (2005) 36 Ocean Development and International Law 201, at 204. 
47 The decision by Australia to submit according to the original ten-year time period is 
discussed in Serdy, ibid., at 204. 
48 Supra n. 21, SPLOS/183. 
 198 
increase costs and potentially undermine the results if the ability to maintain 
consistency in the scientific, technical and legal experts was compromised.49 
The Russian Federation and Australia, among other states, chose to make their 
submissions to the CLCS in accordance to the provisions set out in LOSC, 
regardless of the extension to 2009 in SPLOS/72. The Russian Federation 
made an initial submission in 2001, while Australia submitted in full in 2004.  
 
4.3 The Russian submission 
The Russian submission to the CLCS provides an excellent example of the 
difficulty faced by Arctic states in relation to their rights and claims as coastal 
states. The geology and geography of the Arctic submarine environment are 
complex and poorly understood (see  
Figure 1). Political maritime boundaries for this semi-enclosed sea are 
incomplete. The agreed boundaries do not take into consideration the full 
potential of the legal continental shelves. 
 
Four of the five coastal states bordering the Arctic Ocean have ratified the 
LOSC and are able to make CLCS submissions. The Russian Federation 
ratified the LOSC in 1997 and made a submission in 2001. Norway made a 
submission in 2006, while Canada and Denmark have until 2013 and 2014, 
having ratified the LOSC in 2003 and 2004, respectively. The fifth coastal 
state, the US, has not acceded to the LOSC and although the US can prepare 
scientific data for the purposes of defining the outer limits of the continental 
shelf, the US cannot receive recommendations from the CLCS.50 It is still 
unknown whether the US will accede to the LOSC; however, there are 
statements that suggest an intention to do so.51 By states maximizing the 
                                                
49 Supra n. 46, at 204. 
50 Status of the LOSC available at: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2008.pdf>, last accessed at 23 June 2008. 
51 In April 2009 it was reported that Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, announced that the 
US Obama administration was committed to ratifying the LOSC. See, among others,  Sheldon 
Alberts, Obama 'Committed' to Resolving Arctic Disputes: Clinton (06 April 2009) The 
Gazetter 
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/Travel/Obama+committed+resolving+Arctic+disputes+Cli
nton/1470347/story.html> at 14 April 2009 and The China Post, U.S. Committed to Backing 
Law of the Sea Convention (08 April 2009) 
<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/international/americas/2009/04/08/203408/U.S.-
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extent to which the outer limits can be measured, most of the Arctic Basin 
seabed will be allocated to fall under the national jurisdiction of one of the 
Arctic coastal states. Furthermore, a significant area of overlap will occur in 
the central Arctic Ocean between Canada, Denmark and the Russian 
Federation. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Arctic Basin and coastal states52 
                                                                                                                          
committed.htm> at 15 April 2009. Similar statements have occurred by government 
representatives prior to this. See, President George W. Bush, President's Statement on 
Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans (15 May 2007) Office of the Press Secretary 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070515-2.html> at 23 January 2008; 
Deputy Secretary U.S. Department of State John D. Negroponte, Written Testimony Before 
the Senate Foreign Relations: Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and 
Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention (27 
September 2007) <http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/NegroponteTestimony070927.pdf> at 23 
July 2008; Paul L. Kelly, Statement by Paul L. Kelly Senior, Vice President Rowan 
Companies Ltd on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute, the International Association 
of Drilling Contractors and the National Ocean Industries Association (23 October 2003) 
<http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=219712> at 15 June 2010. See also 
Michael J. Mattler, 'The Law of the Sea Convention: A View from the U.S. Senate' in Myron 
H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Alexander S. Skaridov (eds), International Energy 
Policy, the Arctic and the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2005) 33-38. 
52 Canadian American Strategic Review, Arctic Development (2007) <http://www.casr.ca/id-
arctic-spring-2.htm> at 01 April 2010. 
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On 20 December 2001, in accordance with LOSC Article 76, the Russian 
Federation made its initial submission to the CLCS. It contained the scientific 
data supporting an extended continental shelf claim encompassing four 
distinct regions: two regions in the Arctic and two in the northwest Pacific.53 
Figure 2 below pertains to the Russian Arctic submission. This submission 
was made only four years after the Russian Federation’s ratification of the 
LOSC and well within the ten year timeframe established in Article 4 of 
Annex II.54 The executive summary of the submission has been posted on the 
UN Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) website 
since its receipt, along with several other documents, including Notes 
Verbales from five states.55 
                                                
53 Executive Summary of the Russian Federation (20 December 2001) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm> at 14 May 
2008. 
54 Article 4 of Annex II, LOSC reads: ‘a coastal state…shall submit particulars of such limits 
to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but 
in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State.’ A 
decision by the States Parties in 1999 has effectively extended the timeframe for states that 
signed LOSC prior to 1999 to 2009, ten years following the 13 May 1999 decision. See supra 
n. 21, SPLOS/72. A further decision in SPLOS/183 of 2008 states that a coastal state may 
satisfy the ten-year deadline by submitting preliminary information indicative of the outer 
limits accompanied by an indication of the status of the preparation, and intended date, for a 
full submission.  
55 Supra n. 53. Documents include the Executive Summary, a Press Release SEA/1726 dated 
21 December 2001, and an unofficial English translation of the Executive Summary which 
consists of geographical coordinates, maps and a page of map captions. Also posted are the 
Notes Verbales submitted by five states: Canada, Denmark, Japan, Norway and the United 
States, and a Statement made by the Deputy Minister for Natural Resources of the Russian 
Federation during the presentation of the Russian submission to the Commission. See UN 
Document CLCS/31 of 03 April 2002, Statement made by the Deputy Minister for Natural 
Resources of the Russian Federation during presentation of the Submission made by the 
Russian Federation to the Commission, made on 28 March 2002. Available from the Division 
of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) website 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/318/60/PDF/N0231860.pdf?OpenElement
> at 14 May 2008. 
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Figure 2: Map pertaining to the 2001 submission of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf for the Russian Federation. Adapted from the Executive Summary of the Russian 
Federation available from the DOALOS website.56 
 
 
In total the Russian extended continental shelf amounts to 460,000 NM2 or 1.2 
million km2 (by comparison, Australia’s extended shelf is 2.5 million km2). It 
will amount to possibly the largest Arctic claim. In the submission, Russia 
extends the outer limit to the geographical North Pole and far into the central 
Arctic Ocean Basin along two large features of the Amerasia Basin: the 
Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge complex (shown in Figure 
3). The outer limits of the submission in the Amerasian Basin combine a 
Boundary Agreement57 with the US, the sector line extending from the 
geographical North Pole, and lines measuring 100 NM from the 2500-m 
isobath along the Lomonosov Ridge.58 From the North Pole moving west, the 
outer limit line combines with the foot-of-slope measurements pertaining to 
                                                
56 Supra n. 53. 
57 Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the maritime boundary, done at Washington 01 June 1990, 29 ILM 941, not 
entered into force (Boundary Agreement). 
58 In accordance with Article 76(5) and 76(6), LOSC. 
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the Gakkel Ridge in the Eurasian Basin and the outer limits extending north 
from the western Siberian shelf. Appropriately, in the Eurasian Basin the 
Gakkel Ridge is excluded from the submission. In the Barents Sea, the 
Russian Federation applies the sector principle, consistent with state practice 
as used in negotiations with Norway (discussed below).  
 
The Notes Verbales of the five states addressed several different aspects. 
These include the difficulty of assessing proposed outer limits given the 
current state of knowledge, problems of overlapping jurisdiction, questionable 
baselines and differences in the geological interpretation of the central Arctic 
Ocean.59 For example, the Chukchi Plateau, the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge and 
the Lomonosov Ridge are included in the submission on the basis that they are 
natural prolongations of the Russian continental shelf,60 but concern was 
raised by the US over the lack of consensus as to whether the Lomonosov 
Ridge and Alpha-Mendeleev complex qualifies as ‘natural prolongations of 
the continental margin’.61 The US comment addressed this concern directly by 
providing one interpretation of the geology of the Arctic Basin. The US Note 
Verbale describes the Alpha-Mendeleev complex as a ‘volcanic feature of 
oceanic crust that was formed on and only occurs within an area of oceanic 
crust that underlies the Amerasia subbasin of the deep Arctic Ocean Basin.’62 
Further support is detailed and the US concludes that the Alpha-Mendeleev is 
not part of any state’s continental shelf and cannot be a prolongation of the 
land-mass of Russia.63 The US also considers the Lomonosov Ridge a 
‘freestanding feature in the deep, oceanic part of the Arctic Ocean Basin, and 
                                                
59 Ron MacNab and Lindsay Parson, 'Continental Shelf Submissions: The Record to Date' 
(2006) 21(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 309-322, at 311. 
60 Supra n. 53. 
61 Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, United States of 
America: Notification regarding the submission made by the Russian Federation to the 
Commission on the Limits on the Continental Shelf (2002) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__US
Atext.pdf> at July 24 2007. See also Tomasz Gόrski, 'A Note on Submarine Ridges and 
Elevations with Special Reference to the Russian Federation and Arctic Ridges' (2009) 40(1) 
Ocean Development and International Law 51, at 53-55. 
62 Ibid., US Note Verbale, at 2. 
63 Ibid. 
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not a natural component of the continental margins of either Russia or any 
other State’.64 
 
 
Figure 3: Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge complex and Lomonosov Ridge which traverse the 
Arctic Ocean Basin. Adapted from MacNab (2008),65 the arrows indicate the 
morphological breaks that need to be explained if the ridges are to be characterized as 
natural prolongations of the continental margins. 
 
MacNab et al. describe the Mendeleev and Alpha Ridges as the ‘extremities 
of a broad, continuous elevation that links the continental margins of Siberia 
and North America respectively.’66 Symonds et al. describe the Alpha Ridge 
as a microcontinent in close proximity to the surrounding continents, the 
composition of which is often difficult to define, while their origin and 
method of isolation from major continental landmasses are generally poorly 
understood.67 Grantz states that the Alpha-Mendeleev complex ‘was 
constructed on oceanic crust in the Amerasia Basin’ analogous to the origin of 
                                                
64Ibid., at 3. 
65 Ron MacNab, 'Submarine Elevations and Ridges: Wild Cards in the Poker Game of 
UNCLOS Article 76' (2008) 39(2) Ocean Development & International Law 223, at 226. 
Permission to reproduce this figure was provided by Ron MacNab, Geological Survey of 
Canada (Retired), Personal Communication (01 June 2009). 
66 Ron MacNab, Paul Neto and Rob van de Poll, 'Cooperative Preparations for Determining 
the Outer Limit of the Juridical Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean: A Model for Regional 
Collaboration in Other Parts of the World?' (2001) (Spring) IBRU Boundary and Security 
Bulletin 86-96, at 86. 
67 Philip A. Symonds et al, 'Ridge Issues' in Peter J. Cook and Chris M. Carleton (eds), 
Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface, Oxford University Press (2000) 
285, at 290. 
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the Iceland-Faroe ridge of the North Atlantic, and detached from the 
surrounding continental margins by an obvious shelf break comprised of 
deeper oceanic crust.68 A better understanding of the morphological breaks or 
bathymetric troughs between the ridge ends and the continental margins is 
needed to explain the potential morphological breaks shown in Figure 3.69 
 
The Lomonosov Ridge is understood to be a continental sliver that separated 
from the continental margin of Scandinavia and northwestern Russia by the 
sea floor spreading, responsible for propagating the Mid-Atlantic Ridge into 
the Arctic Ocean.70 It is the second largest ridge in the Arctic Ocean (Figure 
3), described as being more than 1500 km long, rising from water depths of 
more than 4200 m to less than 700 m.71 Its appurtenance to the continental 
margins of Greenland, Denmark and Ellesmere Island on the North American 
end, as well as the Siberian end, is still subject to some disagreement. It is 
argued that regardless of the continental origin, at present the Lomonosov 
Ridge does not amount to a natural prolongation of either the Russian 
continental margin or the margins off Greenland or Ellesmere Island. If each 
of these states, however, extends the outer limits of their continental shelves 
along this ridge, an area of overlap in jurisdiction in the central Arctic will 
result (Figure 4). 
 
 
 
                                                
68 Arthur Grantz, 'Treatment of Ridges and Borderlands Under Article 76 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: the Example of the Arctic Ocean' in Myron H. 
Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Tomas H. Heidar (eds), Legal and Scientific Aspects of 
Continental Shelf Limits, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2004) 201, at 206 -207. The US Note 
Verbale also makes a comparison of this ridge to the Iceland-Faroe ridge system in the North 
Atlantic. See supra n. 61, at 3. 
69 Supra n. 65, at 226. 
70 Martin Jakobsson et al, 'Physiographic Provinces of the Arctic Ocean Floor' (2003) 115(12) 
GSA Bulletin 1443, at 1450. See also Jakobsson, Martin et al, 'An Improved Bathymetric 
Portrayal of the Arctic Ocean: Implications for Modeling and Geological, Geophysical and 
Oceanographic Analyses' (2008) 35(L07602) Geophysical Research Letters, 1-5. 
71 Ibid., at 1448. 
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Figure 4: Equidistance (solid line) and sector theory (dashed line) boundary delimitation 
in the Arctic. These depict the potential overlap in jurisdiction in the central Arctic.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
72 From Mel Weber, 'Defining the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf across the Arctic 
Basin: The Russian Submission, States' Rights, Boundary Delimitation and Arctic Regional 
Cooperation' (2009) 24(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 653, at 662. 
Adapted from Donat Pharand, 'Canada's Arctic Jurisdiction' (1983) 7(3) Dalhousie Law 
Journal 315, at 318. 
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Notes Verbales from both Canada and Denmark refer to their inability to 
agree or disagree with the Russian Federation’s Arctic continental shelf 
submission without further supporting data to analyze.73 In 2001, neither state 
had ratified the LOSC nor commenced research towards setting continental 
shelf limits in the Arctic. Norway, in a Note Verbale, consented to the 
examination of the area representing the longstanding maritime dispute 
between Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea (now 
resolved)74 on the basis of Article 9 of LOSC Annex II, Rule 5 of the CLCS 
Rules and Procedures concerning maritime disputes, and the inability of the 
CLCS to prejudice the delimitation of boundaries between states. The full 
extent of the previously disputed area occurs landward of the foot of the 
continental slope in the Barents Sea and within 350 NM of the Norwegian and 
Russian baselines. This area beyond 200 NM was  ‘considered as being part 
of the continental shelf still to be delimited by the two coastal states 
concerned without any need for further scientific or technical 
documentation’.75  
 
                                                
73 Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, Canada: Notification Regarding the 
Submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (2002) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__CA
Ntext.pdf> at 02 April 2008; Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations, 
Denmark: Notification Regarding the Submission made by the Russian Federation to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (2002) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__DN
Ktext.pdf> at 02 April 2008. 
74 Agreement was reached on 27 April 2010 by Norway and the Russian Federation through 
bilateral negotiation. The Norwegian-Russian Treaty concerning the Maritime Delimitation 
and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Oceans was signed 15 September 2010. 
Details of this recent agreement have not, however, been integrated into the thesis figures. See 
Walter Gibbs, Russia and Norway Reach Accord on Barents Sea (27 April 2010) The New 
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/europe/28norway.html> at 03 May 
2010; BarentsObserver.com, Norway and Russia Agree on Maritime Delimitation (27 April 
2010) <http://www.barentsobserver.com/norway-and-russia-agree-on-maritime-
delimitation.4778541-116320.html> at 06 May 2010 and BarentsObserver.com, Norway and 
Russia Sign Maritime Delimitation Agreement (15 September 2010) 
<http://www.barentsobserver.com/norway-and-russia-sign-maritime-delimitation-
agreement.4819173-16149.html> at 15 September 2010.   
75 Permanent Mission of Norway to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Norway: 
Notification regarding the submission made by the Russian Federation to the Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (2002) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/rus01/CLCS_01_2001_LOS__NO
Rtext.pdf> at 09 October 2007. 
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During the presentation made by the Russian Federation to the CLCS 
following the receipt of its submission,76 a statement was made by the Deputy 
Minister for Natural Resources.77 The Deputy Minister also responded to the 
Notes Verbales, observing that the responses did not constitute an obstacle to 
the consideration of the submission.78  
 
The subcommission examining the Russian submission did not receive any 
instructions from the Commission to disregard any of the Notes. This differs 
from the Brazilian case in 2006, when the Commission instructed the 
subcommission to disregard comments by the US. 79 With respect to both the 
Russian and Brazilian submissions, the US presented comments regarding 
submerged features and the application of LOSC Article 76 rather than a 
delimitation issue or dispute.80 However, the comment regarding the Russian 
submission did include reference to the Boundary Agreement in place between 
the US and Russia.81 Whether the difference in the Commission’s decisions 
reflected the involvement in a boundary dispute is speculative.82 
                                                
76 In accordance with Paragraph 6(3) and 9 of Annex III of the Rules and Procedures of the 
CLCS, a coastal state may make presentations to clarify the contents of the submission. In 
accordance with Article 5 of Annex II of LOSC, a coastal state may send a representative to 
the deliberations of the subcommission examining the submission. 
77 Supra n. 55, UN Document CLCS/31. 
78 Ibid., at 4. 
79 UN Document CLCS/42 of 14 September 2004, Statement by the Chairman of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of the work in the 
Commission 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/510/12/PDF/N0451012.pdf?OpenElement
> at 17 September 2008, at para 17. The Commission noted that both Annex II of the LOSC 
and the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS provide for only one role to be played by other 
states in regard to the consideration of the contents of a submission. Only in the case of a 
dispute between States with opposite or adjacent coasts or in other cases of unresolved land or 
maritime disputes would the Commission be required to consider communications from states 
other than the submitting one. 
80 The Deputy Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, 
Diplomatic Note: Notification Regarding the Submission made by Brazil to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (25 August 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/bra04/clcs_02_2004_los_usatext.p
df> at 02 April 2008. This letter highlighted discrepancies between sediment thickness 
relating to the Victoria-Trindade feature off the coast of Brazil, remarking that differences 
exist between the sediment thickness as presented in the Brazilian submission and sediment 
thickness derived from publicly available data. The letter also remarked that the US doubts 
whether the feature in question is part of Brazil’s continental shelf beyond 200 NM, 
suggesting the CLCS take a cautious approach. 
81 Supra n. 61, US Note Verbale, at 1.  
82 Some indication exists that the timing of the decisions was significant and that the decision 
made in the Brazilian case was not necessarily helpful to the submission process for Brazil or 
other states. See generally Edwin Egede, 'Submission of Brazil and Article 76 of the Law of 
 208 
 
Between December 2001 and June 2002, the CLCS considered the Russian 
submission and made a number of recommendations.83 The CLCS 
recommended that upon entry into force of maritime delimitation agreements 
with the US in the Bering Sea and Norway in the Barents Sea, the Russian 
Federation shall transmit the charts and coordinates of the delimitation lines to 
the Commission, as they would represent the outer limits of the continental 
shelf for the Russian Federation in those Seas.84 For the central Arctic, a 
revised submission was recommended.85 Eight years on, Russia has still not 
made a revised submission though there has been progress on components of 
the recommendations. Norway and the Russian Federation have recently (27 
April 2010) come to a resolution of the boundary dispute in the Barents Sea86 
and there are indications that a submission may still be expected in 2010.87 
 
Boundary delimitations and continental margins 
Because the Arctic Ocean is semi-enclosed, the coastal states are either 
adjacent to and/or opposite one another. For the most part, maritime 
boundaries between these states, including those related to the continental 
shelf, have not been finalized. Prescott and Schofield identify nine delimited 
maritime boundaries in the Arctic region (Figure 5).88 Most of these do not, 
however, provide for the delimitation of continental shelf boundaries beyond 
200 NM. For example, the boundary between Canada and Greenland was 
                                                                                                                          
the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1982' (2006) 21(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law 33-55. 
83 Paragraphs 38-41 of UN Publication A/57/57/Add.1 of 08 October 2002, Report of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Fifty-seventh Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly under the agenda item Oceans and the Law of the Sea, New York 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement
> at 14 May 2008. 
84 Ibid., at para 39. 
85 Ibid. 
86 See supra n. 74. Reportedly, the agreed line on the 40 year old dispute will split the 
disputed area nearly in half. A number of oil or gas fields identified by Russian seismic 
surveys in the 1980s are thought to straddle the line. 
87 See reference to statements made at the 2008 International Geological Conference 
regarding the progress of the Russian submission at infra n. 139. In speaking to Galo Carrero 
Hurtado, Chairperson of the Subcommission examining the Russian Federation, indications 
had been made of a 2010 resubmission, Personal Communication (02 July 2008).    
88 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2nd ed, 2005), at 522-523. 
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settled in 1973, but does not extend beyond 82˚13’ N.89 The exception is the 
1990 US-Russia Boundary Agreement90 negotiated between the US and the 
former Soviet Union on their maritime boundary. This Agreement is still to 
enter into force; nevertheless, both states apply its terms. The agreed boundary 
runs along the 168˚49’30 West Longitude meridian, with no fixed northern 
limit. Article 1(1) of the Agreement refers instead to the ability to extend the 
boundary as far as permitted by international law. Article 1(2) states that ‘each 
party shall respect the maritime boundary as limiting the extent of its coastal 
state jurisdiction otherwise permitted by international law’. Thus, coastal state 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf beyond 200 NM is provided for within 
the Boundary Agreement.  
 
The agreed boundary is derived from the 1867 Boundary Treaty91 (the 
Convention related to the sale of Alaska to the US). In the Boundary Treaty, 
the meridian line was used as a cartographic device to describe the lands 
concerned in the matter, not as an agreed state boundary. In 1926, the then 
Soviet Union issued a decree using the sector principle along this same 
meridian to enclose territorial lands and islands.92 Since issuing this decree, 
the former Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) has been consistent in 
its claims over lands and islands within the sector but has never claimed 
waters beyond national jurisdiction within the sector.93 In negotiations 
between Norway and the former Soviet Union concerning the continental 
shelf and economic zones in the Barents Sea (ongoing formally since 1974), 
the former Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) insisted on recognition 
of the sector concept as constituting special circumstances for the region.94 A 
similar position was taken in negotiations concerning the Chukchi Sea from 
1989, out of which the 1990 Boundary Agreement was signed. 
                                                
89 Ibid., at 522. 
90 Supra n. 57. 
91 Convention ceding Alaska between Russia and the United States, 30 March 1867, 134 
Consolidated Treaty Series (CTS) 331, 15 Stat 539. Treaty Series No. 301. 
92 See Leonid Timtchenko, 'The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present' (1997) 
50(1) Arctic 29-35, at 30 for reproduction of the Soviet Decree. Reproduced from Sobraine 
Zakonov SSSR (1926) No. 32(203). 
93 Ibid., at 34. 
94 Ibid., at 32. 
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Figure 5: Maritime boundaries in the Arctic. Solid lines represent agreed boundaries 
and the ‘Svalbard Box’. Dashed lines represent potential equidistance lines projected 
across the Arctic Basin. Adapted from Prescott and Schofield.95 
 
In the CLCS submission, the boundary between Canada and Denmark 
(opposite states), is shown by the Russian Federation as being derived from 
the same meridian boundary line used in the 1990 Boundary Agreement drawn 
up to the geographical North Pole. The use of the sector concept to bring the 
line to the North Pole has been consistent state practice of the former Soviet 
Union, and now the Russian Federation, as a method of enclosing land and 
island territories.96 The sector concept was used to enclose sea expanses, but 
has not been used to lay claim to waters beyond national jurisdiction within 
the sector.97 Accordingly, this provides Russia with a provisional outer limit 
of the continental shelf98 and will not necessarily represent the boundary 
between the opposite states, such as with Canada and Denmark. In the Barents 
Sea, Russia also applied the sector principle, maintaining consistency with its 
negotiating position with Norway (see above). Again, these are the Russian 
                                                
95 Supra n. 88, Figure 22.1, at 651. 
96 Supra n. 92, at 34. 
97 Ibid., at 32. 
98 Supra n. 55, UN Document CLCS/31, at 4. 
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positions and will not necessarily reflect agreed boundaries between states. 
Incidentally, the recently agreed boundary in the Barents Sea reflects a 
compromise between the two states, reportedly splitting the 175 000 km2 area 
in two parts of approximately the same size.99   
 
Overlap 
Further towards the North Pole there is a discrepancy between the Russian-
drawn boundary and where equidistance lines would potentially meet between 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and Russia. The junction of these equidistance 
lines is in the vicinity of 88˚20’ N, 155˚E  on the Russian side of the North 
Pole, whereas Russia draws its boundary all the way to the Pole (Figure 2). If 
Canada and Denmark are entitled to seabed in this area along the Lomonosov 
Ridge and proceed to the junction of the equidistance lines, rather than just to 
the North Pole, an overlap of jurisdiction for approximately 22,000 NM2 may 
potentially result (Figure 4).100 
 
Donut holes 
Mapping of the constraint lines available through LOSC Article 76, in the 
absence of political boundaries, demonstrates that all but two areas of deep 
ocean floor could potentially be allocated to the respective Arctic states under 
the LOSC (Figure 6).101 The first of the two ‘donut holes’ excluded from the 
extended continental shelf claims relates to the elongated and meandering area 
of the Gakkel Ridge, circumscribed by a combination of 200-NM, 350-NM 
and 100-NM segments from the 2500-m isobath lines stretching from the 
outer limits of Denmark, Norway and Russia.102 The second is a roughly 
trapezoidal zone in the Mendeleev Abyssal Plain in the Canada Basin that is 
circumscribed by both the 350-NM limits and the 2500-m isobath projected 
seaward by 100 NM, combining the outer limits of Canada, Russia, and the 
                                                
99 Supra n. 74, BarentsObserver.com. 
100 Supra n. 88, at 527. 
101 Supra n. 66, at 92. See also Alex G. Oude Elferink, 'The Outer Continental Shelf in the 
Arctic: The Application of Article 76 of the LOS Convention in a Regional Context' in Alex 
Oude Elferink and Donald Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime 
Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001) 139-156. 
102 Ibid., n. 66, at 92 and Figure 10. 
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US.103 The Gakkel Ridge area has been recognized as an oceanic ridge, 
formed through seafloor spreading in the North Atlantic,104 while abyssal 
plains are also not capable of contributing to an extended continental shelf.105 
 
 
Figure 6: ‘Donut holes’ of the Arctic Ocean Basin, adapted from MacNab.106 
 
The Russian submission was enclosed along the meridian line in the 
Amerasian Basin, rather than extending to the edge of the Mendeleev 
trapezoidal donut hole. The meridian line favours Russia within 200 NM of 
the coast, compared to equidistance (see Figure 4).107 However, beyond 200 
NM, Russia forfeits 24,600 NM2 of seabed along the Chukchi Plateau in the 
Canada Basin to either the US or Canada.108 (The US or Canada may be able 
to include such an area inside the limits of their continental shelf.109) In the 
                                                
103 Ibid. 
104 Supra n. 68, at 205. 
105 Article 76(3), LOSC. 
106 Supra n. 66, at 95, Figure 10. Permission to reproduce this figure was provided by Ron 
MacNab, Geological Survey of Canada (Retired), Personal Communication (01 June 2009). 
107 Supra n. 88, at 523 and 527. Depending on the geological structure of the continental 
margins and the Chukchi Plateau, located in the area east of the sector boundary drawn by 
Russia, the US or Canada may be able to include this feature in their extended continental 
shelf claims. 
108 Ibid., at 527. 
109 Ibid. 
Gakkel Ridge area 
Mendeleev area 
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Greenland 
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Iceland 
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Eurasian Basin, the Gakkel Ridge is excluded from the submission, which 
coincides with the edge of the larger ‘donut hole’ shown on the right hand 
side of Figure 6. 
 
If a geological connection between the Lomonosov Ridge and the continental 
margins of the Arctic coastal states cannot be determined, the outer limit 
along the ridges will be constrained at 350 NM from each coastal state's 
baseline in accordance with LOSC Article 76(5).110 Five hundred and twenty 
nautical miles (520 NM) of ridge beyond the 350-NM constraint lines would 
not be included in the legal continental shelves of the states and would qualify 
as seabed beyond national jurisdiction. The continental shelf limits would not 
meet each other or overlap and boundary negotiations would not be necessary. 
Seabed of the Lomonosov Ridge beyond national jurisdiction would be 
considered part of the ‘Area’. Specific uses of the Area, including exploitation 
of the resources of the deep seabed and subsoil, are regulated through Part XI 
of the LOSC and by the ISBA.111  
  
According to the DOALOS, ridges formed by slivers of continental crust, 
such as the Lomonosov Ridge, can be considered as submarine ridges forming 
a natural component of the continental margin.112 Because the Lomonosov 
Ridge can also be defined by a continuous 2500-m isobath, there is a 
possibility that the entire ridge may be encapsulated inside the limits of the 
continental shelves of Canada, Denmark and the Russian Federation.113 The 
Lomonosov Ridge's geological composition could qualify as elements related 
to natural components of the continental margin. In a symbolic gesture, 
                                                
110 See also discussion on ‘Ridges or Elevations’ in supra n. 61, Gόrski, at 54. 
111 Ibid. The ‘Area’ is defined in supra n. 33 as the ocean floor, seabed and subsoil thereof 
beyond national jurisdiction (Article 1, LOSC) and is considered to be the common heritage 
of mankind (Article 136). Part XI of LOSC, and its subsequent Implementing Agreement 
(1994), establish a regime for exploiting this area and assign the International Seabed 
Authority (ISBA) to implement the terms of the regime. Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982, done at New York, 28 July 1994, 33 ILM 1309, entered into force 28 July 
1996. 
112 Supra n. 12, Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the CLCS, at 52, supra n. 26, ILA, 
Conclusion 3, at 5 and supra n. 36, Office of Legal Affairs, DOALOS. 
113 Supra n. 88, at 528 and n. 66, at 94 where the authors explain that only two sections of the 
Arctic seabed appear to be exempt from projected jurisdiction: the Gakkel Ridge and the 
Mendeleev Abyssal Plain. 
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Russian scientists dropped a flag on the seabed at the North Pole in the 
northern summer of 2007.114 These gestures might demonstrate the Russian 
position of being disinclined to agree to a shift towards equidistance-based 
boundaries. It is unlikely that formal discussions on this topic will be initiated 
while the structure of the seabed in the central Arctic is still being 
investigated.115 
 
Submission rights and possibilities 
Both Canada and Denmark have referred to their inability to agree or disagree 
with the Russian Federation’s Arctic continental shelf submission.116 By also 
indicating that an absence of comment does not imply agreement or 
acquiescence, Canada and Denmark leave open the possibility of overlap 
occurring.117 Until there is certainty concerning the overlap, states are not 
obliged to report a dispute to the Commission in accordance with Annex I of 
the Rules of Procedures of the CLCS.118 However, neither Canada nor 
Denmark was in a position to deny consideration of the area on the basis of an 
existing dispute. The consideration of any submission is independent of 
others. Therefore, Russia’s submission does not depend on Canada’s or 
Denmark’s. However, there are problems related to leaving a boundary 
between opposite states open-ended and states may wish to communicate to 
the CLCS and the Secretary-General of the UN on how issues are being 
considered.119 
 
Tonga, New Zealand and Fiji, for example, had dealt with an overlapping area 
identified in the 2006 New Zealand submission.120 The area of overlap 
                                                
114 Tom Parfitt, Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed (02 August 2007) The Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic> at 08 August 2007. 
115 Supra n. 72, Weber, at 673. 
116 Supra n. 73, Canada Note Verbale. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Paragraph 2 of Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS states that, in the case of 
a dispute, the Commission shall be informed of such a dispute and assured that the submission 
will not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between states. 
119 See supra n. 72, Weber, at 673-677. 
120 New Zealand Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
Pursuant to Article 76(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Executive 
Summary (19 April 2006) 
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concerned the extended continental shelf between Tonga and New Zealand 
and consultations were undertaken in the spirit of understanding and 
cooperation to establish provisional arrangements, pending final agreement.121 
The states agreed that, notwithstanding the outcome of the recommendations 
made by the CLCS and the outer limit determined by the Government of New 
Zealand based on those recommendations, the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be undertaken by agreement on 
the basis of international law.122 The Republic of Fiji commented in a Note 
Verbale that negotiations on the delimitation of the boundary between itself 
and New Zealand were ongoing and that any recommendations ‘ought to be 
without prejudice of (sic) future submissions by the Republic of Fiji and of the 
boundary delimitations.’123 New Zealand assured the CLCS of these 
initiatives in follow-up correspondence to the UN Secretary-General and the 
CLCS.124 Any recommendations from the examination of New Zealand’s 
submission will not override the negotiations between the states.125  
 
In examining information on the Loop Hole in the Barents Sea126 contained in 
the submission made by Norway on 27 November 2006, the CLCS recognized 
                                                                                                                          
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_exec_sum.pdf> at 03 
March 2009. 
121 In accordance with Article 83, LOSC. 
122 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Tonga to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note (08 
April 2008) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/tonga_e.pdf> at 
17 September 2008. 
123 Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Fiji Islands to the United Nations, 
Diplomatic Note (23 June 2006) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/fiji_e.pdf> at 17 September 
2008. 
124 Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note (31 July 2008) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_2008_e.pdf> at 17 
September 2008. 
125 Recommendations have since been made by the CLCS. A summary of the 
recommendations is available from the DOALOS website at: 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_summary_of_recommen
dations.pdf>, last accessed at 07 October 2008. 
126 The Loop Hole is in the central part of the Barents Sea beyond and totally enclosed by the 
200 NM limits of Norway, Svalbard and the Russian Federation. Negotiations concerning a 
maritime boundary between Norway and the Russian Federation, ongoing since 
1967(informally) and 1974 (formally), have now been resolved. See supra n. 74. Refer also to 
the Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the 
Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea, Executive Summary (27 November 2006) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor.htm> at 24 
October 2007 and Ingrid Kvalvik, 'Assessing the Delimitation Negotiations between Norway 
and the Soviet Union/Russia' (2004) 21(1) Acta Borealia 55-78. 
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that Norway cooperated closely with its neighboring state, the Russian 
Federation, which gave consent to the examination.127 In examining the 
scientific information, the CLCS confirmed that ‘both coastal states share 
entitlement to the seabed and subsoil located beyond 200 M in this part of the 
Barents Sea as the natural prolongations of their land territories’.128 The 
CLCS recommended that Norway proceed with delimitation of the continental 
shelf by agreement with the Russian Federation and upon entry into force of a 
maritime boundary delimitation agreement, it deposit with the Secretary-
General charts or a list of geographical coordinates of points showing the line 
of delimitation.129 While able to acknowledge entitlement to seabed and 
subsoil, recommendations do not assist with determining the line of 
delimitation and do not prejudice the delimitation of the boundary which is 
now agreed upon but not yet finalized between the states.130  
 
As illustrated in the New Zealand and Norwegian cases, boundary 
negotiations in the central Arctic may be initiated before (or after) Russia 
makes a revised submission and possibly before Canada and Denmark are due 
to submit (2013 and 2014, respectively). For the Russian submission, the 
Commission has no role in recommending that Russia, Canada and Denmark 
engage in provisional, transitional arrangements; pending final agreement; 
however, the states are free to consider this option. The Boundary Agreement 
between the US and Russia might be a useful foundation for such 
arrangements. For example, the boundary line agreed between Canada and 
Denmark currently ends at 82˚13’ N.131 By extending this limit ‘into the 
                                                
127 UN Document CLCS/62 of 20 April 2009, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the Progress of Work in the Commission 
<http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/307/58/PDF/N0930758.pdf?OpenElement> at 30 March 
2010, at 5, para 18. 
128 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Summary of the Recommendations of 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in Regard to the Submission made by 
Norway in Respect of Areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 
27 November 2006, adopted 27 March 2009 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor06/nor_rec_summ.pdf> at 30 
March 2010, at 9, para 23. 
129 Ibid., at 9, para 24. 
130 See reports in supra n. 74. 
131 Supra n. 88, at 522. 
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Arctic Ocean as far as permitted under international law’,132 similar to the 
Boundary Agreement, the continental shelf between Canada and Denmark 
would be delimited out to where the continental shelf areas overlap with those 
described by Russia. The final delimitation would still be pending until the 
outcome of the CLCS and final boundary agreements. However, 
unidirectional extension of an existing boundary is not a necessary solution, or 
the only option available to the states in order to achieve an equitable solution. 
 
Provisional arrangements with Russia could also employ the wording of the 
Boundary Agreement (consistent with international law) and be based on 
equidistance lines or the sector theory through special circumstances.133 
Boundary arrangements or final agreements, which apply to continental shelf 
boundaries that occur further than 350 NM from the states’ coastline, would 
require geological evidence to prove each state had equal entitlement to 
extend the shelf beyond 350 NM. Any prior resolution of boundaries related 
to extended continental shelf claims may still be provisional, pending CLCS 
consideration. If the scientific data do not support entitlement to extended 
continental shelf for each of the involved states, the provisionally agreed 
boundary would need to be altered accordingly. In these cases the states may 
prefer to enter into boundary negotiations following the receipt of 
recommendations from the CLCS, rather than before, even if those 
arrangements do not prejudice the final agreement.  
 
There is also the possibility of a joint submission between Canada, Denmark 
and Russia.134 A joint submission would only be possible once all of the data 
had been acquired and prima facie entitlement for all three states along the 
ridge established. For a number of reasons, this is an unlikely option. Russia 
                                                
132 Article 2, Boundary Agreement. 
133 See Robin R Churchill, 'Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic - Law of the Sea 
Normality or Peculiarity?' in Alex G. Oude Elferink and Donald R Rothwell (eds), The Law of 
the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction, Kluwer Law International (2001) 
105-124, at 121-122 for a short discussion on the sector application in polar maritime 
delimitation. A more comprehensive discussion is found in Donat Pharand, Canada's Arctic 
Waters in International Law, Cambridge University Press (1988), at 3, 64 and Chapter 4 (44-
87), in general. See supra n. 88, at Chapter 10 (215-244) for a comprehensive description of 
the boundary delimitation process and options. 
134 In accordance with Paragraph 4 of Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. 
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has a much earlier timeframe for its submission and has already made a 
unilateral submission. Canada and Denmark are in the early stages of data 
acquisition and it would be very difficult to consolidate the existing Russian 
submission into a joint submission, which would require compatible data sets 
and interpretation. Language and political differences may be problematic.135 
As well, considering that the request for Russia to make a revised submission 
was in 2002 and the case load of the CLCS is increasing, Russia will likely 
seek to present its revised submission well before Canada and Denmark have 
prepared theirs.136  
 
Alternatively, states affected by the potential overlap may mutually agree to 
exclude this area from examination. A state may make a submission for a 
portion of its continental shelf in order not to prejudice questions relating to 
the delimitation of boundaries between states in any other portion of the 
continental shelf for which a submission may be made later.137 This would 
delay the examination for the excluded portion of the continental shelf. Russia 
has the ability to do this in its revised submission, as do Canada and Denmark 
within their pending submissions. There have, however, been no indications 
that this will occur.  
 
There is minimal likelihood of partial submissions by the individual states. 
Omitting the area of potential overlap would again only delay the verification 
of the entitlement and prevent finalizing boundary delimitations. Any 
preliminary data submitted in accordance with the SPLOS/183 decision are 
unable to be examined pending a full submission.138 The Russian Federation 
has been working steadily towards a resubmission for the Arctic139 and since 
                                                
135 As well, a joint submission that includes a region already given some consideration in a 
single submission could increase the CLCS workload. 
136 The Russian submission is a revision rather than an initial submission, and according to 
Article 8 of Annex II to LOSC, any resubmission must follow within a 'reasonable' 
timeframe. Although not definite in its description, waiting 11 years to meet the Canadian 
deadline of 2013, might be considered beyond 'reasonable'. The consequences of a ‘late’ 
submission have yet to be determined. 
137 Paragraph 3, Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. 
138 See supra n. 21, SPLOS/183. 
139 Victor Poselov, presenting at the International Geological Congress in August 2008, 
indicated that a submission containing recently acquired data is still three to four years away. 
See V. Poselov et al, 'A Combined Geological and Geophysical Model of the Earth's Crust 
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the Russian submission is not dependent on Canada and Denmark, delaying 
on the basis of a possible overlap is neither worthwhile nor necessary.140  
 
Given that submissions are examined on an individual basis and any 
recommendations of the Commission are without prejudice to the question of 
the delimitation of boundaries,141 it is at the discretion of the coastal states to 
engage in boundary delimitation negotiations and agreements. For the central 
Arctic, a series of scientific discussions have occurred.142 However, as of 
2010, there has been no formal discussion on delimitation of boundaries 
between states.  
 
There have also been no requests from Arctic coastal states to have the 
recommendations pertaining to the Russian submission made publicly 
available through the UN Secretary-General or the state. Having the Russian 
recommendations available would undoubtedly assist Arctic and other states 
in understanding the application of LOSC Article 76. Recommendation 
summaries are now available for some of the submissions, including those by 
Australia, New Zealand and Norway.143 The Australian submission dealt with 
a number of ridges in its submission and a precedent for ridges may be 
identified in the CLCS recommendations. For those summaries not provided 
yet, such as Russia’s, there is no reason that recommendations cannot be made 
available to states through requests to the state having received the 
recommendations or to the UN Secretary-General, who serves as a custodian 
of the recommendations.144 However, this has yet to occur.   
                                                                                                                          
within the Mendeleev Ridge and its Transition to Adjacent Shelves of the East-Siberian and 
Chukchi Seas, Based on Results of the "Arctic 2005" Expedition' (Paper presented at the 
International Geological Congress, Oslo, Norway, 06 to 14 August 2008). 
140 See supra n. 72, Weber, at 677. 
141 Article 76(10), LOSC and Article 9, Annex II to LOSC. 
142 J. Richard MacDougall, Wendell Sanford and Jacob Verhoef, 'Ice and No Ice: The 
Canadian UNCLOS Bathymetric Mapping Program' (Paper presented at the Canadian 
Hydrographic Conference and National Surveyors Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, 
May 2008), at 11. 
143 Pursuant to Section V, paragraph 11(3) of Annex III of the Rules and Procedures of the 
CLCS, Recommendation summaries are available on the DOALOS website along with the 
submission with which the recommendations are concerned. Summaries shall not contain any 
information that might be confidential and/or which might violate the proprietary rights of the 
coastal state.  
144 In accordance with Article 6(3) of Annex II to the LOSC, the CLCS shall submit one copy 
of the recommendations to the submitting state and one copy to the UN Secretary-General. 
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Collaborative Arctic research 
A key element of developing submissions to the CLCS regarding extended 
continental shelf area is the need for states to establish appurtenance of 
submerged features to the continental margin and identify if the features are 
also natural components of the continental margin. In light of the difficulty 
and cost of undertaking scientific research in the Arctic,145 states have 
engaged in collaborative scientific research expeditions.146 Canada and 
Denmark began appurtenance testing of the Lomonosov Ridge through both 
independent and joint seismic and bathymetric mapping. The area has also 
been the focus of two collaborative projects, the LORITA and the LOMROG 
(see below).  
 
In March-April 2006, the Lomonosov Ridge Test of Appurtenance (LORITA) 
project began. On-ice bathymetric work was conducted again in April 2007 
from the Canadian Forces Station Alert and Canadian scientists joined an 
International Polar Year (IPY) joint Swedish-Danish expedition to try to fill 
gaps in the data collection that often occur due to Arctic climatic variables, 
such as ice, fog and sea ice conditions.147 Joint interpretation and scientific 
publication of the results of the LORITA project are underway. A workshop 
attended by scientists from Canada, Denmark and Russia was held in the 
second half of 2007, and in August 2008 scientists presented results at the 
International Geological Congress in Norway. Although limited by weather 
conditions, the scientific results indicate that there is a continuation of 
sedimentary basins from onshore geology under the bathymetric trough out to 
the Lomonosov Ridge and that volcanic structures are responsible for the 
                                                
145 Larry Mayer, Martin Jakobsson and John Hall, 'Challenges of Collecting Law of the Sea 
Data in the Arctic' in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Alexander S. Skaridov 
(eds), International Energy Policy, the Arctic and the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (2005) 125-134. 
146 Along with research outlined below, see discussions in Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, 'Canada 
and Arctic Politics: The Continental Shelf Extension' (2008) 39(4) Ocean Development & 
International Law 343, at 349-351 and supra n. 72, Weber, at 677-680. 
147 Supra n. 142, at 2 and 9. 
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broadening of the foot of slope.148 A follow-up workshop on remaining key 
scientific questions occurred in late 2008.149  
 
The Lomonosov Ridge off Greenland (LOMROG) 2007 project was a 
Danish/Swedish collaboration using the Swedish Icebreaker Oden and the 
Russian icebreaker 50 Let Pobedy collecting, inter alia, seismic reflection 
profiles, sediment cores, and gravity measurements from the Lomonosov 
Ridge. In addition to Danish/Swedish participants, scientists from Canada, 
Finland and the United States also took part in the voyage.  
 
The 2001 Russian submission was supported by the findings of seismic and 
bathymetric investigations carried out by Russian expeditions during the 
period of 1960 to 1990.150 In response to the CLCS recommendations, Russia 
launched an international conference in St. Petersburg, featuring an array of 
geoscientific topics relevant to the application of LOSC Article 76.151 Russia 
also launched several scientific expeditions, including the Arctic-2004, -2005 
and -2007 projects, to confirm the existence of a geological link between the 
Siberian margin and both the Lomonosov Ridge and Alpha-Mendeleev 
complex.152 In 2007, Russia approached Canada and Denmark for scientific 
collaboration. Since Canada and Denmark had only just initiated data 
acquisition, these states had little in the way of new scientific information to 
provide. However, the above-mentioned workshops were convened. In 
November 2007, Russia and Canada also signed a joint statement on 
economic cooperation, which reaffirmed their commitments to the LOSC 
process and recognized the need for cooperation and collaboration in Arctic 
seabed mapping work.153   
 
                                                
148 T. Dahl-Jensen et al, 'Crustal Structure from the Lincoln Sea to the Lomonosov Ridge, 
Arctic Ocean' (Paper presented at the International Geological Congress, Oslo, Norway, 06 to 
14 August 2008). 
149 Christian Marcussen, Senior Advisor, Geophysicist Geological Survey or Denmark and 
Greenland, Personal Communication (20 March 2009). Reference to this meeting can also be 
found in supra n. 142, at 11. No meeting materials have been produced. 
150 Supra n. 55, UN Document CLCS/31, at 1. 
151 Supra n. 59, at 311-312. 
152 Supra n. 65, at 226. 
153 Supra n. 146, at 346, 351 and fn 48. 
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Russian Arctic research projects examined the geological and tectonic 
linkages between the Mendeleev Ridge and the Siberian continental margin, 
as well as the history and composition of the Lomonosov Ridge and Alpha-
Mendeleev complex. The results of two of the Russian Federation expeditions 
refute any concern over the appurtenance of the Lomonosov Ridge and Alpha-
Mendeleev complex, confirming the existence of geological links between the 
ridges and the Siberian shelf.154 Preliminary results from the Russian Arctic-
2005 expedition indicate that a morphological and structural continuity exists 
between the Mendeleev Rise and the Siberian shelf.155 Findings were 
presented in the Fall 2007 meeting between researching states, and at the 
International Geological Congress in Norway, August 2008.156 Additional 
information was discussed at the November 2008 meeting; however, no 
meeting material was produced.157  
 
Preliminary desktop studies identify the potential for appurtenance of the 
Alpha Ridge to the Canadian continental margin. Further field studies are 
required to confirm or reject this assessment. The Alpha Ridge Test of 
Appurtenance (ARTA) project for the Canadian Continental Shelf Project 
began on an ice camp offshore in Nansen Sound during March-April 2008. 
Annual ice camps are scheduled through to 2011.158 A study conducted from 
the USCG Healy early in 2005 sought to identify the origin and stratigraphy of 
the Mendeleev Ridge using seismic reflection and bathymetric data. Results 
                                                
154 Ibid., with reference to both V.D. Kaminsky et al, Geophysical and Geological Study of 
the Transition Zone between the Mendeleev Rise and the Adjacent Siberian Shelf: Preliminary 
Results (Abstract only) (2005), posted on the website of the American Geophysical Union 
available from <http://www.agu.org/cgi-bin/SFgate/SFgate> at 23 May 2008, and V. Poselov, 
V. Butsenko and V. Glebovsky, 'Preliminary Results of Geophysical and Geological 
Investigations in the Transition Zone Between the Mendeleev Rise and Adjacent Siberian 
Shelf' (2006) 87(52) EosTrans. AGU. Fall meeting Suppl., Abstract.  
155 Ibid., Kaminsky et al. 
156 Supra n. 139 and V. Kaminsky et al, 'Current Results of a Geological and Geophysical 
Study of the Transition Zone Between the Lomonosov Ridge and the Siberian Shelf' (Poster 
presented at the International Geological Congress, Oslo, Norway, 06-14 August 2008). 
157 Supra n. 149. 
158 Supra n. 142, at 11 and Personal Communication with the lead author, Richard J. 
MacDougall, Director of the Law of the Sea Project and Fisheries and Oceans’ member of the 
Management Board for Canada’s UNCLOS program (12 June 2008). 
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have not been finalized and future studies aim to develop a structural map of 
the Ridge.159 
 
In the western Arctic, similar collaborative efforts are emerging. Canada and 
the US have originally conducted independent research in the Beaufort Sea. 
Recent collaboration, in 2008, assisted with research in areas of dense ice 
conditions. The states have now agreed ‘in principle’ to develop one data set 
for the Beaufort Sea and interpret the information jointly.160  
 
Continued scientific collaboration has contributed to several useful tools, 
including the recently updated International Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic 
Ocean (IBCAO) and the Mapping of Arctic Sediment Thickness (MAST) 
project. MAST was initiated following an international workshop held in 1999 
in Znamenkag, Russia.161 During the course of discussions, it was agreed that 
creating a database of available marine sediment thickness in the Arctic would 
be useful for the development of a common understanding of this key factor in 
the implementation of LOSC Article 76. MAST involved scientists from 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US.162 Known information from 
all Russian and non-Russian data sets was consolidated. By 2005 the project 
was suspended. New data was not available from Western partners and any 
further Russian data was not released.163 It was agreed that MAST activity 
should be maintained so that new data sets anticipated from the ongoing 
research can be assimilated into the regional map.164  
 
                                                
159 D. Dove, B. Coakley and J. Hopper, Stratigraphy, Structure and Origin; A Geophysical 
Survey of the Mendeleev Ridge (Abstract only) (2005), posted on the website of the American 
Geophysical Union available from <http://www.agu.org/cgi-
bin/SFgate/SFgate?&listenv=table&multiple=1&range=1&directget=1&application=fm06&d
atabase=%2Fdata%2Fepubs%2Fwais%2Findexes%2Ffm06%2Ffm06&maxhits=200&="OS5
3B"> at 23 May 2008. 
160 Supra n. 146, at 350. Irrespective of accession to the LOSC, the US is entitled to a 
continental shelf under customary law. US research on the outer limits of such continental 
shelf will continue in accordance with LOSC, reflecting customary international law. 
161 Stephen Bigras et al, 'MAST: Map of Arctic Sediment Thickness, Meeting of the Working 
Group' (2005) 1-5, at 1. Report provided by Ron MacNab, member of MAST Project 
Working Group, Personal Communication (24 July 2008); see also supra n. 66, at 90. 
162 Supra n. 161, Bigras, at 1. 
163 Ibid., at 2. 
164 Ibid., at 4. 
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Although progress is being made, it appears that the understanding of the 
Arctic basins and ridges is still far from comprehensive. Nonetheless, 
scientific collaboration can occur between states with potentially competing 
continental shelf claims in parallel to the submission process without 
derogating from the rights of states. The collaborative research with respect to 
the Lomonosov Ridge may be discussed in joint fora, such as those occurring 
between the scientific communities. Collaborative research may also be 
published jointly. In this manner, one interpretation can be strengthened by 
the support of two or more states, represented by their academic or 
government institutions.165 States may choose to use joint interpretations as 
further support for a particular issue addressed in their submission, such as 
appurtenance of a ridge to a continental margin. Each state’s case will be 
stronger if scientific data is agreed upon and as Riddell-Dixon comments, ‘the 
Commission’s task will be easier if there is consistency in the data 
submitted’.166 
 
In the recent Ilulissat Declaration and Arctic Ocean: Ministers’ Meeting the 
five coastal Arctic states declared that they remain committed to strengthening 
their regional cooperation concerning marine scientific research, including 
collecting the data required for the CLCS submissions.167 The Arctic states 
committed themselves to the orderly settlement of overlapping claims and to 
continuing to contribute actively to the work of the Arctic Council and other 
international fora.168 While collaboration can occur between the states, such as 
recognized by the Ilulissat Declaration, the Arctic Ocean meeting or the 
Canada/Russia Joint Statement on economic cooperation, the responsibility 
for interpreting the scientific information ultimately rests with the state 
preparing the submission. Any disagreement amongst states on the 
interpretation of the scientific information, as well as its legal application, still 
                                                
165 Supra n. 72, Weber, at 680. 
166 Supra n. 146, at 350. 
167 Ilulissat Declaration (29 May 2008) <http://www.cop15.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BE00B850-
D278-4489-A6BE-6AE230415546/0/ArcticOceanConference.pdf> at 11 June 2008 and The 
Honourable Lawrence Cannon (Chairman), Chairman's Summary of the Arctic Ocean: 
Foreign Ministers' Meeting (29 March 2010, Chelsea, Canada) 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/arctic-meeting_reunion-arctique-
2010_summary_sommaire.aspx?lang=eng> at 30 March 2010. 
168 Ibid. 
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does not derogate from a state’s right to have a submission considered. Nor 
does it derogate from a state’s ability to inform the Commission of concerns. 
Cooperation is not prevented by the fact that the US remains outside the 
LOSC, although this should not be used by the US to avoid accession. Nor 
does the US position prevent or derogate from the rights assigned to states for 
claiming a continental shelf.  
 
4.4 Discussion of Arctic robustness and the Russian submission 
Submissions regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf cannot 
prejudice the rights of states with respect to boundary disputes and the CLCS 
cannot examine an area of a dispute without prior consent. Any evaluation and 
recommendations by the CLCS cannot prejudice the rights of states in 
boundary delimitation. Boundary delimitation is a separate process from the 
CLCS evaluation. The CLCS may be examining a submission that includes 
agreed or unilaterally assigned boundaries. Their evaluation is limited in 
scope to the area and data provided within those boundaries. Whether 
compromising or maximizing a state’s continental shelf potential, the CLCS 
has a limited role to play, moderating the extent to which a unilaterally 
assigned boundary can potentially be proclaimed on technical and scientific 
grounds. The CLCS can recommend that the data does not correspond to the 
area included within the assigned boundaries, pulling in potential areas of 
overlap or of grandiose unilateral claims.  
 
For the central Arctic Basin, the issues of geological connection and 
appurtenance of submerged ridges have been raised in the context of the 
application of Article 76. The scientific understanding of Arctic geology and 
the application of LOSC Article 76 along geological features, including 
through-running ridges, determine the extent to which continental shelf claims 
in the central Arctic are possible. Regardless of how the technical application 
proceeds, the final delimitation of the limits of a continental shelf and 
associated political boundaries between these opposite and adjacent states is 
the responsibility of the states involved. As a semi-enclosed sea, adjacent and 
opposite Arctic coastal states will need to delimit boundaries between each 
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other in order for the outer limits of continental shelves to be proclaimed and 
recognized.  
 
Potential overlap of outer continental shelf claims over the centre of the 
Lomonosov Ridge in the Arctic Basin between Canada, Denmark and the 
Russian Federation was identified. A submission may still be evaluated on the 
understanding that if a dispute arises concerning the overlap, 
recommendations from the CLCS are without prejudice to the ultimate 
decision of the states involved in boundary delimitation. Numerous options 
will remain available to the states in terms of delimitation, including an open 
timeframe for delimitation and proclamation. Thus, Arctic coastal states are 
able to make a submission and have it examined. The contents of the 
submission cannot derogate from the provisions available in LOSC or 
encroach on the rights of the other Arctic coastal states. Thus, the 
formalization process undertaken by the Russian Federation was recognized 
by states as within the rights afforded by LOSC and has not created prejudice 
within the Arctic operating system.169 As well, boundaries suggested in the 
Russian submission are inherently provisional, pending the examination of 
continental shelf entitlement and extent by the Commission, as well as final 
agreement amongst states involved. Within the operating system states were 
able to interpret the provisions to suit national interest, maintaining state 
authority in the process and without creating prejudice of other states rights.  
 
Questions related to the geological and geomorphologic connection of the 
through-running ridges to the Russian mainland were raised. On one occasion, 
the US reaction to the Russian Federation, in the form of a Note Verbale, 
questioned the scientific understanding of the Arctic Basin geology. Canada 
and Denmark neither accepted nor denied the interpretation. None of the 
statements made by Arctic states, regardless of their status under the LOSC, 
however, undermined the rights of the Russian Federation or other Arctic 
states.170 The geological assessment of the Arctic seabed is challenging due to 
the research conditions of the area, the absence of an agreed geological history 
                                                
169 Supra n. 72, Weber, at 681. 
170 Ibid., 653-681.  
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and the absence of previously acquired, publicly available, data. States are 
within their rights to protect their own research interests by not agreeing, 
protesting or acquiescing in one interpretation. As well, one interpretation, 
such as that of the Russian Federation, may serve other states in their 
evaluation of the submerged land features and submission compilation. A 
state will be reluctant to protest an act of another state which may, in turn, 
satisfy its own interests in future submissions. The use of Notes Verbales 
demonstrates the ability of states to protect national interest within the 
operating system; protecting their own rights with respect to continental shelf 
submissions and the ability to delimit boundaries between opposite and 
adjacent states. In neither denying nor accepting Russia’s interpretation of 
LOSC provisions, states demonstrated acceptability and legitimacy of the 
process within the operating system. The inability of the CLCS to prejudice 
the delimitation of boundaries between opposite and adjacent states also 
confirms state authority within the operating system.171 
 
The submission process has also effectively provoked clarification from the 
international community regarding the application of the provisions of LOSC. 
Clarification derived from decisions of the CLCS and States Parties to LOSC 
introduces secondary elements of authority within the system. These 
decisions, however, have not undermined state authority. Rather, state 
authority to formalize rights has been maintained alongside these decisions. In 
the Arctic, four of the five coastal states are State Parties to the LOSC and as 
such the delimitation, development and management of the continental shelf 
and water column occur in accordance with these provisions. The US, having 
yet to accede to the Convention, is still able to delimit outer limits of its 
continental shelf extending from the Alaskan coast under customary law. The 
International Law Association concluded in a 2006 report that the right to 
make a submission to the CLCS only exists for States Parties to LOSC.172 As 
of April 2010, no decision by the States Parties to LOSC has been reached as 
                                                
171 State authority has been further confirmed through the recent boundary agreement between 
Norway and the Russian Federation discussed in supra n. 74 and around n. 130. 
172 Supra n. 26, ILA, Conclusion 16, at 20. 
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to whether a non-party state can invoke the processes of the CLCS.173 Nor has 
the status of this process been given credence under international customary 
law, requiring a state to engage in the submission examination process. 
 
Furthermore, the formalization of rights under the LOSC has not undermined 
the collective authority present within the existing operating system towards 
regional collaborative initiatives.174 Alongside legal provisions associated 
with continental shelf entitlement and delimitation are responsibilities towards 
regional cooperation that co-exist within the Arctic operating system. 
Mechanisms of regional cooperation exist in the framework of LOSC through, 
inter alia, Articles 122-123 regarding semi-enclosed seas, and Articles 194 
and 197 regarding cooperative management of marine pollution.175 The Arctic 
states have endeavored to cooperate in creating the AEPS and the Arctic 
Council. These initiatives are in conformity with the provisions of LOSC 
while also providing emphasis on Arctic specific issues and thus provide 
further structure to the Arctic operating system. Cooperative initiatives can 
co-exist with the submission process without undermining state authority or 
regional governance. 
 
 
Arctic states have also collaborated on scientific research concerning the 
geological history of the Arctic Basin with an interest in producing data sets 
useful to submissions as well as the improved understanding of the Arctic 
Basin. Collaborative scientific research will provide enhanced certainty for 
the evaluation of the geological and technical aspects of each submission. 
This collaboration, alongside the unilateral submissions provides transparency 
within the process, acceptance and legitimacy to the Arctic operating system.  
 
                                                
173 While the question arose from the Commission to the States Parties to LOSC, the States 
Parties deferred the decision to be made if the situation arises. See SPLOS/31 of 4 June 1998, 
Meeting of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1998) 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/161/23/PDF/N9816123.pdf?OpenElement
> at 11 April 2008. 
174 See supra n. 72, Weber, at 677-680. 
175 Discussed in Chapter 1. 
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Unilateral submissions do not undermine the collaborative framework of the 
AEPS or the Arctic Council. Numerous initiatives can and do occur across 
political boundaries and along ecological or socio-demographic ones. In the 
2008 Ilulissat Declaration and 2010 Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting the five Arctic coastal states came together to reiterate their 
commitment to strengthening their regional cooperation in marine scientific 
research and the protection of the marine environment within the existing 
operating system.176 As mentioned previously, the declaration also states that 
there is no need for the development of an overarching Arctic-specific 
convention for the Arctic Ocean.177 Coastal states declared that they will 
remain committed to the LOSC, which provides a ‘solid foundation for 
responsible management’ and to the ‘orderly settlement of any possible 
overlapping claims’178 while also continuing to contribute actively to the work 
of the Arctic Council and other international fora.179 This declaration and its 
follow up meeting provide a clear indication that confidence exists with 
respect to states’ rights being upheld alongside cooperative principles. By also 
affirming that there is no need to develop a new comprehensive international 
legal regime for governing the Arctic Ocean, these states also acknowledge 
that the LOSC is a sufficient framework to enable coastal state jurisdiction to 
extend to the outer limits of the continental shelf while still providing the 
means to implement regional cooperation. As discussed previously, through 
this declaration, actors have demonstrated acceptability of the existing system 
and a willingness to maintain it.  
 
Conclusion 
An evaluation of the 2001 Russian submission and activities of the Arctic 
coastal states concerning the scientific research and boundary delimitations 
demonstrates that the Russian Federation has not overstepped rights under 
LOSC, nor have they created prejudice against the rights of other states in 
their submission. Each state has protected its interests by neither protesting 
                                                
176 Supra n. 167. Also discussed in supra n. 61, Gόrski, at 52. 
177 Supra n. 167, Ilulissat Declaration. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
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outright to a submission nor acquiescing in its content and result. Throughout 
the process the rights of other Arctic states have been upheld. This includes 
the rights and obligations of all the Arctic states to endeavour to cooperate. 
The delimitation process does not prevent or necessarily disrupt the ability of 
states to continue to endeavour to cooperate, satisfying their responsibilities 
under LOSC, AEPS and the Arctic Council. Given the harsh conditions in the 
Arctic, regional collaborative scientific research has even increased. The 
Arctic states have also been attuned to geological, political and legal issues 
relating to the LOSC provisions. The Arctic coastal states have collaborated in 
scientific research concerning the continental shelves in the Arctic and have 
declared, together, their interest in maintaining and working within the current 
Arctic operating system.  
 
Throughout the process of establishing the outer limits of the continental 
shelf, states retain their rights to negotiate maritime boundaries, enter into 
provisional arrangements, engage in collaborative scientific efforts, and to act 
in accordance with other provisions of the LOSC and the Arctic operating 
system. No one interpretation or application of the sources of law within the 
system has to be authoritative, providing recognition and acceptance of 
divergent views co-existing within an operating system without undermining 
the system. The ability to reconcile unilateral interests and rights associated 
with the entitlement and delimitation of the outer continental shelves 
alongside responsibilities towards regional cooperation and the peaceful 
resolution of boundary issues contribute to the understanding of the Arctic 
operating system.  
 
Through a lack of protest or acquiescence in the legal interpretation of the 
LOSC provisions, their collaborative scientific research and their declaration 
of commitment to the existing operating system, states have demonstrated 
participant confidence in the Arctic operating system. The operating system 
has provided a framework from which the formalization of rights under state 
authority can co-exist with regional governance in the absence of prejudice. 
The ability to carry out this formalization process in the absence of prejudice 
lends support to the robust nature of the Arctic operating system. 
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4.5 The Australian submission 
Australia has two external territories in the Southern Ocean – the Territory of 
Heard and McDonald Islands (HIMI) and the Australian Antarctic Territory 
(AAT). In addition, Australia administers sub-Antarctic Macquarie Island as 
part of the State of Tasmania. Australia is an original signatory state to the 
Antarctic Treaty and has the largest of the territorial claims in Antarctica. The 
AAT encompasses around 6.1 million km2 between 44˚E and 160˚E (except 
for the wedge of Adélie Land between 136˚E and 142˚E), amounting to 
roughly 42% of the Antarctic landmass.180 The AAT includes the ice shelves, 
and thus the outer edge of the ice shelves may form part of the territorial sea 
baseline.181 
 
At ATCM XXVII in 2004, there was considerable attention raised, informally, 
concerning Australia’s anticipated continental shelf submission prepared 
according to Article 76 of LOSC and whether or not it would include an 
Antarctic component.182 Potentially included within the Australian submission 
to the CLCS, among other areas, was the continental shelf off the AAT, 
having been included in the continental shelf claim made by Australia in 
1953.183 Concern arose as to whether delimitation and proclamation of a 
continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic was indeed a contradiction to 
the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, specifically Article IV.184 As mentioned, 
Article IV is the foundation of the Antarctic Treaty, setting aside disputes over 
sovereignty by enabling original territorial claims to exist while also 
permitting states to not recognize any of the claims.185 Claimant states can 
                                                
180 Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act 1933, Cth. 
181 Kaye remarks that, in general, using the edge of ice shelves for setting the territorial 
baseline would seem to be consistent with the LOSC. There is nothing in the LOSC which is 
inconsistent with this practice; however, the issue has not been completely resolved. See 
general discussion in Stuart B. Kaye, ‘Territorial Sea Baselines along Ice-Covered Coasts: 
International Practice and Limits of the Law of the Sea’ (2004) 35(1) Ocean Development and 
International Law 75-102 and specifically, at 93.  
182 Andrew Jackson, former Principal Policy Advisor, Australian Antarctic Division (retired 
February 2009), Personal Communication (14 May 2008). 
183 J.R.V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, Methuen & Co. Ltd 
(1985). 
184 Alex G. Oude Elferink, 'The Continental Shelf of Antarctica: Implications of the 
Requirement to Make a Submission to the CLCS under Article 76 of the LOS Convention' 
(2002) 17(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 485, at 498. 
185 Article IV reads: ‘1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
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maintain their view of sovereignty and sovereign rights while others can retain 
a differing view. This can continues as long as no express proclamation is 
required.186 Parties to the Treaty can remain active in the Antarctic and assert 
their own position with respect to territorial claims without derogating from 
other states’ rights under the Treaty. Article IV also specifies that a state 
cannot enlarge their claim or make new claims.187 In this regard, a continental 
shelf submission off the Antarctic continent might be interpreted as an 
assertion of territorial sovereignty and/or an enlargement of a claim.188 
Furthermore, any continental shelf that extends into the area below 60˚S could 
be interpreted as a new claim or an enlargement of an existing claim being 
asserted in the Antarctic Treaty Area (60˚S).  
 
However, the 1969 ICJ Judgment on the North Sea Case confirmed that the 
rights of a coastal state to a continental shelf, one which constitutes a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, ‘exist ipsi facto and 
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land’.189 A continental shelf was 
understood as an express right and its delimitation extends from the land 
territory. In this context, no prior or further legal action, such as effective 
occupation, is required of a state to exercise its rights in the delimitation of the 
continental shelf or to exert legal title over resources of the marine area. 
Written into the LOSC were explicit terms to this effect. Article 77(3) states 
                                                                                                                          
a. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or 
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
b. a renunciation or diminution of by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition of any other State’s right of or claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis 
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. No new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force.’    
186 Davor Vidas, 'The Antarctic Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Miles: A Juridical Rubik's 
Cube' in Davor Vidas (ed), Implementing the Environmental Protection Regime for the 
Antarctic, Kluwer Academic Publishers (2000) 261, at 266. 
187 Article IV(2), Antarctic Treaty.  
188 See, among others, Marie Jacobsson, 'The Antarctic Treaty System: Legal and 
Environmental Issues - Future Challenges for the Antarctic Treaty System' in Gillian Triggs 
and Anna Riddell (eds), Antarctica: Legal and Environmental Challenges for the Future, 
British Institute of International and Comparative Law (2007) 1, at 5. 
189 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgement of 20 February 1969, International Court of 
Justice Reports 1969. 
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that ‘the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not depend on 
occupation, effective or nominal, or on any express proclamation’. The 
continental shelf is an area where exclusive rights may be exercised, but the 
shelf itself is not sovereign territory. Therefore, based on Australia’s territorial 
claim in Antarctica, whether recognized or not, Australia has an express right 
to a continental shelf off its territorial land mass. The location of such 
landmass, inside or outside the terms of a treaty, is irrelevant to this customary 
principle.  
 
For Australia’s recognized sub-Antarctic territory, HIMI, as well as for 
Macquarie Island, a critical distinction can be made between the continental 
shelf, and the territory from which the continental shelf is generated. The 
corresponding landmasses are situated north of the Antarctic Treaty boundary 
(60˚S) and there is no valid argument to limiting the continental shelf to the 
boundary of the Antarctic Treaty. The proclamation of these shelves does not 
enlarge the land territory claimed by Australia within the Antarctic Treaty 
Area. Similarly, the continental shelf extending from the AAT is an express 
right and would not increase the land territory claimed by Australia. However, 
the status of this territory in terms of recognition creates a unique situation for 
states. 
 
In examining submissions, the CLCS has an explicit duty to avoid prejudice in 
any matter.190 Accordingly, the CLCS shall be informed of disputes and will 
not examine area related to a dispute, acknowledging that the responsibility 
for delimitation of boundaries and resolution of disputes rests with the state.191 
While claims to Antarctic territorial sovereignty are not universally accepted 
neither are they necessarily disputed. No special process has been established 
within the CLCS for dealing with Antarctic submissions. Diplomatic and 
political channels were therefore engaged between the relevant Antarctic 
states to resolve the handling of submissions. 192  
                                                
190 Paragraph 2(b), Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. 
191 Dispute occurs when an asserted right, claim, or demand by one state is met by asserted 
contrary claims or allegations. With respect to resolution of the disputes and CLCS 
responsibility, refer to Paragraph 2, Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. 
192 Supra n. 182. 
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Australia submitted its data with respect to all of its areas of extended 
continental shelf on the 15 November 2004,193 one day short of the ten year 
deadline after its ratification of the LOSC.194 The submission included the 
data for the continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic. Recognizing, 
however, the sensitive balance of perceptions within the ATS, in an act 
described by Jabour as a ‘masterstroke of high latitude diplomacy’,195 
Australia attached a Diplomatic Note with its submission requesting that the 
area appurtenant to the coast of Antarctica not be considered by the 
Commission for the time being.196  This approach took advantage of the fact 
there is no positive obligation on the CLCS to consider data submitted to it – 
the submitting state is at liberty to request the CLCS to defer consideration 
and the CLCS is at liberty to accede to the request. 
 
In response to Australia’s submission seven Diplomatic Notes by states party 
to the Antarctic Treaty were lodged with the CLCS.197 The remarkably similar 
phrasing of the notes, referring to the obligations under the Antarctic Treaty 
suggests, as Oude Elferink and Johnson remark, that, indeed, prior discussion 
relating to the submission occurred and that agreement was reached on how to 
proceed prior to Australia’s submission.198 The exception in similarity was the 
Note Verbale submitted by The Netherlands, which refers to an ‘unresolved 
                                                
193 Continental Shelf Submission of Australia, Executive Summary (15 November 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_file/submissions_aus.htm> at 23 
January 2009. 
194 Article 4 of Annex II, LOSC establishes the ten year deadline. See supra n. 21 and 
discussion around n. 44 and 45. 
195 Julia Jabour, 'High Latitude Diplomacy: Australia's Antarctic Extended Continental Shelf' 
(2006) 30 Marine Policy 197, at 198. 
196 Permanent Mission of Australia to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
Diplomatic Note 89/2004 accompanying the lodgement of Australia's submission to the CLCS 
(15 November 2004) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/Documents/aus_doc_es_atta
chment.pdf> at 31 July 2007. See ibid for further discussion. 
197 Notes Verbales received from the US, Russian Federation, Japan, France, The Netherlands, 
Germany and India at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_aus.htm> at 24 June 
2007. 
198 Supra n. 38, at 487. 
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land dispute in relation to Australia’s claim to territory in Antarctica’.199 The 
use of the word ‘dispute’ in the Netherland’s Note Verbale was not consistent 
with Australia’s interpretation of the terms of Article IV. Though there were 
no legal consequences associated with this Note, the deviation from what 
might be considered a template response did create diplomatic redress for The 
Netherlands within the ATS.200  
 
Given the dialogue that transpired between the relevant Antarctic states on the 
issue of the submission of Antarctic data, it is reasonable to conclude that not 
only the submission options, but the diplomatic responses, were, if not 
rehearsed, at least cast in terms that would generate no surprises.201 Jacobsson 
confirms that consultations had been made between claimant states and also 
among the claimants and the two potential claimants (the Russian Federation 
and the US) but that these consultations excluded any other states.202 The 
issue was canvassed as the Antarctic Treaty Parties were gathered at the Cape 
Town ATCM held between 24 May and 04 June, and exercised the minds of 
several delegations, yet the issue was not on the formal Meeting agenda.203 
Accordingly, due to the informal nature of the discussions amongst states, 
reference to the May 2004 notification or the consultations is not recorded in 
the Final Report of ATCM XXVII. In Jacobsson’s case, reference is given to 
the Swedish Ministerial Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.204  
 
Various scenarios were discussed and options identified amongst key players 
that would acceptably protect the interests of states, including those possibly 
immediately impacted by a submission.205 To date, lodged submissions by the 
claimant states reflect the outcome of those discussions. Two options had 
been identified as viable; (1) to include relevant data with an attached caveat 
                                                
199 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of The Netherlands to the United Nations, Diplomatic 
Note (2005) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_aus.htm> 
at 23 June 2007. 
200 The deviation was informally discussed between states and with The Netherlands. Supra n. 
182. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Supra n. 187, at 6. 
203 Accordingly, not every state engaged in the discussions. For example, non-claimant states, 
such as The Netherlands, were not directly involved. Supra n. 182. 
204 Supra n. 187, at 6 and fn 11. 
205 Ibid. 
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(that is, to request the Commission not assess the data); or (2) lodge a partial 
submission, not containing Antarctic data (but reserve the right to submit 
Antarctic data in the future).206  
 
The ability to make a partial submission is not explicitly written into the 
provisions of LOSC. This ability was originally granted by the Commission 
through the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. Paragraph 3 of Annex I of the 
Rules and Procedures of the Commission states that a submission may be 
made on a portion of a continental shelf in order to not prejudice the question 
of the delimitation of boundaries between states.207 States Parties also 
addressed this issue in SPLOS/183,208 validating the use of Preliminary 
Information submitted to the CLCS as a satisfactory means of fulfilling the 
ten year deadline, pending full submissions. The Preliminary Information 
must contain a description of the intended outer limits of the continental shelf, 
the status of preparation and intended date of submission.209 
 
From the first submission by Russia in 2001 to those of New Zealand, 
Norway, France and the UK, a number of states have chosen to make partial 
submissions. These have received no objections, thus providing validity to 
this method of submitting. Along with the legitimacy accorded state practice 
by SPLOS/183,210 it is unlikely that any diminution of the states’ rights under 
LOSC to complete the extent of its continental shelf limits in the future will 
arise. Nonetheless, for the Antarctic states, a partial submission might imply 
that the state recognizes a ‘dispute’ exists between states concerning boundary 
delimitation. A ‘dispute’ might accurately describe the case of overlapping 
claims in the Antarctic Peninsula whereas Australia, Norway, France and New 
Zealand do not consider that any dispute exists surrounding their respective 
claims. Along this principle Australia chose to immediately include all of its 
data using the first of the two approaches. New Zealand, France, and Norway, 
claimant states who are also unlikely to consider their claim ‘disputed’, chose 
                                                
206 Ibid. 
207 Paragraph 3 of Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS. 
208 Supra n. 21, SPLOS/183. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
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to omit Antarctic data, safeguarding their ability to make a future submission. 
Norway then completed its full submission by including the Antarctic region 
in a second submission made three years later. The states with claims to the 
Antarctic Peninsula: Argentina, the UK and Chile, varied in their approaches. 
Argentina made a full submission, the UK a partial submission and Chile has 
yet to indicate which option it will pursue. The use of Notes Verbales and 
nuanced text was essential to protecting the right to make future submissions. 
The overall effect of these statements, whether separate or integrated within a 
submission, may not be realized immediately. 
 
Other Antarctic claimant states 
New Zealand was the second ATCP to make a submission to the CLCS but 
chose to make a partial submission. Accompanying this submission was a 
Note Verbale protecting New Zealand’s position with respect to the Antarctic. 
211 By not including the continental shelf appurtenant to its claim in the 
Antarctic, the Ross Dependency, New Zealand maintains the ability to make a 
submission for this area in the future. Following the submission comments 
were made by Japan and The Netherlands remarking on their non-recognition 
of the territorial claims to the Antarctic and subsequent continental shelf 
claims.212 No other comments were made in this regard; however, after a 
future submission comments may once again be presented.  
Norway made a partial submission for its northern area in 2006.213 Norway 
chose to protect its interests regarding future submissions through its 
Executive Summary, rather than an attached Note Verbale. The Executive 
                                                
211 A list of the submissions is available from the CLCS website available from 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm> at 15 June 2010. Refer to Permanent 
Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations, Note Verbale (19 April 2006) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_doc_es_attachment.pdf> 
at 03 March 2009 for the attached Note Verbale. 
212 Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note No. SC/06/459 (28 
June 2006) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/japan_e.pdf> at 
23 May 2008; Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Diplomatic Note (19 
December 2006) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/clcs_07_2006_nld.pdf> at 
23 May 2008. 
213 Supra n. 126, Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic 
Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea. 
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Summary indicates that the present submission deals only with the areas in 
respect of the Arctic Ocean, Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea and that a further 
submission from Norway may be made in respect of other areas.214 No direct 
mention was made of continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic or to the 
ATS.  
 
Norway completed its submission to the CLCS with a second partial 
submission on 04 May 2009. This submission included full details related to 
the Norwegian Antarctic Claim concerning Dronning Maud Land as well as a 
sub-Antarctic island, Bouvetøya.215 At this time, Norway enclosed a Note 
Verbale indicating that Norway has proceeded under the first of two choices 
available to the Antarctic claimants, providing a full submission and 
requesting that the CLCS not examine the details relating to Dronning Maud 
Land.216 In total, five Notes Verbales were lodged in response, acknowledging 
and supporting Norway’s approach.217 Even though The Netherlands once 
again chose to refer to an ‘unresolved land dispute’ regarding Norway’s 
                                                
214 Ibid., at 6. 
215 Continental Shelf Submission of Norway in respect of Bouvetøya and Dronning Maud 
Land, Executive Summary (04 May 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor_30_2009.htm> at 
05 May 2009. Note that Bouvetøya Island is located north of the Antarctic Treaty Area at 
54˚S. 
216 Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note (04 May 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_nor_30_2009.htm> at 
05 May 2009. 
217 Notes Verbales were lodged in subsequent order by the US, the Russian Federation, India, 
The Netherlands and Japan. See Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the 
United Nations, Diplomatic Note (04 June 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor30_09/usa_re_nor_2009.pdf> 
at 01 September 2009; Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, 
Note No. 1682 (15 June 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor30_09/rus_15jun09_e.pdf> at 
01 September 2009; Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note No. 
NY/PM/443/1/2009 (31 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/ind_re_arg_2009.pdf> at 
16 April 2010; Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Diplomatic Note No. 
NYV/2009/2458 (30 September 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor30_09/nld_re_nor_2009.pdf> 
at 16 April 2010 and Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note No. 
SC/09/389 (19 November 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nor30_09/jpn_19nov2009.pdf> at 
16 April 2010. 
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claim, it also acknowledged ‘with appreciation’ Norway’s request that the 
CLCS take no action.218 
 
In a press announcement released 14 November 2007, the UK had 
foreshadowed its support for the rehearsed options available to claimant 
states. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office clarified that in submitting by 
2009, the UK will ‘follow one of the approaches already adopted by other 
Antarctic claimant states (Australia in 2004 or New Zealand in 2006). We 
expect that all other Antarctic claimant states will do likewise.’219 This was in 
response to media speculation concerning UK claims to the Antarctic 
Peninsula which provoked responses by Argentina and Chile.220 On 09 May 
2008, the UK followed through with its commitment by lodging a partial 
submission in relation to Ascension Island, one of its external territories in the 
South Atlantic. Attached to this submission was a diplomatic note indicating 
that with respect to the continental shelf appurtenant to its territorial claim in 
Antarctica, the data would not be submitted but that a submission may be 
made in the future.221 Accordingly, the UK had adopted the second of the two 
approaches identified for the Antarctic continental shelf. Following the press 
announcement, this Note Verbale also represents the first official admission 
that two options were identified by concerned states.  
 
                                                
218 Ibid., The Netherlands Note Verbale. 
219 Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, The Continental Shelf and the 
UN Process (14 November 2007) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/newsroom/latest-
news/?view=News&id=1534629> at 06 May 2008. 
220 Owen Bowcott, Britain to Claim over 1 Million Square km of Antarctica (17 October 
2007) The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2007/oct/17/antarctica.sciencenews> 
at 06 May 2008; Owen Bowcott, Argentina Ready to Challenge Britain's Antarctic Claims 
(19 October 2007) The Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/oct/19/climatechange.fossilfuels> at 06 May 
2008; and Chilean Foreign Ministry, Declaracion del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (in 
Spanish) (19 October 2007) <http://www.minrel.gov.cl/webMinRel/home.do?sitio=1> at 06 
May 2008. See also Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber, 'Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of 
Polar Sovereignty?' (2008) 17(1) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (RECIEL) 27, at 39 and fn 145.  
221 Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
United Nations, Diplomatic Note 168/08 (2008) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr08/gbr_nv_9may2008.pdf> at 
13 May 2008. 
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Having been involved in a joint submission in 2006 concerning the Bay of 
Biscay and having lodged a partial submission in 2007 regarding French 
Guiana and New Caledonia,222 France followed a similar approach as the UK 
and New Zealand in its second partial submission concerning French Antilles 
and Kerguelen Islands in 2009.223 A Note Verbale was attached to this 
submission reiterating that concerned States have two options in relation to 
the Antarctic.224 France notified the UN in this Note Verbale that France 
‘makes a partial submission which does not include the areas of the 
continental shelf that adjoin Antarctica and for which a submission may later 
be made’.225 France’s submission received two responses, from The 
Netherlands and Japan. These non-claimant states again reiterated their non-
recognition of claims and that any intention to submit data should not in any 
way affect the balance of rights and obligations under the Antarctic Treaty.226 
The Notes effectively extended these comments across any partial 
submissions and future intentions. 
 
Argentina, on 21 April 2009, made a full submission to the CLCS including 
the disputed Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), South Georgia Island 
(Georgias del Sur) and the South Sandwich Islands (Sandwich del Sur) as well 
                                                
222 Refer to the list of submissions available on the DOALOS website, 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm> at 15 June 2010. 
223 The French Continental Shelf: Partial Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea in respect of areas of the French Antilles and the Kerguelen Islands, 
Executive Summary (05 February 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra09/fra_executivesummary_2009
.pdf> at 15 June 2010. 
224 Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, Note Verbale (05 February 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra09/fra_note_feb2009e.pdf> at 
03 March 2009. 
225 Ibid. 
226 There was no mention of ‘unresolved land disputes’ from The Netherlands. Instead, The 
Netherlands and France used the Notes Verbales to extend their non-recognition of claims and 
appreciation that the balance of rights and obligations in the Antarctic Treaty should not be 
affected by the intention to submit data of any state to submit data. See Permanent Mission of 
the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Diplomatic Note No. NYV/2009/2184 (28 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr08/nld_re_nv_grb2009.pdf> at 
16 April 2010 and Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note No. 
SC/09/391 (19 November 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/fra09/jpn_re_nv_fra19112009.pdf
> at 16 April 2010.  
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as the Argentine Antarctic Territory.227 In the submission Argentina 
acknowledged that there is an area subject to Article 46 of the Rules of 
Procedure regarding disputes, relaying information on the Islas Malvinas, 
Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur. For these areas, Argentina has 
reiterated that it does not recognize an entitlement or exercise of any maritime 
jurisdiction right by any other state, community, or entity intending to build 
an interpretation of prior UN Resolutions which aimed at the peaceful 
settlement of sovereignty through bilateral negotiations.228 Without the 
consent of Argentina, any action would be considered ‘null and void’.229 In 
the submission there is no mention of the Antarctic Treaty or the overlapping 
claims and maritime zones between the UK, Argentina and Chile in the 
Antarctic Peninsula. In light of the overlapping claims, the CLCS will not be 
able to examine information regarding the continental shelf appurtenant to the 
Antarctic Peninsula. Thus, in contrast to the Australia’s and Norway’s 
situation, a diplomatic note with an explicit request that the CLCS not 
examine this area was not necessary to obtain such a result.  
 
In the interests of diplomatic relations within the ATS, however, Argentina 
did include a Note Verbale to the CLCS.230 The diplomatic note to Secretary-
General reiterated an awareness of the circumstances of the area south of 60˚S 
and the ‘special legal and political status of Antarctica under the provisions of 
the Antarctic Treaty, including its Article IV, and the Rules and Procedures of 
the Commission’.231 Although different from the approach taken by Australia, 
                                                
227 The LOSC entered into force for Argentina 01 December 1995. Accordingly, by 
submitting on 21 April 2009 Argentina satisfied the 13 May 2009 submission deadline. The 
Executive Summary and attached Notes Verbales are available on the DOALOS website. 
Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf Argentine Submission, Executive Summary (21 April 
2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/arg2009e_summary_eng
.pdf> at 23 April 2009. 
228 Ibid., at 9. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note N.U. 
139/2009/600 (21 April 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/arg_nota_2009esp.pdf> 
at 25 April 2009. 
231 Ibid. 
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the first of the two options discussed by the ATCPs was invoked (although not 
explicitly).  
 
Chile, another state with overlapping claims with Argentina and the UK to the 
Antarctic Peninsula, made a submission to the CLCS with ‘Continental Shelf 
Preliminary Information’ on 08 May 2009.232 According to SPLOS/183 of 21 
June 2008, states are able to satisfy the ten year deadline by providing 
Preliminary Information indicative of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
including a description of the status of preparation and intended date of 
making a submission to the CLCS. Chile’s Preliminary Information includes a 
description of the seabed located in the Western Antarctic from 60˚ to 130˚ W 
and 45˚ to 70˚S, the Chilean Antarctic Territory. Within the text of the 
Preliminary Information and an attached Note Verbale233 Chile reiterates the 
two options open to concerned states, without disclosing Chile’s position on 
the matter. Chile states that ‘the Commission will be duly informed on the 
option to be taken by Chile regarding the Chilean Antarctic Territory,’ 
indicating that it is likely to follow one of the two options but fails at this time 
to commit to either. Due to the nature of the Preliminary Information, no 
responses have been lodged and the UN has not received any communication 
in this regard.  
 
On 11 May 2009, the UK lodged another submission in respect of the 
Falkland Islands, and of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.234 In 
                                                
232 Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf and 
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ormation.pdf> at 01 June 2009. 
233 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Diplomatic Note (07 May 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/chl2009note_e.pdf> at 
16 April 2010. 
234 Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 
76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 in respect of 
the Falkland Islands, and of South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands (11 May 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr45_09/gbr2009fgs_executive%
20summary.pdf> at 12 May 2009. 
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the submission the UK informs the CLCS that the ‘subject of this partial 
submission is also the subject of a submission by Argentina’, affirming the 
existing dispute.235 The Executive Summary also acknowledges that the 
‘United Kingdom has no doubt about its sovereignty’ over these islands and 
maritime areas.236 In both the UK and Argentine submissions, the continental 
shelf arising from the South Sandwich Islands extends into the Antarctic 
Treaty Area.237 Although similar to the extension off HIMI and Macquarie 
Island, in light of the dispute over the sovereignty of the islands, the CLCS is 
not be able to make recommendations for the Argentine or UK submission 
without the consent of each state. Concomitant responsibilities under the 
Antarctic Treaty and LOSC will continue to co-exist without proclamation or 
assertion of jurisdiction over this region.238  
 
After the 13 May 2009 deadline for submissions, responses to the submissions 
continued to be lodged. For example, the UK, US, Russian Federation, India, 
Japan and The Netherlands lodged Notes Verbales concerning the submission 
by Argentina.239 Argentina also lodged a communication with the UN in 
response to the UK submission of 11 May 2009, concerning the Falkland 
Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. With regard to the 
Argentine submission, the Notes Verbales provide further insight to the 
approach of the ATCPs. With respect to the ongoing dispute between the UK 
and Argentina, the UK requested the CLCS not examine those parts of the 
Argentine submission that related to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and 
the South Sandwich Islands. As mentioned, Argentina had not explicitly 
                                                
235 Ibid., at 3. 
236 Ibid. 
237 In the UK submission, Fixed Point 494 is the furthest south at 63˚44’S. See ibid., at 29. 
See supra n. 227, at 22 (Figure 6) in the submission by Argentina which shows points 4227-
4398 extending off the South Sandwich Islands. 
238 In December of 2009, Argentina passed legislation defining the boundaries of the Islas 
Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur as well as the Argentine Antarctic 
Territory. It is reported that the UK Foreign Office has issued a statement rejecting any 
recognition of the Argentine legislation. See Reuters, UK Protests Over Argentine Law 
Claiming Falklands (18 January 2010) The New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/01/18/world/international-uk-britain-argentina.html> 
at 19 January 2010. 
239 These Notes are posted with the submission by Argentina on the DOALOS website. Supra 
n. 227.  
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requested the CLCS not examine the information related to the continental 
shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic. Thus, the UK also took this opportunity to 
confirm through the CLCS and UN forum that the first approach of the two 
options taken by the Parties to the Antarctic Treaty applies. Having given 
mention of the two approaches and their legitimacy amongst the Antarctic 
Treaty Parties in a previous Note Verbale,240 the UK reiterated that these 
approaches were in place irrespective of the inexplicit wording of the 
Argentine submission or attached Note. The UK ‘expects’ that the CLCS will 
not, at this time, examine the portion of Argentina’s submission that relates to 
the continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic.241 The US, Russian 
Federation, India and Japan followed the UK Note with similar Notes that 
affirm their non-recognition of Argentina’s Antarctic claim and the 
‘expectation’242 or ‘understanding’243 that the CLCS would not examine those 
aspects of the Argentina submission. The Netherlands chose once again to 
describe an ‘unresolved land dispute’ and requested the CLCS act in 
accordance with Paragraph 5(a) or Annex I which prevents the examination 
on the basis of an existing dispute.244 In this case, as compared to Australia or 
Norway, The Netherlands may be more correct in characterizing this as a 
dispute. 
 
                                                
240 Refer to discussion around supra n. 219 and 221. 
241 Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
United Nations, Diplomatic Note 84/09 (06 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/clcs_45_2009_los_gbr.p
df> at 23 August 2009. 
242 Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, Note Verbale No. 
2282/N (24 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/rus_re_arg_2009e.pdf> 
at 07 September 2009; Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note 
No. NY/PM/443/1/2009 (31 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/ind_re_arg_2009.pdf> at 
16 April 2010. 
243 Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations, Diplomatic 
Note (19 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/usa_re_arg_2009.pdf> at 
23 August 2009; Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note No. 
SC/09/390 (19 November 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/jpn_re_arg_2009.pdf> at 
16 April 2010. 
244 Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, Diplomatic Note No. 
NYV/2009/2459 (30 September 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/nld_re_arg_2009.pdf> at 
16 April 2010. A similar request was lodged in the Notes regarding Australia’s 2004 
submission and Norway’s 2009 submission. See supra n. 199 and 217. 
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Argentina’s communication with the UN regarding the UK submission related 
to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands 
‘categorically rejects’ the UK submission and any attempt to propose 
maritime delimitation exists or is pending.245 Argentina ‘rejects each and 
every one of the limits that the United Kingdom attempted to trace or 
insinuate in its submission’.246 Argentina also took the opportunity in this 
communication to express its opinion that the islands are being ‘illegally 
occupied’ by the UK and are the ‘subject of a sovereignty 
dispute…recognized in declarations in the UN and other international forums 
and organizations’.247  
 
The end result of these communications and submissions keeps the 
delimitation of the outer limits of these continental shelves at a standstill. The 
process has, however, provided another venue to air respective positions. 
These positions, though categorically divergent, have not affected the 
outcome for the Antarctic continent. The issues, though close in physical 
proximity remain separated by the commitments in the Antarctic Treaty. 
Similarly, although there was indication of political discourse (from Australia) 
occurring in the ATCM forum following the initial use of the term 
‘unresolved land dispute’, The Netherlands continued to use this expression in 
some of their Notes. This perspective may not be shared but has been voiced 
without significant disruption to the ATS. 
 
The existence of the Antarctic Treaty suggests a low probability for states to 
have the outer limits of their continental shelf off the Antarctic examined. 
Without the Antarctic Treaty, submissions made by the UK, Chile or 
Argentina would still have to follow the provisions established in the Rules 
and Procedures of the CLCS regarding disputes – at least for those parts of 
their territories which are directly overlapping (note that the UK and Chile 
have parts that are not subject to counter-claim). Hence, even without the 
                                                
245 Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note No. 
290/09/600 (20 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr45_09/arg_re_gbr_clcs_2009e.
pdf> at 16 April 2010. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
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presence of the Antarctic Treaty, it is impossible for the CLCS to validate all 
of the outer limits established for continental shelf claims in the Antarctic 
Peninsula region. The delimitation of the outer limit of continental shelf area 
extending into the Antarctic Treaty Area from South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands will be determined by the discourse between Argentina and 
the UK. While each state may decide to apply sovereign rights in these 
regions, their assertions will proceed unrecognized and the limits invalidated 
under international law. 
 
Aside from the obvious overlapping claims of Argentina, Chile and the UK, 
other areas within the Antarctic Treaty Area exist for which uncertainty 
concerning continental claims and rights over seabed resources will be 
complicated. For example, debate exists whether the unclaimed sector of 
Antarctica can generate maritime claims.248 Peter 1st Island, claimed by 
Norway, is situated off the unclaimed sector of Antarctica. As Oude Elferink 
points out, any continental shelf claim extending from this island would 
overlap with Chile’s claimed boundary as well as the unclaimed sector.249 In 
this case the ability of the CLCS to examine and provide recommendations 
concerning submission data which overlaps with the unclaimed sector is yet to 
be determined. 
 
By 13 May 2009, the Antarctic claimant states had indicated in one form or 
another, their preferred approach to the question of a continental shelf 
appurtenant to the Antarctic. The press release by the UK in 2007 was the first 
formal indication that options were previously discussed by concerned states 
and that an understanding existed between claimant states to act on either of 
two options. Following this announcement, within the text of Notes Verbales 
or, in Chile’s case, its Preliminary Information, the UK, France and Chile 
have openly reiterated this understanding on the two options for concerned 
states. So far there has not been any adverse reaction from either claimant or 
non-claimant states within the ATS or third party states to these two options. 
                                                
248 Discussed in Stuart B. Kaye and Donald R. Rothwell, 'Southern Ocean Boundaries and 
Maritime Claims: Another Antarctic Challenge for the Law of the Sea?' (2002) 33(3&4) 
Ocean Development & International Law 359, at 371-372. 
249 Supra n. 184, at 505. 
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With the exception of The Netherlands and Argentina, submissions and most 
of the Notes Verbales and communications have not strayed far from each 
other in terms of their structure and terminology. Responses to Argentina’s 
submission appear to also reaffirm that acceptance of the two approaches 
exists across all the Antarctic Treaty Parties, reigning in any interpretation 
that Argentina is trying to assert a position in contradiction to these agreed 
approaches. It is also notable that, aside from the clarification deemed 
necessary for Argentina’s submission, the pattern of responses seems to be 
confined to particular states. In response to full submissions, Notes were 
consistently lodged by the US, Russian Federation, India, The Netherlands 
and Japan. In response to partial submissions, only Japan and The Netherlands 
were consistent in their responses. The UK, France and Germany responded 
only to individual cases related to Argentina and Australia respectively. In 
essence, the number of responses has declined from the first submission by 
Australia and the responses have followed an identifiable pattern as more 
Antarctic claimants follow one of the two options. The effectiveness of the 
Australian approach – as the test case – gained recognition and, overall, the 
nuanced approach has become accepted through the international community.  
 
The examination of Australia’s submission 
Following the diplomatic note provided by Australia, the continental shelf 
appurtenant to the AAT was intentionally set aside from examination by the 
CLCS. While the AAT was not considered, the extended continental shelves 
for HIMI and Macquarie Island were not subject to the diplomatic note and 
accordingly, have been examined. HIMI and Macquarie Island are both 
situated north of the Antarctic Treaty Area and Australia’s sovereignty is 
recognized. For HIMI, the extended continental shelf consists mostly of the 
Kerguelen Plateau with associated features, such as the Elan Bank, Labuan 
Basin and William’s Ridge. In figures 8 and 9 of Australia’s Executive 
Summary, representing the Kerguelen Plateau, the HIMI continental shelf 
extends between roughly 50˚S and 64˚S, and encompasses an area of 1, 185 
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038 km2.250 This is seemingly incongruent with the small size of the islands 
which occupy an area of 372 km2 but nevertheless satisfies the CLCS criteria. 
Figure 8 shows the outer limit of the continental shelf meeting the Australian 
EEZ boundary, 200 NM from Antarctica (also shown in Figure 7 below). 
However, given that the Antarctic continental shelf was omitted from 
examination, the line demarcating the outer limits of the HIMI shelf follows 
the foot of slope around the southern tip of the Kerguelen Plateau, extending 
past the EEZ boundary to approximately 64˚S, and well inside the boundary 
of the Antarctic Treaty area at 60˚S (Figure 7). In fact, the maps suggest that 
the HIMI shelf is contiguous with the shelf extending from the Antarctic 
coast.  The legal and technical details, not included in the Executive 
Summary, included the more southerly points and it was on these 
measurements that the decisions of the Commission were based. 
 
For Macquarie Island, its extended continental shelf claim arises from the 
Macquarie Ridge upon which the island is located. The ridge extends both 
northeast and southwest past 60˚S and is oceanic in nature. Figures 12 and 13 
of Australia’s Executive Summary provides an appreciation of the Macquarie 
Ridge feature and the extended continental shelf claim that crosses just 
slightly into the Antarctic Treaty Area south of 60˚S (shown here in Figure 7 
below).251  
 
The examination of Australia’s extended continental shelf areas was 
extensive. Recommendations were finally adopted by the Commission 09 
April 2008 at CLCS/58252 and as of 03 October 2008 are publicly available 
from the DOALOS website.253 Of the 2.8 million square km of seabed that 
                                                
250 Supra n. 193, at figures 8 and 9. 
251 Ibid., figures 12 and 13. 
252 UN Document CLCS/58 of 25 April 2008, Statement by the Chairman of the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of work in the Commission 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/319/06/PDF/N0831906.pdf?OpenElement
> at 29 May 2008, at para 11. 
253 In accordance with Section V, para 11(3) of Annex III of the Rules and Procedures of the 
CLCS, the summaries of recommendations in regard to submissions are made publicly 
available. See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Summary of the 
Recommendations of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in Regard 
to the Submission made by Australia on 15 November 2004: Recommendations adopted by 
the CLCS on 09 April 2008 
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were originally inside the outer limits delimited by Australia in their 2004 
submission, the Commission has validated outer limits that will contain 2.5 
million square km of continental shelf beyond 200 NM over nine regions.254 A 
few areas required adjustment of the outer limits, including William’s Ridge 
on the Kerguelen Plateau.255 The southern ends of the Kerguelen Plateau, 
extending from HIMI to approximately 64˚S, however, as well as the 
Macquarie Ridge, also reaching across 60˚S (Figure 7), were accepted.256 
Accordingly, Australia will be able to proclaim outer limits through national 
procedures, in the Sea and Submerged Lands Act,257 in due time.258  
                                                                                                                          
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/aus04/aus_summary_of_recomme
ndations.pdf> at 15 April 2009. 
254 The Honourable Martin Ferguson AM MP Minister for Resources and Energy and 
Tourism, UN Confirms Australia's Rights over Extra 2.5 Million Square Kilometres of Seabed 
(21 April 2008) Australian Government 
<http://minister.ret.gov.au/TheHonMartinFergusonMP/Pages/UNCONFIRMSAUSTRALIA
%E2%80%99SRIGHTSOVEREXTRA.aspx> at 02 October 2009. 
255 See supra n. 253, at 11-15. 
256 Ibid., at 11-15 and 20-22. 
257 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, Cth.  
258 Proclamation is likely to occur around September of 2010. Bill Campbell QC, First 
Assistant Secretary, Office of International Law, Attorney General's Office of Australia, 
Personal Communication (05 June 2010).  
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Figure 7: The extent of Australia's continental shelf and the Antarctic Treaty boundary 
(60˚S).259 
 
 
                                                
259 Adapted from Geoscience Australia, Map of Australia's Marine Jurisdiction 
<http://www.ga.gov.au/oceans/mc_los_Map.jsp> at 02 December 2009. 
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Concern may exist over whether the recommendations made by the CLCS on 
the outer limits extending across the Antarctic Treaty boundary prejudice the 
position of any Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty as regards its 
recognition or non-recognition of any other state’s rights. Inclusion of the 
extended continental shelves originating from islands that are not disputed (ie, 
recognized to a state) and are located north of 60˚S has no effect on the 
territorial claims to the Antarctic or their assertion. Therefore, 
recommendations from the CLCS regarding the extended continental shelves 
appurtenant to HIMI and Macquarie Island also play no role in the assertion, 
recognition, support, or denial of territorial claims to the Antarctic. In any 
case, under Article IV(2) nothing shall prejudice the position of states in the 
recognition or non-recognition of the assertion of claims to the Antarctic. As 
well, a state does not have to support any proclamation made by another state 
on the basis of these recommendations, having avenues to protest, acquiesce 
or deny recognition of such claim under international law. The existence of 
the Antarctic Treaty and the CLCS process do not change those inherent 
rights.  
 
Given the unique position states have taken with respect to the Antarctic and 
the history of the ATS, if the CLCS examination had included the AAT, 
different concerns could have arisen. Inclusion of data pertaining to the 
continental shelf off the Antarctic continent for examination could be seen to 
constitute an assertion of a territorial claim to the Antarctic (or constitute an 
activity that supports a territorial claim to the Antarctic). Any submission 
requesting the examination of continental shelf appurtenant to Antarctica 
could have had the effect of opening a Pandora’s Box of territorial 
sovereignty, in which case the territorial claim might become actively 
disputed. CLCS recommendations in regard to the Antarctic, if able to be 
formulated without prejudice to other states,260 could also appear as 
legitimization of that claim for Australia by a body outside the ATS. The 
                                                
260 In accordance with Paragraph 5 of Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS, the 
Commission shall not consider and qualify a submission made by any state concerned in a 
dispute unless prior consent is given. As well, the submitting state shall assure the 
Commission that to the extent possible, the submission will not prejudice matters relating to 
boundary delimitation (Paragraph 2(b) of Annex I. See discussion around supra n. 13-15.  
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ATCPs have historically tried to prevent the involvement of external regimes 
such as the United Nations to avoid having the accommodations inherent to 
the Antarctic Treaty undermined by an external body.261 Therefore, regardless 
of the lack of affect the recommendations have on a state’s ability to proclaim 
outer limits or protest such limits, the exclusion of the Antarctic through a 
partial submission or the request to the Commission by a state to not examine 
the data supports the interests of all Contracting Parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
  
Proclamation 
Having received the recommendations from the CLCS, Australia is now in a 
position to consider its proclamation of the extended continental shelf areas. 
Australia must deposit data and charts describing the outer limits to the 
Secretary-General of the UN at which point they receive due publicity.262 
While any proclamation made will be final and binding and given permanence 
through Articles 76(8) and 76(9), it is recognized that any permanence exists 
only for that which is proclaimed and that any claim may still be successfully 
challenged (in which case the outer limit lines may be changed) even if based 
on the recommendations of the CLCS.263 As well, the final and binding and 
permanent nature of a continental shelf outer limit cannot be invoked against 
another state where the delimitation of the continental shelf is concerned.264 
Only following a reasonable time and in the absence of protest or registered 
objection could legal consequence for other states possibly be attached to 
these limits.265 Australia is under no obligation to include the full extent of the 
limits in any proclamations, nor is it limited to just one proclamation. 
Australia has yet to make a proclamation and has not indicated whether the 
area south of 60˚S will be included.266 
                                                
261 An example of this is evident in the history of the ‘Question of Antarctica’ which sought 
UN involvement in the governance of the Antarctic for the benefit of the Group of 77. This is 
discussed in Chapter 3 around n. 168. The UN Environment Program (UNEP) has ‘expert’ 
status at the ATCMs; however, it is not a decision-making body. 
262 Article 76(9), LOSC. 
263 Supra n. 26, ILA, Conclusion 13, at 18 and n. 35, at 315. 
264 Supra n. 38, at 464. 
265 Supra n. 35, at 316. 
266 Supra n. 258. 
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There is no time line associated with the recommendations of the Commission 
and the state’s proclamation of the outer limits of the extended continental 
shelf boundaries. In other words, Australia can make partial proclamations or 
a full proclamation at any time of its choosing without losing any affect the 
recommendations have on the extent of the possible proclamation. Australia is 
likely to consider the consequences of proclaiming outer limits of the nine 
regions to the full extent possible, cognisant of the possible responses of states 
and the bilateral and multi-lateral commitments that it upholds.  
 
In the Antarctic context, Australia has the ability to proclaim or declare outer 
limits of HIMI and Macquarie Island to their full extent without derogating 
from the rights of other states. The extended continental shelf of HIMI and 
Macquarie arise from islands north of the Treaty boundary. Therefore, the act 
of proclaiming this area cannot be viewed as supporting or denying claims to 
the Antarctic territory. A Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty may decide 
to protest the proclamation of the extended continental shelf limits that 
overlaps into the Antarctic Treaty Area; however, this doesn’t change the 
ability of Australia to make such proclamation. A non-Contracting Party to 
the Antarctic Treaty does not recognize the political boundary of the Antarctic 
Treaty and it would therefore be an unlikely basis for a protest. Nonetheless, 
in terms of resource development, granting or denying another state access to 
the extended continental shelf area might appear as an assertion of Australia’s 
jurisdiction within the confines of the Antarctic Treaty Area.  
 
4.6 Discussion of Antarctic robustness and the Australian 
submission 
The lack of recognized sovereignty in the Antarctic prevents outright assertion 
of a continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic. Yet, responsibilities under 
the Antarctic Treaty do not diminish the rights under LOSC. A continental 
shelf is an inherent right. Within the Antarctic operating system, claimant 
 254 
states will wish to secure these rights while not challenging the balance of 
sovereignty interests in the Antarctic Treaty System.  
 
There is nothing to prevent a state, which believes in the validity of its own 
claim, from acquiring and compiling a submission for its claimed territory. 
This practice does not derogate from the rights of other states in not 
recognizing the claim from which the submission arises or prevent the 
operation of cooperative mechanisms within the ATS. The Antarctic claimant 
states need not renounce rights to a continental shelf in order to fulfil the 
terms of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. They must, however, be cognisant 
of the destabilizing effect of asserting or proclaiming a continental shelf 
appurtenant to the Antarctic continent and to the exercise of rights over 
continental shelf within the Antarctic Treaty Area. Furthermore, as a technical 
body it is not possible for the CLCS to provide legitimization of the Antarctic 
claims. Thus, as long as states are cognisant of the rights of other states within 
the Antarctic operating system and their inherent responsibilities, the 
continental shelf delimitation process can occur.267  
 
In the Antarctic, conflict was identified between the ability to assert a 
continental shelf and the balance achieved by Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Prior to the Australian submission, key Antarctic states (claimants, US 
and Russia) came together to examine the submission process and potential 
consequences. Out of interest in maintaining stability of the ATS, these 
primary actors took the opportunity to deliberate options, consequences and 
reactions to various methods of proceeding with continental shelf submissions 
while not assuming a disruptive authoritative presence in the Antarctic 
operating system. Two options were proposed for Antarctic claimant states. 
The approaches made use of Notes Verbales and the ability to make a partial 
submission. Notes Verbales have been an important means of diplomatic 
exchange throughout the submission process.  
 
                                                
267 See Mel Weber, 'Australia's Extended Continental Shelf Submission: States' Rights in the 
Context of Antarctic Regional Governance' (2008) 12(1) Antarctic and Southern Ocean Law 
and Policy Occasional Papers 1-32 for further discussion. 
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Two options provided flexibility in the approach to the issue of continental 
shelf area appurtenant to the Antarctic. The first option included data on the 
continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic continent in the submission 
accompanied by a diplomatic note. The diplomatic note was used to request 
that a submission not be examined and thus prevent the prejudice of rights of 
other states in their interpretation and application of Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty. The second option involved making a partial submission for 
continental shelf area outside of the Antarctic whilst protecting an ability to 
make a submission with respect to the Antarctic in the future. States protected 
their national interests through statements made within the Executive 
Summary or through separate Notes Verbales accompanying a partial 
submission. 
 
Australia, and more recently Argentina, chose the first option, while France, 
New Zealand, and the UK chose the second option. Norway used both 
options. Chile provided Preliminary Information indicating that a submission 
to be made within the next ten years would use one of the two available 
options. Following Australia’s submission, seven Antarctic-related Notes 
Verbales were submitted to the UN Secretary-General. Chile’s Preliminary 
Information received no responses. The submission by Argentina that strayed 
from the original structure of the first approach received six Notes in response. 
All of these responses reaffirmed the applicability of the first approach for this 
submission. By the end of all of the submissions a clear pattern of responses 
emerged.    
 
Considering that Australia was only the third state to make a submission (and 
the first of the Antarctic claimant states) and that the legitimacy of partial 
submissions had yet to develop, the first approach of a full submission with 
accompanying note protected Australia’s interest while upholding the rights of 
other states as well. The diplomatic note ensured that stability provided by 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty could be maintained and that the authority 
of the ATCPs would not be compromised by CLCS examination. Meanwhile 
Australia did not have to compromise entitlement rights to a continental shelf, 
upholding state authority as well within the operating system. This approach 
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was effective at accommodating different rights within the operating system 
in the absence of prejudice towards those rights. 
 
The second option also prevented prejudice of states rights under the Antarctic 
Treaty by simply not including any data on the continental shelf appurtenant 
to Antarctica. Under the concept of partial submissions, which has gained 
significant legitimacy through decisions of the States Parties and through state 
practice, the rights to a future submission regarding the Antarctic continental 
shelf are protected. The lack of inclusion of Antarctic data prevented 
misinterpretation of the states’ intent under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Statements reiterating the right to a future submission, included in separate 
diplomatic notes or the Executive Summary, protected claimant states 
interests and authority, and confirmed that partial submissions in no way 
indicate a renunciation of rights. 
 
In acquiring data for the Antarctic continental shelf, which is an expensive 
and difficult task, Australia demonstrated a lead role. A precedent for 
examining submerged features, such as the Kerguelen Plateau and associated 
ridges, was also established through the Australian submission and work done 
by the Australian delegation and the CLCS. The information available to 
states through the now publicly available recommendations has assisted with 
other submissions.268 The Australian submission resolved any uncertainty 
regarding examining continental shelf data that lies within the Antarctic 
Treaty Area but arose from sub-Antarctic islands. Finally, the Australian 
submission also showed that it was possible to collect data in ice-covered 
waters – thus resolving the option of giving special treatment to polar regions 
because of technical difficulty. 
 
Diplomatic exchange prior to the first submission by Australia as well as 
alongside the submissions played an important role in the formalization of 
rights to a continental shelf within the Antarctic operating system. Diplomatic 
exchange assisted in ensuring the non-prejudicial outcomes for all states 
                                                
268 For example, Riddell-Dixon, supra n. 146, at 351, refers to Canadian officials having 
benefited from consultation with Australia.  
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involved. While the necessity of diplomatic notes might indicate a lack of 
confidence in the existing system, the use of diplomacy, international 
relations, and Notes Verbales can be identified as a key component to 
maintaining stability within the system. The Notes Verbales or careful 
wording within the submissions has helped to clarify the intent of actions or 
assertions, protecting both national interest and regional governance. State 
authority was not compromised while cooperative authority of the ATCPs was 
not undermined.  
 
The international community was not immediately aware that a nuanced 
approach had been conceived prior to the Australian submission. However, 
subsequent submissions, whether full or partial, have provided evidence of 
this. The similarity in the phraseology of diplomatic notes, submissions and 
responses also indicates that the two options for submissions as well as the 
reactions to the submissions had been preconceived. Pre-emptive efforts in 
this process verify the desire of states to maintain the existing operating 
system, indicating confidence in the system. That a pre-emptive approach was 
necessary is also indicative of potentially less legitimacy surrounding the 
system and an acknowledgement of the risk of instability. Nonetheless, the 
continued use of similarly phrased Notes Verbales in response to the 
Australian submission and patterned use of Notes for later submissions 
indicates a commitment by the actors to work within the existing operating 
system. Acceptance emerged that this formula protects national interest as 
well as the stability of the ATS and operating system. While some states did 
stray somewhat from an agreed format, such as The Netherlands and 
Argentina, the divergence did not result in a prejudicial or compromising 
result; rights were upheld and the system was therefore able to absorb these 
discrepancies. The consistent pattern of responses and relative decrease in the 
number of Notes Verbales submitted to the UN Secretary-General in response 
to submissions (the Argentine submission notwithstanding) indicates 
acceptance and acquiescence of the process and has fostered legitimacy of the 
operating system.  
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In a similar manner, through acquiescence in the sub-Antarctic continental 
shelf submissions, further legitimacy has been identified for the Antarctic 
operating system. Land territories that lie outside the Antarctic Treaty Area 
are not subject to the terms of Article IV of the Treaty. In the absence of 
territorial disputes, such as in respect to HIMI and Macquarie Islands, 
submission, examination and recommendations for continental shelf area 
extending within the Antarctic Treaty Area can proceed without prejudice of 
states rights within the Antarctic operating system.269 Recommendations and 
ultimately proclamation of the outer limits of these continental shelf areas will 
not enlarge the Antarctic claimant territory, such as the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, and does not contradict terms of the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
At no time during the submission, examination or recommendation process 
for Australia, were diplomatic responses lodged with respect to the HIMI and 
Macquarie Island. The acquiescence in this aspect of the submission by other 
states acknowledges the understanding that the CLCS does not have the 
authority to deny these sovereign rights to a state even if exercised within the 
Antarctic Treaty Area. The lack of negative reaction lends confidence to the 
ability of states to exercise rights in the absence of prejudice alongside other 
obligations within the Antarctic operating system. Within the existing 
operating system, a state can uphold jurisdictional responsibilities under the 
Antarctic Treaty without dismissing rights under LOSC. Acceptability is 
gained through this bifocal approach and legitimacy is gained through 
acquiescence.  
 
Actors within the Antarctic operating system as well as states outside the 
Antarctic operating system have demonstrated acceptance of the bifocal 
approach wherein the formalization of inherent state rights can co-exist with 
the normative principles and binding obligations of the ATS. The bifocal 
approach is effective at protecting state authority alongside the authority 
granted through regional governance in the ATS. Greater legitimacy is 
                                                
269 Other sub-Antarctic islands, such as the South Sandwich Islands, will also provide similar 
circumstances however until the territorial disputes between Argentina and the UK with 
respect to these islands are settled, examination cannot proceed.  
 259 
afforded to the Antarctic operating system in this acceptance and participant 
confidence is evident. In creating and implementing two options for the 
submission process where clearly defined sovereignty does not exist, and 
demonstrating clear rights to entitlement over continental shelf area that 
extends within the Antarctic Treaty area, participant confidence within the 
operating system has correlated with the capacity of the operating system to 
absorb emerging issues without prejudice. Nonetheless, the administration of 
the sovereign rights associated to those outer continental shelf areas located 
south of 60˚S will need to be approached with an interest in honouring the 
binding obligations of the Antarctic Treaty as well as appreciating and 
protecting entitlement rights under LOSC. 
 
Conclusion 
In contrast to the Arctic, the lack of recognized sovereignty and terms of 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty prevent outright assertion of a continental 
shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic. As well, the CLCS cannot be placed in a 
position to support or deny a basis of claim in Antarctica. Thus, Antarctic 
claimant states worked within the Antarctic operating system to protect 
inherent rights to a continental shelf while not asserting or denying a basis to 
claim or enabling the CLCS to undermine their authority. Key Antarctic states 
used international relations and diplomacy to facilitate an understanding of the 
non-prejudicial nature of the actions of the individual states, while not 
assuming a disruptive authoritative presence in the Antarctic operating 
system. The nuanced approach provided two choices for submissions, neither 
of which asserted rights contrary to the ATS. The pre-emptive approach to the 
submission process demonstrated commitment by the actors to the Antarctic 
operating system, providing acceptability and legitimacy to the existing 
system. Throughout this process, national interest was protected alongside the 
principles inherent to the Antarctic operating system. Regional cooperative 
principles within the system can co-exist with the delimitation process, 
reiterating the versatility within the operating system. 
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In identifying two options for claimant states, the states of the Antarctic 
operating system have demonstrated their willingness and desire to work 
within the existing operating system. While speculation arose over the ability 
of the ATS to withstand the new challenges created by continental shelf 
claims in the Antarctic Treaty Area,270 thus far the Antarctic operating system 
has demonstrated resilience and accommodated the issues. Through the 
submission process claimant and non-claimant states have reiterated their 
commitment to the ATS, confirming state authority within the operating 
system can co-exist with regional governance. Non-claimants have 
acknowledged that the submission process, to date, has also not prejudiced 
their rights. The media’s misrepresentation of the events of the continental 
shelf submissions as ‘land-grabs’ in the Antarctic,271 appears not to have 
provoked reaction within the ATS. In the current resource setting, withdrawal 
from the Treaty may not be favourable. 
 
4.7 Chapter conclusion 
In summary, it is apparent that both the Arctic operating system and the 
Antarctic operating system provide for the ability to delimit continental shelf 
outer limits without creating prejudice towards other states’ rights or in the 
ability to recognize another state’s outer continental shelf limit. This 
entitlement process can coincide with regional cooperative principles without 
destabilizing the system through which cooperative initiatives are created and 
pursued. The ability to formalize rights, create non-prejudicial submissions, 
continue collaborative scientific research and support the cooperative 
frameworks integral to the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems contributes 
to the understanding of participant confidence and the operating system. 
                                                
270 See, among others, discussion in supra n. 184, at 498. 
271 See, among others, Jane Merrick, Scramble for Antarctica: Argentina Hits Back After 
Britain Makes Land Grab (18 October 2007) The Daily Mail 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=488025&in_p
age_id=1770&ito=1490> at 06 May 2008; The Times, A New Cold War? Antarctica Must be 
Protected from Any New Land Grab (13 November 2007) 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article2859366.ece> at 06 May 
2008; International Television News, Britain Joins Antarctic Land-Grab (17 October 2007) 
<http://itn.co.uk/news/721aa66bd0c78d909ba84e40fb183223.html> at 06 May 2008. 
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Chapter Five: Polar Offshore Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Development 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In terms of exploration and development of offshore oil and gas resources, 
both polar regions share remoteness, relative inaccessibility and closures of 
existing areas. The regions share physical similarities such as the presence of 
ice, cold temperatures and remoteness. Arctic offshore petroleum projects are 
often hampered by short summer seasons and physical challenges such as sea 
ice, iceberg drift, severe storm events with high wind speeds and frigid 
temperatures. There is no current industry activity in the Antarctic; however, 
these conditions would present similar obstacles to any future exploration and 
development. The Arctic and Antarctic differ in their geological histories, 
geomorphology, relative remoteness, ice regimes and governing systems. 
Significant variability also exists within these large regions. Homogeneity of 
potential across regions, or in the constraints of development, cannot be 
assumed. Thus, polar offshore development potential and accompanying 
regulatory issues provides an interesting case study for examining the robust 
nature of the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems. 
 
The process 
The process through which offshore oil and gas are discovered, extracted and 
transported can be applied to both polar regions. Offshore energy projects 
generally have four stages of development: exploration (which includes 
prospecting), development, production and decommissioning. These stages 
relate to oil, gas or condensate projects. Most offshore oil and gas 
development occurs on the continental shelf. The degree of development 
potential depends on physical characteristics of the shelf area and surrounding 
region. The development potential also varies across the regions and can be 
identified more clearly by examining variables such as the geological setting, 
the geographical setting and the physical environments. Development 
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potential reflects the relative severity of the environmental, technical and 
regulatory challenges faced in each region. Technological costs, remoteness, 
jurisdictional uncertainty and lack of regulatory controls for licensing and 
environmental considerations also present barriers to industry development.1   
 
Petroleum potential is based on the identification and examination of each 
geological basin, the seabed properties, geological history, sedimentation 
layers and availability of source rocks and trapping mechanisms. Sedimentary 
layers and reservoir traps are identified using seismic profiles2 along with 
geological maps and expertise during the prospecting phase. Prospecting 
involves trying to identify where exploratory wells should be targeted. In the 
exploration phase the quality of the resource, size of the reservoir and 
commercial value is identified. Drilling for an exploratory well can last 
anywhere from two weeks to three months depending on the drilling 
technology and conditions.3  
 
In the development phase, infrastructure is established to extract, store, 
process and transport the petroleum (oil, gas or condensate). Once 
infrastructure has been put in place, the ongoing operation of the facility is 
considered the production phase. During production, oil and gas is extracted, 
processed, stored and transported depending on the facility. Finally, once the 
reservoir is dry, or when it is no longer profitable to maintain, the project is 
decommissioned. 
  
History 
Onshore and offshore exploration in the Arctic began in the 1950s and 
increased into the 1970s and 1980s. Numerous significant discoveries were 
                                                
1 Christopher Harrison, 'Industry Perspectives on Barriers, Hurdles, and Irritants Preventing 
Development of Frontier Energy in Canada's Arctic Islands' (2006) 59(2) Arctic 238, at 242.  
2 Two dimension (2D) seismic profiles establish sediment thickness whereas three dimension 
(3D) seismic profiles can map a reservoir to greater detail and four dimension (4D) seismic 
profiles can monitor the fluid dynamics of the reservoir over time. Information available at 
<http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfm?Term=4D%20seismic%20data> at 16 
July 2010. 
3 Mark J. Kaiser and Allan G. Pulsipher, 'The Impact of Weather and Ocean Forecasting on 
Hydrocarbon Production and Pollution Management in the Gulf of Mexico' (2007) 35(2) 
Energy Policy 966, at 972. 
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made and corresponding development of Arctic technology increased. An 
economic recession in the 1980s curtailed Arctic activity but not before some 
of the infrastructure and technology had been established. Arctic exploration 
has remained on the portfolio of many oil and gas companies, while changes 
in government policy and international demand has either promoted or 
stymied development. Changing climatic conditions in the Arctic may 
increase the capacity for offshore development and transportation as sea ice 
conditions change around the northern coast of Russia and the Canadian 
Archipelago, potentially opening the NSR and the NWP.4 Accompanying this 
change is increased risk of environmental degradation from oil spills, vessel-
based pollution and noise pollution. Potential benefit may also result for 
northern communities. Involvement in projects may provide jobs, 
shareholding opportunities, economic benefits, and exposure for northern 
issues. 
 
In the Antarctic, actual petroleum resource potential is unknown. Scientific 
research has, however, been carried out that is relevant to the question of 
Antarctica’s resource potential. These include magnetic studies, drilling 
programs and multichannel seismic reflection surveys.5 A prohibition exists in 
the Antarctic Treaty Area, banning mineral resource activities other than 
scientific research for signatory states of the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic 
Treaty.6 States party to the Madrid Protocol are thus prohibited from 
implementing or encouraging mineral resource activity, although States are 
still able to develop a positive investment atmosphere for the future, if the 
prohibition were lifted.7 Prospecting in its early phases may be difficult to 
                                                
4 ACIA, 'Impacts of a Warming Arctic: Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Overview Report' 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapter six: Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase 
marine transport and access to resources, at 83. See also Ivana Kubat et al., 'Climate Change 
Impact on Canadian Northern Shipping Regulations' (2007) 44(4) Marine Technology 245, at 
245. 
5 For a review of related research conducted prior to 1991 see John C. Behrendt, 'Scientific 
Studies Relevant to the Question of Antarctic Petroleum Resource Potential' in Robert J. 
Tingey (ed), The Geology of Antarctica, Oxford University Press (1991) 588-617. 
6 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol), opened for 
signature 04 October 1991, 30 ILM 1455, entered into force 14 January 1998, Annex V 
entered into force 24 May 2002, Annex VI was adopted 14 June 2005. 
7 In recent times there have been indications from some of the non-claimant states, 
specifically Korea and the Russian Federation that scientific research along the avenue of 
prospecting was, if not occurring, at least potentially still on the radar. In 2001, a Working 
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distinguish from non-commercial scientific research and may or may not be 
directed towards exploration and development. Nonetheless, oil and gas 
companies have had little involvement in the Antarctic research that has been 
carried out thus far. Little incentive or certainty exists for industry in the 
current economic climate and political situation of the Antarctic. 
 
5.2 Physical characteristics and estimates relating to offshore 
resources 
Arctic 
The Arctic Ocean occupies around 12-14 million km2 and is for the most part 
land-locked by surrounding continents.8 It is a unique ocean in that such a 
large proportion (around two thirds) of it is underlain by continental shelves, 
49% of which are the wide, broad Euroasian shelves. Narrow, deeper and 
more irregular continental shelves fringe North America and Greenland 
margins.9 The extent of the continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean is a unique 
feature of this ocean. The deep Arctic Basin is divided into four major 
subbasins by three parallel submarine mountain ranges. The Euroasian and 
Amerasian subbasins are divided by the Lomonosov Ridge. The Lomonosov 
Ridge is a non-seismic mountain range extending 1800 km across the Arctic 
Ocean from Ellesmere Island, where it merges with the Alpha Rise, to the 
New Siberian Islands. The Euroasian Basin is further subdivided into the 
Nansen and Amundsen Basins by the Arctic Mid-Oceanic (Nansen-Gakkel) 
                                                                                                                          
Paper was submitted to the 24th ATCM by the Russian Federation outlining the Russian 
Antarctic Subprogram. The paper included reference to the ‘enormous resource potential’ of 
the Antarctic, the program objective to ‘assess the mineral-raw material resources’ and chart 
areas ‘most perspective [sic] for mineral resources’. The paper was raised in the ATCM and 
subsequently withdrawn. The reason for withdrawal was never formally indicated however 
there was some discussion on the translation of certain terms and the sensitive nature of these 
terms. See Russia, 'Working Paper (WP) 27: Russian Studies of the Antarctic 2000 under the 
Subprogram "Study and Research of the Antarctic"' (Paper presented at the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXIV - CEP IV, 09-20 July, St. Petersburg, 2001). 
Information also provided by Andrew Jackson, former principal policy Advisor, Australian 
Antarctic Division, Personal Communication (23 February 2009 and 25 January 2010) and 
meeting notes from ATCM XXIV, 09-20 July 2001.  
8 Yvonne Herman, 'Topography of the Arctic Ocean' in Yvonne Herman (ed), Marine 
Geology and Oceanography of the Arctic Seas, Springer-Verlag (1974) 73, at 73. 
9 G.L. Johnson, 'Morphology and Plate Tectonics: The Modern Polar Oceans' in Ulrich Bleil 
and Jorn Thiede (eds), Geological History of the Polar Oceans: Arctic vs Antarctic, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers (1988) 11, at 13. 
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Ridge. The Gakkel Ridge is an active spreading ridge similar to the Mid-
Atlantic Ridge. The Amerasian Basin is subdivided into the Makarov and 
Canada Basins by the Alpha and Mendeleev Ridges. Of the three, this ridge 
complex is the least understood. The most extensive abyssal plain in the 
Arctic is found in the Canada Basin, which has a relatively uniform depth of 
3800 m, sloping gently away from the Canadian continental shelf.10   
 
 
Figure 1: Arctic seabed11 
 
 
                                                
10 Supra n. 8, at 77. 
11 Adapted from Canadian American Strategic Review, Arctic Development (2007) 
<http://www.casr.ca/id-arctic-spring-2.htm> at 01 April 2010. 
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The shallow and wide continental shelves in the Arctic, often less than 100 m 
deep yet over 1500 km wide in some regions, favour oil and gas 
development.12 For example, the continental shelf under the Barents Sea 
covers approximately 1.3 million km2, is one of the largest continental shelves 
in the world, and is surrounded by a circumpolar chain of known petroleum 
basins.13  Other proven petroleum provinces include the North Sea/Mid-
Norwegian shelf, the Sverdrup Basin and the Mackenzie Delta of Arctic 
Canada, the North Slope of Alaska, the Western Siberian Basin and Timan-
Pechora Basin.14 Known oil and gas fields onshore already account for 240 
billion barrels of oil and oil equivalent natural gas, which is approximately 
10% of the world’s known conventional petroleum resources.15 A recent 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) circum-Arctic assessment estimates 
that up to 22% of the world’s undiscovered, technically recoverable resources 
exist north of the Arctic Circle in onshore and, significantly, offshore 
reservoirs.16 The Arctic accounts for approximately 13% of the undiscovered 
oil, 30% of the undiscovered natural gas and 20% of undiscovered natural gas 
liquids.17 Undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the Arctic are 
approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids.18 Approximately 84% of these 
estimates are expected to occur offshore.  
 
An Arctic Council Oil and Gas Assessment indicates that the Russian 
Federation has 75% of the known oil reserves and 90% of the known gas 
                                                
12 John Yates, Paul Cunningham and Denis Smith, 'Polar Hydrocarbon Technologies' (1995) 
19(5) Marine Policy 419, at 422. 
13 A.G. Dore, 'Barents Sea Geology, Petroleum Resources and Commercial Potential' (1995) 
48(3) Arctic 207, at 208. 
14 Ibid., at 208, Figure 1.   
15 Kenneth J. Bird et al, 'Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil 
and Gas North of the Arctic Circle' (United States Geological Survey (USGS) Fact Sheet 
2008-3049, 2008), at 1-4. 
16 USGS Press Release, 90 Billion Barrels of Oil, 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic (23 July 2008) <http://www.usgs.gov/corecast/details.asp?ep=55> at 23 
March 2009. See also, Donald L. Gautier et al, 'Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in 
the Arctic' (2009) 324(5931) Science 1175-1179. 
17 Ibid., USGS Press Release and Gautier, at 1178. 
18 ‘Undiscovered estimates’ are based on available geological data and modelling, estimating 
the likelihood of discovering hydrocarbons and the possible volumes within each area. 
Further mapping of the reservoirs, drilling and hydrocarbon identification is necessary to be 
listed within ‘discovered estimates’. Supra n. 15, at 4.  
 267 
reserves in the Arctic and has already produced 80% of all Arctic oil and 99% 
of Arctic gas.19 Exploration and development is set to expand further offshore 
especially along the Russian and Norwegian continental shelves in the 
Eurasian Basin of the Arctic Basin and to a lesser extent Alaska (US). The 
most significant sedimentary basins of the Barents Sea lie in the Russian 
sector, west of Novaya Zemlya, in the North Novaya Zemlya Basin, the North 
Barents Basin and the South Barents Basin.20 Much of the Canadian resources 
were identified in the 1970s and 1980s; however areas further offshore and 
those around Greenland and the Faroe Islands should not be discounted as 
possible future sources.  
 
Recent geological data, which places 22% of the world’s exploitable energy 
resources north of the Arctic Circle, also states that the full extent of the 
petroleum potential is unknown.21 There is low probability (<10%) of the 
presence of at least one undiscovered oil and/or gas field with recoverable 
resources greater than 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMBOE) in most 
areas beyond 200 NM from the Arctic Basin coastlines, within the outer 
continental shelf areas. In the Lomonosov-Makarov Basin probability rises to 
10-30% along the Lomonosov Ridge and to 30-50% in an area along the 70th 
North Latitude line north of the Russian Federation coast.22 The Lomonosov-
Makarov Basin will potentially be shared between the Russian Federation, 
Canada and Denmark through the delimitation process.23 This basin shares 
similar prospects to the Eurasian Basin, as does the Amerasian Basin, 
potentially shared between Canada and the US. According to the assessment, 
the Eurasian Basin, which includes the continental shelves extending from 
Norway and the Russian Federation, demonstrates the potential for 6-100 
trillion cubic feet of undiscovered gas and 1-10 billion barrels of undiscovered 
oil.24 
 
                                                
19 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 'AMAP Assessment 2007: Oil and Gas 
Activities in the Arctic - Effects and Potential Effects' (Arctic Council, 2007), at 7.2. 
20 Supra n. 13, at 210. 
21 Supra n. 15. 
22 Ibid., at Figure 1: Probability. 
23 Refer to Chapter 4. 
24 Supra n. 15. 
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Figure 2: Prospective development areas of the Arctic25 
 
 
                                                
25 Phillippe Rekacewicz and Hugo Ahlenius, UNEP/Grid-Arendal: Fossil Fuel Resources and 
Oil and Gas Production in the Arctic (2002) <http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/fossil-fuel-
resources-and-oil-and-gas-production-in-the-arctic> at 23 March 2009. 
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Snapshot of Arctic petroleum activity 
For the Arctic coastal states, there are a lot of resources to develop on the 
mainland and within the EEZs, where costs and risks are reduced, before 
expanding to the outer continental shelf area.26 As Canada, Denmark, the 
Russian Federation, Norway and the US appreciate the extent of their 
continental shelves and understand the real resource potential, further progress 
will have to be made to develop explicit means of carrying out obligations 
established in LOSC, in particular those related to Article 82, which deals 
with distribution of benefits accrued from outer continental shelf resource 
exploitation.27 Thus far, the majority of projects are on or very near shore, 
such as the North Slope of Alaska, the Amauligak, Kopanoar and Adlartok 
discoveries in the Mackenzie Delta/Beaufort Sea,28 the Bent Horn, Cisco or 
Hecla projects in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago,29 and the Prirazlomnoye 
project located on the Pechora Sea shelf north of Russia.  
 
Although Arctic oil and gas exploration and development diminished in the 
late 1980s, a recent resurgence in interest has occurred due to increased 
demand and high market values for both oil and gas. Due to the length of time 
required to bring some projects online, reservoirs that were first discovered in 
the 1960s and 1970s are now set to begin production. Projects are also moving 
further offshore. Phase-1 of Sakhalin, in the icy waters of the North Pacific to 
Russia, reached full production in the first quarter of 2007.30  
                                                
26 Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, 'Canada and Arctic Politics: The Continental Shelf Extension' 
(2008) 39(4) Ocean Development & International Law 343, at 344. 
27 For example, the LOSC does not indicate a procedure for determining the amount of 
payment in kind or contributions to be made by the state and these procedures are not 
explicitly included in the Authority’s mandate. The LOSC does not stipulate currency or 
define how value is assessed for calculating payments. States are responsible for 
implementation of regulations that incorporate Article 82 considerations; however, there is 
minimal guidance available to states thus far. These and other issues are identified in ISBA 
Technical Study No: 4, 'Issues Associated with Implementation of Article 82 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea' (International Seabed Authority, Jamaica, 
Kingston, 2009). 
28 G.R. Morrell, Petroleum Exploration in Northern Canada: A Guide to Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Potential (1995) Northern Oil Directorate, Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/oil/bkgd/prospectus/index_e.html> at 
04 July 2007, at 72. 
29 Ibid., at 79. 
30 ExxonMobil, Sakhalin-1: Project Production Goal Achieved (2007) 
<http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/exxonmobil/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&n
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Already several offshore Arctic basins, such as the South Kara/Yamal 
subbasin in western Siberia, the East Barents Basin off northern Norway, and 
the North Slope of Alaska, have previously discovered resources that are in 
different stages of development.31 Numerous large gas fields have been 
identified in the Barents and Kara Seas32 where Russian industry expansion is 
expected.33 Shtokmanovskoye, discovered in 1988 over 350 miles (563 km) 
north of the Siberian coast under 320-340 m of water, holds estimated 
resources of 3700 billion cubic metres and is one of the largest known gas 
fields in the world.34 The commencement of its development was announced 
by Gazprom, Russia’s leading national oil company, in 2004, with a target 
production start up date of 2013.35 Prirazlomnoye oilfield lies 60 km south of 
Novaya Zemla in northern Russia on the Pechora Sea shelf, contains 
estimated reserves of 610 million barrels and 58 million barrels of recoverable 
resources.36  It was discovered in 1989 and as of 2010 is still in the 
development phase.37 North Slope development peaked in 1988;38 however, 
renewed interest in US domestic energy supply from the Arctic has opened 
new lease bids in the Beaufort Sea,39 Chukchi Sea, as well as, controversially, 
in and around the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge40 and National Petroleum 
                                                                                                                          
dmConfigId=1001106&newsId=20070214005789&newsLang=en&vnsId= or 
http://www.sakhalin1.com/en/news/press/20070214.asp> at 16 January 2008. 
31 Alan Murray and Andrew Latham, 'World's Arctic Basins Pose Array of Unique Work 
Opportunities' (2006) 104(42) Oil and Gas Journal 31, at 31. 
32 Supra n. 13, at 211-212 and 214. 
33 In the period following 2010, Gazprom reports that the gas output targets will be met by 
developing fields on the shelf of the Arctic seas, among other regions. See Gazprom, Gas 
Production (2008) <http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article20151.shtml> at 16 January 
2008 and Oyvind Midttun, 'Cold Opportunities' (2004) (1) Norwegian Continental Shelf 12, at 
13. 
34 Gazprom, Shtokman Project (2008) 
<http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article21712.shtml> at 16 January 2008. 
35 Ibid. See also Colleen Taylor Sen and Warren R. True, 'LNG Construction Projects, Plans 
Move Ahead, Buck Cost Pressures' (2007) 105(37) Oil and Gas Journal 20, at 25. 
36 Offshore-technology.com, Prirazlomnoye Oilfield - Barents Sea, Russia (2007) 
<http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/Prirazlomnoye/> at 16 January 2008 and 
Gazprom, Prirazlomnoye Oil Field (2008) 
<http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article22766.shtml> at 16 January 2008. 
37 Ibid., Gazprom. 
38 Richard J. Wiener, 'Drilling for Oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge' (2006) 35(3) 
Physics and Society 4, at 5. 
39  Lease information available from Mineral Management Service, Outer Continental Shelf 
(OCS) Beaufort Sea Alaska Oil and Gas Lease Sale 202 (2007) 
<http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/07-
1298.htm> at 07 June 2007. 
40 On May 25, 2006, the House of Representatives passed the ‘American-Made Energy and 
Good Jobs Act (H.R. 5429)’ which opened the ANWR for development. See M. Lynne Corn, 
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Reserve, Alaska.41 In the Canadian Beaufort Sea, Shell, Imperial Oil, 
ExxonMobil, Chevron Canada and ConocoPhillips Canada were awarded new 
leases in 2007.42 In 2008 further licences were acquired by ConocoPhillips, 
MGM Energy, Phillips Petroleum and British Petroleum.43 
 
The Snøhvit gas project in the Barents Sea, 143 km off Norway, began 
production on 13 September 2007, 24 years after discovery.44 Nearly 100 
billion cubic metres of natural gas are estimated to be held within the Snøhvit 
gas field.45 In 2004, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate estimated that 
undiscovered resources are just under a billion cubic metres of oil equivalent, 
representing 30% of the Norwegian continental shelf total, excluding the 
disputed area.46 Within the disputed area of the Barents Sea, between Russia 
and Norway, a large geological structure was identified on seismic studies in 
the 1970s that showed potential as a reservoir capable of holding four times 
that of the Shtokmanovskoye.47  
 
                                                                                                                          
Bernard A. Gelb and Pamela Baldwin, 'Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): 
Controversies for the 109th Congress' (Congressional Research Service, The Library of the 
Congress, 07 July 2006) at 1. 
41 Results of lease sales available from United States Department of Interior: Bureau of Land 
Management, National Petroleum Reserve - Alaska (NPR-A): Oil and Gas Leasing 
Information (2008) 
<http://www.blm.gov/ak/st/en/prog/energy/oil_gas/npra/npra_leasing.html> at 17 October 
2009. 
42 Three Exploration Licences were awarded by the Canadian Government to winners of the 
2007 Call for Bids: Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta. EL446 is held by Imperial Oil and 
ExxonMobil Canada, EL 447 is held by ConocoPhillips Canada and EL 448 is held by 
Chevron Canada. Refer to Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, Results of the 2007 
Call for Bids: Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta (2007) <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/oil/act/Cal/beau2007/winbid/07_07_e.html> at 07 August 2007. Shell’s 
Exploration Plan for 2007–2009 was approved by the US Department of the Interior, Minerals 
Management Service. The Exploration Plan is outlined in Shell Offshore Inc., Beaufort Sea 
Outer Continental Shelf Lease Exploration Plan 2007-2009 (2007) 
<http://www.mms.gov/alaska/fo/ExplorationPlans/shell_exploration_plan/Exploration%20Pla
n.pdf> at 16 January 2008.  
43 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2007-2008 Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta: 
Winning Bids <http://mainc.info/nth/og/rm/ri/bsm/bsm08/index-eng.asp#chp3> at 04 May 
2010. 
44 Statoil, Statoil Starts LNG Production from Snohvit (21 September 2007) Rigzone News 
<http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=50494> at 15 November 2007, at 1. 
45 Supra n. 13, at 211. 
46 Supra n. 33, Midttun, at 14. 
47 Perry A. Fischer, 'What's New in Exploration' (2007) 226(12) World Oil 1, at 15. 
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Antarctic 
The Antarctic is vastly more remote, cut off from other continents by the 
circumpolar Southern Ocean. Potential for offshore hydrocarbon development 
is not as well appreciated as in the Arctic because exploratory drilling has 
been limited to scientific purposes, not inclusive of prospecting. Adequate 
surveys of distinct reservoirs or recent estimates for oil, gas, condensate, or 
gas hydrates, separately or in combination, have not been compiled. Any 
existing estimates are based on magnetic studies, seismic studies and ocean 
drilling projects, along with the interpretation of Antarctic geology and 
continental shelf characteristics.48  
 
Antarctic continental shelves exhibit high latitude characteristics with a well-
developed continental rise cut by numerous submarine canyons. However, the 
Antarctic shelf is deep, averaging 500 m in depth (eight times the world 
average) with troughs exceeding 1000 m.49 Irregular and often steep 
topography combines with commonly broad shelf width and significant 
variability in glacial marine sediments.50 The shelf profile typically slopes 
towards the continent rather than away, as it does in more temperate regions. 
This is a result of glacial erosion and isostasy from the weight of the 
continental ice sheet.51 Breadth of the shelf varies from over 200 km in 
regions of West Antarctica52 to areas where the breadth is only 30 km.53 
 
One estimate from the USGS proposes that 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas may be recoverable from Antarctica.54 Other 
research correlates the geological history and position of Antarctica with 
respect to other oil and gas producing continents in Gondwanaland to support 
                                                
48 References and information used in this case study represent the most up-to-date 
information available to the public. The author is not aware of any publicly available current 
industry-related assessments, which confirm estimates provided from these geological studies. 
49 John B. Anderson, 'The Antarctic Continental Shelf: Results from Marine Geological and 
Geophysical Investigations' in Robert J. Tingey (ed), The Geology of Antarctica, Clarendon 
Press (1991) 285, at 285. 
50 Ibid., at 319. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., at 285. 
53 Supra n. 12, at 423. 
54 Jonathon D. Weiss, 'The Balance of Nature and Human Needs in Antarctica: The Legality 
of Mining' (1995) 9 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 387, at 387. 
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the likelihood of finding reserves.55 For example, prior to the onset of the 
breakup of Gondwanaland around 125 million years ago, the AAT would 
have shared continental margins and similar sedimentation as southern 
Australia, where petroleum development is occurring.56 Offshore of the 
eastern part of the AAT, extending towards the Ross Sea is the Scott Basin 
(Figure 3) which, according to continental reconstruction, would be expected 
to have a similar history to that of the productive Otway Basin at the South 
Australia-Victoria border.57 In 1972–73, scientific drilling projects in the Ross 
Sea identified ethane and methane gas hydrates, although the significance of 
the finding is still debatable. At the time, ‘authors considered it premature to 
attach any economic significance to the hydrocarbons’.58  
                                                
55 See among others supra n., 5, Dennis Hayes, 'An Overview of the Geological History of 
Antarctica With Regard to Mineral Resource Potential' in Lewis M. Alexander and Lynne 
Carter Hanson (eds), Antarctic Politics and Marine Resources: Critical Choices for the 
1980s, Center for Ocean Management Studies (1984) 173 and US Congress and Office of 
Technology Assessment, Polar Prospects: A Minerals Treaty for Antarctica, US Government 
Printing Office (1989). 
56 Patrick Quilty, 'Mineral Resources of the Australian Antarctic Territory' (1985) 27 
Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition Notes 165, at 183. 
57 Ibid., at 188. There are a number of active leases in the Otway Basin, see PESA News, 
'Three Otway Basin Areas Released' (2006) June/July(82) Petroleum Exploration Society of 
Australia 1, at 50. 
58 Supra n., 5 at 602. 
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Figure 3:  Sedimentary basins offshore Antarctica59 
 
Across Antarctica offshore petroleum potential also differs according to shelf 
properties and sedimentation. According to Anderson, major sedimentary 
basins have been discovered in the Ross Sea, Prydz Bay, on the Wilkes Land 
continental shelf, in the Weddell Sea and the Pacific-Antarctic margin.60 The 
Ross Sea basins and the basins on the East Antarctic continental shelf, those 
that were formed during the early rifting of Gondwanaland and prior to the 
establishment of glacial conditions on the continent, have the highest potential 
for hydrocarbons. These basins contain, on average, 3-6 km of mostly Late 
Oligocene and younger glacial marine deposits.61 Prospects for hydrocarbons 
are good in the Ross Sea, where surveys of the Victoria Land Basin indicate 
                                                
59 Adapted from Egil Bergsager, ‘Basic Conditions for the Exploration and Exploitation of 
Mineral Resources in Antarctica: Options and Precedents’ in Francisco Orrego Vicuña (ed), 
Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and Political Issues, Cambridge University Press 
(1983), at 170. 
60 Supra n. 49, at 324. 
61 Ibid. 
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that 3-5 km of sediment correlate to basins having potentially reached the oil 
generation window.62 Thick sedimentation (up to 6 km) of marine deposits 
have resulted in lower seabed gradients off the AAT in East Antarctica63 and 
the likelihood of suitable reservoir rocks is high in some areas along this 
margin.64 Potential source rocks have also been collected off Wilkes Land and 
Prydz Bay and thick passive margin sequences have been identified off the 
East Antarctic continental shelf.65 Prydz Bay has sedimentation and 
characteristics favourable for exploration of resources, particularly natural gas 
in pre break-up sediments and oil in post break-up rocks.66  
 
The eastern Weddell Sea continental shelf off Dronning Maud Land and west 
of Crary Trough has accumulated thick sedimentation. However, the 
sediments may be located above the oil generation window.67 The western 
Weddell Sea has been identified as an area of potential based on the 
geological comparison to the oil-producing basins of Argentina and the 
geological setting of the Andes, although conclusive evidence is lacking.68 
The vastness of the Pacific-Antarctic margin is favourable to hydrocarbon 
potential, particularly for that portion of the margin that lies south of a 
particular fracture feature. However, in general, hydrocarbon prospects are not 
thought to be high for this region.69 
 
These studies indicate potential areas of interest and highlight favourable 
characteristics for hydrocarbon generation. Research that is a precursor to 
exploration will continue to contribute to an improved appreciation of 
resource potential. For example, seabed mapping to establish the outer limits 
of continental shelves near and around the Antarctic has been done in some 
locations. Although limited mostly to 2D seismic surveys, these surveys, as 
well as other scientific drilling projects, will provide detail of the possible 
                                                
62 Ibid., at 317. 
63 H.M.J. Stagg et al, Geological Framework of the Continental Margin in the Region of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory, Geoscience Australia Record (2004/2005), at 9. 
64 Supra n. 49, at 318 and n. 56, at 179 and 184. 
65 Ibid., Anderson, at 318. 
66 Supra n. 56, at 179, 183-184 and n. 5, at 600. 
67 Supra n. 49, at 317. 
68 Ibid., at 315 and 318. 
69 Ibid., at 318 and 324. 
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location where further commercial research would be beneficial. To date, 
linking the more recent research to isolate areas for commercially relevant 
research has not occurred. Moreover, conclusive estimates are impossible for 
the Antarctic without further seismic studies and exploratory drilling. Under 
the terms of Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol, commercially relevant seismic 
studies and exploratory drilling would probably be interpreted as mineral 
resource activities rather than scientific research. Thus, the ability to carry out 
commercial exploration south of 60˚S by Parties to the Madrid Protocol is 
essentially prohibited.  
 
Snapshot of Antarctic petroleum activity 
The review of Antarctic resource potential suggests that it is not as high as the 
Arctic. However, West Antarctica and specific basins mentioned previously 
do demonstrate varying degrees of potential. Current activity is limited to 
offshore areas north of the Antarctic Treaty area, such as offshore of the 
Falkland Islands. These islands are located north of the Antarctic Peninsula at 
latitude 51˚45’S. In February 2009, London-based company, Falkland Oil and 
Gas, completed seismic and bathymetric surveys as well as gravity cores and 
sediment grabs. These provided accurate data on seabed composition and 
local environmental factors for impact assessments and structural design for 
pending lease development south and east of the islands.70 Borders and 
Southern Company is also exploring basins to the south and east, whereas 
Desire Petroleum and Rockhopper Exploration are exploring shallower water 
to the north. In February 2010, the Ocean Guardian drill rig was brought down 
to explore the North Falkland Basin by Desire Petroleum.71 The rig will 
subsequently be leased to Falklands Oil and Gas, Rockhopper and BHP 
Billiton to carry out exploration contracts throughout the year.72 Estimates for 
                                                
70 See media release by Proactive Investors, Falkland Oil and Gas Completes Site Survey 
Programme (23 February 2009) 
<http://www.proactiveinvestors.co.uk/companies/news/4529/falkland-oil-and-gas-completes-
site-survey-programme--4529.html> at 24 March 2009.  
71 BBC News, Drilling for Oil Begins off the Falkland Islands (22 February 2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8527307.stm> at 23 March 2010.  
72 The arrival of the Ocean Guardian has stirred tensions regarding the sovereignty of the 
Falkland Islands, disputed between Argentina and the UK. See news report in the 
Guardian.co.uk, Falklands Oil Prospects Stir Anglo-Argentinean Tensions (07 February 
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the area range from 300 million barrels to almost 3 billion and most of the 
prospects are located in 500-1200 m of water.73 The cost of development has 
required the assistance of other companies within the licenses. In 2006, BHP 
Billiton agreed to be involved over all of the Falkland Oil and Gas license 
area.74 The agreement brings in BHP for a minimum of two wells over three 
years and following the agreement, the exploration phases of the Falkland Oil 
and Gas license were extended to December 2010 and December 2015.75   
Falkland Oil and Gas have since reported that the first exploratory well was 
completed in July 2010 to 2476 m in the Toroa prospect, south of the 
Falklands. The well did not encounter any hydrocarbons and according to a 
July report it will be plugged and abandoned.76 Progress on a second well in 
the Loligo prospect continues. Desire Petroleum announced an unnamed 
farm-in partner in February 2008 and is also planning to drill two wells. 
Desire Petroleum recently submitted an environmental impact assessment to 
the Falkland Islands Government on 09 March 2009.77  
 
                                                                                                                          
2010) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/feb/07/falkland-islands-oil-britain-
argentina/print> at 09 February 2010. 
73 One report estimates that potentially 60 billion barrels of high grade oil could be found in 
EEZ surrounding the islands. If correct, this could make the Falklands one of the world's 
largest oil reserves. See Caroline Henshaw, UK Firms Mobilize in New Falklands Foray (25 
January 2010) The Wall Street Journal 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699204575016672711190144.html?mo
d=googlenews_wsj> at 26 January 2010. See also Stuart Watson, Does Falkland Oil and Gas 
Have a Fortune Beneath the South Atlantic? (27 March 2008) 
<http://www.proactiveinvestors.co.uk/companies/news/407/-does-falkland-oil-and-gas-have-
a-fortune-beneath-the-south-atlantic-0407.html> at 24 March 2009. For an update on 
activities see also Tom Bulford, The 'Big Four' Falklands Oil Shares (15 January 2010) Fleet 
Street Invest <http://www.fleetstreetinvest.co.uk/oil/supply-demand-oil/falklands-oil-update-
98463.html> at 18 January 2010. 
74 Falkland Oil and Gas Ltd., FOGL Press Release: Farm-out Agreement with BHP Billiton 
(October 2007) <http://www.fogl.com/documents/FalklandOilandGasLimited-PressRelease-
2007-10-02.pdf> at 24 March 2009. 
75 Falkland Oil and Gas Ltd., Work Programme 2008/09: Drilling (2009) 
<http://www.fogl.com/operations/2008/drilling.asp> 2009. 
76 Falkland Oil and Gas Ltd., Results of the Toroa exploration well (12 July 2010) 
<http://www.fogl.com/fogl/en/Operations/story/drilling_updates> at 23 August 2010. 
77 Desire Petroleum, Environmental Impact Assessment Submission (09 March 2009) 
<http://www.desireplc.co.uk/investor_relations_announcements.php?article_id=120> at 23 
March 2009. 
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5.3 Barriers to exploration and development in the polar 
regions  
Exploration and development in the polar regions are hampered by a number 
of obstacles such as remoteness, availability of licensing, 
jurisdictional/regulatory uncertainty, harsh conditions, and physical 
challenges such as sea ice, iceberg drift, and severe storm events with high 
wind speeds and frigid temperatures. Polar petroleum development, 
particularly offshore, demands specific technical expertise and therefore large 
upfront investment.78 Discoveries are often not immediately developed, delays 
may occur to allow for technological advances as well as market 
opportunities. Investing in polar industry is a complex risk that ebbs and flows 
with economics, regulatory requirements, politics and the physical 
environment.  
 
Economics 
For industry, the break-even price for the development of an Arctic oil field 
was around $25 United States Dollars (USD)/barrel in 2006. However, the 
average varied between basins from $19 to $46 depending on remoteness and 
the ice challenges.79 In some cases high costs elevate development break-even 
prices for Arctic fields to over $30 USD per barrel of oil equivalent.80 In 
comparison, average field development costs around the world in 2006 were 
around $6 USD/barrel of oil equivalent81 and Middle East oil, such as that in 
Iraq, could be produced in 2004 for as little as $1.50 USD/barrel.82  
 
Exploratory offshore drilling is expensive in remote polar regions due to 
increased transportation costs and further specialized technology. Offshore 
wells in the Canadian sector of the Beaufort Sea have cost more than $100 
                                                
78 Supra n. 33, Midttun, at 13. 
79 Supra n. 31, at 32. 
80 Sam Fletcher, 'WoodMac: Arctic has Less Oil than Earlier Estimated' (2006) 104(42) Oil 
and Gas Journal 18, at 19. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Matthew Yeomans, Oil: A Concise Guide to the Most Important Product on Earth, The 
New Press (2004), at 131. 
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million USD.83 A well drilled in the US sector of the Beaufort Sea, known as 
Mukluk, cost an estimated 1.6 billion USD and came up dry.84 Costs for 
project implementation in the Arctic are also high. The Snøhvit gas field, 
discovered in 1983 offshore of northwest Norway, cost over 58 billion kroner 
(equivalent to over $9 billion US dollars) to finally bring online in 2007, and 
is set to produce 4.3 million tonnes/year over 30 years.85 An estimate in 2002 
assessed that gas prices needed to be greater than $5.20 USD (in 2002 dollars) 
per thousand cubic feet for Snøhvit to break even, compared to $2.50 for a gas 
field in the Norwegian Sea further south.86 Development of the 
Shtokmanovskoye gas field, offshore north of Russia in the Barents Sea, was 
estimated in 2007 to cost between $10 billion and $25 billion US dollars to 
bring online by 2013.  The field is aiming to stretch the 1.13 trillion tonnes 
over 50 years of productivity.87 In comparison, an Australian LNG project 
lead by Woodside Petroleum Ltd. on the Western Australian Burrup 
Peninsula, set to start up in 2010, is estimated to cost $12 billion Australian 
dollars and aims to deliver 4.3-4.8 million tonnes/year for 15-20 years.88 
 
Additional costs relate to high wages and insurance rates. Harsh climates 
increase liability and risk factors which flows over into insurance premiums. 
For example, insurance cost for shipping in the NSR is estimated to be twice 
that of shipping in the Suez Route and correlates to environmental risk factors 
including ice infested waters and shallow depths.89 Difficult and remote 
                                                
83 Frontier oil and gas projects are highly capital intensive. See John F. Helliwell et al, Oil and 
Gas in Canada: The Effects of Domestic Policies and World Events, Canadian Tax Paper No. 
83, Canadian Tax Foundation (1989), at 166. 
84 The Mukluk well in the Alaskan Beaufort Sea region was known as ‘the most spectacular 
failure in the history of petroleum exploration’. See Richard A. Fineburg, Projected Bonus 
Payments from Proposed Leasing on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Coastal Plain 
Greatly Exceed North Slope Historical Trends: A Background Report to the Alaska 
Wilderness League (15 January 2005) <http://www.finebergresearch.com/pdf/arbr.pdf> at 23 
March 2009, at 3. 
85 Odd Arild Mosbergvik, 'Statoil to Begin Snøhvit LNG Operations by Yearend 2007' (2007) 
105(14) Oil and Gas Journal 48, at 53. 
86 Supra n. 13, at 219. 
87 Supra n. 35, at 25 and n. 47, at 15.  
88 Ibid., n. 35, at 20-21. 
89 K. Kamesaki, S. Kishi and Y. Yamauchi, 'INSROP Working Paper 164: Simulation of NSR 
Shipping Based on Year-round  and Seasonal Operation Scenarios' (Paper presented at the 
Northern Sea Route User Conference: The Twenty-first Century: A Turning Point for the 
Northern Sea Route?, Oslo, Norway, 18-20 November 1999) following the International 
Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP) which ran 1993-1999. 
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working conditions usually demand higher wages, contributing to the overall 
heightened cost in polar projects.90   
Unlike the Arctic, Antarctic petroleum development has not occurred; 
however, it has been reported that oil prices need to be above $200 
USD/barrel for Antarctic production to reach profitability.91 In 2006, oil 
expert Ali Samsam Bakhtiari of the University of Tehran indicated in a speech 
to the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) that ‘it would 
make economic sense to exploit even Antarctic energy’ if prices were to rise 
to $150 or $200USD/barrel.92 Market oil prices peaked on 11 July 2008 at 
$147.25 USD/barrel,93 well over the estimated break-even price, based on a 
15% return on investment for the Arctic. This price approaches the estimates 
of profitability for the Antarctic. However, the current global economic crisis 
has seen the per barrel cost of oil drop back down. Oil returned to averaging 
$76.96 USD/barrel in May 2010.94 
  
Politics 
Alongside the volatility in pricing and demand, availability of supply 
emerging from the polar regions varies with political instability of major oil 
producing regions such as the Middle East. Local political influence can also 
provide both incentive and disincentive to industry. If, for example, the 
                                                
90 For example, in a 2005 survey, the average annual salary for an oil and gas rig technician 
was $18 671 Canadian dollars higher for jobs located in the northern and remote areas of the 
province of Alberta as opposed to the central region. Rig technicians in the Athabasca 
(northeast) region had an annual salary of $70 050 CAN whereas in Edmonton (central) the 
annual salary was $51,379 CAN. Alberta Learning Information System, WAGEinfo: 2005 
Alberta Wage and Salary Survey (2007) Government of Alberta <http://www.alis.gov.ab.ca/> 
at 12 December 2007. 
91 Anthony Bergin and Marcus Haward, 'Frozen Assets: Securing Australia's Antarctic Future' 
(Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2007), at 9. 
92 Andrew Darby, Antarctic Next, Says Oil Expert (Sydney Morning Herald, 14 July 2006) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/antarctic-next-says-oil-
expert/2006/07/13/1152637808246.html> at 24 March 2009 and Tom Iggulden, World 
Running Out of Oil: Expert (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Broadcast of 10 July 2006) 
<http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1683183.htm> at 24 March 2009. For 
scientific publications and reports published on Peak Oil and other related topics see: Dr. 
Samsam Bakhtiari, <http://www.sfu.ca/~asamsamb/homedown.htm> at 14 September 2009. 
93 Tom Whipple, Peak Oil Review (14 July 2008) 
<http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20080714/peak-oil-review-july-14-2008.htm> at 18 March 
2009. 
94 Energy Information Agency, Petroleum Navigator: World Crude Oil Prices (US dollars per 
barrel) <http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_wco_k_w.htm> at 25 May 2010. 
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Canadian Government is promoting sovereignty of the Canadian Arctic along 
with northern governance initiatives, frontier development is in a more 
positive development setting.95 On the other hand, media attention given to 
adverse environmental impacts such as oil spills may delay project 
development.96 Similarly, governments may intervene or prohibit activities in 
order to brand their government with a positive image, be it concerning 
environmental issues or indigenous rights.97 Political disputes over territorial 
sovereignty or overlapping maritime claims result in jurisdictional 
uncertainty. Industry interest decreases with regulatory uncertainty and 
political complications. For example, even though significant hydrocarbon 
potential exists offshore of the disputed Falkland Islands, only four companies 
hold active exploration licenses and none of the major companies already 
working in Argentina are interested.98 Renewed exploration activity offshore 
of the Falkland Islands has recently prompted Argentina to tighten control on 
ships heading to the Falkland Islands. A permit will now be needed by ships 
using Argentine waters en route to the UK-controlled Falklands, South 
Georgia or the South Sandwich Islands.99 
Controversial issues, such as the debate over control of the Arctic waterways 
or seabed in either the Arctic or Antarctic, can also manifest in what Kraska 
labels as domestic political point scoring with concomitant rejection of 
multilateralism.100 In the absence of diplomacy, amplification of domestic 
interests can inflame geopolitical tensions across many states. For example, 
pledges to increase militarization of the Arctic by Canada, which arose 
                                                
95 American presence in the Canadian Arctic, following the Prudhoe Bay discovery in 1968, 
revived concerns about Canadian sovereignty. This was combined with other factors in the 
National Oil Policy reviews of 1969 and 1972. J. C. Stabler and M. R. Olfert, 'Gaslight 
Follies: The Political Economy of the Western Arctic' (1980) 6(2) Canadian Public Policy 
374, at 375. 
96 Supra n. 1, at 239. 
97 For example, the Australian and French initiative to abandon CRAMRA in favour of a 
comprehensive environmental protection regime was influenced by many factors, including 
upcoming elections and the desire to secure votes from a population that was increasingly 
concerned about the environment. The decision to shift away from CRAMRA is discussed in 
further detail Chapter 3. See also Anthony Bergin, 'The Politics of Antarctic Minerals: The 
Greening of White Australia' (1991) 26 Australian Journal of Political Science 216- 239. 
98 See comments in supra n. 73. 
99 See BBC News, Argentina Toughens Shipping Rules in Falklands Row (18 February 2010) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8518982.stm> at 23 March 2010. 
100 James Kraska, 'International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage' 
(2009) 42(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1109, at 1120. 
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following the Russian bomber flights and flag planting on the seabed of the 
North Pole,101 may increase geopolitical attention by other states, including 
powerful, non-Arctic states such as China.102 Political relationships may 
subsequently change and practical matters relating to global industries and 
their regulation may potentially be hampered by these types of political 
complications.103  
 
Amongst heightened geopolitical attention are also more opportunities for 
countries with polar-specific expertise to forge unique relationships with non-
Arctic or non-claimant states in the Antarctic. For example, Chinese and 
Norwegian companies may seek cooperative arrangements so that China may 
acquire Norwegian expertise in deep sea drilling and Arctic resource 
development.104  Interest from states that are neither Arctic littoral states nor 
Antarctic claimant states will also influence growth and development policies 
for international industries, such as oil and gas and shipping.105 Cooperation 
amongst states outside of the Arctic or Antarctic operating systems, such as 
the East Asian states, may also deepen as shipping routes become more 
accessible and concerns manifest over access to the seabed that falls outside 
the realm of national (coastal state) jurisdiction. Management and regulation 
of activities occurring in the polar regions, within and beyond the extent of 
national jurisdiction, will be influenced by pressures and political concerns of 
these and other states. A Chinese researcher on Arctic politics, Guo Peiqing, 
                                                
101 See Randy Boswell, Thaw may be Underway in Ottawa-Moscow Arctic Issues (12 March 
2007) Canwest News Service <http://www.chtv.com/ch/cheknews/story.html?id=1589395> at 
25 March 2010. 
102 See supra n. 100, at 1118 and Linda Jakobson, 'China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic' 
(2010) 2(March) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Insights on Peace 
and Security 1, at 11-12. According to Jakobson, as at March 2010, Canada and Norway are 
the only states to have engaged China in formal bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues.  
103 For example, Jakobson comments that melting of the Arctic ice could create tension in 
China-Russia relations as shipping routes become accessible and non-Arctic states seek 
access to Arctic resources. Ibid., at 13. 
104 Suggested in ibid., at 8 and 13. 
105 China has expressed increased interest recently in Arctic shipping routes and resources as 
well as Antarctic resources. See Anthony Bergin, Chinese Explorers have an Eye for our 
Frozen Assets (01 February 2010) The Australian 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/chinese-explorers-have-an-eye-for-our-frozen-
assets/story-e6frg6ux-1225825212699> at 23 March 2010 and Kathrin Hille and Isabel Gorst, 
China Looks to Arctic Shipping Route (01 March 2010) Financial Times 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8360ad4c-2553-11df-9cdb-00144feab49a.html> at 23 March 
2010. 
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was recently (in 2010) quoted by Jakobson, commenting that ‘any country 
that lacks comprehensive research on polar politics will be excluded from 
being a decisive power…and therefore be forced into a passive position’.106 
 
Marine environment 
Physical characteristics of the polar regions limit project development by 
demanding specialized technology and engineering. Physical characteristics 
also increase the risk of impacts to the environment, discussed below. 
Environmental factors such as ice regimes, predominant current and wind 
characteristics, and seasonal temperatures, influence which basin can be 
developed, to what degree development is feasible and what type of 
technology must be employed. Any barriers identified for Arctic development 
carry over to the consideration of Antarctic development even though 
variability exists between the dominant ice features and the marine 
environments. The Arctic is mostly affected by sea ice, pack ice, land-fast ice 
(fixed to the coast), and ice ridges. Small and infrequent icebergs are found 
predominantly in channels between Greenland and Canada. The Antarctic also 
experiences pack ice, sea ice, land-fast ice and ice ridges. The size and 
distribution of calving tabular icebergs (from ice shelves) and glacier icebergs 
are larger and more frequent than those in the Arctic.107 Offshore polynyas 
create localized ice regimes. Some areas of icebergs and sea ice are more 
predictable than others.  
 
Remoteness is one of the greatest environmental challenges for the oil and gas 
industry in the polar regions with respect to transporting resources to markets 
and mobilising people and equipment.108 Lack of existing infrastructure limits 
the potential for companies to simply transport resources using nearby 
                                                
106 Supra n. 102, at 7. With respect to Chinese interest in Antarctica, see ibid., Bergin and 
Andrew Darby, China Flags its Antarctic Intent (11 January 2010) Sydney Morning Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/china-flags-its-antarctic-intent-20100111-
m287.html> at 22 March 2010. 
107 Properties of sea ice and some of the differences between Arctic and Antarctic sea ice 
regimes are discussed on the website for the Antarctic Sea Ice Processes and Climate 
(ASPECT) program of the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) (established 
1996) <http://www.aspect.aq/differences.html> at 17 March 2009. 
108 Supra n. 31, at 31. 
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transportation links. Primary or secondary resource capture is also limited in 
the absence of previously completed exploratory drilling and reservoir 
identification infrastructure.109 Frontier exploration involves entering largely 
unexplored areas and is often limited by the availability of seismic data, 
equipment – such as ice-strengthened drillships – as well as the ability to 
obtain exploration licences.110 Availability of licensing to enter remote areas 
varies widely across the Arctic basins,111 while no licensing opportunities 
currently exist in the Antarctic. 
 
Technology 
In order to perform Arctic offshore exploration, development and production, 
a number of technologies must be employed. These may include specialized 
platforms, ice pads, artificial islands, bottom founded/fixed structures, various 
floated or semi-submersible designs, ice-reinforced transport vessels and/or 
pipelines. Resource development may be able to move further offshore and 
into regions with more harsh working conditions as technology advances. 
Emerging technology, applicable in the polar regions, is highlighted by the 
Hibernia project off the northeast of Canada which has been productive since 
1997,112 and the Norwegian Snøhvit project, which began producing on 13 
September 2007.113  
 
Technology for the Arctic has progressed since the collapse of the world oil 
prices in 1985 prevented Alaskan and Canadian operators from developing the 
first Arctic offshore fields.114 Offshore projects gained renewed interest with 
strong world oil prices prior to the price collapse in December 2008. The 
technologies employed by these and other Arctic projects have been 
developed in response to the characteristics of the region. While some of the 
                                                
109 Ibid., at 32-35. 
110 Ibid., at 35-36. 
111 Ibid., at 32. 
112 Refer to About Hibernia <http://www.hibernia.ca/html/about_hibernia/index.html> at 19 
December 2007 and Offshore-technology.com, Hibernia, Jeanne d'Arc Basin, Offshore 
Newfoundland, Canada <http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/hibernia/> at 22 
December 2009 for information on the history of Hibernia and the technology used. 
113 Supra n. 44. 
114 Supra n. 12, at 424. 
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technology such as drill ships and ice-strengthened transport vessels can have 
immediate application in the Antarctic, platforms, bottom founded structures 
and artificial islands may not.115 For example, the Arctic Production and 
Loading Atoll artificial island, constructed with sand ballasted concrete 
caissons, mounted on two submerged berms filled with dredge or imported 
material, is intended for use in 60-75 m water, and is able to withstand ice 
features up to 60 m thick and 8-15 km in diameter.116 Construction of these 
and other artificial islands, such as the Sacrificial Beach Islands, requires the 
immediate presence of suitable construction material, either dredged or 
imported. Therefore, environmental impacts, as well as the issues of water 
depth offshore of Antarctica, compounded with the cost for construction, will 
likely be an inhibiting factor in their use in the Antarctic region.117 Floating 
designs, semi-submersibles, ship-based drilling platforms or sub-sea 
production systems hold greater potential for application offshore Antarctica. 
These have already been successful in the Arctic. Subsea systems, like that 
employed at Snøhvit gas project, link numerous wells to a single manifold 
from which oil or gas is transported via pipeline to shore; or a storage facility 
which might be located on or offshore.  
 
This application may have utility in Antarctica in areas where there is low risk 
of icebergs scouring the seafloor or grounding themselves.118 Floating or 
semi-submerged systems may be fixed to the sea floor through a variety of 
cable designs or held in position through propeller system similar to those 
employed by drill ships.119 These designs are better equipped for deeper 
water, do not require local or imported dredge material and can be mobilized 
                                                
115 In ibid., 419-346, Yates et al. discuss different applications of polar technology. Refer also 
to Offshore-technology.com: The Website for the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 
<http://www.offshore-technology.com/> at 24 August 2009 for project and technology 
design, description and application. Other references include A.B. Cammaert and D.B. 
Muggeridge, Ice Interaction with Offshore Structures, Van Nostrand Reinhold (1988) and P. 
Broughton et al, 'Offshore Development in Iceberg-Infested Waters with the Use of Concrete 
Protection Barrier' (Paper presented at the International Arctic Technology Conference, 
Anchorage, Alaska, 29-31 May 1991). 
116 Ibid., Yates et al., n. 12, at 430. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., at 436. 
119 Drill ships have propellers positioned underneath the vessel that activate in response to a 
sensor around the drill apparatus to correct for any positioning change. This ensures that the 
drill ship is held steady throughout the drilling process. 
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away from danger in some circumstances. Mobility has proven important in 
hurricane affected areas such as the Gulf of Mexico where deep sea drilling up 
to 7000 feet (2133.6 m) is already taking place.120 In the polar regions, a 
sheltered area to move the drilling apparatus and platform to may be difficult 
to find or significant distances away. While the risk of infrastructure damage 
is not necessarily greater in all areas of the polar regions, compared to 
equatorial regions susceptible to hurricanes, the ability to respond rapidly to 
emergencies decreases with remoteness.  
 
Different systems are available for offshore development, such as concrete 
gravity based systems (GBS) similar to the Hibernia platform, floating storage 
and re-gasification units (FSRU) for offshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
terminals or rapid re-gasification terminals with no LNG storage.121 Each 
system has advantages. GBS are proven technology offering storage, 
constructability and survivability; however, depending on the environment 
and weather, berthing may not be possible throughout the year and the 
facilities are expensive to construct.122 The need to abandon the facilities 
because of weather must be considered, given the remoteness and 
environmental conditions in the polar regions. FSRUs are able to berth both 
submerged and floating systems to unload the LNG. These facilities can be 
moved due to severe weather but the crew must remain with the facility. 
Offshore and remote locations will minimize the visible impact of the systems 
and potential impact on wildlife. In many regions of the world, even though 
transportation onshore is required, offshore facilities strategically located near 
onshore infrastructure and consumers will also reduce capital investment.123 
However, remote Arctic and Antarctic locations may not provide this financial 
advantage and the risk of environmental impact to the marine environment 
and wildlife cannot be completely reduced. 
  
                                                
120 Refer to supra n. 3, at 966. 
121 Wendy Weirauch, 'LNG Demand, Siting Risks Impact US Development' (2002) 81(11) 
Hydrocarbon Processing 25, at 26. 
122 For example, offshore of California, berthing is only available 80% of the year because of 
weather. 
123 Supra n. 121, at 26. 
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Transportation – oil tankers and LNG fleets 
Transportation of oil and gas occurs through either ship-based transport, in the 
form of oil tankers, super tankers or LNG carriers, or through pipelines 
located under the sea or on land. Often a combination of pipelines and carriers 
will be necessary, depending on the site/rig set up and end market. Oil and gas 
corporations have long been involved in logistic systems that expedite 
transport, lower cost or increase security.124 ExxonMobil, for instance, 
sponsored the 1969 Northwest Passage voyage of the S.S. Manhattan, a 
merchant ship transformed to an icebreaker supertanker.125 The purpose of the 
voyage was to test the feasibility of using the NWP and represented the first 
commercial vessel to navigate the Arctic transportation route.126 Although the 
NWP has not been developed as a commercial transport route yet, oil tankers 
have been used extensively in the Canadian and Russian Arctic. Advances 
have introduced double acting icebreaker and carrier capacity. Icebreakers can 
use stern and bow systems to combat ice conditions while tankers and carriers 
are being built with greater reinforcement against ice and very low 
temperature operation.127 Depending on the size of the tanker or carrier, 
convoys often require two icebreakers as escort.128 However, advances in 
oblique ice breaking capabilities suggest the potential to reduce icebreaker 
escort from two to one.129 Larger tankers are unable to enter ports and carry 
unrefined or crude oil over long distances, whereas smaller ones often carry 
refined petroleum products and work near coasts or inland waters.  
                                                
124 In 1998, one of Russia’s largest oil companies, Lukoil, acquired 50.02% of the Murmansk 
Shipping Company (MSC), shifting the controlling interest in MSC’s polar icebreaker fleet to 
support the interests of an oil company active in developing northern Russian fields. Lawson 
W. Brigham, 'The Northern Sea Route, 1998' (2000) 36(196) Polar Record 19, at 22. 
125 See Chapter 2. 
126 This is also discussed in Chapter 2. For further information on the transit and the 
Northwest Passage refer to Donat Pharand, 'The Arctic Water and the Northwest Passage: A 
Final Revisit' (2007) 38(1&2) Ocean Development and International Law 3, at 38. See also 
the news broadcast from 1969, Norman dePoe, S.S. Manhattan Breaks Through (08 
September 1969) Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
<http://archives.cbc.ca/science_technology/transportation/topics/2349-13648/> at 14 January 
2009. 
127 For example Aker Arctic Technology, a company dedicated to ship design and building, is 
working towards independent cargo ships with ice breaking capabilities. See Mikko Niini, 
'Modern technology - The Key to Arctic Opportunities' (Paper presented at the Arctic Oil and 
Gas Developments, London, 26 September 2005). 
128 Tankers vary in carrying capacity from river tankers which carry a few thousand metric 
tons of deadweight to the mammoth supertankers that carry 550 000 deadweight tons of oil.  
129 See supra n. 127. 
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There is an ever growing fleet of LNG carriers. LNG carriers are up to 305 m 
(1000 feet), may have a carrying capacity up to 120 km3 and require a 
minimum water depth of 25 m to dock, and between 36 and 48 m water depth 
in transport channels when fully loaded.130 In 2006, the global fleet of LNG 
carriers had been 194 vessels with 11 million tonnes of LNG capacity while 
estimates for 2010 to 2020 range from 300 to over 500.131 While predicted 
decreases in sea ice may seemingly increase shipping potential or decrease the 
need for icebreaker escort, corresponding increased variability in conditions 
may hamper shipping progress. As well, shallow seabed depths across the 
northern Russian continental shelf will constrain the movement of LNG 
carriers regardless of decreased sea ice. Whether transport occurs in LNG 
carriers, tankers or supertankers, icebreaker capability and/or support, as well 
as compliance with regulations regarding hull strength, and ice navigation 
systems, are necessary. 
 
Transporting a highly valued resource has become a daily affair with risks 
extending from rough seas to sabotage, theft and modern-day piracy. Primary 
risks to production and transportation in the polar regions stem from poor 
weather conditions, low ambient temperatures, volatile ice conditions and 
long periods of winter darkness.132 The most significant and potentially 
dangerous factor in polar operations is the presence of sea and glacial ice on 
the ocean’s surface, which also present a serious structural hazard to 
                                                
130 Petroleum News, Icebreaker LNG Carriers for Arctic Alaska Gas an Interesting but 
Challenging Concept (Vol.13, No.24, 15 June 2008) 
<http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/114342229.shtml> at 24 March 2009. See also 
Bob Curt, Marine Transportation of LNG (Presentation given by Ship Acquisition Manager, 
QatargasII, at the Intertanko Conference 29 March 2004) 
<http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/DWP_--_Marine_Transportation_of_LNG.pdf> at 24 
March 2009. 
131 Saeid Mokhatab, Michael J. Economides and David Wood, 'Natural Gas and the LNG 
Trade - A Global Perspective' (2006) 85(7) Hydrocarbon Processing 39, at 42. Estimates also 
available from Witherby Seamanship International, LNG Shipment by Sea - Current and 
Future Situation 
<http://www.witherbyseamanship.com/pages/category/category.asp?ctgry=GasBoats&cookie
_test=1> at 20 August 2010. 
132 Refer to the introduction of the IMO Arctic Guidelines, infra n. 140, which provides some 
background to unique risks of operating in the Arctic. 
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vessels.133 Ships navigating ice-covered waters need obvious structural 
reinforcement in the bow but damage can also occur to other parts of the hull, 
the propellers, shafts, and external steering gear.134 Cold temperatures may 
reduce the effectiveness of deck machinery, reduce the structural integrity of 
some materials and cause superstructure icing, which hampers stability and 
navigation, especially if the radar system is adversely affected.135 Darkness 
and poor visibility can also hinder navigation, while entrapment in 
compressive ice can throw a vessel off course into a perilous situation and/or 
cause structural damage.136 Navigational charts and aids for much of the polar 
oceans, Arctic and Southern, are less developed and currently there are no 
traffic separation schemes or standardized Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) in 
place.137 Icebreaker assistance may be limited and remoteness makes rescue 
and clean-up operations difficult and costly.138  
 
There are several layers of regulations that attempt to develop and implement 
international shipping standards. This occurs through the IMO, states, ship 
owners, cargo owners, industry bodies and classification societies. 
International standards apply to polar shipping activities but may not capture 
polar-specific issues. Therefore, harmonization of international standards with 
polar-specific issues and requirements must also occur. 
 
National legislation and rules based on transportation safety and 
environmental standards provide ship owners and operators with specific 
                                                
133 Diana Pietri et al, 'The Arctic Shipping and Environmental Management Agreement: A 
Regime for Marine Pollution' (2008) 36(5) Coastal Management 508, at 518. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., at 519. The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment reports on the gaps in navigational 
charts, traffic schemes and shipping lanes applicable in the Arctic. Only Canada and Russia 
specifically regulate Arctic shipping. Canada has a vessel traffic scheme (NORDREG) and 
routing requirements under the Shipping Safety Control Zones for the Arctic. Russian 
authorities give careful consideration to navigation under the permit applications and ice 
piloting is mandatory under NSR Regulations. Refer to Chapter 2 as well as the PAME, 
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (2009) Arctic Council 
<http://pame.arcticportal.org/images/stories/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf> 
at 10 November 2009, at 66-67 for a synopsis. 
138 Ibid., PAME, at 64-66 for a description of issues regarding marine insurance, salvage and 
liability. See p. 55 for a review of maritime safety and standards. These issues exist for the 
Arctic and the Southern Ocean. 
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requirements that must be complied with prior to navigating or transporting 
oil and gas. Regulations may extend to provide specific requirements for ships 
traveling through the Arctic, such as the Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention 
Regulations under Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act or 
Russian Northern Sea Route Regulations discussed in Chapter 2. Also 
mentioned in Chapter 2, efforts are being made to standardize requirements 
for ship builders, owners and operators through the Guidelines for Ships 
Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters (Arctic Guidelines), Unified 
Requirements for Polar Ships, and the International Code of Safety for Ships 
in Polar Waters (POLAR Code). These are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Private contracts are also drawn between ship owners and commercial parties, 
such as cargo owners, under private maritime law. These contracts, such as 
carriage contracts or charter parties (for movement of petroleum, minerals and 
LNG) also take into account relevant international law, ensuring, for example, 
that under a carriage contract, ship owners ensure that their ships meet 
international standards for human safety and environmental protection. 
Industry bodies can also influence these carriage contracts. For example, the 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) 
has devised generally accepted standard terms of trade to be included as 
necessary in individual charter parties.139 The Baltic and the International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO) has also created ‘ice clauses’ that permit a carrier 
to deviate from contract terms to prevent a ship from becoming icebound.140 
Private carriage contracts and charter parties can account for international 
standards and there is potential for these to be adapted to polar conditions.  
 
Shipping 
Arctic Guidelines 
The Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters (Arctic 
Guidelines), developed largely between 1993 and 1997, were adopted by IMO 
                                                
139 Ibid., at 64. 
140 Ibid. 
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in 2002.141 As mentioned, these guidelines draw together the technical rules 
for shipping and provide recommendatory provisions. For example, the 
guidelines recommend that ships should have structural arrangements to resist 
ice loads and be strengthened to resist design structure/ice interaction. The 
guidelines recommend the provision of equipment and supplies, including life 
preserving equipment and fire management equipment that can withstand cold 
temperatures. Arrangements should be in place to protect against ice build-up 
and accelerated structural degradation. As well, according to the guidelines, 
all ships operating in Arctic ice-covered waters should carry at least one Ice 
Navigator. Ice navigators should have documentary evidence of having 
completed approved ice navigation training.   
 
Member States of IMO are encouraged to bring these guidelines to the 
attention of ship owners and other parties concerned with Arctic shipping 
operations. However, these are non-binding guidelines.142 There are reported 
shortcomings in the guidelines, such as the absence of reference to a 
standardized and recognized ice navigation training program, and there is no 
requirement of documented Arctic navigation service.143 The guidelines are 
not explicit in detail regarding regulations concerning icing, design structure 
or material selection or towage in ice-covered waters.144 Nonetheless, the 
guidelines provide a good first step towards generally accepted international 
standards that in due course may be absorbed into binding provisions. 
Consequently, mandatory guidelines for shipping activities in the polar waters 
are being pursued through the IMO with the support of Arctic Ocean coastal 
states and Antarctic Treaty Parties.145  
                                                
141 Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters, IMO MSC Circular/Circ. 
1056, MEPC/Circ. 399 (23 December 2002). 
142 Øystein Jensen, 'Arctic Shipping Guidelines: Towards a Legal Regime for Navigation 
Safety and Environmental Protection' (2008) 44(229) Polar Record 107, at 111. Member 
State of IMO may not have implemented these specific regulations through binding 
legislation; however, compliance with existing Arctic legislation is facilitated through the 
guidelines. 
143 Ibid., at 111 and supra n. 137, PAME, at 57. 
144 Ibid. 
145 As discussed at the 2010 Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Chelsea, Canada, 
Arctic coastal states are pursuing a mandatory regime to make shipping in the Arctic waters 
safer. See The Honourable Lawrence Cannon (Chairman), Chairman's Summary of the Arctic 
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Unified Requirements for Polar Ships 
Complementary to the Arctic Guidelines, the IACS ‘Unified Requirements for 
Polar Ships’146 pertain to polar ships working in both regions and therefore 
capture both Arctic and Antarctic shipping activities. Adopted on 01 July 
2006, the ‘Polar Class Rules’ are similar to the Arctic Guidelines but cover 
more explicit material, design and structural requirements, taking into 
consideration different force equations.147 The ‘Unified Requirements’ still 
defer to rules of individual societies and are therefore not completely uniform 
across all societies. Deficiencies have also been recognized in provisions 
regarding hull requirements and ice compression loads.148 Nonetheless, all 
members of IACS will incorporate these requirements into their classification 
rules and as they are complementary to the Arctic Guidelines, further 
harmonization is possible as the Guidelines are updated. 
 
International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters (POLAR Code) 
There are no Antarctic-specific Shipping Guidelines endorsed through the 
IMO. Following the adoption of the Arctic Guidelines, states involved in the 
Antarctic undertook a review of the IMO guidelines to evaluate their 
applicability to the Antarctic. This began in 2003 through the Council of 
Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP).149 COMNAP 
                                                                                                                          
Ocean: Foreign Ministers' Meeting (29 March 2010, Chelsea, Canada) 
<http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/arctic-meeting_reunion-arctique-
2010_summary_sommaire.aspx?lang=eng> at 30 March 2010. At the Baltimore ATCM 
(2009), the Antarctic Treaty Parties resolved to write to the IMO to express their desire that 
the IMO commence work towards mandatory requirements for ships operating in Antarctic 
waters. See Resolution 8(2009) - ATCM XXXII - CEP XII, 06-17 April, Baltimore: Antarctic 
Shipping Code.    
146 International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Unified Requirements 
Concerning Polar Class, adopted 01 July 2006, revised 2007, effective as of 01 March 2008. 
147 Unified Requirements have been adopted for numerous issues including Polar Class. Other 
Unified Requirements exist for navigation, mobile offshore drilling units, gas tankers, and 
strength of ships. A list of the Unified Requirements, as well as access to the documents, is 
available at <http://www.iacs.org.uk/publications/publications.aspx?pageid=4&sectionid=3> 
at 04 February 2009. 
148 Supra n. 142, at 110-111. 
149 Prior to the 2003 initiative, an ‘Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Guidelines for 
Antarctic Shipping and Related Activities’ had taken place in London in 2000. At that time, 
and in a later 2002 Information Paper drafted by COMNAP, it was recognized that the IMO 
was working to develop the Arctic Guidelines and that when available these guidelines would 
be a useful basis for developing Antarctic Guidelines. See Council of Managers of National 
Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), 'WP 09: Working Paper on the Applicability to the Antarctic 
 293 
produced a revised edition of the Arctic Guidelines to apply to the Antarctic. 
These revised guidelines were endorsed by the ATCPs at the Cape Town 
ATCM in 2004 and national representatives were urged to take action at the 
IMO to have these guidelines considered.150 By 2007 the Sub-Committee on 
Ship Design and Equipment, under the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
IMO, had been assigned the task of extending the Arctic Guidelines to make 
them applicable to Antarctic waters.151 It was recognized that in addition to 
extending the guidelines to the Antarctic, general updates needed to be done 
to account for technical developments since the approval of the Arctic 
Guidelines in 2002.152 In 2008 a correspondence group was established to 
prepare a draft of revised guidelines for consideration by the sub-committee in 
March 2009.153 Antarctic Treaty Parties reiterated their support of IMO 
progress towards mandatory requirements at ATCM XXXII in Baltimore.154 
Harmonization of the IMO guidelines and classification society rules such as 
the IACS Polar Class Rules has lead to the development of the International 
Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters – the ‘POLAR Code’ for the 
shipping industry.155 Endorsement through the IMO and industry 
organizations will capture a significant amount of the shipping activities 
through state and industry member responsibilities.  
 
                                                                                                                          
of the IMO "Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters"' (Paper presented 
at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXVII - CEP VII, 24 May-04 June, 
Cape Town, South Africa, 2004). 
150 See Decision 4 (2004) - ATCM XXVII - CEP VII, 24 May-04 June, Cape Town: Shipping 
Guidelines. It is worth noting here that the driver for Antarctic Guidelines is not the potential 
for oil and gas transportation and development but the ever-growing presence of ship-based 
tourism. 
151 International Maritime Organization, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 50th 
Session, 5-9 March 2007 <http://www.imo.org/> at 23 March 2009. 
152 Ibid. 
153 International Maritime Organization, Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 51st 
Session, 18-22 February 2008 <http://www.imo.org/> at 23 March 2009.  
154 Supra n. 145, Resolution 8(2009). 
155 In accordance with Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO, 86th Session (27 May 
to 05 June 2009) <http://www.imo.org/> at 24 August 2009, the MSC has adopted the revised 
guidelines for ships operating in polar waters. Following concurrent approval by the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) and subsequent adoption by the IMO Assembly, 
the POLAR Code will be adopted.  
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Pipelines 
Pipelines have traditionally been used to transport either oil or gas across land 
or submerged land, connecting the raw resources to refinement infrastructure 
or the refined resource to a consumer grid. Shorter pipelines provide less risk 
to the environment. Polar climates introduce increased challenges, such as 
permafrost layers on land and iceberg scouring risks associated with offshore 
pipelines. Criteria for site selection, construction and maintenance are 
established by state regulations or guidelines, such as the Canadian Northern 
Pipeline Guidelines. These guidelines were created in 1970 and amended in 
1973 in response to the growing need for a pipeline that would carry resources 
from the Beaufort Sea region to southern markets.156 
 
5.4 Impacts of oil and gas development 
Oil and gas development entails a potentially large impact on the 
environment, with potential harm incurred by local marine and terrestrial 
ecosystems in the form of contamination from agents such as lubricating 
fluids, drilling fluids, emulsifying agents, chemical or polymer additives, 
additional noise pollution, atmospheric discharge, discharged solids and/or 
drilling wastes.157 Northern development onshore has been linked to animal 
predation and migration pattern changes and significant contamination.158 Oil 
contamination in the marine environment, as well as ship-based pollution and 
rig-based pollution, threaten the polar marine environments during scientific 
drilling projects, commercial exploration, development and transportation.  
 
There have already been numerous maritime incidents in the polar regions. 
For example, in 1987 the Danish supply vessel, Nella Dan, ran aground at 
sub-Antarctic Macquarie Island,159 releasing 125 tonnes of diesel fuel.160 This 
                                                
156 Supra n. 95, at 378 and 380. 
157 Benjamin K. Sovacool, 'Environmental Damage, Abandoned Treaties, and Fossil-Fuel 
Dependence: The Coming Costs of Oil and Gas Exploration in the "1002 Area" of the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge' (2007) 9(2) Environment, Development and Sustainability 187, at 
189-197. 
158 For a comprehensive look at environmental hazards of oil and gas development in the 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska see ibid., at 190-191. 
159 The ship was chartered to the Commonwealth of Australia and ran aground 0.5 miles off 
Macquarie Island where it was resupplying an Australian National Antarctic Research 
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was considered to be a ‘major oil spill’ by the Australian Maritime Safety 
Authority.161 Gotland II sank in 1981 and a private ship, the Southern Quest, 
sank in 1986.162 On 28 of January 1989 the Argentinean Bahia Paraiso ran 
aground two miles (3.2 km) off the coast of Antarctica, releasing 
approximately 250 000 gallons (925 000 litres) of diesel fuel and petroleum 
into the marine and coastal environment.163 On 23 November 2007, the 
Liberian flagged Canadian tourist vessel MS Explorer sank off King George 
Island, leaving an estimated 1.5-5 km2 trail of diesel fuel,164 while more of the 
50 000 gallons (185 000 litres) continued to flow from a depth of 4790 feet 
(1460 m) where the vessel now rests on the sea floor.165  
 
The most famous (infamous) oil spill to have affected the Arctic occurred on 
24 March 1989 when the Exxon Valdez hit a reef while manoeuvring to avoid 
ice in the shipping lanes and released over 11 million gallons (42 million 
litres) of oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound.166 The marine environment 
                                                                                                                          
Expedition (ANARE) station at Buckles Bay. It was refloated and sank 24 December 1987 
offshore at 54˚37.5’S Longitude 159˚13.3’E Latitude. Information available from the 
Government of Australia, 'Report on the Preliminary Investigation into the Grounding of the 
MV Nella Dan at Macquarie Island on 03 December 1987' (1988), at 6, 8 and 18.   
160 Ibid., at 22. Total consisted of 120 m3 of diesel fuel and 5 m3 of lubricating oil.  
161 Australian Maritime Safety Authority, Major Oil Spills in Australia (2006) Australian 
Government 
<http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Major_Oil_Spills_in_Australia/> 
at 12 December 2007. 
162 Referred to in COMNAP, 'WP 25: Working Paper on "Worst Case" & "Less than Worst 
Case" Environmental Scenarios' (Paper presented at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting (ATCM) XXV - CEP V, 10-20 September, Warsaw, 2002). 
163 Information on this spill can be found at the Energy Information Agency, Antarctica: Fact 
Sheet (2000) United States Government <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/antarctica.html> 
at 12 December 2007. 
164 CTV.ca News Staff, Sunken Canadian Cruise Ship Leaves Oil Spill (30 November 2007) 
CTV News 
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20071130/oil_ship_071130/200711
30?hub=World> at 12 December 2007 reported a 1.5 km trail. In the official report by the 
Republic of Liberia, the trail of oil sheen was immediately observed over 2.5 km2 and 
extended to 5 km2 two days after sinking. See Belgium, 'Information Paper (IP) 120: Decision 
of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs of the Republic of Liberia and the Report of the 
Investigation in the Matter of Sinking of Passenger Vessel EXPLORER (O.N. 8495) on 23 
November 2007 in the Bransfield Strait near the South Shetland Islands' (Paper presented at 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXXII - CEP XII, 06-17 April, 
Baltimore, 2009), at 40. 
165 MSNBC, Sunken Antarctic Cruise Ship Left Oil Spill (30 November 2007) Microsoft 
Network <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22039975> at 12 December 2007. For the official 
report on the sinking refer to ibid., Belgium IP 120(2009).  
166 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Oil Program: Exxon Valdez (2006) U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency <http://www.epa.gov/oilspill/exxon.htm> at 13 December 
2007. 
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and over 1700 km of coastal biodiversity and ecosystems were affected.167 
The size of the spill and its remote location, accessible only by helicopter and 
boat, complicated the clean up efforts and significantly tested the existing 
response and remediation plans. While the environmental damage was 
detrimental and unfortunate, the Exxon Valdez incident played an important 
role in understanding the oil remediation process,168 progressing 
environmental standards for oil transport and integrating improved 
environmental monitoring.169 The recent Deepwater Horizon rig explosion 
and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which began on 20 April 2010 has been 
compared to the Exxon Valdez spill and is a reminder of the impact and 
consequences of oil spills in the offshore environments.170 
 
5.5 Polar development within the operating systems 
Notwithstanding the environmental, infrastructure and technical limitations, 
offshore petroleum drilling and capture has undergone significant changes and 
improvements in its lifetime, enabling difficult oil and gas fields to be 
developed. Hydrocarbons once thought to be inaccessible because of water 
depth and/or harsh conditions are now being captured and processed. No 
longer isolated from the main markets, Arctic oil and gas will likely play a 
more significant role in energy supplies. Inaccessible and non-profitable 
                                                
167 The Bahia Paraiso and the Exxon Valdez played an important role in the CRAMRA 
negotiations, discussed in Chapter 3. 
168 J.R. Bragg et al, 'Effectiveness of Bioremediation for the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill' (1994) 
368(6470) Nature 413, at 413. 
169 In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez incident, US Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990, which required the Coast Guard to strengthen its regulations on oil tankers, their 
operators and owners. Refer to supra n. 166. 
170 Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon drill rig, operated under contract terms for British 
Petroleum, had been drilling in deep water (5000 ft or 1524 m) approximately 130 miles (209 
km) offshore Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. A blowout explosion on 20 April 2010 caused 
the rig to catch fire and eventually sink, killing 11 people and severely injuring a further 17. 
Oil began to spill from the well and the offshore surface. Estimates of oil being released from 
the well ranged initially from 1000 barrels of oil per day to over 5000 barrels per day. The full 
extent of the damage is unknown. For information on the project and the incident refer to 
British Petroleum (BP), The Deepwater Horizon Incident 
<http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9033573&contentId=7061731> at 04 May 
2010; Offshore-technology.com, Macondo Prospect, Gulf of Mexico, USA 
<http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/macondoprospect/> at 04 May 2010 and 
media report by Rowena Mason, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill: a Q and A (04 May 2010) 
Telegraph.co.uk 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/7677217/Gulf-of-
Mexico-oil-spill-a-QandA.html> at 04 May 2010.  
 297 
estimates of Antarctic resources by today’s standards may eventually become 
less of a barrier in the future. Increased attention on resource potential of the 
Antarctic may foster industry interest. 
 
Although very different levels of knowledge exist concerning real resource 
potential of the Arctic compared to the Antarctic, the entitlement to and 
exercise of sovereign rights, alongside cooperative mechanisms within the 
Arctic and Antarctic operating systems, provides a platform for discussing the 
accommodation of development and conservation interests. Sovereign rights 
for the Arctic coastal states are recognized and their application coincides 
with implementation of development and conservation initiatives at a state 
level. Thus far, industry development and regulatory initiatives relate to the 
marine space or continental shelf within 200 NM. Since delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf is still progressing, less regulatory and jurisdictional 
certainty exists for the outer continental shelf area. In the Antarctic, the 
application of sovereign rights must also conform to the principles of the 
Antarctic Treaty, which has created a bifocal approach. Within all of the 
maritime zones, including the outer continental shelf area, the ability of 
coastal states to apply their sovereign rights is balanced with the inability for 
any assertion of these rights to be recognized.171   
 
Measures related to specific activities occurring within the 200 NM EEZ and 
continental shelf may be implemented at national and sub-national levels 
without encroaching on the rights of other states or groups. Development of 
the outer continental shelf seabed resources can occur through exclusive 
sovereign rights to the resources by the coastal state and provisions under 
Article 82 of LOSC.172 However, the water column above the outer 
continental shelf is not subject to the same exclusivity of development or 
conservation granted to the coastal state under Article 77 of LOSC.173 In fact, 
                                                
171 Article IV, Antarctic Treaty. 
172 As long as obligations under Article 82 are fulfilled with respect to contributions being 
made to the ISBA for redistribution, interference in resource development by the international 
community may be minimal. 
173 Article 77 provides for exclusive sovereign rights to the seabed and subsoil resources of 
the continental shelf. The water column beyond 200 NM is outside this jurisdiction and is 
considered high seas, subject to Part VII of LOSC. 
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responsibility of the coastal state over these waters may be limited in terms of 
the LOSC. Access to the high seas and concomitant shared responsibilities for 
the protection of the high seas marine environment will collide with resource 
development interests in the outer continental shelf and Area. The 
international community may indirectly be able to intervene with resource 
development through these rights and responsibilities.  
 
Arctic continental shelf resource development raises jurisdictional and 
governance issues similar to those faced by states in the Antarctic. Thus, the 
issue of continental shelf delimitation, resource development and conservation 
must be considered against the existing operating systems, their actors and 
sources of law. The interest of third states (defined as non-Arctic states, or 
states not bound to the LOSC or the ATS) concerning jurisdiction over the 
high seas in the Arctic and the ocean and seabed area south of 60˚S may also 
be considered against the backdrop of the operating systems. Different 
approaches, such as extended jurisdiction, custodianship and/or joint 
development, provide interesting adaptations within the operating system and 
depend on the existence and clarity of sovereign rights. They also depend on 
the responsibilities outlined under the LOSC, customary law and more 
specific regimes such as the ATS.  
 
5.6 Arctic development 
Arctic jurisdiction and regulatory measures 
Implementation and enforcement of development and regulatory rules and 
laws are created at national and even sub-national (i.e. territorial) level to 
assist development and protect the marine environment.174 Arctic-specific 
issues may be effectively undertaken with respect to the EEZ and continental 
shelf. Arctic coastal states implement development and conservation measures 
unilaterally for their continental shelf and outer continental shelf areas. 
                                                
174 For example, the National Energy Board of Canada develops and enforces regulatory 
requirements for Canadian Arctic offshore development. The Mineral Management Service of 
the US State Department maintains a similar role for the US. The nature and standards of the 
rules and regulations are the responsibility of the state.  
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Alternatively, measures can take the format of agreed cooperative 
management, which is then implemented at a national or sub-national level. 
Arctic regional initiatives that encapsulate issues of resource use and 
conservation of the continental shelf and the Arctic marine environment 
already exist through international conventions, such as the 1990 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Cooperation,175 to which all of the Arctic states are party. Regional treaties 
and bilateral agreements such as the 1993 Nordic Agreement,176 the Joint 
Contingency Plan of the United States and the Russian Federation on 
Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas, the Canada-United 
States Joint Marine Contingency Plan and the 1994 bilateral Agreement 
between Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation on the 
Combating of Pollution in the Barents Sea also capture Arctic states and 
Arctic issues.177 As well, Working Groups and initiatives of the AEPS and 
Arctic Council, although non-binding, are capacity-building and carry over 
into national implementation.178  
 
Specific initiatives of the Arctic Council and AEPS have targeted oil and gas 
activities in an effort to highlight and minimize negative effects. The Working 
Group for the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) has, 
since the 1996 Inuvik Ministerial Meeting, had clear priorities in the Regional 
Programme of Action for the protection of the Arctic marine environment 
from radioactive waste and pollution caused by land-based and marine 
                                                
175 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 
adopted at London, 30 November 1990, 30 ILM 747, entered into force 13 May 1995. 
176 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden Concerning 
Cooperation in Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful 
Substances, done at Copenhagen, 29 March 1993, 2084 UNTS I-36173, entered into force 16 
January 1998. 
177 See Timo Koivurova and Erik J. Molenaar, 'International Governance and Regulation of 
the Marine Arctic: Overview and Gap Analysis' (WWF International Arctic Programme, 
2009), at 25 for a description of these and other agreements. 
178 For example, Offerdal comments that while specific and binding measures have not been 
taken within the Arctic Council forum in relation to oil and gas development, involvement in 
Arctic Council initiatives invokes participation by states that may not have otherwise 
participated in such an ‘important collaborative arena’ (p. 146). As well, there are indications 
that some states, such as Norway and its Norwegian Pollution Control Authority, are 
voluntarily ‘regulating its own activities by means of Arctic Council decisions’ (p. 147). See 
Kristine Offerdal, 'Oil, Gas and the Environment' in Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Hønneland 
(eds), International Cooperation and Arctic Governance, Routledge (2007) 138, at 146, 147 
and 150.  
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activities, including oil and gas activities. Consequent to the Inuvik Meeting, 
PAME developed Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines.179 These were first 
adopted at the Alta Meeting in 1997, then revised and endorsed at the Inari 
Meeting in 2002.180 The revisions were based on feedback from numerous 
stakeholders including Arctic governments, regional governments, NGOs, 
indigenous groups, industry representatives and scientists.181 The Report on 
Arctic Energy, prepared by the Working Group on Sustainable Development 
(SDWG),182 also contributed in the field of Arctic energy. On 29 April 2009, 
the Arctic Council Ministers approved the third version of the Arctic Offshore 
Oil and Gas Guidelines, which incorporate information available since 
2002.183 The Guidelines recommend voluntary standards, technical and 
environmental best practices and regulatory controls taking into consideration 
best available technology, integrated and ecosystem management and the 
establishment of special management areas.  
 
The Inuvik Meeting also mandated PAME to work on Arctic Shipping issues 
including working on the International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in 
the Polar Waters (POLAR Code) under the auspices of the IMO. By 2002, 
IMO had adopted revised guidelines, specific only to the Arctic – Guidelines 
for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered Waters.184 Since then, work has 
continued to promote the need for mandatory rather than voluntary guidelines. 
In 2010, Foreign Ministers of the Arctic coastal states acknowledged the need 
for timely adoption of a mandatory regime for shipping in polar waters 
                                                
179 PAME, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (13 June 1997) 
<http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/oilandgasguidelines.PDF> at 06 April 2009. 
180 PAME, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (10 October 2002) 
<http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/ArcticGuidelines.pdf> at 06 April 2009. 
181 Timo Koivurova and David VanderZwaag, 'The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect 
and Prospects' (2007) 40(1) University of British Columbia Law Review 121, at 144, fn 124. 
182 This was prepared in furtherance of request in the Salekhard Declaration of 2006 to 
address Arctic energy issues and provide an overview of cooperation in the field of Arctic 
energy in order to facilitate strategic decisions about future cooperation. The report was 
published during the 2006-2009 Norwegian Chairmanship. See Arctic Council Sustainable 
Development Working Group, Report on Arctic Energy (2006-2009 Norwegian 
Chairmanship) <http://portal.sdwg.org/content.php?doc=76> at 29 March 2010.  
183 PAME, Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (29 April 2009) <http://arctic-
council.org/article/2009/6/updated_oil_and_gas_guidelines> at 23 June 2009. 
184 Supra n. 141. 
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through the IMO and the commitment to developing a legally binding Arctic 
search and rescue instrument in the Arctic Council.185 
 
Further to the oil and gas and shipping guidelines, PAME developed 
Guidelines for Transfer of Refined Oil and Oil Products in Arctic Waters 
(TROOPS),186 which were endorsed by the 2004 Reykjavik Ministerial 
Meeting. The Reykjavik Meeting also endorsed PAME to develop the Arctic 
Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP).187 This plan’s mandate, listed below, contains 
several initiatives that relate directly to oil and gas activities, including 
conducting a comprehensive assessment of Arctic Shipping,188 examining the 
adequacy of the current Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines and 
developing guidelines and procedures for port reception facilities.189  
 
In 2007, an Oil and Gas Assessment was undertaken by AMAP Working 
Group in a combined effort with PAME to establish the current and likely 
future impact of the oil and gas industry. The final reports, released publicly 
in 2008, reflect a careful balance between the interests of sustainable 
                                                
185 These issues, among others relating to Arctic resources, continental shelf delimitation and 
cooperation were discussed at the Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. See the 
Chairman’s summary at supra n. 145. 
186 PAME, Guidelines for Transfer of Refined Oil and Oil Products in Arctic Waters 
(November 2004) <http://old.pame.is/sidur/uploads/TROOP%20-%20English%202.pdf> at 
06 April 2009 (TROOP Guidelines). 
187 PAME, Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) (24 November 2004) 
<http://arcticportal.org/uploads/vx/IW/vxIWcyCi_7UnSBwZDbPVug/AMSP-Nov-2004.pdf> 
at 06 April 2009. 
188 The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) included 2020 and 2050 projections. 
The Assessment was delivered to the 2009 Ministerial meeting. See supra n. 137, PAME, for 
the AMSA report and n. 181, at 164 for discussion leading up to AMSA publication. See also 
the governance report,  David L. VanderZwaag et al, 'Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping' 
(Marine and Environmental Law Institute, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, 10 October 
2008). This report and the AMSA are available on the PAME website 
<http://arcticportal.org/en/pame> at 06 April 2009. 
189 Ibid., n. 180, at 163-173. The proposed action plans of the AMSP are:  
1. Conduct a comprehensive assessment of Arctic shipping 
2. Develop guidelines and procedures for port reception facilities 
3. Examine adequacy of Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 
4. Identify areas for new guidelines and codes of practice 
5. Promote application of the ecosystem approach 
6. Promote the establishment of protected areas, including a network 
7. Consider revision of the Arctic Council Regional Programme for the Protection of 
the Arctic Marine Environment from Land-based Activities 
8. Call for periodic review of international, regional agreements and standards 
9. Promote implementation of contaminant-related conventions or programs and 
possible additional global and regional actions. 
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development, protection and conservation of the Arctic environment, and 
cultural and industry interests. The scientific report tries to expand on 
previous AMAP assessments conducted in 1997 and 1998. Since 1998, there 
has been growth in the oil and gas industry in the Arctic and the current 
assessment takes a broader view of ‘activities’, considers a wider range of 
physical, social and economic effects while providing near term projection for 
oil and gas for each Arctic country.190 Now that the Arctic Oil and Gas 
Assessment report has been completed, the examination of the Arctic Offshore 
Oil and Gas Guidelines191 can be considered against the governance issues. 
Areas can now be identified where bilateral or regional agreements may be 
useful for addressing seabed activities carrying transboundary threats.192 As 
well, the identification of areas for special protection or even prohibition may 
be revealed in light of the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment.193  
 
The mandate of the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response 
(EPPR) Working Group concerns itself with environmental emergencies in 
the Arctic and has undertaken considerable work with respect to the oil and 
gas industry. The EPPR is not, however, a response agency. Members 
exchange information on best practices and conduct projects such as the 
development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies and response 
exercises. Work has primarily focused on oil and gas transport and extraction 
sectors and will continue along this mandate as well as dealing with 
radiological and other hazards including natural ones.194 At the Alta 
Ministerial Meeting in 1997, the EPPR was mandated to develop A Field 
Guide for Arctic Oil Spill Response (1998)195 and strategic plan of action for 
the program area. EPPR work has also contributed to the PAME initiatives 
discussed above. 
                                                
190 Supra n. 19. 
191 Supra n. 183. 
192 Suggested in supra n. 181, at 166. 
193 Ibid. 
194 For information see Arctic Council Emergency Prevention Preparedness and Response 
(EPPR) Working Group, <http://arctic-council.org/working_group/eppr> at 04 April 2009. 
195 EPPR, A Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in Arctic Waters (September 1998) Prepared 
by Edwards H. Owens, Owens Coastal Consultants and Counterspill Research Inc. (Laurence 
B. Solsberg, Mark R. West, Maureen McGrath) for the EPPR <http://eppr.arctic-
council.org/content/fldguide/fldguide.pdf> at 06 April 2009. 
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The Working Group on Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), in its 
effort to protect the Arctic environment, has taken steps to coordinate issues 
that cross jurisdictions. Coordination has occurred for conservation issues 
related to the marine environments of coastal states and of the high seas 
enclave of the Arctic Ocean. A Memorandum of Cooperation between CAFF 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was signed on 31 March 
2009. This memorandum facilitates cooperation between the secretariats of 
the CAFF and CBD and will ‘contribute to building and sharing knowledge, 
creating awareness and enhancing capacity for implementation for the 
Convention [of Biological Diversity] in the Arctic region.’196 Given that the 
CBD is actively working on implementation measures for the conservation of 
biological diversity beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, this cooperation 
may provide opportunity for the interests of Arctic states and the international 
community to merge. 
 
Without a legal mandate, Arctic cooperation has occurred through signed 
declarations rather than adoption by the way of a treaty or binding measures. 
In order to further promote regional governance, the Arctic Council needs 
these declarations to be complemented by national legislation that relates to 
the specific characteristics and needs of the Arctic. As Koivurova and 
VanderZwaag (2007) state,  
[S]ince much of the Arctic falls within the functions of national and 
sub-national legal systems, it is these systems that ultimately 
determine whether the objectives of the AEPS have been met.197  
 
Unfortunately, not all initiatives achieve implementation immediately upon 
adoption. Work needs to continue to shorten the gap between initiatives and 
practical results. For example, research conducted in 2003 on implementation 
of Guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic, an 
                                                
196 Resolution on Cooperation between the Secretariats of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (31 March 2009) 
<http://arctic-
council.org/filearchive/Memorandum%20of%20Cooperation%20between%20CAFF%20and
%20the%20CBD.pdf> at 04 April 2009. 
197 Supra n. 181, at 157.  
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instrument adopted in the 1997 Alta Ministerial meeting,198 revealed that 
regardless of the declaratory commitment of the participants, only a few 
Arctic stakeholders (such as environmental NGOs, indigenous peoples’ 
organizations and administrative agencies) even knew that the EIA Guidelines 
existed.199 Nonetheless, the development of these initiatives remains catalytic 
in the process of regulating activities in a manner that targets Arctic specific 
issues. Outreach to the national and sub-national systems is likely to improve 
with greater communication between participants and within the varying 
levels of stakeholders.  
 
Outer continental shelf and Arctic high seas enclave 
Arctic and non-Arctic states share access to and responsible use of the high 
seas, including the conservation of the marine environment and protection of 
marine biodiversity above the outer continental shelf. Some scholars note 
there are grounds for the five Arctic coastal states to claim jurisdiction over 
the high seas beyond national zones or become ‘custodians’ of the high seas 
enclave.200 The basis of the ‘high seas enclave’ arises from the notion of a 
semi-enclosed sea with special obligations for cooperation.201 As well, Article 
234 grants Arctic coastal states a wider responsibility for jurisdiction 
concerning the protection of ice-covered waters and provides coastal states the 
ability to implement and enforce extensive marine pollution provisions 
potentially above those of generally accepted international standards.202 This 
may also provide scope for coastal state authority over the high seas enclave. 
 
                                                
198 Guidelines available from Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Guidelines for 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in the Arctic (13 June 1997) 
<http://arcticcentre.ulapland.fi/aria/procedures/eiaguide.pdf> at 06 April 2009. 
199 Supra n. 181, at 158 and fn 180. 
200 Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Protecting Marine Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction' (2008) 17(1) Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law (RECIEL) 3, at 10. See also discussion in Timo Koivurova, 'Alternatives for an Arctic 
Treaty - Evaluation and a New Proposal' (2008) 17(1) Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 14, at 20 on the ability of coastal states to have 
greater obligations to cooperate in regard to the environment if the Arctic Ocean were 
considered a semi-enclosed sea. 
201 Articles 122-123, LOSC.  
202 Ibid., Article 234. See discussion on this provision in Chapter 1 and 2. 
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So far, practice in the Arctic has developed favouring extensive coastal state 
jurisdiction. Arctic states have claimed ‘special privileges with respect to the 
control of Arctic waters which may include the high seas’.203 Rayfuse even 
considers that ‘precedent certainly exists’ concerning the promotion of the 
Arctic states as custodians of the high seas enclave through the Agreement on 
the Conservation of Polar Bears,204 in which Canada, Denmark, Norway, the 
Russian Federation and the US recognize their ‘special responsibilities’ and 
‘special interests’ in relation to the protection of polar bears.205 
 
Some commentators believe that an international framework for controlling 
uses of the high seas and a high seas marine protected areas (MPA) network 
need to be developed prior to the commencement of outer continental shelf 
resource development.206 Discussions are ongoing through the UN Open-
ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and Law of the Sea and the 
Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Protected Areas, established under 
the CBD.207 Over-arching international treaties, a ‘mixed reform regime’, 
extended jurisdiction through innovative application of existing law,208 and 
high seas MPAs have also been proposed.209 If implemented, these initiatives 
                                                
203 Douglas R. Brubaker, 'Regulation of Navigation and Vessel-Source Pollution in the 
Northern Sea Route: Article 234 and State Practice' in Davor Vidas (ed), Protecting the Polar 
Marine Environment, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Cambridge University Press (2000) 221, 
at 231. 
204 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done at Oslo, 15 November 1973, 13 ILM 
13, entered into force 30 September 1976. 
205 Supra n. 200, Rayfuse, at 10. 
206 For example, see Lee A. Kimball, 'The International Legal Regime of the High Seas and 
the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and Options for Cooperation for the 
Establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Marine Areas Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction.' (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, 
Technical Series no. 19, 2005).  
207 See UNGA A/61/65 of 20 March 2006, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal 
Working Group to Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine 
Biodiversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/277/50/PDF/N0627750.pdf?OpenElement
> at 04 January 2009, at paras 55 and 58. 
208 See discussion below on collective jurisdiction, custodianship and trusteeship. See also 
Olav Schram Stokke, 'A Legal Regime for the Arctic? Interplay with the Law of the Sea 
Convention' (2007) 31(4) Marine Policy 402 and supra n. 200, Koivurova, for views on 
building on existing norms or creating an international treaty. A ‘status quo’ regime as well as 
the ‘mixed reform regime’ are also suggested and discussed in T. Potts and C. Schofield, 
'Current Legal Developments: The Arctic' (2008) 23(1) International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 151, at 173. 
209 For example, the World Summit on Sustainable Development has as one of its goals the 
establishment of a comprehensive global system of representative high seas MPAs by 2010. 
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could signify a shift from jurisdictional limitations to over-arching 
governance.210 A similar shift may be seen in the Mediterranean with the 
recent adoption of a new protocol on integrated coastal zone management211 
where the wider Mediterranean community is expanding beyond the 
traditional allocation of state jurisdiction seawards towards the high seas. 
According to Gavouneli, this development may perhaps redesign the 
traditional jurisdictional tenets of the law of the sea.212 
 
Overarching governance driven by the international community exclusive of 
the Arctic states would pressure coastal states’ rights concerning development 
and conservation of the outer continental shelf seabed. As well, a 
comprehensive instrument to conserve and manage marine biodiversity of the 
Arctic Ocean, whether it is inclusive of only the Arctic coastal states or far 
reaching through global multilateral participation, would have to work closely 
with previously existing instruments that already cover areas of the high seas 
enclaves of the central Arctic Ocean. For example, in the northeast Atlantic, 
two separate multilateral treaties concerning fisheries, and one regarding the 
protection of the marine environment, already encompass high seas enclaves 
in the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea of the central Arctic Ocean.213 The 
Convention on the Future of Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic 
                                                                                                                          
Rosemary Rayfuse, 'Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in a 
Warming World' (2007) 16(2) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (RECIEL) 196, at 213-214. See also supra n. 200, Koivurova, at 20 
which describes the World Wildlife Fund’s proposal for an Arctic Treaty, which includes a 
network of MPAs and n. 206, UNGA A/61/65, at para 35. This CBD Working Group is 
charged with the task of examining and establishing a network of MPAs for areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. See also Rosemary Rayfuse and Robin Warner, 'Securing a Sustainable 
Future for the Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction: The Legal Basis for an Integrated Cross-
Sectoral Regime for High Seas Governance for the 21st Century' (2008) 23(3) International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 399, at 406.  
210 For an overview of the issues posed by high seas MPAs see K.M. Gjerde, 'Current Legal 
Development: High Seas Marine Protected Areas' (2001) 16(3) International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 515-528 and T. Scovazzi, 'Marine Protected Areas on the High 
Seas: Some Legal and Policy Considerations' (2004) 19(1) International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 1-17.  
211 Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean (ICZM Protocol), 
done at Madrid, 21 January 2008, was signed by the states parties to the Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, done at Barcelona, 16 February 1976, 
15 ILM 290, entered into force 12 February 1978 (Barcelona Convention). 
212 Maria Gavouneli, 'Mediterranean Challenges: Between Old Problems and New Solutions' 
(2008) 23(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 477, at 479. 
213 Supra n. 200, Rayfuse, at 8. 
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Fisheries (NEAFC)214 applies to all fishery resources including highly 
migratory species. The Convention on the Conservation of Salmon in the 
North-East Atlantic Ocean215 applies to stocks that migrate beyond areas of 
national jurisdiction. The Convention on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment in the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR)216 regulates existing 
maritime activities to the extent that these activities are not covered by a 
competent global organization such as the IMO.217 It is unlikely that the 
geographical scope would be reduced in order to accommodate another 
overarching high seas instrument.218  
 
Young suggests that the broader jurisdictional claims to seabed in the central 
Arctic Basin, beyond 200 NM from coastlines of the coastal states, be 
suspended or ‘frozen’ to stabilize jurisdictional claims and boundary issues.219 
A cooperative arrangement based on concepts of ‘trusteeship’ or 
‘stewardship’ is proposed to assist in the formulation of collaborative 
arrangements dealing with specific issues, including oil and gas development 
on the outer continental shelf and conservation of the surrounding marine 
environment. Arrangements could be implemented through appropriate 
international arenas, such as existing or de novo regional management 
organizations, the IMO or other institutions, such as the OSPAR Convention 
or CBD. An enhanced role for the Arctic Council, with increased opportunity 
for participation of non-Arctic states as well as a broader array of 
issue/activity specific stakeholders, could link the regulatory arrangements 
                                                
214 Convention on the Future of Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
(NEAFC), done at London, 18 November 1980, 1285 UNTS 129, entered into force 17 March 
1982. 
215 Convention on the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean, done at 
Reykjavik, 02 March 1982, 1338 UNTS 33, entered into force 01 October 1983. 
216 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 
(OSPAR), done at Paris, 22 September 1992, 32 ILM 1069, entered into force 25 March 1998. 
217 In the portion of the Arctic covered by the OSPAR Convention a legal framework already 
exists for the establishment of MPAs (among other initiatives) In 2003, the OSPAR 
Commission set an objective of establishing a network of MPAs by 2010. See supra n. 209, 
Rayfuse, at 214, fn 135 regarding the OSPAR Commission Recommendation 2003/3 on a 
network of MPAs. 
218 Supra n., 200, Rayfuse, at 11. 
219 Oran R. Young, 'Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North' 
(2009) 45(232) Polar Record 73, at 79. 
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and work of the Council.220 Under the soft law arrangements, the Council 
does not have the authority or the capacity to tackle regulatory tasks. 
However, given a strong profile, a concerted effort by the Arctic Council can 
raise awareness of vulnerability of the Arctic and mobilize the political will 
needed to energize various implementation processes that are available 
through the international community and regulatory regimes.221 The Arctic 
Council may further be seen as a precursor to more formalized assertion of a 
collective jurisdictional claim.222 However, if collective jurisdiction requires 
Arctic states to give up their sovereignty and/or third party states to defer their 
rights, such internationalization will have minimal chance of implementation 
in the current political setting.223  
 
Appropriation of control over the ocean by the Arctic coastal states could 
interfere with the interests and legitimate rights of other states. If the 
jurisdictional reach of the Arctic coastal states was extended over the high 
seas, such custodianship would exclude Finland, Iceland and Sweden as well 
as interfere with the interests and rights of non-Arctic states in access to the 
high seas and resources beyond national jurisdiction.224 Unilateral assertions 
of creeping jurisdiction, or custodial management, may be contested as 
inconsistent with the LOSC.225 Also, there is still opposition to the idea that 
special rights are vested to the Arctic coastal states, providing that the Arctic 
                                                
220 Ibid., at 80. 
221 Ibid., at 80-81. For example, Young suggests the IMO is already poised to provide an 
implementation forum for regulations. It is much more practical and politically feasible to 
either amend existing regulations as the need arises or create new regulations through this 
mechanism as opposed to creating an over-arching treaty, or ‘charter’, for the Arctic. 
222 Supra n. 209, Rayfuse, at 210. 
223 For example, in an effort by the international community to establish a marine park, 
protected area or perimeter zone prohibiting development (an ‘Arctic Indicator’) such as 
suggested by Hart, Arctic states’ rights may be deferred. See Barry Hart Dubner, 'On the 
Basis for Creation of a New Method of Defining International Jurisdiction in the Arctic 
Ocean' (2005) 13(1) Missouri Environment Law and Policy Review 1, at 11-12. For further 
discussion see also Julia Jabour and Melissa Weber, 'Is it Time to Cut the Gordian Knot of 
Polar Sovereignty?' (2008) 17(1) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law (RECIEL) 27, at 28 and Louise Angelique de la Fayette, 'Oceans 
Governance in the Arctic' (2008) 23(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
531, at 553. 
224 Supra n. 200, Rayfuse, at 10 and n. 209, Rayfuse and Warner, at 408 and 416. 
225 The Chilean assertion of a ‘presential sea’ and the 2006 announcement from the Canadian 
Prime Minister to ‘extend custodial management’ were given as examples of creeping 
jurisdiction that is hotly contested as inconsistent with the LOSC in ibid., Rayfuse and 
Warner, at 408 and fn 21-22. 
 309 
is a high sea ocean area rather than a semi-enclosed sea for the purposes of 
Article 123.226 
Alongside the concern over whether secondary jurisdiction is acceptable to 
Arctic and non-Arctic states rests the uncertainty over the role of a non-party 
state to LOSC that is also a coastal state (the US). There remains some 
uncertainty as to how the outer continental shelf regime and concomitant 
responsibilities regarding development of the Area and protection of the 
marine environment beyond national jurisdiction apply for third party coastal 
states.227 Nonetheless, there is opportunity for the Arctic operating system to 
absorb these issues and recently the US has indicated interest in acceding to 
LOSC. 228 US Arctic involvement and interest in accession indicates their 
acceptability of working within the existing system to resolve uncertainties 
concerning the practical application of jurisdiction. Asserted support for the 
LOSC, even in the absence of forthcoming accession can assist with achieving 
and maintaining consistency amongst the Arctic coastal states. There is also 
the possibility that even if accession does not precede development, the 
principle of contribution to institutions of LOSC such as the ISBA, may 
evolve into customary practice. 
 
As mentioned previously, the Arctic coastal states have declared their support 
for the current operating system in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration229 and again 
following the Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2010.230 The 
Arctic coastal states advocate minimal interference by new initiatives and 
influence from outside the Arctic operating system. LOSC was open to 
                                                
226 See discussion in Donald R. Rothwell, The Polar Regions and Development of 
International Law, Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge (1996), at 288-291 in 
which the ‘Arctic Lake’ theory is discussed. The ‘Arctic Lake’ theory is based on the Arctic 
Ocean being encircled by the Asian-European continent and North America. Therefore, the 
Arctic states are entitled to assert their own sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Ocean on 
either an individual or collective basis. This theory can be seen as a precursor to the idea of 
the Arctic as an enclosed sea but has never been widely accepted or validated. 
227 For example, is the delimitation of the outer continental shelf beyond 200 NM considered 
customary law or is the US limited to 200 NM? Alternately, does the US have the opportunity 
to extend its jurisdiction to the water column over the outer continental shelf since it is not 
limited by obligations in LOSC? Is the US obliged to contribute to the Authority if 
development is pursued beyond 200 NM?  
228 Discussed in Chapter 4 (see n. 51). 
229 Ilulissat Declaration (29 May 2008) <http://www.cop15.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BE00B850-
D278-4489-A6BE-6AE230415546/0/ArcticOceanConference.pdf> at 11 June 2008. 
230 Supra n. 145, Statement by Meeting Chairman, The Honourable Lawrence Cannon.  
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amendments in 2004, ten years after its entry into force; however, nothing has 
occurred in terms of changing the text of the convention. Currently, there 
remains ample room for interpretation of the provisions as issues surface and 
require practical solutions. And until consensus is arrived at with respect to 
appropriate and practical interpretations, the text itself is unlikely to be 
adjusted. Adjusting the terms of LOSC or creating addition regimes to run 
parallel and in conformity to LOSC may undermine the interpretation and 
application of LOSC. 
 
5.7 Discussion of Arctic robustness and development 
Exploration and development of offshore Arctic resources has occurred since 
the early 1960s. Barriers to development have necessitated technological 
developments and improved industry practice. Risk of impact on the marine 
environment and communities of the north will never completely cease. 
However, there are ways to mitigate and respond to impact in the Arctic 
setting. Recently, renewed interest and development has taken place for 
known resources in the Barents Sea offshore Norway and Russia. Interest in 
opening up reserves off the coast of Alaska is growing and continental shelf 
exploration across the Arctic is expanding.231 Capacity exists to continue to 
develop this industry. Infrastructure is in place and jurisdictional certainty 
fosters a working relationship between the state and the oil and gas industry. 
Arctic projects will continue to expand across the regions. Exploitation 
(production rates and amounts) will vary in accordance with local and global 
demand. Arctic projects will also be influenced by projects and incidents that 
occur outside of the region.232  
                                                
231 Supra n. 33, Midttun, at 13-14. 
232 For example, following the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, questions 
were raised concerning industry rules applicable for offshore activities in the Arctic and 
offshore Newfoundland. It is reported that the Prime Minister of Canada has urged the 
National Energy Board to resist calls by industry to amend drilling requirements. The 
companies which had initiated the request for amendments are reported to have since urged 
the Board to suspend examination of the rules and regulations until the causes of this incident 
are understood. It is likely that this incident will have a lasting effect on the offshore 
regulatory framework for the Arctic and elsewhere. See Shawn McCarthy, Harper Slams BP, 
Says Canada has Tougher Rules (04 May 2010) The Globe and Mail 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/harper-slams-bp-says-canada-has-
tougher-rules/article1555953/> at 04 May 2010; James McLeod, Questions Raised in N.L. 
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Within the Arctic operating system, regulation of oil and gas development has 
taken place under a multi-tiered regulatory platform. For most of the Arctic, 
offshore resource development is occurring in areas that are undisputed under 
a coastal state’s jurisdiction. Aside from a few boundary disputes and the 
pending proclamations of the limits of the outer continental shelf, boundaries 
have generally been resolved and jurisdictional/regulatory certainty exists. 
Resolution of existing boundary disputes will require further negotiations 
between involved states.  
 
The distribution of oil and gas resources is not consistent across all of the 
Arctic. Regulations implemented at national levels will vary according to the 
level of current and future activities, economic demand, political history and 
underlying capacity of the state to implement and enforce regulation. 
Inconsistency does occur between the Arctic coastal states and varying levels 
of effectiveness can also occur if effectiveness is measured by the regulatory 
capacity of one state against another’s. However, as demonstrated above, the 
Arctic operating system accommodates the inter-state differences. As well, the 
regulatory capacity of each Arctic state individually does not diminish the 
capacity of the operating system to absorb and manage issues collectively. 
Regulatory differences can occur without derogating any states’ rights or 
abandoning interest in cooperative regional governance. 
 
Oil and gas related activities carried out by state, private or collaborative 
industry enterprises must adhere to the regulatory requirements of the coastal 
state from which licenses are provided. Coastal states are also engaged in the 
work of the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council has identified numerous 
issues that relate to the oil and gas industry. Working Groups have 
implemented numerous projects providing current industry and environmental 
assessments, guidelines and recommendations as well as other important 
                                                                                                                          
After BP Oil Spill (04 May 2010) Telegram and Montreal Gazette 
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/Questions+raised+after+spill/2984680/story.html> at 04 
May 2010 and Nathan VanderKlippe, Gulf Oil Spill Could Affect Rules for Arctic (05 May 
2010) CTV News <http://www.ctv.ca/generic/generated/static/business/article1547474.html> 
at 05 May 2010. 
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issues. States can use the assessments and guidelines of the Arctic Council in 
their licensing and regulatory decisions. Thus, Arctic states maintain authority 
over regulatory decisions and implementation while participating in regional 
collaboration to identify issues and impacts. 
  
Since the Arctic Council includes all of the Arctic states, several indigenous 
groups and representatives of non-Arctic states and NGOs, it provides a 
platform to engage different stakeholders on various issues. Through this type 
of participation, Arctic coastal states are made increasingly aware of concerns 
of other stakeholders without direct pressure being exerted against the 
operating system. Such inclusion strengthens the resilience of the operating 
system against concern from the non-Arctic international community. Having 
insulated the existing operating system, participants promote acceptance, 
legitimacy and confidence in its longevity. 
 
Involvement in the Arctic Council does not require legislative commitment or 
necessitate regulatory changes. Regional oil and gas related initiatives of the 
Council do not attempt to prohibit activities. Nonetheless, there is an 
underlying commitment to ensuring some level of environmental consistency 
across the Arctic states. Involvement by states on a national and sub-national 
basis also ensures transparency over oil and gas activities and environmental 
issues and Arctic Council programs provide an opportunity for states to 
showcase their expertise on an issue such as oil and gas impacts. States, and 
non-state actors with particular issue-specific capacity, can be accessible and 
offer varying levels of assistance through the Arctic Council and other 
regional fora. Amelioration of some issues may not occur without this 
encouragement, capacity-building and assistance.  
 
The programs of the Arctic Council also highlight specific issues and the need 
for more effective regulatory measures without targeting one specific state. 
Current standards of practice and inconsistencies can be identified within the 
constraints of the Arctic Council. Environmental accountability can be more 
transparent when the standards of state practice are set against current 
activities and impacts. In this manner, state practice standards are indirectly 
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set against each other and responsibility for the amelioration of a problem is 
not as easily avoided. The issues are out in the open and states, under their 
own authority, can identify and address shortcomings without being the centre 
of attention or being publicly shamed. This increases accountability without 
derogating states’ rights to regulate activity within their jurisdiction.  
 
States can also choose whether to combat specific issues unilaterally or 
collectively within a cooperative framework. States determine which Council 
outputs are transferred to national legislation. Moreover, states have the 
authority to decide their level of involvement depending on their own 
resources and political incentive. Thus, through the Arctic Council, states can 
be held accountable (albeit indirectly) to their regulatory decisions. 
Responsibility and accountability is shared amongst the Arctic states. This 
fosters interdependency and cooperation. The Arctic Council showcases the 
efforts of the Arctic states as a group rather than putting the states in 
competition against each other. While there is no means of insisting a state 
implement changes or address an issue, sharing accountability reinforces a 
sense of regional responsibility. This also provides a sense of, or at least the 
appearance of, collaboration to the international community.233 
 
In a region where sovereignty and jurisdiction are defined and, for the most 
part, recognized, there is opportunity for national interest, energy security and 
economics to dominate cooperative norms. The pressure to secure 
international supply and adjust to demand for current and future offshore oil 
and gas will contribute to national decisions. Even though the 2010 Arctic 
Ocean meeting and the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration have brought Arctic coastal 
states together, tension in the areas of political and economic differences will 
influence cooperation and may give rise to potential operating system 
instability. However, in terms of the existing operating system, state authority 
concerning energy and military security, is upheld. The presence of such 
authority prevents states from compromising their cooperative 
                                                
233 The AEPS and the Arctic Council were developed in a post-UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) era in which environmental accountability and 
transparency had generated normative status in the global community. 
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responsibilities. For example, the use of military presence to protect borders, 
sovereignty (and therefore jurisdiction) does not jeopardize regional 
collaboration within the operating system. Militarization of the Arctic is not 
prohibited in the operating system nor does the Arctic Council have anything 
to do with military security.234 Therefore, national security interests do not 
interfere with or deter regional cooperation.   
 
Development of the Arctic seabed of the outer continental shelf and beyond is 
not an immediate threat; however, the delimitation of continental shelf area 
and geological assessments of potential resources of the Arctic Ocean Basin 
are indicators that the issues need to be considered within the operating 
system. Resource development of seabed underneath Arctic high seas could 
provoke instability in the operating system. This is especially true if initiatives 
do not foster accountability for sustainable development of the seabed or do 
not conform to existing marine environmental standards – those implemented 
through varying instruments, such as NEAFC, OSPAR, the Convention on the 
Conservation of Salmon in the North-East Atlantic Ocean and the Agreement 
on the Conservation of Polar Bear. Provisions also already exist within LOSC 
for marine scientific research and the protection of the marine environment 
above the outer continental shelf.  
 
Marine environmental measures that indirectly or directly restrict the potential 
for resource development on the outer continental shelf impinge and possibly 
derogate from the sovereign rights of the coastal states concerning 
development and/or conservation. However, the Arctic coastal states have 
reiterated their commitment to these provisions. Thus, any new initiative that 
attempts to broaden development or environmental management across the 
Arctic would have to conform to measures already in place, even though 
existing instruments target different issues. Actors accept existing terms 
through which to accommodate issues related to the marine environment and 
acknowledge the capacity and legitimacy of the existing operating system. It 
                                                
234 In creating the Arctic Council, it was clearly indicated that the ‘Arctic Council should not 
deal with matters related to military security’. See the Declaration on the Establishment of the 
Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), 19 September 1996, 35 ILM 1382-1390. 
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is within the interests of the Arctic states to foster agreement and commitment 
to the current system. Through this commitment the system has retained the 
resilience necessary to combat emerging issues.  
 
Conclusion 
Oil and gas development within the constraints of national jurisdiction is 
occurring in the Arctic offshore setting. National legislation accounts for 
regulation of these activities and the Arctic Council initiatives provide further 
transparency and accountability. Driven by the actors within the operating 
system, the level of involvement satisfies the interest of states to maintain 
state authority while also engaging in regional initiatives that increase 
accountability to regional normative principles and the growing 
acknowledgement of the importance of mitigating environmental damage. The 
current system integrates international concerns and non-state actors including 
indigenous peoples and NGOs without derogating the rights of coastal states 
under LOSC. Individual state authority has been maintained alongside 
regional cooperative initiatives through the non-binding approach inherent 
within the AEPS and Arctic Council. Collective authority of the Arctic coastal 
states has also been reinforced by the ongoing efforts of the Arctic Council 
and by the collective commitment of the states to continue supporting the 
existing system.  
 
Political differences and geopolitical variables have not undermined the 
collective authority within the Arctic operating system. States acknowledge 
the importance of resource security within the region and this 
acknowledgement increases the legitimacy of the system. The ability to steer 
cooperative measures without compromising resource security depends on 
maintenance of states’ rights within the system. Given that states have 
declared their support for the system and demonstrated this support in 
practice, states have accepted and acknowledged that resource security can co-
exist with regional cooperative arrangements. States have demonstrated a 
desire to not create upheaval in the interpretation of LOSC and through this 
commitment they decrease pressure from the international community to 
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move away from LOSC. Undermining the existing balance of LOSC 
provisions, regional treaties and Arctic Council initiatives may create 
significant repercussions. Without minimizing the importance of regional 
environmental considerations, Arctic coastal states have demonstrated 
confidence that upheaval is not desirable.  
 
5.8 Antarctic development 
Antarctic jurisdiction and state rights 
The nuanced approach described in the previous chapter successfully deferred 
the recognition of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf 
appurtenant to Antarctica and prevented placing the CLCS in a position to 
support or deny a basis to claim. The delay in assessing resource potential 
south of 60˚S does not undermine sovereign rights granted under LOSC or the 
balance of sovereignty under the Antarctic Treaty. Claimant states (which are 
also coastal states in the Antarctic) continue to have sovereign rights to the 
seabed appurtenant to the Antarctic. Claimant states may even formulate and 
implement laws as well as enforce those laws against their nationals to 
prohibit development and encourage preservation of the environment. 
However, the effect of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty is that recognition of 
the Antarctic continental shelf and, accordingly, its outer limits and any 
initiatives for conservation or development, cannot constitute a basis for 
supporting or asserting a claim to territorial sovereignty. Attempts at 
enforcement, beyond ensuring the compliance of nationals, would also raise 
concerns that the state involved was acting contrary to the Treaty and the 
norms established over time.  
 
Beyond the concern for unprecedented recognition of claimant status in the 
Antarctic Treaty Area, extended continental shelf claims give rise to the 
consideration that obligations under the ATS are not limited to the Antarctic 
continent. Rather, CCAMLR and Madrid Protocol obligations encompass 
marine ecosystems north and south of 60˚S.235 For example, the prohibition on 
                                                
235 Article 3, Madrid Protocol and Article 1, CCAMLR. 
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mineral resource activity may actually extend north of 60˚S through the 
Madrid Protocol’s application to dependent and associated ecosystems 
articulated in Article 2 of its text.236 Clearly, sub-Antarctic islands such as 
HIMI and Macquarie Island exhibit ecosystems associated to the Antarctic. 
Regardless of jurisdiction being recognized to a state (Australia in this case), 
obligations under the Madrid Protocol and CCAMLR still exist. Rights under 
LOSC to exclusively develop the seabed of these areas do not forsake these 
and other obligations under the ATS.  
 
Alternatively, the Madrid Protocol may not apply to the marine area of the 
Southern Ocean. According to Article VI, of the Antarctic Treaty (which the 
Madrid Protocol defers to for its area of application) nothing in the present 
Treaty prejudices or affects the rights of any states under international law 
with regard to the high seas south of 60˚S. The Protocol’s mining prohibition 
may, therefore, potentially not apply to the marine area by virtue of the 
application of Treaty Article VI. Those marine areas, right up to the coast of 
the Antarctic continent, may be considered the high seas and the seabed part 
of the Area. These interpretations, however, have yet to be tested.  
 
States not party to the Antarctic Treaty are not bound by the provisions or 
prohibitions of the Antarctic Treaty and related Madrid Protocol. These states 
may, however, carry out offshore resource activities under the regulations 
afforded in the LOSC and according to international customary law. 
Provisions in Part XI of LOSC and the jurisdiction of the ISBA would be 
invoked over State Parties to LOSC for activities proposed for the deep 
seabed resources located in the Southern Ocean. There is less certainty 
whether jurisdiction would occur through the ISBA or the relevant coastal 
(claimant) state for activities proposed for the continental shelf appurtenant to 
the Antarctic continent.237 The Antarctic continental shelf could be considered 
area beyond national jurisdiction (because sovereignty is not recognized) but 
                                                
236 Article 2 of the Madrid Protocol reads: ‘The Parties commit themselves to comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and hereby 
designate Antarctica as a natural reserve, dedicated to peace and science.’ 
237 Even though claimants recognize their jurisdiction over their associated continental shelf, 
other states do not have to recognize this jurisdiction, under Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
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outside the mandate of the ISBA (because it is continental shelf rather than 
deep seabed and jurisdiction is recognized by the claiming state). In the 
absence of certainty of the status of the Antarctic continental shelf, state-
derived provisions applicable in the Antarctic Treaty Area could be acceptable 
under terms of international law.  
 
With respect to sub-Antarctic land territories located outside the Antarctic 
Treaty Area, States Parties to LOSC claiming sovereignty over these islands 
are entitled to delimit and proclaim outer limits to the continental shelves 
irrespective of the possibility that the continental shelf will extend into the 
Antarctic Treaty Area south of 60˚S. For this continental shelf seabed, such as 
the continental shelf extending south from HIMI, jurisdiction exists through 
the relevant coastal state. The coastal state, in this case, Australia, has the 
ability to deny or grant access to any state in accordance with its national 
legislation.  
 
The exercise of rights in terms of granting or denying access to the continental 
shelf area can still occur in conformity with Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty.238 The exercise of these rights does not in any way assert a basis or 
support a basis of a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. It also does 
not affect in any way the recognition or non-recognition of a claim or basis of 
claim of territorial sovereignty. In accordance with LOSC, the coastal state, 
from which the continental shelf extends, has exclusive sovereign rights to 
                                                
238 Another region where a continental shelf will extend into the Antarctic Treaty Area is the 
South Sandwich Islands. However, unlike HIMI and Macquarie Island, the sovereignty of the 
South Sandwich Islands is disputed between Argentina and the UK. In accordance with Rule 
46 and paragraph 5(a) of Annex I of the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS, the Commission 
shall not consider a submission by any state concerned in a dispute unless consent has been 
given by all states that are party to the dispute. This is discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 
See UN Document CLCS/40 Rev. 1 of 17 April 2008, Rules and Procedures of the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.htm#Rules%20of%20Proce
dure> at 20 April 2008 and Notes Verbales from the UK and Argentina in response to 
continental shelf submissions concerning the South Sandwich Islands. Permanent Mission of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, Diplomatic 
Note 84/09 (06 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/arg25_09/clcs_45_2009_los_gbr.p
df> at 23 August 2009 and Permanent Mission of the Argentine Republic to the United 
Nations, Diplomatic Note No. 290/09/600 (20 August 2009) 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/gbr45_09/arg_re_gbr_clcs_2009e.
pdf> at 16 April 2010. 
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conduct research239 and potentially develop seabed resources.240 However, for 
that portion of continental shelf which is located south of 60˚S, provisions of 
the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol also apply for Parties to those 
instruments. As such, that national legislation may invoke provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty to third party states.  
 
The Antarctic Treaty applies to the area south of 60˚S and is not explicitly 
limited to land territory.241 Nothing in the Treaty affects the rights of any state 
under international law with regard to the high seas; however, there are no 
explicit limitations or applications for rights associated with resources of 
continental shelf seabed not appurtenant to the Antarctic, but located inside 
the Treaty Area. For the seabed extending from sub-Antarctic islands, a 
bifocal approach to jurisdiction and concomitant obligations under LOSC and 
the ATS could occur in a manner similar to that occurring with CCAMLR 
through the Chairman’s Statement appended to the Convention.242 
 
For example, on the basis of the recommendations adopted on 09 April 2008 
for the outer limits of the Australian continental shelf, Australia can finalize 
and proclaim the continental shelf extending from Macquarie Island and 
HIMI.243 The ability to exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf, 
regardless of its location within the Antarctic Treaty Area, is not dependent on 
proclamation. According to Article 77 and 246, LOSC, Australia has the 
ability to deny or grant a state, including itself, access to this continental shelf 
for research and/or development purposes. Australia is also bound to ATS 
provisions concerning, inter alia, scientific research, the Antarctic 
environment and mineral resource activities. Article III of the Antarctic Treaty 
                                                
239 According to Article 246, LOSC, coastal states have the right to regulate, authorize and 
conduct marine scientific research on their continental shelf. 
240 If development occurs beyond 200 NM in the outer continental shelf, Article 82 of LOSC 
(benefit-sharing) is also applicable. 
241 Article VI, Antarctic Treaty. 
242 The bifocal approach is discussed in previous Chapters. See also Gillian D. Triggs, 'The 
Antarctic Treaty System: Some Jurisdictional Problems' in Gillian D. Triggs (ed), The 
Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, the Environment and Resources, Cambridge University Press 
(1987) 88, at 93. 
243 Summary of the Recommendations (2008) are available from the CLCS website at 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_aus.htm#Recommend
ations_> at 12 May 2010.  
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refers to an obligation to share scientific information derived from research 
undertaken in Antarctica.244 An obligation exists to protect the Antarctic 
environment and the dependent and associated ecosystems.245 Accordingly, 
there is a prohibition on mineral resource activity aside from scientific 
research.246  
 
Actual mechanisms for sharing scientific information, such as results and 
observations, are not explicit in the Antarctic Treaty. There is no time 
constraint applied to information sharing and scientific research is not 
explicitly confined to non-commercial research. Accordingly, Australia is 
within its rights to deny or grant access to the seabed of the HIMI extended 
continental shelf for research purposes. Australia is under no legal obligation 
to share all scientific information derived from research undertaken on or 
within this seabed, nor is research undertaken necessarily limited to science 
expected to be non-commercial in nature. Scientific research that might share 
components of resource prospecting could occur as long as information is 
shared on some level and the research does not directly or immediately 
correspond with mineral resource development activities. Appropriately, 
Geoscience Australia, the state agency housing continental shelf scientific 
data, is also under no legal obligation to withhold information if a commercial 
enterprise becomes interested in this seabed area. Already, through the public 
domain, information can and has (to a limited extent) been made available for 
interpretation.247 Eventually, more accurate assessments of resource potential 
could be made, which in time could precipitate interest in development.  
 
                                                
244 Article III, Antarctic Treaty. 
245 Article 2, Madrid Protocol. 
246 Ibid., Article 7. 
247 For example, information on seabed mapping has led to varying publications such as P.T. 
Harris et al, 'Marine Zone Management and the EPBC Act: How Environmental Marine 
Geological Information Provides Certainty for Petroleum Exploration' (2007) 47(Part 1) 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration (APPEA) Journal 329-345 and Peter 
Southgate, 'Offshore Energy Program Underway: New Programs to Improve Resource 
Estimate' (2008) 90(June) AUSGEO News - Geoscience Australia 1-3. The program 
integrated previous geological surveys with New Petroleum Program seismic survey data 
gathered by Geoscience Australia between 2003 and 2007 to improve resource estimates. 
Data from seabed surveys also contributed to improved understanding of large igneous 
provinces and their resource potential. See, for example, Irena Borissova, 'Kerguelen Plateau - 
A New Look at Basins' (2001) 60(March/April) AUSGEO News - Geoscience Australia 24-
27. 
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At present, commercial progress on the HIMI continental shelf extending 
south of 60˚S is limited by commitments undertaken by Australia under 
national legislation. Commitments Australia has made under the Antarctic 
Treaty (Environment Protection) Act248 to prohibit mineral resource activity 
south of 60˚S in accordance with its interpretation of the Madrid Protocol 
apply alongside provisions of the Sea and Submerged Lands Act249 for 
Australian nationals. If Australia were approached regarding interest in 
pursuing mineral resource activity, rather than data interpretation, by either a 
Contracting Party or non-Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty, it would 
not currently be in a position to permit such activity south of 60˚S, on 
continental shelf or outer continental shelf.250 Despite this seemingly clear 
position, prohibited activity, being not clearly defined, may relate only to 
reservoir specific exploration and development, leaving commercially-related 
research, often referred to as prospecting, still permissible.  
 
Proclamation and outer continental shelf responsibilities 
While entitled to, a coastal state may choose not to proclaim the outer limits 
of a continental shelf which extends into the Antarctic Treaty Area. In the 
case of HIMI, Australia may choose to not proclaim the full extent, stopping, 
rather, at the Antarctic Treaty boundary. If Australia stops the proclamation 
where the outer limit lines meet 60˚S, Australia would defer the sovereign 
rights over those areas further south. The state, in this case Australia, forgoes 
immediate exclusive rights to the seabed within the Antarctic Treaty Area. 
Australia would still have the right to make a revised proclamation in the 
future (discussed below); however, in the absence of indication of intention to 
                                                
248 Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act 1980, as amended 11 June 2007, Cth. 
249 Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, Cth. 
250 In accordance with Part 5, Subsection 19A ‘Prohibition against mining in the Territory’ of 
the Antarctic Treaty (Environment Protection) Act: 
A person must not engage in a mining activity : 
(a) in the [Australian Antarctic] Territory; or 
(b) on any part of: 
(i) the continental shelf of the Territory; or 
(ii) the continental shelf of any of the islands known as Heard and 
McDonald Islands; 
that is within the Antarctic. 
Penalty: Imprisonment for 16 years or 1,000 penalty units, or both. 
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exercise these rights, either through proclamation or state practice, it might be 
at risk of forfeiting its sovereign rights completely.251  
 
For a non-Contracting Party to the Antarctic Treaty, deferred jurisdiction 
might enable that portion of extended continental shelf below 60˚S to be 
considered available for development either through the regulation of the 
ISBA (for those States Parties to LOSC) or without a regulatory authority (for 
states not party to LOSC). Under these terms, this area could be considered 
beyond national jurisdiction and a state interested in potential resource 
development would be free to carry out at least prospecting under the 
accepted terms of marine scientific research.252  
 
At an exploration or development stage, if the international community were 
aware of activities proceeding, pressure and tension might emerge to involve 
the ISBA for State Parties to LOSC. In this case, to avoid administration 
through the ISBA, the state (Australia) previously not proclaiming the 
extended continental shelf area might consider a revised proclamation, 
drawing the outer limit lines all the way around rather than stopping at 60˚S. 
If a revised proclamation is not made, the state will have chosen to continue to 
defer its jurisdiction. In the event development occurs, payments required by 
Article 82 could come directly from the exploiting state to the ISBA, if that 
state were party to the LOSC. The outcome is effectively a substitution of 
Australia’s jurisdictional role for that of the ISBA concerning areas of 
continental shelf not proclaimed by Australia. The ISBA, instead of Australia, 
would grant resource exploitation and collect royalties directly for 
redistribution.  
 
Another possibility that arises if a state chooses to not claim extended 
continental shelf past 60˚S is that obligations under Article 82 would not take 
effect. If the extended continental shelf areas arising from land territory 
outside the Antarctic Treaty Area are not claimed beyond 60˚S, even though 
                                                
251 Proclamation is still pending. Discussed in Chapter 4, n. 257, Bill Campbell QC, Personal 
Communication (25 June 2010).  
252 Part XIII, Articles 238-265, LOSC. 
 323 
they could be, the continental shelf area is effectively without jurisdiction. 
While this might not equate to being beyond national jurisdiction per se, these 
areas could still possibly be considered the responsibility of the ISBA under 
the provisions of Part XI, LOSC. Lack of proclamation would voluntarily 
forfeit, rather than defer, sovereign rights in this area to the ISBA. In this 
scenario, the ISBA might assume a regulatory role over resource development 
under the interpretation that this section of seabed is beyond national 
jurisdiction. Resource exploitation might proceed as common heritage for 
mankind.253  
 
In the future, the ATCPs may collectively encourage claimant states to have 
the CLCS make recommendations on Antarctic data on the basis that 
understanding the scientific constraints of the continental shelf might assist in 
implementing appropriate environmental protection measures. This would 
also have the useful effect of further formalizing the southern boundary of the 
Area. Once the outer limit of the continental shelf appurtenant to Antarctica is 
clearly identified, Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty could maintain a 
more explicit no-development zone around the Antarctic continent and its 
shelf out to the boundary of the Area. Development in the Area south of 60˚S 
would be confined to the deep seabed beyond this boundary in accordance 
with Part XI of LOSC, under the regulation of the ISBA. 
 
Provisions under Part XI include protection and conservation of the natural 
resources of the Area, reduction and control of pollution, waste and 
interference with the ecological balance of the marine environment, as well as 
prevention of damage to the flora and fauna.254 LOSC deems that exploitation 
must be carried out in a manner that ‘fosters healthy development of the world 
economy and balanced growth of international trade’ with a view of ensuring 
rational management of the resources, promotion of long-term equilibrium of 
supply and demand and prevention of monopolization of activities.255 Clearly, 
                                                
253 Ibid., Article 1 defines the Area as the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond 
national jurisdiction. Part XI regulates the resource exploitation of the Area. 
254 Ibid., Article 145. 
255 Ibid., Article 150. 
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there are indications of a precautionary approach to exploitation of the 
resources.  
 
However, managed exploitation still cannot equate to the prohibition in place 
under the Antarctic Treaty for ATCPs and Parties to the Madrid Protocol. 
Commitment to the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol, through the 
national legislation of signatory states, currently achieves an effective legal 
means of closing off development within the Antarctic Treaty Area (at least 
for those Parties). As long as those relevant states remain committed to 
denying direct commercial research and development on continental shelf 
seabed extending into the Antarctic Treaty Area (irrespective of the 
concomitant rights granted through Article 77 of LOSC and the narrow 
interpretation of the area of application of the Antarctic Treaty) potential 
resource development on these continental shelf areas is delayed in the same 
way delay is incurred for research and development of the Antarctic 
continent’s continental shelf. 
 
Any gesture that assumes greater rights to any one state, such as a unilateral 
assertion of jurisdictional entitlement or initiation of resource development in 
breach of the Treaty, would evoke considerable attention from many of the 
Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties. These gestures could ignite instability in 
the ATS. With any breach of a treaty, states have the right to react to such 
activity through appropriate diplomatic and/or legal channels. However, if the 
terms of the ATS hold less importance under burgeoning resource demands, 
any Party could withdraw from the Antarctic Treaty. Once withdrawn, the 
state is no longer bound by restrictive provisions and has the legal freedom to 
carry out resource activity. Once one party withdraws others may follow, 
abandoning the Antarctic Treaty altogether.256 
 
In the event the Antarctic Treaty was not in place, territorial disputes in the 
Antarctic would, in all likelihood, resurface. Issues regarding unsettled 
                                                
256 Refer to the discussion on the ‘walkout’ clause (Article 25) of the Madrid Protocol, in 
Chapter 3. Once the Antarctic Treaty is abandoned rights protected under Article IV regarding 
territorial claims and non-recognition no longer exist. Claimant state status may be overtly 
challenged or blatantly disregarded, potentially unraveling the existing norms of behavior. 
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boundaries would rematerialize for discussion. Submissions to the CLCS have 
already stimulated diplomatic responses from states with overlapping claims 
as well as comment from non-claimants and states reserving their rights to 
make a claim to territorial sovereignty (the Russian Federation and the US).257 
Presumably, this reserved right could be exercised if the Antarctic Treaty 
dissolved. If the Russian Federation or the US pursued a claim and the claim 
went undisputed, only the Russian Federation would have the clear ability to 
invoke the processes of the CLCS for its new Antarctic claim. There is 
potential, of course, for a Russian claim to precipitate US accession to LOSC 
so that it is not disadvantaged.258 
 
Regardless, it is unlikely that continental shelf delimitation and development 
will be forthcoming or immediately acceptable to the international 
community. Nor would any new claim to the Antarctic in the absence of the 
Antarctic Treaty be immediately acceptable. A drastic paradigm shift would 
have to occur, unraveling the web of governance that has developed around 
the Antarctic Treaty since 1961 and the perception of states within and outside 
the ATS. At present, evidence supporting any kind of shift is lacking. Even 
with the recent events of Russia planting flags on the seabed in the northern 
and south regions,259 Russia, along with other states, have reiterated their 
commitment to the Antarctic Treaty.260 The recent Ministerial Declaration 
marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty also reaffirms ATCP 
commitment to the objectives and purposes of the Treaty and ATS, including 
Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol.261  
 
                                                
257 See Chapter 4. 
258 See above discussion for the Arctic around supra n. 227. 
259 Tom Parfitt, Russia Plants Flag on North Pole Seabed (02 August 2007) The Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/02/russia.arctic> at 08 August 2007 and 
Mercopress, Russia Plants Flag in Seabed Ratifying Antarctica Ambition (19 February 2008) 
<http://www.mercopress.com/vernoticia.do?id=12675&formato=html> at 13 May 2008. 
260 In Russia’s case, director of the Russian Antarctic Program, Valerie Lukin, of the Arctic 
and Antarctic Research Institute in Russia has denied comments in the media (having never 
spoken to journalists) and confirms that Russia is fully cognizant of its obligations under the 
Antarctic Treaty and is committed to them. Andrew Jackson, former Principal Policy Advisor, 
Australian Antarctic Division, Personal Communication (23 February 2009). 
261 Washington Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty - 
Appendix I, Final Report of ATCM XXXII - CEP XII, 06-17 April 2009, Baltimore. 
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Since there is no immediate development potential in the Antarctic to raise 
any of these concerns and there have not been any official proclamations 
made corresponding to continental shelf limits, the possible deferral of 
regulation to the ISBA remains untested. A claimant state is unlikely to forfeit 
sovereign rights over potential gains, even if the gains are speculative and far 
in the future. States not bound to the Antarctic Treaty are still bound under 
customary law to obligations identifying sovereign rights of a coastal state. 
Therefore, in all likelihood, states with land territory with corresponding 
continental shelf area extending into the Antarctic Treaty area will seek to 
proclaim the full entitlement of the extended continental shelf regardless of 
their commitments to prohibit resource development.  
 
Regulatory measures 
Decisions, Resolutions and Measures taken through the special collective 
responsibilities by the ATCPs are, similar to the Arctic, implemented at a 
national level. While Decisions and Resolutions are not binding on states, 
Measures are. Inconsistency can arise between the interpretation of Decisions, 
Resolutions or Measures and subsequent implementation. As well, the 
implementation of regulations is binding only as far as the regulations are 
enforced by the national governments and cannot apply beyond the reach of 
national activities. While undertaken through the ATS, Measures can also 
conform to accompanying sources of law within the larger Antarctic operating 
system and international system. Regulatory initiatives can be developed 
under this congruence, capturing third party states while still allowing for the 
preservation of associated rights. However, the process of maintaining 
conformity with numerous instruments complicates the delivery and 
enforcement of regulatory or conservation initiatives. In light of the fact that 
offshore oil and gas is not occurring, specific regulatory measures do not 
exist. Measures do exist for other related activities and these measures may 
provide templates when considering the activities related to offshore oil and 
gas development. 
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In relation to protection of the environment, the Madrid Protocol applies to all 
activities occurring within the Antarctic Treaty Area for Parties to it.262 Some 
of the provisions of the Madrid Protocol overlap with other sources of law 
within the Antarctic operating system. For example, measures exist for the 
development of marine protected areas (MPA) under the auspices of the 
Madrid Protocol, CCAMLR, LOSC and the CBD. The implementation of 
MPAs will have an effect on potential offshore oil and gas interest, possibly 
restricting research and/or development on a more local scale. 
  
Annex V of the Madrid Protocol provides for the designation of marine areas 
as Antarctic Specially Protected Areas (ASPAs) or Antarctic Specially 
Managed Areas (ASMAs)263 in coordination with CCAMLR. CCAMLR 
Conservation Measures can close particular areas to fishing, establishing a 
protected area for states party to CCAMLR. Under CCAS, three Seal 
Reserves have been created where sealing is strictly prohibited.264 While 
coordination would seem paramount, Grant identifies gaps in the ATS in 
terms of the delivery of MPAs.265 These include the absence of clear 
processes for MPA selection and implementation, inconsistency with the 
application of appropriate tools to achieve objectives for the protection of the 
marine environment, and a lack of specific commitments for the establishment 
of a representative protected area system.266 Any designation would apply 
only to those signatory states that voluntarily commit themselves to an MPA 
network. As well, until specific clarification is made as to the designation of 
                                                
262 Contracting Parties implement and enforce the provisions through national legislation. 
There is the argument that provisions of the Madrid Protocol do not apply to the seas 
surrounding Antarctica. Under this interpretation Antarctic Treaty Contracting Party 
commitment to the provisions of the Madrid Protocol relating to maritime areas would have 
no effect on third party states. For discussion refer to Kevin R. Wood, 'The Uncertain Fate of 
the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty in the Maritime Area' (2003) 34(2) Ocean 
Development & International Law 139, at 144-148 in particular; D. R. Rothwell, 'The Madrid 
Protocol and Its Relationship with the Antarctic Treaty System' (1992) 5 Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean Law and Policy Occasional Papers 1, at 3. 
263 Articles 2, 3, Annex V, Madrid Protocol. 
264 Article 5, Annex to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), 
opened for signature 01 June 1972, 1080 UNTS 175, entered into force 11 March 1978. 
265 S.M. Grant, 'The Applicability of International Conservation Instruments to the 
Establishment of Marine Protected Areas in Antarctica' (2005) 48(9-10) Ocean and Coastal 
Management 782, at 808. 
266 Ibid., at 808. 
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maritime areas along the coast of Antarctic, some states may consider water 
up to the coast of Antarctica high seas to which access cannot be denied. 
 
Article 194(5) of LOSC commits States Parties to take measures ‘necessary to 
protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of 
depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms of marine life’. 
These measures are not exclusive of the high seas. Therefore, States Parties 
could coordinate and implement a similar MPA network in a regional sense 
for the Southern Ocean.267 In the absence of coordination between States 
Parties to LOSC and Contracting Parties of the Antarctic Treaty, any 
designation would, again, apply only to those signatory states of the Antarctic 
Treaty and LOSC that voluntarily commit to the network.  
 
Through Part XI of LOSC, the ISBA can also contribute to aligning the 
activities of third party states to the principles of the Antarctic Treaty. Already 
the ISBA potentially provides collective jurisdiction over Antarctic seabed 
resources beyond national jurisdiction.268 The ISBA mandate also includes the 
obligation to ensure the ‘protection and conservation of the natural resources 
of the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine 
environment’.269 Regardless of whether initiatives are developed under the 
auspices of the ISBA or the ATS, if implementation occurs through both 
instruments, measures will capture Contracting and non-Contracting Parties to 
the Antarctic Treaty. Consistency will promote conservation of the seabed 
resources and associated ecosystems without the derogation of rights under 
any of the above mentioned instruments.  
 
Under the CBD, the legal scope to specifically create high seas MPAs does 
not exist. However, there is scope to control activities and processes occurring 
beyond national jurisdiction.270 The CBD commits states to developing 
guidelines for the selection and establishment of protected areas and invokes 
                                                
267 See also Article 197, LOSC: Cooperation on a global or regional basis. 
268 See discussion in D. Vidas, 'Emerging Law of the Sea Issues in the Antarctic Maritime 
Area: A Heritage for the New Century?' (2000) 31(1) Ocean Development & International 
Law 197, at 209-214. 
269 Article 145, LOSC. 
270 Article 4 and 5, CBD, relate to jurisdictional scope.  
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cooperation between parties directly or through other international 
organizations (such as the CCAMLR Commission) for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity. The 1995 Jakarta Mandate on the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine and Coastal Biodiversity 
encourages a program of recommended action for implementing the 
Convention (CBD), including the development of criteria for the 
establishment and management of marine and coastal protected areas.271 The 
2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development compiled 
recommendations that, although non-binding, provide objectives and timelines 
to which states, including Contracting Parties to the ATS, have committed.272 
Thus, within the Antarctic operating system, states within and outside the 
ATS are committed to the comprehensive protection of the marine 
environment under several different auspices. Implementation and compliance 
can be achieved under numerous provisions and initiatives without derogating 
from the rights of states or undermining established regional governance.  
 
The ATS has also sought to implement measures through the ATCM and 
other international fora that will have a role in regulating industry-related 
activities immediately, as well as for the future. Initiatives agreed to by the 
ATCPs by consensus create obligations that can be implemented through 
national programs and enforced accordingly for Contracting Parties. Matched 
with international standards, the measures capture a broad audience. For 
example, under the 1991 Madrid Protocol, Annex IV relates to the prevention 
of marine pollution and requires State Parties to follow more specific 
requirements related to the polar environment of the Southern Ocean as well 
as international standards created under MARPOL.273 These requirements will 
apply to ships regardless of their commercial interest, thus capturing the 
                                                
271 Jakarta Mandate on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine and Coastal 
Biodiversity, adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD by Decision II/10, 
Jakarta 1995. 
272 UN Document A/CONF.199/20*, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Johannesburg, South Africa (26 August - 04 September 2002) <http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/636/93/PDF/N0263693.pdf?OpenElement> at 21 June 
2010. 
273 For example, in accordance with Article 6(1)(a) and (2), Annex IV, Madrid Protocol, ships 
must not discharge untreated sewage within 12 NM of land or ice shelves and where 
appropriate parties require the use of sewage record books. 
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potential oil and gas industry at some level. Since the adoption of the Madrid 
Protocol, other initiatives have sought to fill gaps in knowledge and 
regulations. For example, recognizing the importance of accurate and up-to-
date nautical charts, ATCPs, in 2008, recommended the coordination of 
hydrographic surveying and charting activities through the International 
Hydrographic Organization’s Hydrographic Commission on Antarctica as 
well as support of the development of the chart scheme for Antarctic 
waters.274 Increased attention has also been given towards improved search 
and rescue coordination and response in Antarctic waters through combined 
efforts of COMNAP and national Rescue Coordination Centres across the 
southern region.275 
 
In 1990, the IMO designated the Southern Ocean south of 60˚S as a ‘Special 
Area’. As discussed in Chapter 1, special mandatory measures for the 
prevention of marine pollution are required within ‘Special Areas’.276 Also 
mentioned previously, COMNAP, under direction from the ATCPs, undertook 
the formulation of shipping guidelines that parallel those adopted by IMO for 
the Arctic.277 Since 2008, the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment 
                                                
274 Resolution 5(2008) - ATCM XXXI - CEP XI, 02-13 June, Kyiv: Hydrographic surveying 
and charting. At ATCM XXXII an Information Paper submitted by the International 
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) reported progress and identified the need for ongoing 
coordination and promotion of updated hydro-cartographic information. See IHO, 
'Information Paper (IP) 016: Report by the International Hydrographic Organization on 
"Cooperation in Hydrographic Surveying and Charting of Antarctic Waters"' (Paper presented 
at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting XXXII, 06-17 April, Baltimore, 2009). 
275 At present the Regional Coordination Centres of Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand 
and South Africa share responsibility for the coordination of search and rescue over the 
Antarctic region. Recent incidents, such as the sinking of the MS Explorer in 2007 (see supra 
n. 164) and a joint medical evacuation required from the AAT in 2008, have highlighted the 
need for continued coordination and attention to the search and rescue capacity of states in the 
Antarctic. For a recent report on search and rescue coordination issues see, among others, 
Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), 'WP 47: Towards 
Improved Search and Rescue Coordination and Response in the Antarctic' (Paper presented at 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXXII - CEP XII, 06-17 April, 
Baltimore, 2009). For information on the joint evacuation refer to Australia and United States, 
'Information Paper (IP) 79: Joint Medical Evacuation from Davis Station, Antarctica' (Paper 
presented at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXXII - CEP XII, 06-17 
April, Baltimore, 2009). 
276 Antarctic waters were adopted as ‘Special Areas’ under Annex I (Oil) 16 November 1990, 
entered into effect 17 March 1992, Annex II (Noxious Liquid Substances, 16 November 1990, 
entered into force 1 July 1994 and Annex V (Garbage) 16 November 1990, entered into force 
17 March 1992. See ‘Special Areas under MARPOL’ at <http://www.imo.org/> 15 April 
2009. 
277 Since ATCM XXIV (2001), COMNAP and the ATCPs have been considering proposed 
guidelines for Arctic Shipping and their applicability to the Antarctic. With the adoption of 
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of the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has been 
working towards the POLAR Code, appropriate for both regions.278 The 
Antarctic Treaty Parties have welcomed work achieved through the IMO and 
support the endeavour to develop applicable mandatory requirements for 
Antarctic shipping.279 Another example of initiatives having joint 
endorsement by ATCPs and IMO is the Ballast Water Guidelines. These 
Guidelines were adopted by the ATCPs in 2006 and have been subsequently 
adopted by the IMO.280 There has also been an initiative driven through 
COMNAP to restrict the use of Heavy Fuel Oil in vessels travelling in 
Antarctic waters.281 Consideration in IMO of this initiative was originally 
endorsed according to ATCM Decision 8(2005).282 Recently, in March 2010, 
an amendment to MARPOL was adopted.283  
                                                                                                                          
IMO Arctic Guidelines in 2002, COMNAP’s Working Group on Ship Operations reported in 
IP-040 (ATCM XXV - CEP V (2002), Warsaw) that the Arctic Guidelines adequately address 
construction, equipment operations, environmental protection and damage control. 
Modifications were suggested to render the guidelines appropriate to the Antarctic. These 
modifications and suggested guidelines were transmitted to the IMO for consideration and are 
currently being considered alongside a review and revision of the Arctic Guidelines within the 
Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment to IMO’s MEPC. See supra n. 149 and 153.   
278 Discussed previously around n. 149-155. See supra n. 155 for recent progress on revisions 
and adoption of a POLAR Code. 
279 Supra n. 145, Resolution 8(2009). 
280 Having adopted the Practical Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange in the Antarctic 
Treaty Area in Resolution 3(2006) - ATCM XXIX - CEP IX, Edinburgh: Ballast Water 
Exchange, the Guidelines were then referred to the IMO in accordance with  Decision 
2(2006) - ATCM XXIX - CEP IX, Edinburgh: Ballast Water Exchange: Referral to IMO. The 
Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and Gases under the IMO MEPC finalized guidelines for 
ballast water exchange in 2006 as a part of a series developed to assist in the implementation 
of the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and 
Sediments (BWM Convention), adopted 13 February 2004 (not yet in force). 
281 There is a relatively high risk of fuel release due to navigational hazards such as icebergs, 
sea ice and uncharted waters as well as the high potential of environmental impact associated 
with a spill or emission of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in the Antarctic Treaty Area. HFO is 
defined in accordance with MARPOL Regulation 13 H definition of ‘Heavy Grade Oil’ as all 
fuels of higher number than Intermediate Fuel Oil 180 (IFO-180). See Council of Managers 
of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) and the International Association of Antarctica 
Tour Operators (IAATO), 'Information Paper (IP) 67, Rev.1: The Use of Heavy Fuel Oil in 
Antarctic Waters' (Paper presented at the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) 
XXVIII - CEP VIII, 06-17 June, Stockholm, 2005) and Decision 8(2005) - ATCM XXVIII - 
CEP VIII, 06-17 June, Stockholm: Use of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in Antarctica. 
282 Ibid., Decision 8(2005). 
283 Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) - 60th Session, Amendments to the 
MARPOL Convention (22-26 March 2010) 
<http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1859&doc_id=12724> at 20 June 
2010. The new MARPOL regulation to protect the Antarctic from pollution by heavy grade 
oils is expected to enter into force 01 August 2011. See MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, 
Regulation 43: Special requirements for the use or carriage of oils in the Antarctic 
<http://www.imo.org/conventions/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#2010march> at 
06 September 2010. 
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Adoption through the IMO will capture states party to MARPOL. As well, 
Antarctic relevant contracts entered into with shipping companies will hinge 
on meeting certain IMO requirements. This will help promote consistency in 
regulating shipping activities by non-Contracting state to the Antarctic Treaty. 
While using lighter fuel for fuelling their ships and transporting lighter fuel to 
the Antarctic as resupply for stations is beneficial for environmental 
standards, the compatibility of this, and other initiatives with oil and gas 
development, is uncertain. However, together they serve to raise the bar on 
industry activities and standards. 
  
An initial step towards the implementation of measures for the protection of 
the marine environment is often scientific research. With respect to the seabed 
of the Southern Ocean, acquisition of knowledge regarding the Antarctic 
seabed ecosystems and adjacent water column may provide the impetus for 
the implementation of conservation measures. Following a bottom survey 
along the Antarctic continental shelf conducted as part of the Collaborative 
East Antarctic Marine Census (CEAMARC), vast cold reefs containing rich 
biodiversity were discovered. Subsequently, two areas of the Southern Ocean 
have been designated Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs) by the 
Commission for CCAMLR.284 This type of project promotes further research 
and provides incentive for protection, preservation and a precautionary 
approach to activities.  
 
Nonetheless, the Antarctic Treaty System remains applicable only insofar as it 
is congruent with the definition of rights pertaining to the high seas and 
obligations under other international regimes such as CCAMLR, MARPOL, 
CBD and LOSC.285 Given the wide variety of options for achieving 
conservation within the Antarctic operating system, harmonization is unlikely 
to be forthcoming until involved parties recognize the need for it. Moreover, 
the desire of the ATCPs to maintain authority over Antarctic issues may 
                                                
284 Australian Antarctic Division (AAD), Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in Antarctica 
<http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=35649> at 15 April 2009. 
285 Supra n. 262, Wood, at 146, fn 45. 
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provide enough incentive for the ATCPs to implement measures or a regime 
through the ATS that captures the Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties prior 
to harmonization with the ISBA or other international bodies. 
 
5.9 Discussion of Antarctic robustness and development 
With respect to the Antarctic, the oil and gas industry must also contend with 
high costs of development, technological challenges and harsh environmental 
variables if it were to proceed with exploration and development. 
Compounded with remoteness is the uncertainty linked to jurisdiction offshore 
of the Antarctic continent. The physical and political constraints are 
considerable. Global demand has not triggered significant interest in the 
Antarctic. For Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid 
Protocol, a prohibition is in force concerning mineral resource activities. 
Commitment to this prohibition continues to be expressed.286 However, given 
the technological developments, discussion on the capacity of the Antarctic 
operating system with respect to future interests in offshore resources is 
warranted. 
 
Within the Antarctic operating system, national interests, although divergent, 
are protected through Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. For Contracting 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty the ability to act strictly in accordance with 
national interest is, however, conditional on the ability to not prejudice the 
ability of a state in regards to the recognition or non-recognition of any other 
state’s rights. The ability of third parties to act strictly along national interests 
is not conditioned by terms of the Antarctic Treaty but is influenced by 
political and international relations as well as, potentially, customary rules.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the delimitation process for the outer limits of 
the continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic islands 
has not altered jurisdictional entitlement within the Antarctic Treaty Area. The 
process has also not altered the ability to regulate offshore oil and gas 
                                                
286 Supra n. 261. 
 334 
activities for sub-Antarctic islands. Thus far, state practice to protect future 
interests and adhere to regional norms has been acceptable to actors within the 
Antarctic operating system. The system has demonstrated resilience in 
accommodating issues and states have demonstrated acceptability towards the 
existing framework, including the sources of law, their ambiguities, and the 
manner in which states interact within the system. As well, the delimitation 
process has mirrored the process in CRAMRA for defining its area of 
application. Validation of concepts brought to light in previous negotiations 
within the ATS (irrespective of the lack of entry into force) fosters legitimacy 
of the operating system. 
 
The current prohibition on mineral resource activities remains for Contracting 
Parties to the Antarctic Treaty. There is, however, uncertainty regarding what 
constitutes ‘activities’ as opposed to ‘scientific research’ and how the 
obligations for sharing information are to be fulfilled. Nonetheless, the 
implementation of regulations at the national level running in parallel with 
Decisions, Resolutions and Measures of the ATCM, demonstrates a 
willingness to adhere to collaborative principles. Willingness to continue to 
promote the existing system has also been demonstrated through the ATCP 
Ministerial Declaration at the ATCM XXXII, Baltimore.287 Cooperative 
regional initiatives co-exist acceptably with national interest and interest 
remains to fostering this approach. This consistency provides legitimacy to the 
Antarctic operating system. 
 
Third party states to the Antarctic continue to have limited certainty over 
whether freedoms attached to the high seas will apply to the continental shelf 
appurtenant to the Antarctic continental shelf or whether the ISBA can 
provide some type of jurisdiction. In some respect these uncertainties leave 
the Antarctic operating system vulnerable to instability. However, built-in 
ambiguities also provide for divergent interests. Given that resource 
development is uncertain, built-in ambiguities and uncertainties may also 
provide greater opportunity for regulatory measures in the future. The lack of 
                                                
287 Ibid. 
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change in the system also represents stability within the system over time. 
This is reflected in a longstanding interest by the actors to maintain the 
existing system. Over time, this process builds greater legitimacy.  
 
As a result of the delimitation process, some clarity has arisen concerning 
jurisdiction of sub-Antarctic continental shelf seabed located within the 
Antarctic Treaty Area. Clarity concerning sub-Antarctic continental shelves 
contrasts the lack of certainty regarding jurisdiction of the Antarctic 
continental shelf. For seabed area that extends into the Antarctic Treaty Area, 
commitments under the Antarctic Treaty still exist alongside sovereign rights 
to conserve and/or exploit the resources of the seabed within the constraints of 
national jurisdiction. State authority to develop resources exists for the coastal 
state; however, the prohibition in the Madrid Protocol voluntarily constrains 
mineral resource activities south of 60˚S, preventing development from 
ensuing.288 In a similar manner, the coastal state must place conditions on the 
scientific research being undertaken or consented to. The type of research 
cannot undermine the prohibition and scientific information derived from 
research undertaken within the Antarctic Treaty Area must be shared.  
 
Nevertheless, research may also potentially increase the scientific 
understanding of resource potential within the Antarctic Treaty Area. Since 
‘activities’ and ‘research’ are not defined, as long as a state does not develop 
resources and information is made available at some level, a state would be 
complying with concomitant obligations under the LOSC and the Antarctic 
Treaty. Commitments within the Antarctic operating system do not diminish 
state authority. These divergent interests can be accommodated within the 
system without derogating states’ rights. 
 
                                                
288 As discussed previously around supra n. 248, Australia, for example, maintains a 
prohibition over mineral resource activity anywhere south of 60˚S in the 1980 Antarctic 
Treaty (Environment Protection) Act. Notwithstanding, if Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty 
and the Madrid Protocol are interpreted to exclude the marine areas, in accordance with 
LOSC, Antarctic waters may not be covered by the mineral resource activity prohibition. This 
is discussed in Kees Bastmeijer, The Antarctic Environmental Protocol and its Domestic 
Implementation, International Environmental Law and Policy Series, Kluwer Law 
International (2003), at 94-96 and 441-442.  
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The right to grant or deny access to seabed in the Antarctic Treaty Area can 
also provide a bifocal approach to research and conservation. Consent would 
need to be granted by the coastal state for access to the continental shelf. This 
consent could only be granted if conditions related to Antarctic Treaty 
commitments were met. Thus, third party states to the Antarctic would be 
indirectly bound to the provisions of the Treaty by a coastal state. National 
interest and state authority can therefore exist alongside collective authority 
and regional norms within the operating system. The system can 
accommodate possibly divergent interests without compromising states’ rights 
or collaborative governance.  
 
Scientific research may, nonetheless, lead to further resource interest. 
National interest may eventually shift from strict adherence of the prohibition 
anywhere south of 60˚S to an interpretation that the Antarctic Treaty Area 
does not include seabed that is a natural prolongation of the land territory 
originating outside the Treaty Area.289 In the current environment, where 
exploitation is not imminent, there is, however, no need to clarify this 
interpretation. States within the Antarctic operating system can maintain 
authority over their interests while not derogating their responsibilities under 
the ATS. Once again, the lack of clarification and ambiguity serves to protect 
national interest and reflects the commitment of actors to the collaborative 
principles under the ATS and regional governance. Any unilateral assertion 
away from ambiguity towards clarification and assertion could be an 
indication that resource exploitation was imminent and could provide a 
significant challenge to the operating system.  
 
In the current resource exploitation atmosphere, any corporations and industry 
groups under the jurisdiction of Contracting Parties will experience reduced 
incentive. There are licensing restrictions and there are no subsidies available 
through Contracting Parties. The lack of government subsidization reflects 
government wariness of diplomatic and political reaction to potential industry 
                                                
289 Prior to the implementation of the Madrid Protocol this was the interpretation provided in 
CRAMRA. 
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interest.290 When national interest not only accommodates potential industry 
interest but also actively encourages it through subsidization or incentive 
packages, further challenge will be placed on the operating system.  
 
Third parties to the Antarctic are currently in a position to interrupt the 
efficacy through which the ATCPs protect both regional and national interest 
by accommodating industry interest without the constraints of the Antarctic 
Treaty. However, considering the lack of immediate demand on industry to 
investigate the Antarctic, alongside barriers to development including, inter 
alia, remoteness from the market and persistent jurisdictional uncertainties 
under the LOSC,291 it is difficult to imagine the scenario of industry working 
with a third party in unilateral development interests. The collective authority 
of the ATCPs granted within the ATS contributes to the acquiescence and 
acceptance of the Antarctic operating system by actors outside the system. 
The legitimacy of the ATS for Antarctic issues will also help dissuade 
industry. Thus far, commitments to prohibit oil and gas development south of 
60˚S are adhered to and industry interest in the region is minimal.  
 
Furthermore, if the consensus of the international community accepts the 
authority and legitimacy of the ATS rather than the decision of one state to 
initiate development, diplomatic and political channels will create obstacles 
for development. This could be the case whether development is triggered by 
unilateral interest within or outside the Antarctic operating system. After 50 
years of existence and governance, there could also be an argument that at 
least some of the principles of the Antarctic Treaty have gained status as 
international customary law, creating further legal obstacles of such 
development. 
                                                
290 Paul B. Stephen reiterates that instability in any regulatory regime drives the cost of 
projects up. Regions or states with weak legal institutions have a lower value tied to the 
resources and more insecurity for both industry and the coastal state (upon whose continental 
shelf the resource is located). See Paul B. Stephen, 'Energy Development and Distribution - 
What Can the Law Do?' in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore and Alexander S. 
Skaridov (eds), International Energy Policy, the Arctic and the Law of the Sea, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2005) 201, at 204-205. 
291 Jurisdictional uncertainties still exist for third party states. As mentioned, the seabed 
appurtenant to the Antarctic continent is not, by definition, deep seabed, nor is it by 
definition, ‘beyond’ national jurisdiction, but rather without asserted national jurisdiction. 
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As well, activities associated with offshore oil and gas activities, such as 
shipping and marine pollution, are being considered across varying 
instruments within the Antarctic operating system. This process captures 
Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties and a wider audience through, for 
example, the IMO. Sovereign rights can coincide with a collective approach to 
the Southern Ocean if regional principles can be bridged to a wider audience 
and the commitment of states within the operating system continues. 
 
Conclusion 
The Antarctic operating system has been effective at absorbing national 
interest in future resource potential alongside collaborative interests in 
prohibiting immediate development. Neither hegemonic national interest, nor 
the derogation of states’ rights in the interests of cooperative management has 
occurred. The prejudice of rights has not occurred. Acceptability has been 
demonstrated by the actions taken by states and lack of clarification of built-in 
ambiguities of the system. Actions, thus far, have not diminished the ability of 
the operating system in its capacity, providing legitimacy to the system. The 
system is supported by state practice. This state practice reiterates 
commitments to the ATS and demonstrates confidence to maintain entitlement 
to the jurisdiction offshore Antarctica in a manner that does not derogate the 
rights of other states in the recognition or non-recognition of other states’ 
rights. Combined with the acquiescence of other states and continued 
commitment of ATCPs to the ATS, participant confidence is apparent within 
the operating system. 
 
5.10 Chapter conclusion 
States involved in the polar operating systems, whether coastal, claimant, non-
claimant or those not party to the LOSC or the ATS (third party states), are 
able to merge regional governing interests with their national strategic 
interest, including oil and gas resource development and conservation 
principles. The Arctic operating system has already produced initiatives that 
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bring together oil and gas activities and conservation principles. Though non-
binding, these initiatives target activities across jurisdictional zones 
throughout the Arctic and provide a starting point for integration with 
sovereign rights and the exercise of freedoms and responsibilities towards the 
high seas. A prohibition in is place for the Antarctic that captures Contracting 
Parties as well as other interests through industry disincentive, broad forums 
such as the IMO and through political willingness and regional norms. The 
interaction between aspects of the operating systems of both polar regions and 
third party states highlights rights and responsibilities amongst the 
international community.  
 
In the immediate future, while resources remain accessible in areas onshore or 
in adjacent offshore areas, it is less likely that polar resource development will 
expand to the outer continental shelves. It is also less likely for development 
to rapidly progress while continental shelf delimitation is still underway. 
However, once the full extent of the continental shelves is realized, attention 
may shift towards actual development potential and rights associated with the 
outer continental shelf seabed area. Within each operating system, meanwhile, 
provisions to accommodate conservation interests can align with future 
development interests. Regulatory measures relating to the seabed and marine 
ecosystems will eventually coincide with increased development interest. 
Increased interest in scientific research into continental shelf properties of the 
Arctic Basin and the Antarctic may provide the first incremental step towards 
bridging sovereign rights and the shared responsibilities among states for the 
oceans.  
 
Participant confidence has been demonstrated by the Arctic coastal states in 
their collective support for the existing system. Arctic states have 
demonstrated an ability to consolidate Arctic governance in a non-prejudicial 
manner through fostering regional cooperation established in LOSC and 
initiatives established through the Arctic Council while protecting national 
sovereign interests. The pre-emptive planning and balanced assertion of rights 
in conformity with the Antarctic Treaty by Antarctic claimant and other 
Contracting Parties has demonstrated confidence within the Antarctic 
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operating system. Responses by the international community to the Antarctic 
situation reinforces acceptance of the approach to sovereign rights over 
seabed south of 60˚S. As well, the consideration and adoption of ATCP-
endorsed initiatives through the IMO and international fora indicates 
satisfaction that the rights of all states, alongside responsibilities have been 
maintained.  
 
Thus far, significant adverse challenges to the polar operating systems have 
been avoided through the process of delimiting the outer continental shelves 
in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The operating systems have demonstrated 
participant confidence in the existing systems throughout the process. This has 
been reflected in the balance of state authority against regional cooperation, 
acceptance and greater legitimacy afforded to the existing system through 
state practice, and the willingness to uphold the resilience of the existing 
systems in the face of instability. As resource development ensues, beginning 
with reservoir identification or further resource verification, the operating 
systems are equipped to accommodate a shift in industry activity without 
abandoning the balance between national interest and regional governance. 
The robust natures of the operating systems have been demonstrated and each 
has remained above the operating system threshold. 
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Chapter Six: Comparing the Operating Systems 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have developed different case studies to highlight 
elements of the Arctic and Antarctic operating systems. Each system has 
demonstrated various characteristics of ‘robustness’, developed through key 
criteria: participant confidence, state authority, legitimacy, resilience, and 
effectiveness. Examining each of these criteria contributes to an overall 
assessment of robustness. Robustness, as noted in the Introduction, is the 
quality to withstand pressure, stresses or changes in procedures or 
circumstances and survive over time. In this thesis, robustness is determined 
by the ability to exceed an operating system threshold.  
 
Although polar operating systems have similar structures, they are unique to 
each region. And even though many of the technical and environmental 
variables involved in polar transport and resource development discussed in 
the case studies are comparable, the issues that must be dealt with by the 
operating systems are not the same. Assessing robustness in each system 
reflects the dynamics and the structure of either system. While both polar 
systems demonstrate robustness throughout the case studies, the variables of 
robustness are expressed in different ways. 
  
The first section of this chapter compares systems, highlighting the 
similarities and differences between the polar operating systems. Table 2 
provides a synoptic comparison. Recognizing these similarities and 
differences helps identify the contributions to robustness within each system. 
The second section of this chapter compares the elements contributing to 
robustness to gain an overall comparison of the expression of robustness of 
the Arctic and Antarctic operating system.  
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6.2 Section one introduction 
The Arctic and Antarctic operating systems are representative of any regional 
operating system. Each has sources of law which are built on similar 
foundations, but have discreet differences that make them individual to each 
region. In the examination of the cases presented in this thesis it becomes 
apparent that both polar operating systems have added sources of law and 
normative principles to their system. Evolution of the operating systems has 
cemented the stewardship of the primary actors and provided new legitimate 
means of asserting this stewardship within the operating system. For example, 
Article 234, LOSC was negotiated by and primarily for Arctic states during 
UNCLOS III; however, its capacity is far reaching. The most significant 
changes in both systems coincided with trends of the international community 
concerning regional and global environmental accountability. The AEPS and 
the Madrid Protocol were adopted in 1991, one year prior to the UNCED 
Earth Summit.1 Importantly, for both regions, the operating systems carry 
issues along as the systems evolve. This occurs regardless of whether the 
issues are at the forefront of discussion or simmering on the back burner and 
irrespective of choices to engage in hard or soft law mechanisms.  
 
Sources of law 
In both polar operating systems, the basic foundation forming the sources of 
law, including international law, global treaties and customary international 
law are similar. Differences exist in relation to the application of legal rights 
and responsibilities in accordance with sovereignty arrangements. Differences 
also exist in relation to the implementation of regional responsibilities.  
 
The Arctic, as described by Rothwell, has become ‘subject to an increasing 
array of global international law mechanisms, both treaty and custom based, 
                                                
1 The significance of this relates to legitimacy within the polar operating systems. Each 
regional forum and its actors responded to pressure from the global community to 
demonstrate commitment to environmental accountability and transparency. For the Antarctic 
operating system, this is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 relating to the CRAMRA and 
Madrid Protocol negotiations. This is also discussed in Chapter 5 for the Arctic.  
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which deal with problems such as marine pollution, climate change and 
biodiversity.’2 The blend of measures constitutes the Arctic legal regime and 
the sources of law within the Arctic operating system. Within the Arctic 
operating system, the AEPS and Arctic Council are soft law arrangements, 
lacking any authority to bind states. States voluntarily bind themselves 
through enacting legislation that is appropriate to their regulatory situation 
and/or the level of activity related to a given issue.  
 
The ‘pick and choose’ method may appear to produce less consistency 
amongst states. However, more effective measures at a practical level may 
actually be produced. Key actors may create more influence through soft 
binding engagement with issues rather than diluted influence created through 
the lowest common level of accommodation and agreement required to get 
states to sign onto binding measures. Soft law tends to produce more flexible 
measures; ones that more easily adapt to new issues and regulatory pressures. 
In the case of the Arctic Council, the existence of a non-binding framework of 
cooperation has still produced considerable success.3 This arrangement has 
been very successful at providing a strong political identity for the Arctic, as a 
region, and profiling Arctic issues to the global community. Other 
international fora are better equipped to ameliorate problems that, although 
not originating in the Arctic, have caused detriment to the Arctic. Thus, the 
significance of the Arctic Council rests in its high profile, implicit Arctic 
scientific and cultural knowledge and the ability to bridge appropriate 
international organizations concerned with identified issues.  
 
The Antarctic operating system, in contrast, includes the ATS, which is based 
on a binding treaty. The regime by definition is not solely hard law. Sources 
of law within the Antarctic operating system extend from soft and hard law 
                                                
2 Donald R. Rothwell, The Polar Regions and Development of International Law, Press 
Syndicate of the University of Cambridge (1996), at 155. 
3 Koivurova identifies three key successes of the Arctic Council: 1. promoting scientific 
assessments of the Arctic which are complemented with policy implications; 2. offering a 
broad platform for discussing the Arctic; and 3. contributing to new ways of perceiving 
indigenous involvement. See Timo Koivurova, ‘Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council 
in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic Governance’ (2010) 46(237) Polar Record 146, at 
153.   
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including Resolutions, Decisions and Measures of the ATCMs.4 Further 
obligations also stem from other regional and global treaties. Rothwell 
distinguishes that ‘regional and global treaties are not formally recognized 
[sic] as part of the ATS’. As part of the larger operating system, however, the 
ATCPs are able to adopt provisions from those regimes and maintain contact 
with the institutions created under those regimes.5 In contrast to decisions of 
the Arctic Council meetings, Measures taken by consensus by the ATCPs are 
binding on states party to the Antarctic Treaty and Madrid Protocol. Similarly, 
decisions made within CCAMLR and CCAS are also binding on States 
Parties.  
 
States are required to implement Measures through their national legislation 
making them effective on their nationals. This may facilitate compliance; 
however, the ability to enforce Measures directly is limited. There are no 
mechanisms in place within the ATS to provide over-arching authority over 
the implementation and compliance of Measures, Decisions or Resolutions. 
Similar to the Arctic, states provide authority over their own implementation, 
compliance and enforcement. In contrast to the Arctic, the ability to enforce 
legislation over other Contracting Parties or third parties is limited by the 
effect of Article IV. The ability to impose regulations on others depends on 
whether the other state recognizes the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state 
imposing the law. In addition, the acceptance of such enforcement depends on 
the norms of behavior between the states involved and their political situation. 
In most cases the Parties choose only to enforce their laws against their own 
nationals.  
 
In contrast to Arctic states, signatory states to the Antarctic Treaty cannot 
discriminate against which Measures to implement - although they can deny 
consensus on a proposed Measure.6 Antarctic states, having agreed to a 
                                                
4 The hard law of the Antarctic regime is founded with the binding treaties – the Antarctic 
Treaty, CCAMLR, CCAS and the Madrid Protocol. With regard to the Antarctic Treaty, 
much of the ATS sources of law-making are soft law, such as Resolutions.  
5 Supra n. 1, at 111. 
6 For example, there has been a delay in ratification of Measure 4(2004) regarding tourism 
search and rescue insurance. As of 2010, only 9 of the 28 ATCPs have ratified this Measure.   
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Measure, are obligated to implement it. (They may, however, ‘pick and 
choose’ which Resolutions to carry out or the extent to which they will 
implement them). Political will is still required to have timely implementation 
as time limits for domestic ratification are not specified. Similar to the Arctic, 
states may also agree to non-binding instruments such as voluntary guidelines. 
Accordingly, in each operating system the practical implications may vary. 
More significantly in the Antarctic, diplomatic exchange and political will is 
necessary for compliance in the absence of recognized jurisdiction and 
enforcement capacity. In the Antarctic operating system political will plays a 
significant role to engage third parties and accept compromise. 
 
With respect to the sources of law, Arctic states use political will and 
diplomatic measures to influence implementation, rather than compliance. 
Once implementation has or has not occurred, enforcement on nationals as 
well as others within the scope of jurisdiction is possible. Jurisdiction and 
enforcement capacity are recognized alongside sovereignty and can legally 
influence compliance. Although political will is important to both systems, its 
importance varies across implementation, compliance and enforcement.  
 
Actors  
The key actors of both Arctic and Antarctic operating systems include states 
with territory, or claims to territory and therefore coastal states, but with a few 
significant exceptions. Sweden, Finland and Iceland are not coastal states of 
the central Arctic Ocean Basin; however, these states are active in the Arctic 
Council and regional initiatives. In the Arctic, even though the US has not 
acceded to the LOSC, customary law prevails in terms of maritime zones and 
coastal state jurisdiction. In the Antarctic operating system, the US and the 
Russian Federation are original signatory states to the Antarctic Treaty but are 
not claimant states or coastal states. These states are included as key actors 
because of the reservation on their basis of claim to territorial sovereignty 
present under Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and their significant presence 
as global powers. Currently, they remain non-claimants but play a strong role 
in the ATS.  
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Most of the key actors of each operating system are developed nations. Of the 
primary actors in the Arctic operating system, only the Russian Federation is 
considered by the International Monetary Fund as a developing and emerging 
economy.7 Russia is also a key Antarctic player but a non-claimant state. Of 
the Antarctic operating system claimant states (primary actors), Argentina and 
Chile have developing economies.8 Along with Russia, there are other 
Antarctic Treaty signatory states which are developing states. In a similar 
manner to observers in the Arctic Council, these states influence the operating 
system as secondary actors.9  
 
The Arctic operating system includes indigenous groups as Permanent 
Participants in the Arctic Council. There are no indigenous peoples in the 
Antarctic. Regardless of their efforts towards self-determination, indigenous 
groups still fall under the jurisdiction of a represented state in the operating 
system. Importantly, mandatory consultation increases their engagement. 
Non-state actors and industry influence both operating systems but are not 
considered primary actors. The ATCMs have expert observers attending them 
and further representation can occur through each state’s delegation.10 
Observer status in Arctic Council meetings has been granted to several states, 
international organizations and NGOs.11 In either system, secondary actors, 
such as observers, Permanent Participants, non-Consultative Antarctic Treaty 
Parties and invited non-state actors, do not hold authority to vote on decisions. 
In light of the more institutionalized arrangement of the ATS, the non-
Consultative parties of the ATS may have a wider opportunity of influence on 
the operating system actors than observers of the Arctic Council. Young 
                                                
7 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database: Emerging and 
Developing Economies List (October 2009) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/weoselco.aspx?g=2200&sg=All+
countries+%2f+Emerging+and+developing+economies> at 01 April 2010. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Refer to Chapter 1 for a description of the actors of each operating system. 
10 This varies between delegations. 
11 A list of the observers is available from the Arctic Council website available at: 
<http://arctic-council.org/section/observers> 22 October 2009. 
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suggests that influence of the observers of the Arctic Council could, 
nonetheless, be enhanced.12 
 
Jurisdiction 
In the Arctic operating system, coastal, flag, and port state jurisdiction are 
recognized and applicable. LOSC Article 234 provides emphasis on coastal 
state jurisdiction for the protection of the Arctic environment. Article 234 
could also be applicable to the ice-covered areas of the Antarctic because it 
does not expressly mention the Arctic, despite history recording that it was 
written for the Arctic. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, however, limits 
jurisdiction of the Antarctic claimant states in practical application. As a 
consequence of the non-recognition of claims to territory, the ability to further 
enforce coastal state and port state jurisdiction beyond nationals in Antarctica 
is limited. Flag state jurisdiction, though recognized, depends on the flag 
states’ commitments. No restrictions are imposed on third parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty within the Antarctic Treaty Area, except those imposed by 
other sources of law, such as LOSC and IMO-derived conventions. For both 
polar regions, the extent and limits of jurisdiction continues to be discussed 
regarding, inter alia, the protection of marine biodiversity and the 
environment in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The approach towards the 
Arctic Ocean and the ocean area offshore Antarctica will pose similar 
jurisdictional challenges relating to high seas governance and the Area. As 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, there are perhaps more legal lacunae to clarify 
regarding the ocean space directly offshore Antarctica. 
 
Institutions 
The meetings of the Arctic Council and the ATCM depend on consensus for 
the adoption of measures, resolutions or decisions. The structure of both 
meetings is based around key players, known as Member States in the Arctic 
Council and Consultative Parties in the ATCM. These key players have voting 
                                                
12 Oran R. Young, 'Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North' 
(2009) 45(232) Polar Record 73, at 76. 
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privileges or decision-making authority. Other states participate in these 
meetings on various terms of engagement. For example, the Arctic Council 
must consult with the Permanent Participants concerning each decision being 
voted on at the biannual meetings. The Observers of the Arctic Council 
meetings, including non-Arctic states and NGOs do not receive mandatory 
consultation and their engagement is limited in this forum. To date, in the 
Arctic Council, there is no method to change the status of observers to 
produce further Member States. New Permanent Participants can be derived 
through application by indigenous organizations that are yet to be represented.  
 
In the ATCM, non-Consultative Parties and invited experts/groups or states 
are also observers to the annual ATCM and CEP meetings. NGOs, scientific 
groups, UN organizations and non-signatory states can be invited to observe 
the ATCMs.13 This decision is taken by the ATCPs. The non-Consultative 
states and other invited participants cannot make decisions. During the ATCM 
and CEP, these parties and other observers might engage through the 
presentation of Information Papers or through individuals of a delegation. For 
example, some delegations have invited NGO representatives to participate in 
their delegations as advisors. Unlike the Arctic operating system, which has a 
fixed group of key voting Arctic states, a non-Consultative state can become a 
Consultative Party given significant scientific commitment or relevant 
Antarctic engagement. This decision is taken by the current ATCPs at the 
ATCMs.  
 
Both institutional frameworks depend largely on political dynamics and 
interstate relations. A significant amount of negotiating and ‘working through 
an issue’ occurs on a more informal basis. These informal discussions occur 
alongside formal meetings or sessions but receive no formal attention or 
documentation. There is nothing to prevent any of the actors from meeting at 
other times or locations and from meeting with only a few of the actors. In 
any multilateral forum there are often stronger players or alliances that 
provide strategy and influence. International relations are integral to the 
                                                
13 So far, Malaysia has been the only non-signatory state invited to observe the ATCMs and 
CEP meetings. 
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operation of multilateral forum. The Arctic and Antarctic operating system 
capitalize on political will as necessary.   
 
Following the failings of diplomacy and international relations, both operating 
systems also include similar dispute resolution mechanisms. These include 
arbitral tribunals specific to treaties or the ICJ. In either operating system 
there appears to be a similar incentive to resolve issues outside of these formal 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
Section one concluding remarks 
The Arctic system is dominated by voluntary state involvement through soft 
law initiatives. The regional and impartial approach of the Arctic Council 
does not undermine this authority or interfere with national jurisdiction. The 
ATS is built on hard law arrangements but practical implementation occurs 
significantly through soft law initiatives in a manner that protects the 
normative principles concerning sovereignty.  
 
Each system depends on national interest and political will to either drive 
implementation (in the Arctic) or enforcement (in the Antarctic). Differences, 
therefore, are also accompanied by similarities when the overall goal of 
regional governance is present. Actors and institutions have similar and 
different characteristics. While weaknesses may be found in either of the 
systems, the significant interest in this thesis lies in the operation of the 
system in terms of robustness. In the following section a comparison based on 
the operation of the systems will test robustness.   
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Table 2: Comparison of the components of the operating systems 
1. Sources of law 
ARCTIC ANTARCTIC 
Hard law 
(No over-arching regional treaty) 
LOSC 
Regional bilateral and multilateral treaties 
with specific purposes (ie) Polar Bear 
Convention and Arctic Cooperation 
Agreement. 
Unilateral state legislation is exercised within 
national jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soft law 
Regional and collaborative aspects of 
operating system performed through soft law 
arrangements including regional forums such 
as AEPS, Arctic Council, the Northern 
Forum, BEAC/BEAR. 
 
Soft law organizations do not enact any 
binding measures. Voluntary implementation 
of regional initiatives varies across national 
legislative efforts/interests (‘pick and 
choose’). 
 
Hard law 
(Over-arching regime – ATS) 
LOSC 
Antarctic Treaty and associated instruments 
comprising ATS as a legally binding, over-
arching framework. 
Antarctic Treaty – Measures 
CCAMLR – Conservation Measures 
 
Antarctic Treaty binding Measures – 
obligation to be implemented (timeframe and 
consistency between states may vary). 
Enforcement also varies across national effort 
– conditional on behavioural norms 
developed from Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
 
Soft law 
Non-binding Antarctic Treaty Resolutions 
and Decisions are also used to implement 
Antarctic Treaty provisions. 
Resolutions and Decisions may include 
initiatives such as Guidelines or 
Recommendations. 
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2. Actors 
ARCTIC ANTARCTIC 
Primary actors: 
Arctic Coastal States  
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russian 
Federation, US) and non-coastal Arctic 
states, Finland, Iceland, Sweden 
Only developed nations as primary actors. 
 
 
 
 
Secondary actors: 
Representatives of non-state actors including 
NGOs and Indigenous Groups through 
Permanent Participant in Arctic Council. 
 
Permanent Participants fall under the 
jurisdiction of respected states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some developing nations are observers in the 
Arctic Council (for example: China). 
 
 
Industry representation is at the discretion of 
the states participating in the various 
Working Groups of the Arctic Council and 
this varies between initiatives. 
Primary actors: 
ATCPs (claimant states: Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
Norway, UK and key non-claimants: Russian 
Federation and US) 
 
Predominance of developed nations as 
primary actors – exception of Argentina, 
Chile and Russia which are less developed. 
 
Secondary actors: 
Non-claimant Consultative Parties are also 
voting participants at ATCMs. 
 
Non-Consultative Contracting Parties have 
observer status. 
 
Non-state actors represented by scientific 
groups, management groups and NGOs are 
invited experts and can contribute to 
meetings.  
 
Malaysia has been invited to observe since 
2002. Malaysia is not a party to the Treaty, 
cannot contribute in the meetings, and does 
not have the status of ‘invited expert’ or 
‘observer’. 
 
Numerous developing nations involved as 
secondary actors represented as non-claimant 
ATCPs and non-Consultative Parties.  
 
Industry involvement limited to invited 
representatives, such as IAATO, at ATCM 
level. Industry representation varies across 
delegations to various meetings including 
ATCMs, CEP and CCAMLR meetings. 
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3. Jurisdiction 
ARCTIC ANTARCTIC 
Coastal state jurisdiction: recognized 
Exceptions include areas of unresolved 
disputes or overlapping maritime boundaries 
between opposite or adjacent states. 
 
 
 
 
Coastal state enforcement: recognized 
(in unresolved areas there may be provisional 
measures established) 
 
 
Enforcement varies according to issues, 
availability of resources and diplomatic 
channels. 
 
 
Diplomatic efforts used as well as traditional 
security measures in order to maintain 
regional norms. 
 
 
 
Article 234, LOSC: Coastal state 
jurisdiction in ice-covered areas provided for 
by Article 234 and exercised. 
 
 
 
Freedoms of the high seas and rights 
associated to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction are recognized. 
 
 
Coastal state jurisdiction: Article IV 
provides sovereignty arrangement – 
recognition or non-recognition possible.  
 
Coastal state jurisdiction exists for states that 
recognize the ability of a coastal state to exist 
for Antarctic claimant states. 
 
Coastal state enforcement: varies in 
accordance with norms of behaviour within 
the operating system for Article IV and 
Article XIII, IX of the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
Enforcement recognized over national 
program participants. 
 
 
 
Diplomatic efforts play an important role in 
encouraging third party participation in 
normative behaviours for the Antarctic 
Treaty area. Enforcement not necessarily 
recognized by third party. 
 
Article 234, LOSC: Coastal state jurisdiction 
in ice-covered areas provided for by Article 
234, but application is conditioned by similar 
constraints to traditional coastal state 
jurisdiction described above. 
 
Freedoms of the high seas are recognized in 
accordance with Article VI of the Antarctic 
Treaty which reserves the rights of all states 
under international law with respect to the 
high seas in the Antarctic Treaty Area. 
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4. Institutions 
ARCTIC ANTARCTIC 
Decision making: Consensus basis to Arctic 
Council decisions. 
 
Mandatory consultation with Permanent 
Participant even though these participants are 
not able to vote. 
 
 
 
Frequency of meetings: Biannual Arctic 
Council meeting. Frequency of Working 
Group meetings is variable. 
 
 
Addition of participants and/or change in 
status: No manner to increase Member 
States exists. 
 
Capacity to have new Permanent 
Participants. 
 
 
Dispute resolution: 
Inter-state negotiations and diplomacy 
available for dispute resolution, driven by 
state interest. Variability in use of diplomacy 
pre-emptively or responsively. 
 
Arbitral Tribunals and ICJ available. 
Decision making: Consensus decision 
making at ATCMs and CEP meetings. 
Similar in CCAMLR and if CCAS were to 
become active. 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency of meetings: Annual ATCM, 
CEP, CCAMLR meetings. No CCAS 
meetings at present. 
 
 
Addition of participants and/or change in 
status: Process exists to have non-
Consultative Parties become ATCPs. 
 
Any state can sign onto Antarctic Treaty or 
other legal instruments of the ATS. 
 
 
Dispute resolution: 
Predominance of diplomatic efforts for 
dispute resolution. Diplomatic efforts always 
primary course of action. 
 
 
Arbitral Tribunals and ICJ available. 
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6.3 Section two introduction 
As mentioned in the Introduction, robustness in this thesis is directly related to 
effectiveness, but not solely dependent on, the traditional measure of effective 
implementation and enforcement of regulations. Measuring effectiveness as 
an ability to avoid prejudicing states’ rights combines the influence of 
political willingness, international relations and cooperation alongside the 
sources of law and aspects of operating system dynamics. Effectiveness thus 
contributes to and relies on participant confidence. Robustness combines 
attributes of participant confidence that contribute to and gain from 
effectiveness. Appreciating the robustness of each polar operating system 
relies on assessing past experience and situations along these influencing 
attributes. While the case studies have provided evidence that each system is 
robust, the following section analyses and compares the variables, providing a 
comprehensive understanding and comparison. 
  
Operating system schematic 
 
 
 
Participant confidence:              Effectiveness 
      State authority   (non-prejudice of states’ rights) 
      Legitimacy 
      Resilience 
 
 
 
     Robustness 
----------------------Operating System Threshold------------------------ 
 
Effectiveness 
The Arctic and Antarctic operating systems have demonstrated consistency in 
not creating prejudice against states’ rights as debates emerged and issues 
evolved within the operating systems. Each of the case studies has revealed 
similar and different approaches to accommodating issues and divergent 
perspectives. While the underlying mechanisms and characteristics of these 
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approaches may not be the same, each system has remained above the 
operating system threshold because of effectiveness. In the Arctic, recognized 
sovereignty creates a sense of legitimate state authority and built-in legitimacy 
(discussed later) that is absent in the Antarctic operating system. The 
Antarctic operating system has legally binding mechanisms that are absent in 
the Arctic. Universal recognition of the sovereignty of the Arctic states does 
not guarantee that all states will interpret the sources of law in a similar 
manner. At the same time, the absence of universally recognized sovereignty 
of the Antarctic claimant states does not have to always produce different 
interpretations of the law or responsibilities. States interpret legal and political 
responsibilities and rights in accordance with their national interest 
irrespective of recognition or non-recognition of sovereignty. The 
effectiveness of the operating system, measured as the ability to accommodate 
issues in the absence of prejudice against states’ rights, is affected by these 
characteristics.  
 
For effectiveness to prevail within the operating system, each autonomous 
interpretation of legal and political rights, the manner in which issues fit 
within these rights, and the methods available for accommodating the issues 
cannot prejudice the rights of other states involved in the same issues. For the 
Arctic operating system there is no binding mechanism to ensure this. 
Nevertheless, operating system effectiveness has prevailed. As demonstrated 
with the Arctic waterways case study, different interpretations of the legal 
classification of the waterways were able to co-exist. The interpretations may 
have been challenged and protested; however, the ability of states to maintain 
their interpretations was not compromised. No one actor emerged from the 
debates completely satisfied that their interpretation was universally 
recognized as correct or incorrect. That the states chose to not engage in 
debate in external institutions, such as the ICJ, also indicates that a level of 
satisfaction exists for the time being.  
 
This maintenance of states’ rights continued in respect of the waterways 
debate throughout the evolution of the Arctic operating system. Regulations 
and initiatives implemented with respect to the NSR and the NWP were able 
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to have practical application without necessitating a universally recognized 
legal classification of either sea passage. Because significant commercial 
transit was not imminent, a mixture of regulations with and without 
enforcement evolved. Even with the onset of gradually increasing commercial 
transit interest, a practical and agreed approach to shipping and development 
concerns may override the need to establish their legal status.  
 
Earlier in these debates (such as in the 1960s), the Arctic operating system did 
not contain provisions for cooperative governance or environmental 
accountability. States’ responsibilities did not include cooperative obligations. 
Their interpretations and actions did not have to be placed against any 
regional norms. Even without regional accountability to add pressure to state 
responsibilities or practice, the operating system accommodated divergent 
interpretations effectively.  
 
The onset of cooperative norms also did not change the effectiveness of the 
system. States were able to maintain their positions in the absence of prejudice 
alongside new regional responsibilities. States were even able to use the 
principles of environmental accountability and regional cooperation to 
develop provisions that broadened their interpretations. This was 
demonstrated through the initiative of the Arctic states to create and apply 
Article 234, LOSC. This was (and is) also demonstrated in the broad 
application of regional provisions such as Article 197 and 211, LOSC related 
to protection of the marine environment. These provisions encompass a range 
of different views all within their legal interpretation and application. As the 
Arctic operating system evolved, the emergent norms relating to 
environmental protection and cooperative engagement were able to exist 
alongside the Arctic waterways debate. Opening the NSR to commercial 
transit and the application of the Russian NSR regulations protected national 
interest and were implemented the same year (1991) that the Arctic states, 
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including the Russian Federation, came together to create more regional 
accountability in the AEPS and the Northern Forum.14  
 
The delimitation of the continental shelves in the Arctic and the gradual 
development of the oil and gas industry regulations and initiatives also 
provide evidence of the operating system effectiveness. By 2001, the year of 
the first submission to the CLCS, the Arctic Council and associated 
cooperative norms had been established. In this case study, evolution did not 
occur within the operating system structure. It occurred for states through 
decisions made by States Parties to the LOSC and those of the CLCS. The 
application of these decisions clarified aspects of the process but did not 
undermine states’ rights.  
 
In the Arctic context, there is minimal concern over the recognition of the 
entitlement to claim a continental shelf except in the few areas where small 
boundary disputes remain. However, the extent of the outer continental shelf 
claim does raise issues with respect to the delimitation of boundaries and 
regional governance of the Arctic Ocean. Inherent in the process was the 
binding obligation to not create prejudice regarding the delimitation of 
boundaries between states. States can take a hands-off approach to protecting 
their interpretation because nothing in the process can prejudice the final 
boundary delimitations. The process cannot interfere with any eventual 
decisions regarding jurisdiction over areas of seabed that might, for example, 
overlap. The process eliminated the need to acquiesce or directly protest 
states’ interpretations because any disputed areas would not be examined and 
the basis of the shelf description depended on the scientific evidence. As well, 
final delimitation occurs between states and a process to accept or protest 
those boundaries remains available to states alongside responsibilities of 
Article 76, LOSC. The practical application of the delimitation process will 
occur in the absence of prejudice towards boundary delimitations and there is 
                                                
14 Of interest, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, the first commercial transit of the Northeast 
Passage (including the NSR) from Asia to Europe took place in August-September 2009 by 
Beluga Shipping. Two vessels were sent through, having obtained Russian permits and 
icebreaker assistance. For more information see media reports by Barents.Observer.com, 
LogisticsManager.com and Janet Nodar in Chapter 2, n. 26. 
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no compromise on a state’s ability to protest or dispute final boundary 
delimitation. This binding obligation provided an aspect of built-in 
effectiveness that can be compared in the Antarctic operating system.  
 
There is also a sense of built-in effectiveness with regard to industry 
development and energy security issues. Pending resource development does 
not necessarily require established boundaries because of the ability to share 
joint jurisdiction as agreed between states. The legal status of certain areas of 
seabed may remain ambiguous. Development and security may still proceed 
in the absence of prejudice because of the capacity of the operating system. 
Furthermore, any Arctic Council initiatives cannot prejudice the rights of 
states because the initiatives and involvement are voluntary and non-binding. 
Measures and programs implemented under this forum will contribute to the 
effectiveness of the operating system. Industry decisions and decisions 
relating to energy, border and even environmental security can be taken by 
states under state authority without the risk of creating prejudice against other 
states’ rights within the system. As long as actors are confident in the capacity 
of the operating system to be effective, the operating system can continue to 
accommodate divergent interests in the absence of prejudice. The robust 
nature depends not only on the legal capacity to not create prejudice but the 
confidence of the participants to engage in a manner that consistently avoids 
prejudice. Is this simply avoidance of difficult issues and an expedient way to 
avoid potential conflict, or a tactful and clever method of ensuring a robust 
operating system?15 
 
In comparison to the evolution of the Arctic operating system’s regional 
norms, the Antarctic operating system established certain cooperative norms 
                                                
15 Koivurova comments that while the declaration of the Arctic Council as a high level inter-
governmental forum could have provided a forum to ‘tackle more controversial issues’ it also 
signals, in Koivurova’s view, an apparent ‘low level of commitment to Arctic cooperation’. 
Huebert suggests that within the existing system states contradict themselves by appearing to 
cooperate and indicating intent to continue to cooperate while current actions of rebuilding 
military and naval capabilities suggest otherwise. See supra n. 3, at 148 and Rob Huebert, 
'The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment' (Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Institute, Calgary, March 2010), at 1-25. In terms of this thesis, the flexible soft law 
arrangement and perceived levels of cooperation still complement Arctic operating system 
effectiveness and robustness.   
 359 
and sovereignty conditions prior to the onset of the regulatory debates 
discussed in this thesis. The Madrid Protocol was an addition to the ATS 
which gave legal presence to emerging environmental norms. Nonetheless, in 
terms of effectiveness, the context of all of these debates was already 
established. Alongside the regional interests towards shared scientific work 
and a cooperative approach to issues related to the Antarctic, a binding 
obligation to balance states’ rights in the absence of prejudice was established. 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty ensures that states’ rights in their 
recognition or non-recognition of territorial claims (and therefore sovereignty 
and jurisdiction) are upheld. Every debate comes back to Article IV. This 
provision, and the encompassing regime, almost guarantees effectiveness 
when effectiveness is measured by the ability to protect states’ rights because 
it is built into the operating system. Any move away from protecting the rights 
of recognition and non-recognition with respect to territorial claims would be 
counter to the legal obligation of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Contradiction would reduce effectiveness and drive the system below an 
operational threshold. 
 
As such, there is a legal obligation not to prejudice states’ rights. This was and 
is true for all of the case studies discussed. CRAMRA was a novel approach 
to coordinating jurisdiction and resource development and providing for 
property rights in the absence of prejudice. Many divergent interests and 
views were accommodated in the negotiations and text. Participants were 
satisfied with the outcome of text of the convention – the ‘package deal’. It 
was other drivers, not CRAMRA itself that subsequently moved the ATCPs in 
the direction of the Madrid Protocol. As a direct result of the challenges 
placed on the Antarctic operating system from outside and within, the system 
evolved to formalize environmental accountability. The addition of the 
Madrid Protocol did not, however, overtly change the system into a different 
operating system. Effectiveness remained even though a key objective of the 
system was changed. Cooperative and regional norms remained, and as 
demonstrated in the case study and discussed below, the system gained 
legitimacy from both within and outside. 
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For the continental shelf debates a two-fold obligation existed to avoid 
prejudice. As discussed previously with respect to the Arctic continental shelf 
delimitation process, one obligation rested within LOSC with respect to the 
delimitation of boundaries between opposite and adjacent states. The second 
obligation, unique to the Antarctic operating system, was the protection of the 
non-recognition of claims – which crosses over to future boundary 
delimitations. In the Antarctic, the entitlement to claim a continental shelf 
must be balanced with the inability to support or deny a basis to claim 
territorial sovereignty, in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Asserting a continental shelf appurtenant to the Antarctic continent 
could potentially support the basis of a territorial claim, contrary to the Treaty. 
As well, examination of data submitted with respect to the Antarctic 
continental shelf could also place the CLCS in a position to either support or 
deny a basis to claim.  
 
The hands-off approach of the Arctic states was not as appropriate for the 
Antarctic claimants because the second obligation introduced risk of 
disrupting the balance attained through Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. The 
appropriate course of action pursued by key Contracting Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty was to ensure effectiveness of the process, and in doing so, 
mitigate response from states within and outside of the ATS regime. The 
nuanced approach produced an effective process and flexibility within the 
system, answering to obligations and responsibilities under LOSC and the 
Antarctic Treaty without renouncing states’ rights. As for any future oil and 
gas development in the Antarctic, states will have to return to the questions of 
jurisdiction and development activities in the absence of prejudice. The built-
in obligation to do so does not prohibit solutions from being found but 
requires the solutions be constructed prior to unilateral application. The 
effectiveness has legal presence in the Antarctic operating system but depends 
on the engagement of states and the participant confidence in that 
effectiveness. In the absence of participant confidence, the obligation to be 
effective and not create prejudice would not be upheld, possibly forcing the 
system below the operating system threshold. Prejudice against states’ rights 
within the system would occur, counter to the legal obligation of Article IV, 
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and the system would be markedly changed because the ATS regime would 
be undermined. 
 
In summary, both systems have built-in mechanisms to ensure effectiveness 
when effectiveness is measured by the ability to not prejudice states’ rights. 
The Antarctic operating system has a hard law obligation to protect the rights 
of recognition/non-recognition of sovereignty and thus requires measures, 
outputs or initiatives to co-exist with this provision in the absence of 
prejudice. If this does not occur, the ‘lynch pin’ of the system is withdrawn. 
The effectiveness of the system decreases, potentially dropping the system 
below the operating system threshold. This creates a strong incentive to 
maintain effectiveness, at least for the signatory states.  
 
In the Arctic, the cooperative norms established by the AEPS and Arctic 
Council, although built from binding obligations of Article 197, LOSC, are 
non-binding. In contrast to the Antarctic, it is the non-binding nature which 
ensures the non-prejudice of states’ rights. As demonstrated with the co-
existence of Arctic Council programs related to oil and gas development 
alongside national licensing, development, and regulatory legislation, the 
operating system has been effective at not creating prejudice while also 
providing a broader opportunity for stakeholders to participate in the issues. 
This regional institution encourages consistency between efforts of the Arctic 
Council to increase awareness and the efforts of the Arctic states to implement 
related measures. These efforts foster accountability related to the onset, 
continuation and expansion of activities without the risk of upsetting 
legitimate state authority.  
 
In the Arctic operating system there is no binding protection against prejudice 
and less built-in incentive. However, reduced susceptibility to prejudice, 
through recognized sovereignty and non-binding initiatives, creates a more 
transparent regulatory environment. Participants showcase issues through the 
Arctic Council and other forums. As a result, the likelihood of states’ rights 
being (or suspected of being) undermined is reduced.  
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Effectiveness within the polar operating systems, as defined in this thesis as 
the absence of prejudice,16 may be an outcome of legal provisions. 
Effectiveness may also simply be derived from the authoritative state practice 
carried out in the absence of legally binding provisions to sustain their 
interests while avoiding conflict. In order to facilitate effectiveness promoted 
by a binding obligation, or to ensure consistency in the absence of binding 
obligations, actors in the operating systems must combine the mechanisms of 
effectiveness with participant confidence. Participant confidence must 
reinforce the belief that the existing system has the capacity to continue 
operating in the absence of prejudice. In the pursuit of effectiveness, binding 
measures might seem to contribute to a more robust system; however, the 
necessity of binding measures also corresponds with potentially greater 
instability. Therefore, effectiveness produced through binding measures 
cannot alone represent the true capacity or robustness of an operating system. 
Political willingness, diplomacy and international relations assist this process. 
 
That a binding obligation such as Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty is 
necessary may imply that less participant confidence in the overall system 
exists and more instability can be provoked. Provisions and obligations have 
been necessary to accommodate varying interests and commit states to 
regional governance. This may indicate that states would be less inclined to 
participate along the now normative principles without a binding obligation to 
do so. Confidence in the system was possibly acquired through willingness to 
be bound with other states to the set of principles, rather than through 
confidence that without binding provisions cooperative and normative 
principles would develop and foster longstanding regional commitment. It is 
difficult to predict whether states would participate in Antarctic governance in 
a similar manner in the absence of the Treaty provision.  
 
The conditions established by one regime (the ATS) within the Antarctic 
operating system reinforce the need for measures and initiatives to be 
developed that protect states’ rights across all the sources of law. The 
                                                
16 See Introduction for a review of the definitions used in this thesis. 
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consequences of creating prejudice are potentially greater for the binding 
system because a legal provision would be abandoned, forcing the structure of 
the operating system to inherently change. If prejudice is created in the Arctic 
operating system, the system may not be forced below the operating system 
threshold. Internal mechanisms, such as dispute resolution, may address the 
issues without causing the abandonment or restructuring of the system. The 
engagement of these mechanisms relates to the participant confidence rather 
than the binding or non-binding nature of the sources of law. Therefore, it is 
the process and the manner in which participants create, implement and 
enforce measures that reflect an overall willingness and acceptance of the 
system through which the measures are being discussed or negotiated. 
  
Participant confidence 
State authority 
When jurisdiction is recognized, such as for most of the Arctic, less ambiguity 
exists regarding the application of the sources of law and state authority. 
Except for areas where maritime boundaries have yet to be resolved, 
jurisdiction over the continental shelf is certain. Activities undertaken on and 
within the seabed are under coastal state jurisdiction and licensing. Even in 
the areas of unresolved boundaries, the dispute exists between two states. 
These states have the authority to establish joint jurisdiction or joint 
management for the disputed areas. State authority within the Arctic operating 
system has a legitimate underlying presence and is not dependent on 
acquiescence or acceptance by the international community. States rely on 
their own incentives to create and maintain a non-hegemonic governing 
atmosphere alongside a mutually beneficial cooperative framework. The 
operating system must provide the capacity for participants to be confident 
that while their own authority is maintained, no other state will be provided an 
advantage that might compromise or prejudice their rights.  
 
Corresponding with legitimate state authority within the Arctic operating 
system are regulatory enforcement capabilities and military presence. These 
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capabilities have always co-existed with regional norms and cooperative 
obligations. State authority has yet to be compromised. Rights have been 
upheld because of the practicality of regulations, voluntary compliance and 
enforcement capacity. For example, by connecting such charges with ice 
breaking or ice escort through the NSR, fees charged under Russian 
regulations are legitimate under international law. Flexibility prevents 
prejudice. Similarly, the lack of ability to enforce regulations through the 
NWP has fortunately corresponded with ships volunteering to comply. The 
lack of actual enforcement has not compromised the legal right under national 
legislation. Meanwhile, compliance has prevented the necessity of 
enforcement. If a state chooses to comply on its own terms, voluntary 
compliance for practical purposes does not have to undermine any particular 
asserted position.  
 
Coincidently, with prominent state authority in the Arctic operating system, 
there is potentially more opportunity for national interest to dominate 
cooperative norms within the operating system. A state may decide to assert 
its sovereignty in a more overt manner to emphasize a particular political 
position and support a particular legal interpretation. These assertions will 
depend on their political situation or history and aspire to contribute to 
international acquiescence or acceptance of a position. At the same time, the 
assertions do not have to become dominant within the operating system 
dynamics if other states involved fail to give the assertions attention. This 
exercise of political assertion and non-recognition has played out numerous 
times between Canada and the US with respect to the sovereignty of the 
Canadian archipelago, the claim to the NWP and submarine transit. While 
seeming to place state authority out of balance within the operating system, 
the manner in which these episodes have played out has been in the absence 
of recognized prejudice, and amounts to little instability in the overall system. 
State authority has a legitimate presence, and it is the manner in which 
acceptance of state authority occurs that contributes to stability within the 
operating system. By accepting state authority exists, participants voluntarily 
maintains a dynamic balance between states within the system. If each state is 
confident that its authority is not undermined by another state or by the 
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provisions of regional governance, the operating system can be deemed to 
have robust characteristics and can remain above the operating system 
threshold. 
 
In the Antarctic, as a result of sovereignty arrangements embedded in Article 
IV of the Antarctic Treaty, state authority is not inherent to the participation 
of the states and is not necessarily recognized as legitimate. State authority is, 
however, present but it is the efforts of the state involved (ie the claimant 
state) to ensure its authority has presence regardless of whether it is 
recognized. In doing so, state authority must comply with the provisions of 
sovereignty in Article IV. At the same time, non-militarization of the 
Antarctic decreases the associated authority granted to states and decreases 
enforcement presence.17 As such, state authority will only become overtly 
dominant when the state has decided to abandon the existing principles and 
obligations in favour of unilateral interests. Otherwise state authority co-exists 
with regional norms and cooperation in the absence of prejudice or overt 
hegemony. Article IV provides a built-in incentive to keep state authority in 
line with sovereignty arrangements and non-militarization.  
 
The case studies have demonstrated that this incentive has been effective. 
State authority has existed in conformity with the cooperative arrangements 
and political willingness has been maintained, even in times of instability. The 
system has remained above the operating system threshold. For example, 
during the minerals debate, states were required to balance state interests with 
cooperative obligations. Throughout the negotiations state authority was 
maintained. CRAMRA’s ‘package deal’ balanced claimant state authority 
with Article IV of the Treaty and with interests of non-claimant and 
developing states. Participants had confidence that state authority could co-
exist with cooperative principles and obligations regarding sovereignty 
arrangements and jurisdiction. 
 
                                                
17 For example, refer to the use of inspections as an enforcement presence within the Antarctic 
Treaty Area. 
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With respect to the continental shelf delimitation process it is evident that 
Arctic and Antarctic state authority was effectively maintained. Both 
operating systems demonstrated the capacity to uphold the authority of each 
coastal state while accommodating different issues. Submissions to the CLCS 
provided states an opportunity to showcase their capacity and authority to 
undertake Arctic and Antarctic scientific research. Early submissions also 
enabled states to highlight their interpretation of the provisions of Article 76. 
This authority tested the boundaries of application of Article 76 and Annex II 
of LOSC as well as the Rules and Procedures of the CLCS and the Scientific 
and Technical Guidelines of the CLCS. As a result, further clarification and 
formalization have occurred for the process alongside the maintenance and 
advocacy of state authority.  
 
In the Arctic, issues included the potentially overlapping seabed along 
submerged ridges, associated uncertain maritime boundaries and the larger 
uncertainty concerning the understanding of subsea geology. In the Antarctic, 
issues included how to claim a continental shelf without asserting, denying or 
supporting a claim to territorial sovereignty, how to administer the process in 
conformity with the ATS and international law without the renunciation of 
any rights, and how to avoid turning the process into a challenge amongst 
states over the cooperative authority of the ATCPs over all issues Antarctic. 
The capacity of each system to maintain state authority alongside cooperative 
norms, and under these circumstances (and difficult issues), contributes to the 
confidence of the participants within the system.  
 
Oil and gas development in the Arctic has not challenged state authority. In 
particular, the non-binding nature of the Arctic Council initiatives has ensured 
development in accordance with national interest and authority can proceed. 
Regulation is also driven by state authority and the states have harmonized 
their interests and expertise with contributions to Arctic Council initiatives. 
Increased awareness and transparency may shape future development and 
regulation. Under the current circumstances state authority cannot be 
undermined and this capacity to co-exist with initiatives contributes to the 
confidence of the participants, encouraging involvement. Involvement is 
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voluntary, self-driven and can be self-promoting. However, it also comes 
under the umbrella of regional responsibility. Transparency and shaming can 
play a less obvious but equally important a role without undermining state 
authority.  
 
Under the current system, oil and gas development in the Antarctic will not 
share the same clarity regarding state authority. State driven development and 
regulations will upset the Antarctic operating system because of binding 
regional responsibilities. State authority can only be maintained alongside 
these binding responsibilities with the effort of the participants and their 
confidence in the existing system and associated norms. Over time, the system 
has repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to maintain the state authority when 
driven through the ATS regime to do so. Though challenging, there is every 
opportunity in the future for this to replay itself under the terms of oil and gas 
development. Article 25 of the Madrid Protocol even provides for a legal 
incentive to maintain state authority alongside regional norms through the 
obligation to return to a negotiated regulatory framework.18 It is, however, 
difficult to speculate on the extent to which state authority would be upheld. 
There is evidence that although collaboration and cooperation is occurring, as 
it did with the pre-emptive efforts concerning the continental shelf process, 
there is a strong undercurrent of protecting national interest. Cooperation and 
alliances may be a useful tool for the protection of national interests under the 
guise of maintaining the existing operating system because there are no other 
politically acceptable or appealing alternatives. Regardless of the underlying 
reasons, the confidence that state authority can be maintained and the 
dynamics through which this has repeatedly occurred contributes to 
robustness of the system.  
 
Legitimacy 
In each polar operating system, though founded through different 
mechanisms, there is built-in legitimacy in the operating system with respect 
to the manner in which regional governance and state authority co-exist. The 
                                                
18 For interpretations of Article 25, see Chapter 3 and 7. 
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recognized and legitimate presence of state authority in the Arctic operating 
system grants the system underlying legitimacy. The addition of cooperative 
and regional initiatives to the system did not undermine the state authority and 
has contributed to greater legitimacy within the international community. 
States have continued to volunteer time, energy and resources to the upkeep 
and operation of the cooperative initiatives. States have demonstrated their 
acceptance and commitment to the existing and evolving system. This 
commitment, demonstrated time and again through individual and 
collaborative state practice, reinforces underlying legitimacy.  
 
For example, states have come together to solve waterway disagreements with 
cooperative agreements, deferring any expansion of the dispute. States have 
permitted the different interpretations to co-exist, in the absence of 
recognition or acquiescence. States have used a similar approach through the 
continental shelf submission process. States have also produced scientific 
collaboration and diplomatic communication in terms of the continental shelf 
and boundary delimitation processes. States have come together to create 
Arctic shipping guidelines to assist in practical management as the shipping 
industry initially grows. States have demonstrated an increased awareness of 
the effects of the oil and gas industry in the north through initiatives of the 
Arctic Council. Stakeholder participation in these initiatives will continue to 
have influence on regulatory mechanisms across the individual states. Most 
recently, the states, as a group, have confronted international concerns for a 
new Arctic treaty; one which would create a new and very different operating 
system. 
 
The Ilulissat Declaration and Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 
reiterated acceptability of the existing operating system. The declaration and 
subsequent meeting reinforced the confidence and commitment of states to 
upholding the existing system. These efforts have enhanced Arctic operating 
system legitimacy. The need for the collaborative meetings and the 
declaration indicates that the coastal states acknowledge a sense of external 
pressure on the system and potential instability. These events do not indicate a 
loss in participant confidence but rather reinforce the commitment of the 
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states to maintain the existing system in the face of instability, criticism or 
external pressure. The declaration and the following meeting reiterate 
legitimacy and confirm the capacity of the system to be robust and stable over 
time.  
 
States have also accepted the manner in which state authority and the capacity 
of the system to accommodate divergent state interests has coexisted with 
regional norms. The system has upheld state authority and reinforced 
participant confidence as regional and cooperative norms were introduced to 
the system. States facilitated the development of these norms and accepted the 
additional initiatives, encouraging greater legitimacy. The addition of 
cooperative and regional environmental norms also provided greater 
legitimacy within the international community.  
 
The presence of underlying legitimacy associated with universally recognized 
sovereignty in the Arctic does not share the same capacity in the Antarctic 
operating system. In the absence of universally recognized sovereignty, 
commitment to Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty encourages states to work at 
maintaining the balance between state authority and sovereignty 
arrangements. This obligation provides an incentive to uphold the system, 
encouraging the nuanced behaviour that has developed amongst the ATCPs. 
Thus, state practice in response to the built-in incentive provides legitimacy. 
In the Antarctic operating system, the case studies identify that, historically, 
states have endeavoured to support the co-existence of state authority 
alongside sovereignty arrangements. This provides legitimacy to the incentive 
created by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and the operating system as a 
whole.  
 
Commitment to the Antarctic operating system, demonstrated through the 
incentive to uphold Article IV, has been observed throughout the case studies. 
Most significantly, accommodating licensing, property and royalty rights into 
a multilateral convention agreed to by the negotiating states demonstrates 
commitment to and acceptability of the system. In moving away from 
CRAMRA, states included in the Madrid Protocol a provision that obliges 
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them to coordinate future approaches to the minerals issues (when necessary) 
that uphold the current system prior to and rather than abandoning the system 
altogether. Though abandonment is still an option, the provision once again 
provides a built-in incentive, which fosters the continuation of the existing 
system. 
 
The pre-emptive approach to the continental shelf issue was motivated in part 
by the need to protect the balance achieved by Article IV. The memory of the 
instability created by the CRAMRA negotiations and other issues which have 
raised the sovereignty question19 would have also played a role in determining 
a pre-emptive course of action by the states. The period of external criticism 
of the ATS20 during the CRAMRA negotiations created operating system 
instability. The response to this instability helped to strengthen and grant 
further legitimacy to the system. Response began through the negotiations by 
accommodating developing state interest, NGO interest and welcoming a 
wider breadth of regime participation. The negotiations produced a 
convention acceptable to the parties. Following the conclusion of the 
convention, Australia and then France (followed by Belgium, Italy and others) 
moved away from the convention, creating internal instability. The mitigation 
of this additional instability, however, also proved commitment and 
acceptability of the existing system by the states involved. The use of an 
alliance decreased consequences and reiterated the underlying confidence in 
the system. States moved quickly to a new initiative. The implementation of 
this new initiative, having occurred through significant instability, cemented 
greater legitimacy for the ATS as a regime within the larger operating system. 
The ability of the ATS to co-exist in conformity with other legal instruments 
(such as MARPOL) and norms was also further appreciated. At the 
conclusion of this debate over minerals and the environment, the operating 
system as a whole attained greater legitimacy.  
 
                                                
19 For example, the issue of enforcement of national legislation against whaling activities 
occurring offshore Antarctica brings up questions regarding sovereignty and coastal state 
jurisdiction. 
20 See, in particular, Malaysia’s criticism and the ‘Question of Antarctica’ discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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For the continental shelf issues, states predicted the instability it would create 
and countered this instability through pre-emptive and collaborative 
approaches. This highlights internal acceptability of the system. In some 
ways, the need for a pre-emptive approach may indicate that the states believe 
that the system is still vulnerable to externally driven instability. However, the 
response, or lack of response, by the greater international community in 
challenging the approach taken by the ATCPs is indicative of external 
acceptance as well. Although the continental shelf delimitation process was 
directly attached to national interests, the manner in which the approaches 
were accepted by states both within and outside the operating system has 
contributed to legitimacy. In a sense, the international community has 
acquiesced to the Antarctic operating system and authority of the ATCPs with 
respect to issues of the Antarctic Treaty.  
 
The use of diplomacy and relations between states has been important to the 
Arctic and Antarctic operating systems. Without diplomacy and interstate 
relations, the interpretations and positions of the states would hinge on the 
legal interpretation alone. Legal interpretations may exist in the absence of 
prejudice. The actors must, however, still consider each relevant interpretation 
against their own, as well as against norms within the operating system. For 
greater legitimacy to exist, actors must come to accept that interpretations can 
co-exist without undermining their state authority or the operating system. In 
order to do this, states appreciate that each interpretation has a story, history 
and context from which it emerges and exists. Through diplomacy and 
international relations, informal discussion hints at or even clarifies the 
context and consequences of a given position on an issue. Political history and 
historic relations contribute to the extent to which particular states engage and 
the choices in their positions.  
 
Consistency in this type of interaction between the states within the operating 
system can even become predictable (if longstanding). By acknowledging or 
understanding these idiosyncrasies, states can accept them. Through 
acceptance the system gains legitimacy. For example, under the Arctic 
Cooperation Agreement US agreement to acquire transit permission became 
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an acceptable formality with no influence on the consistent US interpretation 
of the Arctic waterways. In the ATCMs, the UK and Argentina openly 
disagree with each other. States understand their consistent positions. These 
interactions do not necessarily compromise consensus (although it may 
prolong and frustrate the process). The delimitation process in both regions 
included diplomatic sessions. These will likely continue as more information 
is gathered in the Arctic and as new decisions are implemented regarding the 
application of continental shelf jurisdiction in the Antarctic. 
 
In light of diplomatic exchange and international relations, events, interactions 
and positions that seem to threaten the operating system, or threaten the 
balance between states within the system, can actually be less threatening than 
they appear. Actors accept the perspective of the challenges alongside the 
history, context of events, and dynamics of the operating system. Through this 
acceptability, the legitimacy of the operating system is reinforced by the 
actors within. Although challenges may appear from the outside to threaten 
the stability of the system, the underlying legitimacy contributes to the 
resilience, discussed in further detail below. These elements of legitimacy 
reflect participant confidence, contribute to ongoing participant confidence 
and influence the robust nature of the system.  
 
Resilience 
Unlike effectiveness and some aspects of legitimacy, resilience is not built 
into the systems. Yet, if the operating systems and its actors are going to 
overcome the challenge of a new or developing issue in the absence of 
prejudice, the system must have resilience. Resilience has been demonstrated 
in different ways for the Arctic and the Antarctic operating systems. For 
example, the Arctic operating system has had to repeatedly accommodate the 
debate over the Arctic waterways. Each time the debate resurfaces additional 
variables are mixed into the debate. Over time these have included new legal 
provisions such as Article 197 and 234, LOSC, cooperative norms, and global 
responsibilities towards environmental security in the face of climate change 
in the Arctic. With each episode a similar result has occurred. States have 
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implemented practical measures when necessary but have left decisions on the 
legal status of the waterways to be determined at some later date, if ever. 
Certainty in the legal status was avoided in the interests of not employing 
prejudice towards or against one interpretation or state position. To come to 
this solution repetitively, and with such consistency, demonstrates resilience 
within the Arctic operating system.   
 
The manner in which Arctic states have approached the continental shelf 
delimitation process has contributed to the appreciation of resilience in a 
different manner than the Antarctic or even the previous case study on the 
Arctic waterways. Arctic states did not need to utilize a pre-emptive approach 
for the submissions. Informal discussions have occurred; however, the formal 
collaboration has maintained a scientific focus. Areas of disagreement over 
the application of the LOSC, areas of potential overlap and maritime 
boundaries that require delimitation have been identified by the states 
concerned. Nevertheless, because the process is without prejudice to boundary 
delimitation between states, less immediate instability has impacted the Arctic 
operating system. A hands-off, ‘wait and see’ attitude was able to preside over 
the issue without immediate risk of undermining the system. Less diplomatic 
efforts was immediately involved than in the Antarctic. So far, the Arctic 
operating system has been resilient to the challenges of Arctic continental 
shelf delimitation because the process has not destabilized the operating 
system. The Arctic states will continue to respond to issues of delimitation as 
needed and their commitment to the existing process and system contributes 
to the system being resilient to instability.  
 
The continental shelf process itself did not require significant resilience. 
Nevertheless, instability in the Arctic operating system arose in respect to the 
international concern over governance due to the timing of the delimitation 
process. International concern over regional Arctic governance crossed all of 
the issues of the Arctic waterways, continental shelf delimitation, and oil and 
gas resource development. Arctic coastal states did engage to counteract this 
instability and used a declaration to defend their operating system. In a similar 
manner to the need for a pre-emptive approach in the Antarctic (discussed 
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below) the need for a declaration to the international community could be 
construed as further instability or lack of underlying confidence. The system 
couldn’t merely be resilient; the actors had to declare the resilience. 
Nonetheless, the declaration was a useful example of participant confidence – 
confidence based on the accepted ability of the system to counter challenges 
and integrate issues into the existing system. The actors declared that the 
system continues to be resilient and should not be abandoned or changed. 
 
Resilience within the Arctic operating system also stems from the interaction 
of militarization and the cooperative framework. Militarization of the Arctic is 
not specifically prohibited within the sources of law in the Arctic operating 
system.21 In creating the Arctic Council, it was clearly indicated that the 
‘Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security’.22 
Military presence has been used to assert sovereignty, protect national borders 
and maintain Arctic security. In the absence of diplomatic council, overt 
hegemonic positioning by Arctic states through the use of military power will 
challenge the balance currently available between national interest and 
regional cooperation. Nonetheless, because the Arctic Council does not deal 
in matters of military security, regional governance can continue to be 
resilient against its influence. Commitments to regional cooperation through 
the Arctic Council and LOSC can continue while military security initiatives 
are absorbed within the operating system.23 In this regard, through exclusion 
of or resistance to dealing with military issues, the cooperative aspect of the 
operating system has created resilience.  
 
                                                
21 For example, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation 
Treaty), adopted at Washington, Moscow and London 01 July 1968, 729 UNTS 168, entered 
into force 05 March 1970 has been ratified by all of the Arctic states. The US and the Russian 
Federation are still nuclear states and although a Nuclear Weapon free zone has been 
considered for the Arctic it has yet to be established as such. For discussion see Dr. Adele 
Buckley, 'Establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Arctic' (Pugwash, 
Parliamentarians and Political Will: Advancing in the Agenda for Abolition, Canadian 
Pugwash Group, Nova Scotia, 11 July 2008). 
22 Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), 19 September 
1996, 35 ILM 1382-1390, para 1. 
23 For example, under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the Canadian 
government has increased military presence in the Arctic and has reinforced military activities 
in the interests of national security and sovereignty. These initiatives have neither deterred nor 
strengthened Canada’s involvement in the Arctic Council. 
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In both operating systems, participants must trust the capacity of other states 
to foster resilience to challenge. For the Antarctic, states must also accept and 
support the bifocal approach necessary to resist challenge and continue in the 
absence of prejudice. As mentioned, the Arctic waterways debate has 
resurfaced many times. As the system evolved, the resilience to this 
longstanding debate continued. In contrast to a repetitive debate, it is the 
absence of certainty regarding entitlement and jurisdiction that repeats across 
all issues. In the case studies examined, states returned consistently to the 
bifocal approach used to both maintain state authority and deny it absolutely 
in the Antarctic Treaty Area. Actors have consistently returned to 
accommodating interests against Article IV. In returning to this obligation, 
and consistently finding ways to accommodate issues in conformity with 
protecting states’ rights in the absence of prejudice, resilience is reinforced. 
Resilience has also been evident against external criticism in the minerals 
debate and criticism with respect to the approach regarding the continental 
shelf process.  
 
Participants in the Antarctic operating system have had to be more pro-
actively engaged. In light of the sovereignty arrangement, significant effort is 
required to maintain the balance within the operating system. In the cases of 
the continental shelf delimitation and offshore resource potential, the 
engagement has also been pre-emptive. The nuanced approach of the 
continental shelf process and the CRAMRA case study provide excellent 
examples of engaging participants within the system and the debates. During 
CRAMRA, confidence in the system was maintained throughout the periods 
of instability. States acted in a manner that upheld confidence in the system, 
even if trying to protect their own interests. Alongside the attrition of 
legitimacy, this case study demonstrated the extent to which the system was 
resilient to internally and externally provoked instability. It emerged from 
these threats with broader participation and the Madrid Protocol within the 
very much intact operating system. 
 
There was also significant effort involved with the continental shelf 
delimitation process. This occurred over a long period of time prior to the 
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commencement of the submissions. Recognizing the potential for instability, 
states involved spent significant effort to develop options that would not upset 
the inherent rights of states or upset the manner in which the Antarctic regime 
operates within the operating system. Actions were required to conform to 
both sources of law; the LOSC and the ATS. The pre-emptive efforts prepared 
the actors for challenge from within and outside the system. Like the minerals 
issues, the issue challenged stability of the whole system. Unlike the minerals 
issue, greater instability was derived from within the system. The lack of 
international concern over the Antarctic governance was over-ridden by the 
internal concern of participating actors. States were wary of the risks of 
compromising state rights and/or compromising the system from within.  
 
Thus, the construction of submissions and diplomatic responses reflect a 
nuanced approach to this concern and highlight the effort and willingness of 
the states to defend and uphold the existing system in the context of a very 
challenging issue. Throughout the process, states could also appreciate that 
the international community, though aware of the controversial issue, was not 
challenging the system. Legitimacy existed. Under this legitimate context, 
even the potentially more assertive approach of Argentina and the phrasing 
used in the responses by The Netherlands24 did not destabilize the operating 
system and, furthermore, contributed to resilience. In the face of submissions 
that strayed from rehearsed formats (such as Argentina’s), states found the 
ability to affirm that irrespective of subtle differences, the prescribed 
continental shelf delimitation approaches were still invoked. The acceptance 
of the options and the manner in which stability was retained demonstrates 
resilience within the system.  
 
It can be suggested that the need for such a lengthy and intricate pre-emptive 
approach indicates a high degree of instability within the system. Regardless 
of the high degree of instability, this case study exemplified a high degree of 
commitment to maintain the system. In a similar manner, potential offshore 
oil and gas exploration will provoke significant instability. Normative 
                                                
24 See Chapter 4 for discussion. 
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boundaries will be significantly challenged and further effort will be required 
to define physical boundaries, jurisdiction and industry clarity. Nevertheless, 
the case study demonstrates that a foundation for resilience to these issues 
exists. Flexibility in the interpretations of regulatory scope will continue to 
provide resilience. For example, the ability to bind third parties to the 
prohibition on mineral resource activities proposed for the continental shelves 
located within the Antarctic Treaty Area generated from islands north of the 
Area will safeguard ATS norms. A sense of security and confidence that the 
regime will be able to accommodate potentially emerging pressures 
concerning seabed resources is promoted. For the Antarctic operating system, 
the risk of instability will not disappear as long as Article IV sets the backdrop 
for sovereignty. The necessity of pre-emptive and often significant effort to 
mitigate existing or potential instabilities does not, however, provide an 
accurate assessment of the capacity of the system. The ability to remain above 
the operating system threshold is a product the confidence of the actors and 
the appreciation that effort will produce effective results that do not 
compromise states’ rights. Such confidence and effectiveness contributes to 
stability over a longer time and robustness. 
 
6.4 Comparison of variables of robustness across the systems 
States engage in issues related to environmental and energy security as they 
affect local communities, environments and economies. Engagement includes 
a myriad of stakeholders across many issues and various platforms. The 
Arctic and Antarctic operating systems are two such platforms. The case 
studies reviewed in this thesis demonstrate that as the interests of states are 
placed against regional norms, operating system structures and its dynamics, 
the actors and the systems respond. Actions reflect the robust nature of the 
systems and highlight different means of maintaining the system above an 
operating system threshold.  
 
Increased demand for development and transportation alongside opening of 
sea passages as a result of reduced sea ice in the Arctic will continue to 
provoke the issue of the status and regulatory framework for the Arctic 
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waterways. Coastal states in proximity with the sea passages and states with 
vested interest in commercial transportation and security will be engaged in 
the debate. Offshore oil and gas is already occurring with coastal state 
regulation, licensing and enforcement measures in place within each state’s 
jurisdiction. So far, development has been avoided in areas of unresolved 
maritime boundaries.  
 
As the continental shelves of the Arctic Ocean basin are scientifically 
understood and submissions to the CLCS receive recommendations, coastal 
states will apply these recommendations in the consideration of the 
proclamation of their continental shelf and the maritime boundaries associated 
with it, and adopt legislation that is designed to capture activities occurring or 
likely to occur on or within the shelf area. There are established provisions for 
these issues and coastal states will engage with each other in areas of overlap 
and/or dispute and will design unilateral initiatives within the constructs of the 
operating system. Providing the platform for these issues and a context for 
states’ engagement is the structure, norms and dynamics of the Arctic 
operating system. 
 
The Antarctic operating system provides the same underlying context to the 
debates appreciated for the Antarctic region. Oil and gas development is not 
occurring, has not occurred in the past, and is not an immediate prospect for 
the future. Yet even though development was not pending in the 1980s the 
issue was debated at length. The debate produced a development standstill, 
prohibiting the onset and incremental development of mineral resource 
activities. Actors of the Antarctic operating system maintain this prohibition 
yet within the system there is context for the debate to reopen. When the 
prohibition was set in place, the delimitation of continental shelves was in its 
infancy within the LOSC. Now the continental shelf process has matured and 
the approach taken by the states will influence the offshore oil and gas debate 
(when and if it resurfaces). These issues exist within the Antarctic operating 
system, not in isolation.  
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The Arctic operating system does not oblige states to check their actions, 
interpretations, state-driven directives and initiatives against an obligation to 
not create prejudice in the recognition or non-recognition of sovereignty. The 
case studies have demonstrated that the absence of prejudice is sustained 
through the acceptance and legitimacy of each state’s authority. This 
underlying assumption or understanding contributes to participant confidence. 
Underlying the participant confidence is the knowledge that with the 
maintenance of state authority the system is resilient. Because of the influence 
of recognized sovereignty and the non-binding nature of the cooperative and 
regional responsibilities, less effort is required to maintain state authority. 
Less pre-emptive engagement is required because issues return to the 
legitimate existence of state authority. State authority cannot be maintained in 
the presence of prejudice; therefore, every issue is accommodated in a manner 
that prevents prejudice. Thus, recognized sovereignty has provided a means 
for operating system effectiveness. Ignoring absolute resolution of an issue 
may be required. Employing practical mechanisms that do not interfere with 
the co-existence of different interests or interpretations may be required. The 
‘pick and choose’ methods can safeguard states from creating prejudice.  
 
States are still bound through LOSC and other treaties to cooperate on certain 
matters such as the prevention of marine pollution or the protection of polar 
bears. The sources of law provide for regional cooperation and issue 
resolution. States are aware of their responsibilities. The actors of the system, 
similar to the Antarctic, build the system and commit to the responsibilities. 
The responsibilities suit the needs of the actors, respond to emerging issues, 
encourage effectiveness and contribute to underlying legitimacy. Though the 
Arctic operating system may appear to have been the recipient of less 
international challenge in the past, resilience and confidence has still 
developed, contributing to legitimacy through the evolution of the system. 
States have taken the opportunity to declare their commitment and confidence, 
bridging the underlying legitimacy to defer international concern and 
challenge. Together, these elements prove the robust nature of the system.   
 
 380 
States are not bound to cooperate under a regional specific regime such as the 
ATS. Additional cooperative and regional initiatives provided the operating 
system with regional and cooperative norms. Their non-binding nature does 
not equate to a less robust operating system. The case studies have 
demonstrated that the manner in which states interact and uphold the system, 
as well as the structure of the system, have provided the system robustness 
without binding obligations. Effort and engagement of states is required to 
accept divergent interpretations and initiatives. Acceptance upholds the 
system by creating confidence through legitimacy, state authority and 
resilience. Effort and engagement are necessary to maintain that confidence. 
Effort and engagement are also necessary to buy into and uphold the 
cooperative normative principles under their non-binding nature. 
Nevertheless, the non-binding nature ensures state authority, provides 
legitimacy and resilience. Participant confidence provides states the ability to 
carry forward their initiatives and interpretations in the absence of prejudice.  
 
The Antarctic operating system requires effort, engagement, and participant 
confidence to continue to be upheld. The main cause of the effort and 
engagement stems from Article IV – the sovereignty arrangements. Actors 
within the system have bound themselves to these provisions. Underlying that 
legal obligation is the desire to remain bound to it. Underlying that desire is 
the perception that for all states involved, this is the best existing solution in 
which no one state in particular stands to significantly benefit or significantly 
lose. Underlying this perception is the lack of prejudice created through the 
efforts of states and upheld by the actors within the operating system. The 
lack of prejudice stems from the legal provision and the confidence that the 
participants retain in knowing that prejudice cannot be created under the 
current system. Therefore, within the Antarctic operating system the necessary 
participant confidence of a robust system stems from the legal provision that 
obliges actors to be effective when effectiveness is measured by the ability to 
not create prejudice. The system has acquired and demonstrated the ability to 
remain above the operating system threshold. In the case of offshore oil and 
gas development, the system will have the same structure, legitimacy and 
resilience to return to and the engagement of states to remain bound to the 
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provision that sets up effectiveness will be the driving force in the outcome of 
the development debate. 
 
Political will and belief over time that these systems are the most mutually 
beneficial systems available to all states is a key component to the stability of 
the polar operating systems. Actors, if confident in the Antarctic operating 
system, will always return to the interaction of legal obligation under Article 
IV and the norms of behaviour concerning sovereignty which have developed 
by practice. Actors will ensure effectiveness through maintaining that these 
rights are upheld alongside state authority. Confident participants or actors 
within the Arctic operating system will always ensure that provisions do not 
undermine their legitimate state authority. Each state will return to the 
acceptability of provisions or regulations according to the absence of 
prejudice and the maintenance of their own state authority. Arctic states will 
choose to bind themselves to provisions, choose to comply and/or choose to 
enforce in direct relation to how that engagement affects the authority of 
states within the operating system. By choosing to bind themselves to 
commitments and engage in initiatives that do not undermine their authority 
the system is upheld and confidence is reinforced. Upholding the existing 
system through non-binding initiatives guarantees the inclusion of cooperative 
norms alongside state authority. 
  
6.5 Chapter conclusion 
The polar operating systems share similar characteristics and dynamics but 
have different components and sources of law. Though expressed in different 
manners and circumstances, each system has had to overcome challenges and 
instability. Each system has acquired and demonstrated state authority, 
legitimacy and resilience. These elements have contributed in varying 
amounts to participant confidence. Alongside this participant confidence, each 
operating system has been effective at preserving the rights of states in the 
absence of prejudice. In doing so, through various voluntary or binding 
elements of the operating system, robustness has been tested. Overall, 
throughout the issues examined, each operating system, in its own unique 
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manner, has remained above the operating system threshold and neither has 
been abandoned nor abruptly changed. Given the appreciation of existing 
robustness, the next chapter examines contemporary challenges and tests the 
future of polar governance.  
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Chapter Seven: Contemporary Challenges 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding case studies have demonstrated that the Arctic and Antarctic 
operating systems are robust, though characteristics and operation of each 
system differ. These systems are not static and different dynamics and drivers 
can lead to change. Such changes can challenge the existing operating systems 
and test their robustness, with implications for polar governance. Can, for 
example, the Arctic operating system accommodate an increase in offshore oil 
and gas development with accompanying trans-Arctic transportation of 
petroleum related cargo? Can the Antarctic operating system accommodate an 
onset of offshore oil and gas exploration and development and related 
increases in Antarctic shipping? How might these contemporary issues affect 
the variables of robustness? Are these issues likely to push the operating 
system below the threshold and cause abandonment of the current system and 
a shift towards a new system?  
 
7.2 Contemporary challenges in the Arctic 
Many contemporary challenges for the Arctic environment and communities 
will arise from climate change, increasing demand for resources, and 
economic stimuli. Climate change will create significant opportunities and 
impacts on the Arctic. For example, as sea ice retreats and areas of the Arctic 
Ocean become increasingly accessible, marine based activities are likely to 
increase. Trends for Arctic sea ice retreat have been documented in numerous 
studies.1 According to a recent report, September Arctic sea ice extent has 
reduced by approximately 11% between 1979 and present, reducing the 
maximum extent to 4.1 million km2. In comparison, the median maximum 
                                                
1 See, for instance, PAME, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (2009) Arctic 
Council 
<http://pame.arcticportal.org/images/stories/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf> 
at 10 November 2009, 24-32; ACIA, 'Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Scientific Report' 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), Chapter 9, at 456-472 and I. Allison et al, 'The 
Copenhagen Diagnosis: Updating the World on the Latest Climate Science' (University of 
New South Wales Climate Change Research Centre (CCRC), Sydney, Australia, 2009), at 29-
35.  
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September sea ice extent observed across the decades is 6.7 million km2 and 
the previous record was 5.3 million km2 observed in 2005.2 A new record 
minimum sea ice extent was observed on 16 September 2007 when 2.6 
million km2 less ice was present compared to the median.3  
 
With the Arctic already an active region for marine based activities, shipping, 
resource development and tourism are likely to increase. In 2004, 
approximately 6000 ships were reported to have been operating in the Arctic.4 
Almost 50% of the vessels were fishing vessels and the vast majority of these 
were operating around the Aleutian Islands.5 Bulk carriers were the next 
largest category of ships, performing community resupply voyages and bulk 
cargo transport. AMSA categorized transport shipping as ‘destinational’, 
intra-Arctic, trans-Arctic and cabotage.6 Although accessibility is increasing 
in the Arctic with sea ice retreat, AMSA identified that to 2020 the majority of 
shipping will continue to be destinational, not trans-Arctic. Ships will 
increasingly access the Arctic, perform a task or activity and then return 
south. These tasks will include community resupply and fishing as well as oil 
and gas related activities such as exploration, resource transport and 
infrastructure supply and removal.  
 
Long known as a storehouse of untapped natural resources, high 
commodity prices and a growing worldwide demand in recent years 
have the Arctic poised as a significant contributor to the global 
economy.7 
 
                                                
2 Ibid., Allison et al., at 31. Further details on sea ice retreat are also outlined in the AMSA 
and ACIA reports. 
3 Ibid., Allison et al., at 31. See also Figure 3 in Chapter 1 comparing September sea ice 
extent in 2005 and 2007. 
4 Supra n. 1, PAME, at 72. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., at 12. Destinational shipping is when a ship sails to the Arctic, performs a specific task 
and then sails south; intra-Arctic shipping is when a voyage or marine activity remains within 
the general Arctic region and links two or more Arctic states; trans-Arctic shipping or 
navigation are voyages that are taken across the Arctic Ocean from Pacific to Atlantic Oceans 
or vice versa; and cabotage or trade transport is marine transport in coastal waters between 
ports within an Arctic state.  
7 Ibid., at 15. 
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Arctic natural resource development and trade have already experienced an 
increase in recent years. Along with destinational voyages, AMSA reports 
international shipping (trans-Arctic) is expected to increase as appropriate 
infrastructure is put in place to service Arctic navigation and resource 
development.8 The Arctic waterways may become increasingly important 
navigation routes to support local resource development and increased 
shipping for short periods of the year (August-September). Challenging sea 
ice conditions are likely to persist, highlighting the need for accurate charting, 
navigational systems and infrastructure. Thus, exploration, development and 
transport of oil and gas related resources within and through the Arctic as well 
as other commercial shipping requirements will present significant drivers for 
Arctic governance.   
 
Areas of unresolved/disputed jurisdiction 
There are vast quantities of proven resources that states and industry can 
develop. The onset of increased oil and gas activity can be accommodated in 
the short term through existing infrastructure and the ability to exploit 
resources in areas of undisputed sovereignty and jurisdiction. However, 
development interest in areas of known resource potential but disputed 
jurisdiction, such as the Beaufort Sea disputed area between Canada and the 
US or previously disputed area in the Barents Sea between Norway and the 
Russian Federation, might challenge the system. There is, however, minimal 
reason for differences over small, disputed areas to overwhelm the system.9 
The recent agreement concerning the Barents Sea provides a model case. Its 
‘foundation in international law and bilateral negotiation’ is reported to ‘bode 
well for future conflicts’.10 The Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg, 
                                                
8 The availability of reasonable insurance rates was also identified as a factor influencing any 
increase in international shipping. Ibid., at 67. 
9 See comments concerning the recent agreement between Norway and the Russian 
Federation concerning the Barents Sea. Norway and Russian companies are already 
collaborating on a number of oil and gas projects in the region. The recent agreement provides 
for further joint development opportunities and confirms the goodwill and cooperation 
between Arctic states. See Walter Gibbs, Russia and Norway Reach Accord on Barents Sea 
(27 April 2010) The New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/world/europe/28norway.html> at 03 May 2010.   
10 Comments made by the chairman of Norway’s Ocean Futures Research Institute, Willy 
Østreng, reported in ibid.  
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was reported as commenting that this agreement confirms goodwill and a 
policy of cooperation exists between states, quelling anxiety over jurisdiction 
of the Arctic seabed.11  
 
Industry has tended to avoid areas of regulatory uncertainty and will likely 
remain wary of unilateral assertions of regulation or licensing in disputed 
areas. Industrial actors may also be able to influence the resolution of 
uncertainty through their position as critical stakeholders to potential projects. 
Industry may choose to suspend or withdraw exploration and development 
activities while campaigning for fiscal and regulatory certainty.12 If energy 
demand is great, pressure for resolving the uncertainties will increase. 
 
The resolution of these uncertainties does not have to alter the pattern of state 
authority within the system or alter the perceived legitimacy or resilience of 
the system. Confidence of the states across the system will provide assurance 
that the resolution of the uncertainties occurs in conformity with the operating 
system and without unacceptably prejudicing the rights of states involved. In 
the existing system, diplomatic channels are open despite historic and 
contemporary political differences. Importantly, future demand on energy 
resources will require uncertainties to be clarified. Driven by the desire for 
resources and commercial success, innovative approaches to resource 
extraction, shipping and trade can satisfy industry and states. These solutions 
do not necessarily require the resolution of the boundary disputes, disputes 
over sovereignty, or disputes regarding jurisdictional status. Exploiting or 
conserving the resources may proceed through joint development agreements, 
                                                
11 Ibid. 
12 This occurred, for example, with respect to negotiations concerning the petroleum resources 
of the Timor Sea. Woodside Petroleum (an Australian led consortium) suspended 
development activities in 2005 after setting a deadline in 2004 for Australia and East Timor to 
resolve their disputes and ratify the Sunrise International Unitization Agreement. Woodside 
had also produced a submission to a Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in July 2002 in 
order to express the industry view point of terms necessary to secure fiscal and regulatory 
certainty and stability required by the Joint Venture Participants for the Greater Sunrise 
Project in the Timor Sea. See Clive Schofield, 'Minding the Gap: The Australia-East Timor 
Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS)' (2007) 22(2) The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 189, at 197, fn 32 and Woodside Petroleum 
Ltd., Submission to Standing Committee on Treaties (July 2002) Submission No. 21 
<www.aph.gov.au/House/committee/jsct/timor/subs/sub21.pdf> at 06 December 2009.  
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treaties, memoranda of understanding and/or specific terms.13 These may be 
established through negotiations within the operating system. 
 
An increase in shipping and development activity along unclearly regulated 
Arctic waterways may also challenge the system. These challenges can also 
be met within the operating system. There are opportunities to advance the 
scope of regulation across shipping activities within Arctic waterways in the 
absence of prejudice and in the absence of absolute resolution of the 
jurisdiction of the waterways. There are several options available to industry 
and states for transporting resources through the Arctic. The development of 
industry practice will eventually create a demand for the resolution of 
regulatory uncertainty. Regulatory uncertainty does not have to equate to the 
resolution of the status of the NSR or the NWP. The regulation of the route 
across the Arctic basin will also slowly increase as technology permits 
navigation. The IMO will play an important role in this regulation whereas 
coastal states will be influential in the regulation of the waterways. Mutually 
agreeable terms for the Arctic waterways can be negotiated or even develop 
without negotiation as long as states with particularly strong views do not 
intervene with insistent and disruptive assertions. It could be in the interests of 
the US and EU, for example, to continue to assert their interests within the 
forum of the operating system just as Canada and the Russian Federation can 
continue to assimilate those differences of opinion within regulatory terms.  
 
Participant confidence in the system may deteriorate if a state chooses to 
disregard the interests of other states and asserts unilateral jurisdiction or 
control over disputed resource regions or unclearly regulated waterways. Even 
if state practice or industry practice occurs in conformity with the interests of 
many states and is non-prejudicial, an assertion of control by one state can 
potentially overwhelm the confidence of other participants. Disregard for 
existing practice or legal custom will lead to a decrease in the mutual interest 
of avoiding prejudice to the rights of states. The response to such disruptive 
assertions could be decisive to the operating system.  
                                                
13 Terms might be expressed as International Unitization Agreements (IUA). See, for example 
terms of the Sunrise IUA, mentioned above, for the Timor Sea in ibid., Schofield, at 195-198. 
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The management of potentially disruptive assertions and/or actions may 
remain an issue between only the states directly involved in a dispute 
regarding jurisdiction over the resource area or waterway. This may be able to 
be resolved between the states and not create uncertainty in the larger system. 
Alternatively, disruptive assertions may implicate other actors within the 
operating system. For example, several states may be involved with the issue 
of transport through the waterways, involved with trade related to resource 
development, or involved as direct stakeholders in potential development in a 
disputed area. With the involvement of more states and stakeholders, the 
potential for instability in the operating system increases. On the other hand, 
with increased involvement there is greater potential for collective influence. 
Diplomatic and legal channels may potentially accommodate or mitigate the 
threats. For example, states may negotiate certain trade terms only under 
mutually agreed development terms rather than unilaterally asserted terms. 
The response of the operating system actors may therefore stabilize the 
system. 
 
Alternatively, the response of one state (or the collective approach of many) 
might be indicative of attempts to solely protect unilateral interests. If 
assertions by states proceed in the absence of diplomatic measures, 
unilateralism and defensiveness may further facilitate actions prejudicial to 
states’ interests. For example, the action of rebuilding military capacity may 
be indicative of unilateralism on the part of the Arctic coastal states and their 
maritime enforcement capabilities.14 In the absence of existing and reinforced 
diplomatic relations towards regional cooperation or the deterioration of such 
commitments collective confidence of the actors would also deteriorate. The 
system could then weaken and possibly unravel.  
 
                                                
14 See Rob Huebert, 'The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment' (Canadian Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Institute, Calgary, March 2010) for a description of the recent 
militarization activities of the Arctic coastal states and commentary on apparent cooperation.  
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Outer continental shelves and beyond 
It has already been demonstrated that the delimitation of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf and the associated boundary delimitations in the Arctic need 
not disrupt the operating system.15 Boundary delimitation will occur between 
opposite and adjacent states in due course. Exploration of the outer 
continental shelf regions can continue, even in overlapping areas such as those 
predicted for the central Arctic, as long as channels of communication and 
cooperation amongst the involved states and stakeholders exist. Marine 
scientific research cannot be inhibited and an improved understanding of the 
geology and resource potential further offshore will gradually develop.  
 
If industry development pressure were to arise in areas further offshore where 
the boundary between national jurisdiction and the Area is not clearly defined, 
it may prompt finalization of the outer limits of the continental shelf. As the 
only Arctic coastal state yet to accede the LOSC, the US may be 
disadvantaged if industry interest were to arise through the ISBA in an area 
that may or may not be beyond US jurisdiction. Having signed the 1994 
Implementing Agreement, the US has demonstrated commitment to the 
regulatory instrument of the Area. For the instrument to be accurately applied 
it would require its area of authority to be defined. There is, therefore, the 
potential to negotiate this boundary outside the process of the CLCS.16  
 
Further deep sea research and resource development in the Area could be 
initiated and undertaken under the authority of the ISBA. Within the operating 
system there is already capacity for the Arctic coastal states to influence the 
manner in which development proceeds. States Parties (except currently the 
US) can be active within the ISBA. States may decide to join a consortium 
interested in resource development. Regulatory control would be implemented 
through the state legislation. There is also potential for the Arctic Council to 
                                                
15 Mel Weber, 'Defining the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf across the Arctic Basin: 
The Russian Submission, States' Rights, Boundary Delimitation and Arctic Regional 
Cooperation' (2009) 24(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 653-681. 
16 As well, under principles of customary law and Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the 
ability to be bound to rights under a treaty does exist in the absence of explicit consent to be 
bound. The US may therefore have rights to an extended continental shelf rather than being 
limited to the customary 200 NM. Refer to discussion of customary law in Chapter 1. 
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become more of a collective voice within the UN and therefore the ISBA. 
Because the ISBA is a UN organization, this avenue may bring Arctic issues 
into the platform of discussion within the ISBA and its regulatory decision 
making process. For example, Arctic specific mining codes, developed in 
collaboration through the Arctic Council, may come to augment the already 
existing, but perhaps regionally insufficient, deep sea mining code.17  
 
Regional influence and state authority can be retained and increasingly 
expressed through these international fora if participant confidence is 
maintained. Continued legitimacy and resilience in the Arctic operating 
system will correspondingly depend on this confidence and contribute to it. 
Lack of prejudice can be retained through the provisions of international and 
regional instruments while soft law mechanisms discussed below contribute to 
transparency and accountability.  
 
Soft law mechanisms 
Under the current terms of the Arctic operating system, exclusive rights to 
explore and exploit resources exist for coastal states. States can develop their 
offshore areas in a manner of their choosing, in accordance with generally 
accepted international standards. Coastal states also have rights to regulate 
shipping activities in coastal waters, with certain provisions available to 
protect the marine environment of ice-covered waters. It is difficult to predict 
whether environmental security can be maintained under the existing system 
while commercial activity increases. The soft law mechanisms of the AEPS 
and the Arctic Council have provided excellent information and assessment of 
the Arctic. Environmental accountability may continue to affect decisions of 
states, but only if the states subject themselves to this accountability. The 
‘pick and choose’ manner of the Arctic cooperative framework suggests that 
states may alter their involvement without negative consequences if handled 
diplomatically. Non-state actors, such as NGOs, may have little influence on 
                                                
17 Whether the deep sea mining code needs to be adapted for regional specificity is beyond the 
scope of this research. This is, however, just an example of where and how the Arctic Council 
influence might be enhanced.  
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the state decisions within the system given the legitimacy of state authority. 
However, they have abilities to exert pressure from outside or external to the 
operating systems.   
 
Through the Arctic Council and other fora, Arctic environmental issues have 
gained salience. Actors in the Arctic operating system will have a more 
difficult time abandoning the environmental accountability now built into the 
system. The involvement of states in the Arctic Council and other initiatives is 
complex, crosses numerous fora, and levels of government and society. 
Extricating themselves from these projects, including those related to the oil 
and gas industry or transportation might not be the simplest or most beneficial 
action. Rather, shifting the focus within the initiatives might better produce 
the desired affect while also maintaining the operating system and 
contributing to legitimacy.  
 
For example, as described in Chapter 5, current oil and gas assessments and 
guidelines attempt to satisfy stakeholders and exist alongside nationally 
implemented regulations. As development proceeds, the guidelines will need 
to shift to accommodate new technologies and impacts, including those 
represented by incidents occurring outside the Arctic.18 In this manner states 
remain committed to their environmental and regional commitments and 
environmental accountability is carried alongside the increase demand for 
resources. The effectiveness of the operating system can be maintained 
irrespective of the fact that increased development may proceed unchecked at 
a national level. Impact assessments carried out through the AEPS and Arctic 
Council may reveal imbalance between states’ development and 
environmental regulations. However, in the absence of enforceable state 
legislation, the industry becomes responsible for the establishment of 
standards and compliance. 
 
                                                
18 See, for example, the debate in the National Energy Board of Canada concerning the 
proposed amendment of rules and regulations for Arctic offshore drilling, which is being 
influenced by the impact and consequences of the Horizon Deepwater drilling rig incident in 
the Gulf of Mexico discussed in Chapter 5 at n. 232.  
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The political will of the states to correct imbalances will depend on the 
collaborative nature of the system and the perceived importance of 
maintaining the integrity of the existing operating system. The political will to 
implement and enforce unilateral environmental legislation will also depend 
on the mutual confidence between the actors of the operating system. If there 
is a real or perceived disproportionate investment in environmental protection 
between the states within the system, ongoing participant confidence may not 
be fostered. Imbalances may still be mitigated within the system through 
diplomatic pressure, direct assistance or collaborative initiatives which then 
subsidize aspects of the environmental protection. This will minimize the risk 
of instability. As well, pressure from international events can assist in the 
mitigation of inconsistencies. For example, the recent oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico19 provides an opportunity for the Arctic Council to increase its voice 
concerning oil and gas guidelines and the responsibility of states to promote 
standards of practice across the Arctic. 
 
If energy security overwhelms environmental security, there is the possibility 
that the influence of the Arctic Council, AEPS and regional body initiatives 
will decrease. In the existing system there is little need for the initiatives to be 
completely abandoned because they do not provide binding commitments. A 
shift of commitments from the largely assessment initiatives of today to state 
driven implementation initiatives that relate directly to commercial 
development and transportation may occur. After a period of commercial 
development or response to energy demand, a period of assessment might 
return and the influence of the soft law initiatives may again grow. 
 
Implementation of environmental regulations and standards through global 
international organizations, such as the IMO, also provides further opportunity 
for the Arctic states to reinforce principles of the operating system and create 
enforceable regulatory changes that complement soft law mechanisms. Global 
organizations also provide another layer of compliance. Compliance across 
states assists in moderating perceived or real imbalances within the operating 
                                                
19 Described in Chapter 5, at n. 169. 
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system. International standards that target Arctic specific issues can evolve 
through international organizations, classification societies and industry 
bodies. Thus, Arctic states play a crucial role ensuring that principles of the 
operating system, such as environmental protection, are addressed in the 
development of regulations and standards through engagement with these 
fora. The capacity of the soft law mechanisms and initiatives, such as those of 
the Arctic Council, to facilitate regulatory changes is limited unless Arctic 
states support the Arctic operating system within the appropriate regulatory 
forum such as the IMO. Without Arctic state representation, minimal 
standards, although non-prejudicial, may continue to be applied to Arctic 
development and transportation. The operating system would be effective 
although the environment would be increasingly at risk.  
 
Because increased advocacy does not undermine state authority or operating 
system effectiveness, its evolution will depend on the pressure placed on the 
system by external stakeholders such as industry or the international 
community. If the Arctic states fail to create or respond to contemporary 
issues with advocacy, the resilience of the system will potentially falter and 
the legitimacy of the system decrease. In turn, the international community 
may press for the implementation of decisions that do not grant special 
consideration to the Arctic. Decisions in larger platforms, such as the IMO 
and UN, may undermine aspects of the Arctic operating system by 
campaigning to implement standards that disregard norms specific to the 
Arctic. This might occur because of lack of knowledge on the Arctic issues, 
lack of advocacy for these issues, or political dynamics render what advocacy 
that does exist, non-influential. Nonetheless, under the current operating 
system, it is unlikely that the Arctic states will allow their collective authority 
as the Arctic coastal states with primary interests in marine activities to be 
undermined.  
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Symbolic pressures 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, a Russian research team placed a flag on the 
seabed at the geographical North Pole in August 2007.20 That same month, 
Russia resumed long-distance bomber flights over the Arctic.21 More recently, 
Russia has indicated a plan to land paratroopers at the North Pole in a training 
exercise.22 These actions created considerable media attention and state 
responses.23 Thus, symbolic gestures also create pressure on the operating 
system. Although potentially regarded as disruptive, symbolic gestures also 
bring opportunities for increased attention and advocacy. Attention towards 
the Arctic region can be used by actors within an operating system to promote 
Arctic specific issues and geopolitical influence and reinforce existing 
operating system principles. For example, the Russian action provided the 
opportunity to highlight the legal framework that reflects the customary laws 
through which the legal continental shelves are recognized. Importantly, the 
states were able to emphasize the inability of such symbolic acts to change the 
                                                
20 See Chapter 4, at n. 114.  
21 There are further indications that Russia is planning to rebuild its submarine fleet and 
surface capabilities. See supra n. 14, at 16-18.  
22 BarentsObserver.com, Russian Paratroopers to head towards North Pole (29 July 2010) 
<http://www.barentsobserver.com/russia-paratroopers-head-towards-north-pole.4615739-
116320.html> at 07 April 2010. 
23 See for example, Randy Boswell, Thaw may be Underway in Ottawa-Moscow Arctic Issues 
(12 March 2007) Canwest News Service 
<http://www.chtv.com/ch/cheknews/story.html?id=1589395> at 25 March 2010 and 
MacAskill, E., Canada Uses Military Might in Arctic Scramble (11 August 2007) The 
Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/oil/story/0,,2146728,00.html> at 13 August 2007. 
Kraska comments that the flag dropping ‘presaged Moscow’s entry to a geostrategic opera in 
the High North’. He further questions whether these gestures may represent ‘more bluster 
from the Kremlin’s public diplomacy machine to restore national pride’. Nonetheless, Canada 
and Nordic states, along with China, raised concern over the activities. See James Kraska, 
'International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage' (2009) 42(4) 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1109, at 1117. China’s interest in Arctic politics and 
response to Russian activities is described in Linda Jakobson, 'China Prepares for an Ice-Free 
Arctic' (2010) 2(March) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Insights on 
Peace and Security 1-14, at 7 and 12 in particular. Reports have also illustrated Canadian 
concern and response to Russian activities. Following media coverage of statements by 
Foreign Minister of Canada., Lawrence Cannon, “brushing off” Russian plans for paratrooper 
landings, Minister of National Defence, Peter Mackay is reported announcing Canadian 
Arctic military projects including combined training with Denmark’s SIRIUS dog sled patrol. 
See TheSpec.com, Cannon Shoots Down Russian Paratrooper Plan (07 April 2010) The 
Canadian Press <http://www.thespec.com/News/CanadaWorld/article/749145> at 14 April 
2010 and National Defence and Canadian Forces News Room, Canadian Forces Conducts 
Sovereignty Operation in the High Arctic (07 April 2010) <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-
nouvelles/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?cat=00&cat=00&id=3322> at 14 April 2010. 
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outcome of the process.24 This gesture also provided further opportunity for 
the states to undertake and reaffirm their cooperation and their commitment to 
the existing process. This has been demonstrated in the Ilulissat Declaration, 
the 2010 Arctic Ocean: Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and announcements of 
combined operations in the Arctic, such as that between the Canadian Forces 
and the Danish SIRIUS Dog Sled Patrol.25   
 
With increased attention arising from symbolic pressures and international 
incidents, opportunities can also arise to forge cooperation between Arctic 
states and non-Arctic states, as well as amongst non-Arctic states. For 
example, collaboration amongst Arctic Council states to foster environmental 
standards across the Arctic may emerge following the recent oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico.26 Collaboration may also emerge between state-sponsored 
companies of Arctic states with polar development expertise and those of non-
Arctic states which are seeking to increase their industry and technological 
capacity.27 These efforts can influence the industry standards as well as 
creating opportunities. Cooperation amongst non-Arctic states, such as that 
suggested for the East Asia states China, Japan, North Korea and South 
Korea,28 may play an important role with respect to issues on the management 
and access to resources located beyond national (coastal states) jurisdiction 
and shipping routes. These collaborations may advance development 
opportunities, increase development and regulatory capacity, and create 
regulatory pressure on the operating system. Thus, state responses to symbolic 
gestures may also develop into improved representation of the interests of 
non-Arctic states. Though seemingly challenging to the operating system, the 
                                                
24 This is evidenced by the recent agreement between Norway and the Russian Federation 
concerning the Barents Sea dispute and comments made to media by the Norwegian Prime 
Minister and the President of the Russian Federation. In one report the Norwegian Prime 
Minister, Jens Stotlenberg, is quoted to have confirmed that this agreement confirms the 
goodwill and policy of cooperation between states rather than racing. Comments from 
President Dimitri A. Medvedev that this agreement opens the way for joint projects in the 
region, including, but not limited to, energy projects suggests that cooperation has been 
ongoing regardless of apparent symbolic gestures. Supra n. 9. 
25 Supra n. 23, National Defence and Canadian Forces News Room. 
26 Supra n. 18 and 19 and discussed in Chapter 5. 
27 The possibility of China engaging with Norway to advance knowledge and expertise on 
deep sea drilling has been suggested in supra n. 23, Jakobson, at 7 and 13. See Chapter 5 
around n. 103. 
28 Ibid, Jakobson, at 13. See Chapter 5 around n. 105. 
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cooperative alliances may provide the actors of the operating system with an 
improved appreciation of emerging influence and pressures. Actors may then 
be able to engage with these states and their interests in a manner that 
upholds, reinforces and furthers the legitimacy of the operating system. 
Furthermore, any perceived tension to be developing between states as a result 
of symbolic gestures and responses may be mitigated through the use of 
reassuring diplomatic responses amongst key players in the operating 
system.29 
 
Following the increased attention to the Arctic, the opportunity arose to assert 
pressure on the US to accede to the LOSC. Though accession has still not 
occurred, the US also took the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to 
cooperative undertakings on Arctic issues as well as its position on 
international transit through the Arctic waterways. So while these symbolic 
gestures might seem to be threats to the robustness of the system, under the 
presence of participant confidence and the non-prejudice of rights, they can 
continue to be opportunities to reinforce overall robustness of the operating 
system. The will of the states to maintain the image and reality of confidence 
in the system can mitigate unilateral gestures.  
 
Unilateral gestures may have national significance such as promoting 
increased funding for Arctic science or to gain influence in a political 
campaign. If confidence exists amongst operating system participants, actors 
are able to distinguish between genuine threats to the stability of the operating 
system and gestures relating more significantly to domestic interest. With 
participant confidence in the overall system, symbolic gestures can therefore 
dissipate without creating any instability within the operating system. The 
gestures provide an opportunity to indicate a level of general tolerance and 
understanding amongst the Arctic actors. The collective position of the states 
may then be reinforced in other fora such as the IMO or the CLCS. For 
example, although members of the CLCS cannot exercise political influence, 
the general position of cooperation as opposed to conflict may facilitate CLCS 
                                                
29 See supra n. 9 and 10 on the comments by Norwegian and Russian leaders. 
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processes. In the IMO, states have the opportunity to engage and represent the 
position of the Arctic states in unison or independently. As mentioned, this 
can provide advocacy for the development of Arctic-specific international 
standards desirable to the Arctic states, such as mandatory regulations for 
Arctic and non-Arctic states with interest in shipping and industry in the 
Arctic. 
 
A persistent pattern of symbolic gestures, whether related to continental shelf 
delimitation, Arctic resources, or international transit through the Arctic 
waterways, may eventually overwhelm the ability of the Arctic actors to 
manage the perceived threats. The accumulation of gestures from one state 
may also challenge the perceived confidence amongst states. If gestures are 
accompanied by inconsistent state practice or decreased advocacy in 
international fora or state practice, concern that the state is moving away from 
the existing collective norms within the operating system may develop. As 
well, the reaction of the international community, including the media may 
also precipitate undesirable instability within the system. For example, 
increased international attention to the issue of the Arctic waterways may 
develop from symbolic gestures and media exposure. This attention may 
increase pressure to resolve the issue of jurisdiction and status of the straits as 
internal waters or international straits. However, in light of existing 
confidence and legitimate state authority within the system, only when 
destabilizing gestures and international pressure accompany a significant 
change in state practice towards use of the waterways will reactive or quick 
decisions need to be made. In the existing, robust system, custom and state 
practice play crucial roles. Decisions that have the potential to prejudice one 
state’s rights and interests over another’s can be avoided until state practice 
demands resolution. 
 
7.3 Arctic robustness against contemporary challenges 
Legitimate state authority derived from recognized sovereignty in the Arctic is 
integral to the maintenance of participant confidence as Arctic resource 
development and pressure on Arctic shipping increases. This authority will 
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permit regulatory norms to be expressed in and enforced through legislation. 
The ability to choose to engage in discussions, negotiations and agreements 
will continue to foster state authority without undermining positions regarding 
sovereignty.30 This legitimate state authority will also permit wider 
communication and advocacy to be undertaken because of minimal perceived 
or real threats to this authority. States can continue to engage in various fora 
within the operating system with confidence, fostering the system’s 
legitimacy. In contrast, legitimacy has the potential to decrease depending on 
the amount and breadth of advocacy undertaken by the collective participants 
and the direction and utility the soft law mechanisms. Resilience within the 
operating system can also be sustained and further developed by collective 
participant confidence fostered by the mitigation of unilateral assertions and 
symbolic gestures that emerge alongside contemporary challenges. The 
operating system has the capacity to not create prejudice through the 
legitimate state authority, recognized sovereignty and interdependency of hard 
and soft law mechanisms. However, there is no guarantee that environmental 
practice will accompany this effectiveness. Norms of behavior regarding 
environmental protection will challenge underlying principles of the operating 
system. Internal instability created will be accommodated if participant 
confidence in the existing system is maintained.  
 
Future pressure to explore, develop, and transport resources will not change 
this capacity unless unilateral action occurs inconsistent with international law 
practice and in a manner that asserts a prejudice against the rights of other 
involved states. The operating system provides that states will be able to 
regulate development of resources and the increase of maritime transportation. 
To deal with areas of unresolved jurisdiction, joint agreements, memoranda of 
understanding or other arrangements can be negotiated without derogating 
from the structure or operation of the existing system. This applies to the 
Arctic waterways as well. Shipping lanes, monitoring systems, port and flag 
state measures for trans-Arctic shipping may be able to be applied without the 
                                                
30 It may be perceived that sovereignty and state authority are reduced by the engagement in 
cooperative or multilateral agreements because these agreements place rules, restrictions or 
conditions on activities. However, if a sovereign state chooses to engage in these 
arrangements, state authority is fostered and positions of sovereignty cannot be undermined.   
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classification of waterways under the existing system leaving historically and 
politically sensitive debates unresolved.  
 
The global development and movement of resources will challenge the Arctic 
states to better represent Arctic interests in the IMO and other international 
fora. Increased advocacy can occur and will foster legitimacy of the system. 
Arctic states have already demonstrated an increase in advocacy arising from 
responses to symbolic gestures related to the outer continental shelf and its 
resource potential. The coastal states have become more vocal in their 
collective authority and have taken opportunity to assert their positions and 
reaffirm their commitment to the existing legal framework. Decisions 
regarding the development and regulation of the Arctic seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction will also evolve through engagement of coastal states 
within appropriate fora including the ISBA. Soft law mechanisms can 
highlight overall gaps in regulation that may be able to be filled through 
international standards and/or wider organizations. A lack of advocacy does 
not, however, diminish the effectiveness of the operating system when 
effectiveness is represented by the ability to prevent the prejudice of rights.  
 
Summary of Arctic discussion 
Unilateral action to develop resources in every accessible area accompanied 
by an inability to mitigate this through diplomatic channels and initiatives 
between the Arctic actors will likely push the existing operating system below 
the operating system threshold. Whether this would accumulate over time or 
occur rapidly is difficult to predict. However, the current robust system, with 
its current levels of confidence and a mixture of soft law environmental 
initiatives and recognized state authority has the capacity to accommodate 
growing pressures until such time that actors lose confidence in the system. 
When the actors acknowledge that the system can no longer provide for 
states’ rights and state authority in a legitimate manner and in a manner that is 
resilient to challenges, the system will fail from lack of confidence. As a 
result, the operating system will be unable to provide a framework within 
which contemporary issues can be accommodated. Participants must maintain 
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confidence in the system’s capacity to provide for emerging issues, including 
the capacity to effectively accommodate these issues in the absence of 
prejudice. 
 
7.4 Contemporary challenges in the Antarctic 
Contemporary challenges in the Antarctic include increased marine-based 
activities related to research and shipping. Following the continental shelf 
delimitation process, the onset of offshore oil and gas exploration and 
development may also emerge.31 Climate variability may influence the trends 
in activities. Antarctic shipping will continue to be destinational and involve 
ship-based tourism, fishing, marine scientific research, ice-breaking and 
resupply of continental stations. A synopsis report similar to AMSA does not 
exist for the Antarctic; however, it is expected that ship-based activities, 
having increased over the years, are likely to continue to do so.  
 
Tourism has experienced a large increase and station resupply increases in 
proportion to the increasing number of active national programs. The 
International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO) is the 
industry body that reports on Antarctic tourist activities at the annual 
ATCMs.32 IAATO supplies, among other items, statistics on annual Antarctic 
voyages for member companies.33 In a recent overview, IAATO reported that 
from the 1992/93 season to the 2007/08 season, the number of ship based 
tourism voyages increased from 59 to 308.34 CCAMLR reports fishing 
statistics and keeps track of legal and illegal fishing vessels active in the 
CCAMLR Area. Between the CCAMLR Member states in 2008 there were 36 
                                                
31 Although the delimitation of the Antarctic continental shelf may be considered a 
contemporary issue, in this thesis it represents a precursor to offshore oil and gas exploration. 
32 IAATO has been an invited expert to the ATCMs since 1992. See R. Herr, 'The Changing 
Roles of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Antarctic Treaty System' in Olav Schram 
Stokke and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of 
the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge University Press (1996) 91, at 105. 
33 Overviews of each season and their statistics are available from the IAATO website. See 
for example, International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators (IAATO), 'Information 
Paper 86 rev.1: IAATO Overview of Antarctic Tourism: 2008-2009 Antarctic Season and 
Preliminary Estimates for 2009-2010 Antarctic Season' (Paper presented at the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXXII, 06-17 April, Baltimore, 2009), available at 
<http://www.iaato.org/info.html> 12 November 2009. 
34 Ibid., at 4, Table 1.   
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vessels active over 57 cruises accumulating 4803 fishing days. In comparison, 
in 1992, there were 10 Members fishing in the CCAMLR Area accumulating 
1493 days.35 The COMNAP concerns itself with various aspects of the 
operation of national programs including ship based research and resupply 
activities and reports annually to the ATCM. Aware of the increase in 
shipping and the concern for Antarctic specific regulations, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, COMNAP was recently involved in the development of Antarctic 
shipping guidelines and ATCPs have committed to supporting the 
implementation process through the IMO.36   
 
Climate variability in the Antarctic has not demonstrated the same amplitude 
of negative trend for sea ice retreat as in the Arctic. Research in this area is 
ongoing. A 2007 report contributing to the IPCC stated that for satellite data 
from 1978 to present there has been ‘no ubiquitous trend in Antarctic sea ice 
duration’, but there have been regional trends of increased sea ice duration in 
the Ross Sea and decreased sea ice duration in the Bellingshausen and 
Amundsen Seas.37 There is a general warming trend in the Antarctic 
Peninsula.38 Notably, the previous increase in ship-based tourism has also 
concentrated mainly in the Peninsula region.39 As well, the closest oil and gas 
developments to the Antarctic are occurring north of the Antarctic Peninsula 
                                                
35 CCAMLR, Details of Fishing Licences and Permits <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/sc/fish-
monit/vess-licensed.htm> at 12 November 2009 and CCAMLR, CCAMLR Statistical Bulletin 
<http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/e_pubs/sb/intro.htm> at 12 November 2009, Vol 7(1992), 
Table 5.2 and 8.2 and Vol 21(2008), Table 9.3. 
36 See Chapter 5 around n. 149-155. See in particular, Resolution 8(2009) - ATCM XXXII - 
CEP VII, 06-17 April, Baltimore: Antarctic Shipping Code. This Resolution recommends the 
chair of the ATCM write to the IMO to express the desire of the Antarctic Treaty Parties that 
the IMO commence work on mandatory guidelines for shipping activities in Antarctic waters. 
Support for the work of international institutions may develop into greater involvement in the 
development and implementation process.  
37 O.A. Anisimov et al, 'Polar Regions (Arctic and Antarctic)' in M.L. Parry et al (eds), 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contributions of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, Cambridge University Press (2007) 653, at 658. See also supra n. 1, Allison et al., at 
32. 
38 Over the last fifty years, all meteorological stations on the Antarctic Peninsula have shown 
‘strong and significant’ warming. See ibid., Anisimov, at 657. 
39 According to information provided by the industry organization IAATO, tourism increased 
dramatically between the 2002/03 season and the 2007/08. After peaking in the 2007/08 
season, actual and estimated activity is reported to have decreased. This decrease may be 
representative of the general decline in the global economy. See Appendix A: Histogram of 
1992-2009 Antarctic Tourist Trends in supra n.33, at 6. 
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at the Falkland Islands.40 It is therefore plausible that the Peninsula might be 
the first region where industry activity might expand. Industry expansion may 
begin as an increase in industry-related scientific research, of which activities 
will likely also be marine-based. While not occurring at present, such 
developments are important to consider against the current robust nature of 
the Antarctic operating system. 
 
Development-related scientific research 
The current prohibition to mineral resource activities in the Madrid Protocol 
does not explicitly prohibit scientific research that has an industry focus, such 
as preliminary research that may lead to mineral prospecting. This type of 
research may increase over time and potentially develop into resource 
exploitation. Progression in research does not, however, have to destabilize 
the Antarctic operating system. Participants of the operating system may 
accept the gradual onset of development-related research. Alternatively, actors 
may determine that any related research is contrary to the norms of behavior. 
States may determine that there is a need to intervene.  
 
With a general increase in resource relevant research, accepted norms of 
behavior will gradually evolve. When the research provides more conclusive 
evidence of resource potential and development seems pending, the 
acceptability of new norms of behavior, those geared towards development, 
comes under question. As the threat of the onset of development gains 
legitimacy (and momentum) states within the operating system must gauge 
the appropriateness of intervention. There are diplomatic and formal avenues 
within the operating system to discuss appropriate intervention – its necessity, 
timing, and course of action – against the perceived threat. Response to the 
onset of activities, which are inconsistent with norms, is directly related to 
determining what is acceptable and what is not acceptable according to the 
norms developed thus far. The response is also dependent on what should or 
might be acceptable into the future. These considerations are affected by other 
variables such as global economics, energy supply and demand, geopolitics 
                                                
40 Described in Chapter 5 around n. 70-77. 
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and the state of the environment. In any case, appropriate intervention can 
take many forms including, ultimately, the formal review process and Review 
Conference outlined in Article 25 of the Madrid Protocol.41 Unless unilateral 
benefit can be guaranteed from formally reviewing and renegotiating the 
current prohibition, it is likely that states will defer such a review until 
absolutely necessary.42  
 
In all likelihood, some type of review will eventually take place. Whether it is 
formally undertaken prior to 2048 (50 years after the entry into force of the 
current prohibition) or after is dependent on the level of perceived threat of 
activities, the acceptability of these activities under current provisions, and the 
will of the states involved. If industry development looms prior to 2048, there 
are means to initiate the Review Conference.43 The onset of a review of 
provisions (at any time) does not, however, have to destabilize or threaten the 
robustness of the operating system. Flexibility inherent to the system enables 
states to adapt the components of the system to suit changing norms of 
behavior. As discussed previously, by leaving avenues for renegotiation and 
discussion, the states did not encourage development, but facilitated 
confidence in the system.  
 
Initiating a review has the potential to push the operating system below the 
operating system threshold if undertaken in the absence of participant 
confidence and in the presence of a real threat of unilateral disregard for 
existing norms. More importantly, disregard for the process through which 
new norms develop and become acceptable by any of the participants will 
present a greater threat to the operating system than resource development. 
Confidence in the system would have decreased and the risk of creating 
prejudice against states’ rights would be high. Thus, the outcome of any 
review undertaken before or after 2048 will depend on the confidence in the 
                                                
41 See discussion Chapter 3. 
42 In the Washington Ministerial Declaration on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Antarctic 
Treaty - Appendix I, Final Report of ATCM XXXII, 06-17 April 2009, Baltimore, 
Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to the prohibition of 
activities relating to mineral resources in Article 7 of the Madrid Protocol. 
43 Discussed in Chapter 3, n. 152-156, under the subheading: The minerals prohibition and the 
‘walkout’ clause. 
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review process as well as other variables mentioned above (global economics, 
energy security, geopolitics and the state of the environment). Given the state 
of knowledge, resource development and related shipping activity may still be 
in its infancy when the 2048 date is crossed, deferring any immediate need for 
intervention or response. 
 
In the effort to advance scientific research towards development, states may 
alternatively choose to step out of the ATS. A state may choose to leave the 
Antarctic Treaty and carry out scientific research and development 
unilaterally. The threat to the operating system may well depend on which 
state chooses to abandon the Antarctic Treaty and for what reasons. Greater 
instability will be imposed on the Antarctic operating system if a wealthy and 
technologically advanced state (such as the US) or a claimant state (such as 
Australia) decides to leave the Antarctic Treaty and assert resource 
exploration rights 44 The operating system may not be resilient to changes in 
participation if the change is asserted from a state that through its own wealth, 
power, and influence can undertake resource development without significant 
political consequence. The risk of creating prejudice of rights would increase 
and threaten effectiveness of the system. This instability might force the 
operating system below the operating system threshold.  
 
When an influential state threatens to leave or does abandon the Antarctic 
Treaty, there would be occasion to either add to or adjust the existing system 
so that third party rights do not overwhelm the system. The Treaty may be 
adjusted to accommodate a state’s concern and encourage that state to remain 
involved. Alternatively, there is the option to create a whole new system re-
engaging the state that has left the Antarctic Treaty. A whole new operating 
system open to new or different participants with new or adapted norms and 
                                                
44 There is still the possibility that multinational corporations can approach Antarctic resource 
development through a third party prior to influential or wealthy states leaving the Treaty. 
Furthermore, corporations with origins from the wealthy, experienced states may use 
corporate terms with states other than their original state of registration in order to gain access 
to Antarctic resources. Of note, CRAMRA’s ‘substantial and genuine’ link between Operators 
and Sponsoring States tried to prevent this. The complexity of regulating multinational 
corporations adds a further dimension to this discussion and would be an interesting research 
topic.  
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principles would not necessarily retain the qualities that had produced the 
previously robust system. 
   
The operating system may continue to be resilient to a change in participation 
if the norms of behavior within the system carry sufficient influence. If new 
norms were developed that somehow implicated third parties, research would 
potentially occur only in conformity with the adjusted operating system. As 
well, in a similar manner to the Arctic operating system, the participants of the 
current operating system (primary and secondary actors) are linked to 
numerous global institutions. Influence through collaboration in research as 
well as the implementation of international research standards will have a 
potential role to play regarding activities carried out by third parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty. For example, influence placed through Integrated Ocean 
Drilling Program may limit the capacity of the state to gain access to drilling 
equipment made available through this international program.45 A non-
Antarctic Treaty state that is a Member of the IMO will also have to regulate 
industry sponsored ship based research in accordance with international 
standards for ships. ATCPs have provided influence as IMO members in 
trying to get Antarctic specific ship regulations developed and made 
mandatory through the POLAR [Shipping] Code. Thus, influence on a state 
that abandons the Antarctic Treaty may occur directly or through these 
indirect opportunities and the risk to the ATS and overall system is potentially 
mitigated. 
  
More time is required to shift or develop new norms than is required to carry 
out a scientific research activity, even those requiring specialized ship-based 
drilling and coring technology. If a state or industry develops or accesses 
these technologies independently, the onset of activity may immediately 
overwhelm the system. Sudden instability could push the system below the 
                                                
45 The Integrated Ocean Drilling Project is an international marine research program 
dedicated to exploring the structure of the seafloor sediments and environments with the use 
of specific technology. It is funded by six entities which coordinate Annual Programs, 
allocating ships and mission-specific platforms to various scientific expeditions. For more 
information see Integrated Ocean Drilling Program <http://www.iodp.org/about/> at 14 April 
2010. 
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threshold unless there is a collaborative effort amongst the participants to 
overcome this instability within the existing system.  
 
Currently, participating within the system through engagement under the ATS 
has more benefit than imposing third party rights within the system. Powerful 
states, including the US, are committed to the current system. An increased 
number of states, including energy demanding states such as China and India, 
are also actors within the system. This indicates that states value the role of 
the ATS within the operating system over the ability to assert rights as a third 
party to the Antarctic Treaty.46 Third party activities may also increase and as 
scientific involvement increases, awareness of the system at large will also 
increase.47 As involvement grows, participants are increasingly committed (or 
at least increasingly engaged). Abandoning these commitments and 
responsibilities may become too difficult and have negative consequences 
such as tarnishing an international reputation. By adding on to the system, 
further complexity may guarantee that previously external threats become 
internal and are more easily dissipated.  
 
Outer continental shelves and beyond 
It has already been demonstrated that the process undertaken by the claimant 
states in regard to the delimitation of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
appurtenant to Antarctica has proceeded in the absence of prejudice of rights 
within the Antarctic operating system. The CLCS has accepted requests not to 
examine the information relating to the Antarctic continent until the states 
inform otherwise. Therefore, any finalization of the outer limits of the 
Antarctic continental shelf is under the authority and discretion of the 
                                                
46 In this examination China and India are considered secondary actors. However, their 
participation still contributes to the confidence of the primary actors and the overall system. 
Having states that may precipitate threats (based on energy demand in this scenario) inside the 
operating system may be more beneficial than having to have the system react to external 
threats. Internal threats may be more easily dissipated. 
47 For example, in 2009 a scientific expedition from Azerbaijan’s Western University 
collected geological samples from various locations from the Antarctic Peninsula. The 
expedition began from the Chilean station at Patriot Hills, thus bringing their expedition and 
interests in contact with infrastructure and organization of an ATCP. See Azerbaijan Western 
University, The First Azerbaijani Expedition to Antarctica (13 January 2009) 
<http://www.wu.edu.az/index.php?sid=174&lang=en> at 14 April 2010. 
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claimant states. Currently, there is no incentive to initiate the process because 
there is no interest in resource activity on the continental shelf and there is no 
threat to the environment or the political balance between sovereign rights and 
freedom of scientific research. The political consequences of opening up the 
debate regarding the assertion of sovereignty under Article IV are without 
guaranteed reward.  
 
Deferring the examination process will continue to provide security to the 
states and outweigh determining the limits of the continental shelf. It is likely 
that examination by the CLCS will continue to be postponed until such time 
that industry barriers are overcome, economic incentives and environmental 
concerns change and regulatory pressure grows. The onset of examination of 
the Antarctic continental shelf information and the outcome of such 
examination will then reflect the norms of behavior within the operating 
system at that time. Because of the delay between submitting information and 
having it examined (which can be indefinite), there will be opportunity to 
prepare a suitable response within the operating system. This has been 
demonstrated in the historic case studies and as long as the operating system 
remains robust, this potentially destabilizing issue can be accommodated. 
 
Another driver that could trigger the claimant states to authorize CLCS 
examination is the interpretation and assumption that all ocean area and 
continental shelf up to the Antarctic continent is beyond national jurisdiction. 
Under this assumption, continental shelf resources offshore Antarctica can be 
categorized in the ‘Area’ and considered res communis. Without certain 
delimitation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the southern boundary 
for the Area is unknown. Those states not party to the Antarctic Treaty could 
assert that the definition of the Area includes any seabed beyond recognized 
national jurisdiction, regardless of the special circumstances associated with 
the Antarctic and its governance. Pressure may be created to carry out 
resource development under the regulatory administration of the ISBA 
through Part XI of LOSC and the 1994 Implementing Agreement. Though the 
existence of a separate regime (the ATS) for this region reduces the potential 
authority of the ISBA, this has not been legally tested. Thus, examination of 
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the continental shelf information may become necessary in order to further 
clarify the mandate of the ISBA within the Antarctic Treaty Area. 
 
Clarification of the mandate of the ISBA within the Antarctic Treaty Area 
may be perceived as a threat to the authority of the ATCPs. However, with 
collective acceptance that a regulatory balance between the ISBA and the 
ATCPs (through the Madrid Protocol) can be attained, the operating system 
need not be pushed below the operating threshold. If there is acceptance that 
this delimitation does not alter the application of Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty, the system will not create prejudice and, thus, confidence in the 
system can be maintained. Clarification could also shed light on the 
acceptability of the jurisdiction of coastal states in the Antarctic.  
 
The manner in which this unfolds will be critical to maintaining stability 
within the operating system. Under the current system, participants have the 
authority to determine when the clarification of the boundary between the 
Area and the continental shelf proceeds. The system has the capacity to 
consider how this delimitation might proceed in conformity with existing 
principles and the confidence from its participants to examine opportunities to 
accommodate the onset of development before abandoning the system.  
 
During the period between submitting information and giving consent for its 
examination, the ATCPs and interested states are in a position to create and 
adopt a regulatory framework that captures the continental shelf activities as 
they ramp up and prior to issues being provoked through the ISBA. Since the 
claimant states are States Parties to the LOSC and Implementing Agreement, 
discourse concerning the regulatory mandate of the ISBA would occur 
through the UN and the ATCMs. Given that the ATS has been recognized in 
the UN and that the ATCPs will continue to advocate Antarctic and individual 
state interests within the UN forum, there is opportunity to further the 
legitimacy of the ATS.  
 
Regulatory balance is more likely to occur between the institutions of the ATS 
and the ISBA if ATCP involvement advocates standards that reflect norms of 
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the ATS within these international fora. It is likely that international standards 
for environmental protection and regulatory authority will have to evolve with 
consistency across these fora (through involvement of the ATCPs) in order for 
ISBA authority south of 60˚S be acceptable. This will be particularly so for 
the claimant states. Nonetheless, with continued participant confidence 
amongst the Antarctic operating system participants, there is the potential for 
this to occur. As well, if such environmental and regulatory standards are 
arrived at from within the existing robust system, there is less instability 
placed on the system. 
 
Instability from within the system may still be derived from the historical 
resistance of the ATCPs to UN involvement in regulating the area south of 
60˚S. Instability from outside the system might be derived from developing 
states advocating CHM principles or states, such as Middle Eastern states, 
with different geopolitical interests. Discourse and compromise factoring in 
these and other variables will be required to accommodate new activities and 
norms of behavior towards commercial Antarctic resource development. 
However, robustness gained from previous experience will assist in the 
accommodation of these new challenges and potential instabilities.  
 
Regulatory mechanisms and Article IV 
In the absence of universally recognized sovereignty, the operating system 
may be susceptible to unregulated development. The global nature of the 
shipping and resource industries enables companies to contract and register 
development interest and necessary equipment through states that are not 
party to the Antarctic Treaty. If companies utilize offshore drilling rigs and 
scientific research vessels that are registered through third party states, 
regulations will be based only on nationally implemented IMO standards and 
industry standards for such ships and equipment. The Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean are designated as Special Areas under MARPOL Annexes I (oil), II 
(noxious liquid substances) and V (garbage). Ships are limited through 
nationally implemented legislation in the ability to discharge these substances. 
Oil tanker regulations for safety, transport and response to oil spills also exist 
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under terms of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention. However, Antarctic specific 
regulations do not currently exist. An increase in shipping and infrastructure 
use in the Antarctic would require further regulations to be developed through 
MARPOL 73/78.  
 
Through this avenue, influence of the ATCPs can be decisive in the 
formulation of new regulations. There is opportunity within the Antarctic 
operating system to have the principles of the ATS implemented through other 
instruments. Similar to the Arctic Council states, advocacy of the ATCPs 
within those organizations has the potential to produce assertive regulatory 
control. Limitations on this advocacy may still exist because of the historic 
resistance to outside influence on the ATS. However, the larger Antarctic 
operating system has the capacity to deliver this type of multi-forum 
regulatory mechanism and it will become increasingly important if Article IV 
is to be upheld.  
 
While there may be capacity to increase regulatory control over shipping 
through flag state and port state jurisdiction, the regulation of oil and gas 
exploration will be more challenging in terms of sovereignty considerations. 
Currently, the oil and gas sector depends on the acquisition of development 
and property rights. The operating system’s avoidance of prejudice to the 
rights of states and their interpretation of Article IV limits jurisdictional 
capacity to assign property rights, licenses, or enforce regulatory provisions. 
This situation of unresolved sovereignty impedes the assertion of exclusive 
sovereign rights. In the current system, Antarctic resources are, therefore, 
potentially left without custodianship or regulatory provisions. Accordingly, if 
the barriers to industry development are removed and changes in the existing 
system or the norms of behavior that relate to the application of Article IV do 
not evolve, unregulated industry development will likely threaten the 
robustness of operating system.  
 
In light of the fact that Article IV and corresponding norms of behavior have 
gained acceptability and legitimacy, every issue considered within the 
Antarctic operating system has to take account of these provisions. As such, 
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delays usually occur as the ATCPs consider the possible consequences of 
various positions and actions. Thus, new resource development interests can 
be moderated by the effect of delayed regulatory certainty. In some 
circumstances delays can also produce more timely response and foster 
participant confidence through formal and informal communication. 
Outcomes reflect careful consideration of response and impact.  
 
The ‘wait and see’ approach might frustrate participants within or outside the 
system but has an important moderating effect. During a regulatory delay, 
such as that experienced as the oil and gas industry evolves, various 
improvements to the function of the ATS may foster practical methods of 
monitoring and assessing the current state of industry development and 
environment protection measures. As well, by the time industry barriers are 
resolved and industry development is pending, enforcement issues usually 
subject to national jurisdiction may be encompassed in industry standards and 
other regulatory mechanisms which conform to ATS norms. An international 
system of inspection and compliance may also be designed to assist in 
regulating activities of industry globally. This could include shipping and the 
oil and gas sector in the Antarctic. These initiatives would enable the 
Antarctic operating system to better accommodate any industry activity and 
instability would be alleviated.  
 
Solutions may eventually have to be sought for the administration of property 
rights and the regulation of the extraction activities as opposed to the related 
shipping interests. CRAMRA may offer some experience in designing a 
collective approach to the offshore region; however, many of the provisions 
will be outdated by the Madrid Protocol and industry practice. Whether the 
ATCPs can devise another agreement that ensures collective authority over 
the assignment of property rights without undermining state authority and 
exclusive sovereign rights will depend on the approach of the claimant states. 
Acceptability may be the only barrier to implementing and carrying through 
an administrative strategy to facilitate resource development in the absence of 
prejudice of states rights.  
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At the time of considering the various approaches, the interests of developing 
states, claimant states, non-claimant ATCPs and others will once again have 
to be balanced. At such time, there may be a more definitive understanding of 
the applicability of the CHM doctrine and its limitation in the Antarctic. This 
type of understanding would possibly change the position of some developing 
states within negotiations and possibly reduce the number of variables 
needing consideration. At the time of a review, lack of attachment to the 
CRAMRA and Madrid Protocol negotiations may also be important. Though 
valuable experience and lessons have been gained from this period it will also 
be important for confidence to exist independent of the previous successes or 
instabilities. Participant confidence must represent the current political 
identities and issues. An independent sense of the capacity of the system will 
be integral to moving new negotiations forward. Successful negotiations may 
need to exist on a larger platform within the operating system. Insulating 
issues within the ATS may hinder rather than reinforce the system.  
 
By the time Antarctic resource extraction requires regulating, the global trade 
system may change, leading to a different perspective on taxation, levies and 
royalties. More flexibility may be gained through a new trade system. 
Ownership of resources under global industries, such as biotechnology, 
fishing, shipping and oil and gas may be redefined within the customary 
international law. Exclusive rights to resources may coexist with a new 
approach to resource management – one which responds to energy demand 
and supply with increased sensitivity. For example, each location of resource 
supply might be linked to a global grid administered from a representative 
international organization. Such administration could contend with energy 
resource demand and supply alongside global emissions and economic trade. 
This could potentially diminish current control of the oil and gas industry 
through only the oil exporting countries.  
 
At the time of considering Antarctic resource regulation, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) may be completely different from its 
current participation and control of production, supply and prices. Lessons 
from the recent global financial downswing will likely lead to changes in 
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market regulation. Lessons from operating system responses to fishing, 
biotechnology and tourism will also influence responses to oil and gas issues. 
Robustness will be enhanced if these issues are addressed satisfactorily before 
oil and gas issues prevail. All of these variables will coalesce with participant 
confidence and effectiveness carried forward from the existing robust 
operating system at the time that the Antarctic operating system is required to 
accommodate the emergence of Antarctic industry. 
 
Symbolic pressures 
In a similar manner to the Arctic system, the symbolic nature of seabed 
surveys or geological scientific research may be accepted and dissipated 
through diplomacy and collective state responses. In the Antarctic, national 
interests, such as the need for scientific programs to have greater visibility in 
order to acquire funding, may appear to challenge the operating system unless 
confidence exists within the system.48 It is necessary that participants accept 
that a unilateral gesture may have national significance but places little threat 
to the larger operating system. As well, symbolic gestures at a time when 
industry barriers still exist will create less potential instability as compared to 
gestures accompanied by real industry potential in the absence of barriers. 
Participants will still be wary of symbolic gestures in a process of gauging the 
confidence and commitment of other states, as well as themselves, to the 
system. As any perception of tension between states or shifting commitment 
develops within the operating system there is opportunity for states to use 
reassuring diplomatic responses to maintain or return the system to a 
                                                
48 For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the Russian Federation 
would have affected scientific programs and funding. WP27 submitted by Russia at ATCM 
XXIV, also discussed in Chapter 5 at n. 7, reflected the interest of the new Russian Federation 
in continuing research established by the former Soviet Union. The WP included terminology 
such as mineral-raw material resources in the scope of the Russian program. Inclusion of such 
terms might have reflected a ‘translation problem’, as indicated in meeting notes by a former 
policy advisor to the Australian Antarctic Division. The symbolic act of this WP may also 
have reflected Russia’s desire to promote funding for carrying out scientific research and 
promoting Russian research activities at the ATCM hosted in Russia at St. Petersburg. Refer 
to Russia, 'Working Paper (WP) 27: Russian Studies of the Antarctic 2000 under the 
Subprogram "Study and Research of the Antarctic"' (Paper presented at the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (ATCM) XXIV, 09-20 July, St. Petersburg, 2001). Meeting notes from 
ATCM XXIV, 09-20 July 2001 and Personal Communication (23 February 2009 and 25 
January 2010) provided by Andrew Jackson, retired Principal Policy Advisor, Australian 
Antarctic Division. 
 414 
geopolitical status quo. States can also gauge when appropriate silence on an 
issue will mitigate the perceived tension.49 
 
In the absence of industry barriers, unilateral gestures accompanied by state 
practice that is inconsistent with existing norms and undertaken prior to any 
collective consideration within the system, such as through discussions at the 
ATCMs, could overwhelm the operating system. If this occurs, it will become 
apparent that the state (or states) carrying out the industry-related activity does 
not value the existing operating system or their involvement in it; their 
confidence would have decreased. In this situation, the risk of states’ rights 
being prejudiced would be high and overall confidence in the system would 
potentially drop. A significant shift away from the existing system would 
warrant attention. Immediate attention could reign in the inconsistent practice 
or, alternatively, force the operating system below the threshold. Inconsistent 
state practice would pressure the system to change norms of behavior and in 
doing so potentially force the creation of a whole new operating system. 
 
7.5 Antarctic robustness against contemporary challenges 
State authority, which is protected through the provisions of the Antarctic 
Treaty and corresponding norms of behavior, can be sustained as pressure 
from contemporary issues emerges. The protection of state authority arises 
from the inherent obligation of Article IV to continue to prevent the prejudice 
of rights. Participants are therefore committed to maintaining effectiveness as 
a means of securing state authority and the protection of their rights. As long 
as unilateral assertions do not overwhelm confidence in the existing structure 
of the system, the authority of the states will be preserved. This will, in turn, 
contribute to legitimacy and the perception of resilience within the system, 
which together maintain participant confidence. The legitimacy of the system 
has developed through the system’s responses to previous instabilities. The 
                                                
49 For example, continued media attention to continental shelf delimitation submissions may 
amplify issues that do not need to be immediately addressed. Unnecessary tension between 
actors within and those outside the operating system may be created by undesirable attention 
to these issues. Nonetheless, media attention and public interest can also play an important 
role a ‘watchdog’ for accountability. 
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successful accommodation of issues through nuanced approaches, the bifocal 
approach, and informal and formal mechanisms have enabled states to 
conform to the existing norms of behaviors in the absence of perceived 
prejudice. This effectiveness, legitimacy, and resilience will carry forward 
into the accommodation of contemporary issues. Resilience will contribute to 
maintaining the participant confidence necessary for when accommodation of 
contemporary issues can no longer be delayed.  
 
Any solutions to contemporary challenges will likely be delayed until the 
consequences of accepting development or enforcing against resource 
development are more clearly understood. The significant consequences 
attached to abandoning the current operating system have also assisted in 
moderating the responses to unilateral assertions and will continue to do so for 
contemporary challenges. Acceptability of new or altered norms of behavior 
which arise from the evolution of state practice, assertions, and symbolic acts 
can, therefore, emerge in ways that uphold the larger system.  
 
The effectiveness of the system in maintaining non-prejudicial outcomes will 
be challenged by the onset of resource development. However, with 
participant confidence, commitment to the existing system and willingness to 
uphold the existing system (even if willingness to uphold this system is a 
product of lack of better choices) a platform will exist upon which innovative 
approaches to development and corresponding norms of behavior can be 
based. A review of the existing prohibition against mineral resource activities 
will eventually occur. The robust nature of the operating system does not have 
to be compromised by this review if undertaken when participant confidence 
is high. As well, a review does not necessarily have to result in accepted 
norms such as the prohibition on mineral resource activities being relaxed.  
  
If confidence falters, commitments previously maintained may be withdrawn 
and the system will be pushed below the operating system threshold. With 
failing confidence, new research and development behaviors will not attain 
acceptability by states nor will a collective interest to intervene be able to be 
asserted. Any sudden onset of research related activities that are therefore not 
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adjusted for within the system will threaten the system’s robustness. The 
states will be asserting individual state interest, rights and authority 
inconsistent with the operating system.  
 
The system, however, will have similarly failed to use its capacity to respond 
to the emerging issue. It is therefore not a failure of just the state pursuing 
resource development but a failure of the system to not maintain the capacity 
and confidence to accommodate an emergent issue. In the Antarctic operating 
system, commitment and confidence has been longstanding and its legitimacy 
and potential resilience has increased. More states have engaged in this 
commitment, wanting to protect their rights within the system rather than 
asserting them outside the system. The commitments within the system have 
increased in breadth and detail. Thus, the consequences of withdrawal are 
potentially amplified.  
 
In some ways the enduring sense of protectionism of the ATS may be 
potentially detrimental to the progress of the Antarctic operating system. 
During the time of CRAMRA, protecting the system from intervention of the 
UN was important. However, as legitimacy has accrued to the system, the 
protective and possibly defensive attitude of the ATCPs has the potential to be 
a hindrance to progress of Antarctic issues within international fora. 
Significant defensiveness may also be interpreted as insecurity or lack of 
confidence in the system rather than confidence. To respond to an increase in 
marine based activities in the Southern Ocean within the larger international 
platform, demonstration of confidence in the system through increased 
advocacy and minimal defensiveness may prove more beneficial.  For 
example, when the need arises to collaborate with institutions such as the IMO 
concerning increased commercial shipping and/or the ISBA concerning the 
extent of the regulatory authority of the ISBA in the Southern Ocean, 
sustained and apparent advocacy from within the operating system will be 
essential.50 In this manner, issues that affect global industries can be discussed 
on regional as well as global platforms.  
                                                
50 Supra n. 36 regarding ATCP advocacy for IMO initiatives. 
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The collective authority of the ATCPs and individual advocacy of states with 
Antarctic interest can influence the development of regulations in global fora 
as well as develop regulations within the ATS. However, under the existing 
system, the enforcement capacity of the ATCPs will remain limited. Until 
alternative or innovative approaches to enforcement are accepted 
internationally, marine based activities will likely continue to be regulated (or 
not regulated) through global practice and enforced through appropriate 
coastal, port and flag state authority. For the Antarctic operating system, 
holding stakeholders and companies of global industry to account for 
activities occurring in the Southern Ocean will be critical to upholding a 
system that by design has limited coastal and port state enforcement capacity.  
 
Summary of the Antarctic discussion 
Ongoing participant confidence in the existing system, along with operating 
system effectiveness, has the potential to prevent industry-related scientific 
research and the eventual desire to begin resource development and 
transportation of these resources from overwhelming the Antarctic operating 
system. Existing norms of behavior will be challenged once industry barriers, 
including the lack of knowledge of resource potential, are overcome. 
However, within a robust Antarctic operating system acceptability will 
redefine norms of behavior. The responses to contemporary issues will be 
directed by the participants and accommodated effectively within the capacity 
of the system. The global political and economic arena will obviously 
influence the timing and character of any decisions made by participating 
states. Previous experiences and future considerations will also contribute to 
possible collective solutions rather than the predominance of individual state 
interest. Nonetheless, if the Antarctic actors acknowledge that limitations exist 
in the maintenance of states’ rights and acknowledge that the provisions 
balancing the recognition of sovereignty are overwhelmed by state interest, 
the Antarctic operating system will fall below the operating system threshold. 
The drive towards resource development and commercialization may be the 
triggers, but it will be the wavering of confidence that determines the issue is 
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beyond the capacity of the operating system. The decrease in confidence 
could be irreparable. If states have confidence that the issue is not beyond the 
capacity of the operating system, its resolution will continue to occur inside 
the system. Although the system may evolve, the norms of behavior would 
continue. Thus, the importance of the existing operating system lies within its 
ability to continue to foster participant confidence and develop ways in which 
governance can accommodate global industry.   
  
7.6 Comparison and discussion of polar operating system 
robustness 
At first glance, it might appear that the contemporary issues, such as increased 
marine-based activities and the onset or progression of oil and gas 
exploration, are more likely to push the Antarctic rather than the Arctic 
operating system below the threshold. A closer examination of the variables 
of operating system robustness, however, demonstrates that such an outcome 
appears less absolute.  
 
From the case studies and discussion above it is apparent that there is less 
formal commitment required of the Arctic operating system and collaboration 
in the Arctic rests predominantly on environmental issues rather than 
regulatory issues. The soft law mechanisms of the Arctic effectively promote 
a lack of prejudice amongst states by avoiding difficult issues such as security 
or regulatory measures. Regulatory issues and enforcement are advanced 
through the individual states, concomitant with recognized sovereignty. 
Compliance with international standards or norms suggested within the 
cooperative framework of the Arctic states is not monitored under an umbrella 
treaty. States can voluntarily increase or decrease their level of commitment to 
norms. Although diplomatic avenues exist to influence state behavior, state 
authority plays a significant role. The nature of the system enables each state 
to protect its interests and act according to those interests. Thus, the system 
itself may falter under the dominance of state authority and the lack of 
consequence for abandoning the existing system. 
 419 
 
In either system, when state authority no longer contributes to confidence in 
the system and unilateral interests (inconsistent with accepted norms) begin to 
overwhelm, the system will be pushed under the threshold if it fails to 
accommodate new behaviors or intervene in the interests of states’ rights. For 
the Arctic, in the absence of binding measures across which norms of 
behavior must agree, fewer perceptible barriers exist to abandoning the system 
in order to pursue unilateral interests. Abandoning the system may appear 
easier with greater perceived benefit and less apparent consequence than the 
Antarctic operating system. Nevertheless, if the Arctic system and its 
participants accommodate state interests within the norms of behavior, 
perceived benefit from abandoning the system decrease and interests are 
promoted from within the system.  
 
For the Antarctic operating system, the binding provisions of Article IV have 
created bifocalism which plays a more important role in participant 
confidence compared to the state authority in the Arctic operating system. 
Through the acceptability of norms of behavior associated with Article IV, 
bifocalism provides that rights are upheld and state authority is maintained. 
The ability to perceive and interpret Article IV in a way that suits national 
interests within the constraints of the norms of the operating system is 
paramount to upholding the non-prejudice of states rights. Predominant 
unilateral interests towards increased and unregulated marine-based activities 
and Antarctic resource development will threaten the operating system if the 
system does not respond through accepting new behaviors within the 
constraints of bifocalism or intervening to protect bifocalism. Lack of 
response by the participants within the system and the system itself will lead 
to the prejudice of rights and potentially the unraveling of Antarctic Treaty 
commitments. Thus, maintaining bifocalism and the freedom of interpretation 
is essential to maintaining participant confidence while state authority is 
protected as an associated result.  
 
In the Arctic operating system collaborative instruments target environmental 
assessments while avoiding regulatory or security issues. Regulatory issues do 
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not necessarily engage all participants. Similar standards of regulations and 
compliance are not necessarily guaranteed. Nonetheless, regulatory initiatives 
that do emerge whether through individual state implementation or 
collaborative negotiation can be enforced through the Arctic operating system 
and corresponding recognized sovereignty. In contrast, regulatory issues 
related to increased marine shipping, industry-related marine-based research 
and the onset of mineral resource exploration in the Antarctic are considered 
within a collaborative, binding regime – the ATS – in the Antarctic operating 
system. There is opportunity to attain agreement and compliance towards 
collectively negotiated norms of behavior regarding regulatory measures. 
Enforcement, however, is limited due to the nature of the unrecognized 
sovereignty. As well, compliance may only exist in the form of agreement 
rather than state practice. In the absence of enforcement, the need to ratify 
Measures or adopt state law based on Resolutions or Decisions of the ATCMs 
may not take priority or satisfy state interest. Thus, the advocacy of Antarctic 
states across other international fora that produce international standards, 
regulatory measures and customary international law is important. Standards 
that more closely represent Antarctic specific interests but are implemented 
through the wider operating system rather than the ATS can still augment the 
ATS principles and potentially capture a wider audience.  
 
For marine-based activities, such as shipping and research in the Arctic and 
Antarctic, international avenues and advocacy within the larger operating 
system will play an important role in the immediate future. The progression of 
resource development in the Arctic will be influenced by global industry 
regulation. If the primary participants of the Arctic system do not continue 
and foster greater advocacy, the utility of the soft law instruments in which 
states are involved will potentially diminish and the collective normative 
principles potentially lost under pressure from the international community. 
No perceptible advantage to upholding the system may exist. Advocacy in the 
Arctic system does not sustain state authority in the same manner that 
advocacy in the Antarctic upholds norms of behavior associated with Article 
IV and thus state authority. Therefore, less incentive possibly exists within the 
Arctic operating system and greater willingness is required to accept and 
 421 
reinforce the existing system. However, that the coastal states remain 
committed and assert confidence in the existing system indicates robustness is 
present and that progress of contemporary issues will be accommodated 
within this system. 
 
The onset of Antarctic resource development will also be affected by the 
global industry; however, the pressure on the operating system to 
accommodate property rights and fiscal certainty will require a greater 
concentrated review of existing strategies than the Arctic system. In the 
Antarctic operating system, unilateral interests, especially towards the onset of 
resource development, have the potential to create greater instability than in 
the Arctic system. However, the fact that unilateral interests have yet to push 
the system below a threshold of operation reinforces legitimacy and fosters 
maintenance of the system’s robustness of the system to be maintained during 
the progression of as contemporary issues evolve. As issues are 
accommodated within the system, less benefit from instability may be 
perceived. Greater advantage is attached to working within the system. The 
system continues to be perceived legitimately as a robust option for the time 
being.  
 
7.7 Chapter conclusion 
There are a myriad of contemporary challenges that the Arctic and Antarctic 
operating systems will have to accommodate in the near future. Increased 
access to the polar oceans through climate variability and global industry and 
demand will place significant pressure of the operating systems. The 
robustness of each system will be challenged. If dominant unilateral interests 
overwhelm the capacity of the systems to integrate and accept new behaviors, 
or intervene in behaviors that overtly challenge existing norms of behavior, 
the operating systems will be pushed below the operating system threshold. 
Each system has the capacity to develop and to accommodate contemporary 
issues; however, the confidence in maintaining the system must be fostered. 
Lack of confidence can occur from sudden changes or gradual accretion.  
 
 422 
Regardless of the operating system differences, state authority, legitimacy and 
resilience inter-relate to achieve effectiveness and contribute to participant 
confidence. Dominance of any one of these variables does not matter as much 
as whether the combination can maintain confidence to prevent the occurrence 
of prejudice of states rights. This effectiveness can be reinforced by binding 
commitments or definitive jurisdiction. At present, the Arctic system relies on 
definitive jurisdiction and the Antarctic system on Article IV and bifocalism. 
To accommodate contemporary and global issues, both systems will have to 
increase advocacy in the international fora. The confidence of each participant 
individually and of participants collectively will need to be maintained for the 
currently robust nature to be retained in the event of increased development 
and commercialization pressure.  
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
Research objective 
Contemporary issues related to energy and environmental security in the polar 
regions include increased pressures from commercialization, resource 
development and increasing marine-based activities. These issues place stress 
on the systems of governance, expressed in this thesis as the operating 
systems. Without robustness, the operating systems are susceptible to 
instability and potential collapse. In a novel examination of governance, 
robustness has been defined through the combination of participant 
confidence and the ability to effectively avoid prejudice to states’ rights. 
Participant confidence further relies on state authority, legitimacy and 
resilience. The loss of robustness is demonstrated if the system is pushed 
below an operating system threshold. Below the operating threshold, the 
existing system is abandoned and a new or altered operating system would 
have to emerge.  
 
This thesis argues that robustness is dependent on participant confidence and 
effectiveness, rather than on the structure of the operating system. Robustness 
is attained, and maintained, through the dynamic interaction of the system’s 
actors with each other and with the systems’ components. Robustness 
determines the capacity of each polar operating system to deal with emerging 
issues. As long as robustness exists, contemporary issues can be 
accommodated within the existing system. To develop this argument, case 
studies have been used to identify characteristics of participant confidence and 
effectiveness. The differences and similarities related to the expressions of 
robustness between the polar operating systems have then been compared, 
followed by an examination of the capacity of the operating systems to 
accommodate real issues and issues that may emerge in future.  
 
Each case study relates to the contemporary issues of the development and 
transport of offshore oil and gas resources. Thus, each case study has been 
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linked to the issue of energy and environmental security from the perspective 
of Arctic and Antarctic oil and gas resources and the respective operating 
systems. The Arctic waterways controversy will eventually play a role in oil 
and gas development and transport. The negotiation of CRAMRA 
demonstrates previous consideration of energy security and the environment 
in the Antarctic context. The current issue of delimitation of the outer limits of 
the continental shelves considers the application of sovereign rights over 
resources, the ability to protect and conserve the continental shelves, and 
associated marine areas and the application of common property rights. 
Existing and potential offshore oil and gas exploration and development 
illustrate the realities faced by the operating systems.  
 
After comparing the systems and the sources of robustness within the systems, 
it is evident that there are differences in how each system exhibits robustness. 
Each operating system, with its individual expression of robustness, has the 
capacity to accommodate contemporary challenges. From identifying the 
variables that contribute to robustness, it is evident that each system has the 
potential to remain above the operating system threshold. To further examine 
the research questions, the final case study examines how the variables of 
robustness might respond to emerging challenges, such as increased shipping 
and the onset or increase in offshore oil and gas development.  
 
In each case study, it is shown that the systems depend on the dynamics 
between states and the effort of states to engage on issues within the operating 
system. Some issues are harder to deal with. However, most issues are not 
‘surprises’ and states have given them attention either within the collaborative 
forum or unilaterally. The amount of effort or engagement a state places on a 
particular issue varies according to national interest, risk, prior engagement, 
underlying assumptions and politics at the time. The relations with other states 
involved in the issue are important. Using state engagement alone as the 
measure of robustness of an operating system cannot capture the full scope of 
the elements involved. In this thesis, these elements and others are captured by 
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examining state authority, legitimacy, resilience as they relate to participant 
confidence and effectiveness.  
 
The variables of state authority, legitimacy and resilience contribute to and, in 
turn, rely on participant confidence. These variables also influence 
effectiveness. Thus, participant confidence and effectiveness are not created 
or measured in isolation. The components are interconnected. Participant 
confidence reflects effectiveness, state authority, legitimacy and resilience. 
State authority, legitimacy and resilience affect participant confidence and 
effectiveness. Effectiveness accounts for and affects these variables in return. 
There is, therefore, no linear path to assessing the robustness of an operating 
system. Linear connections may exist between variables; however, any test 
must consider the wide ranging influences and nature of each system.  
 
A false sense of robustness would be assumed if state effort were the only 
variable assessed. For example, the amount of effort does not necessarily 
correlate directly with the legitimacy or resilience of a system. Sometimes the 
exercise of little or no effort by states indicates that the system can inherently 
handle challenges, thus indicating resilience. Little or no effort can produce 
greater legitimacy and lack of effort indicates an appreciation of underlying 
legitimacy. Little or no effort can also impose a greater sense of confidence as 
states know that the system can absorb or accommodate the issue.  
Throughout these case studies, robustness has been identified for each system 
through the presence of these variables and the ability to remain above an 
operating system threshold. The structure of the systems has influenced the 
manner in which variables, such as state authority, legitimacy and resilience, 
have been expressed. These differences are highlighted; however, they are not 
identified as barriers to sustained robustness.  
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Findings/empirical data 
Arctic 
In the Arctic, regional concerns and national interest can blend in the existing 
governance structure. The creation of regional, sub-regional and 
environmental initiatives is indicative of state cooperation as well as the 
integration of multi-tiered stakeholder interest within the operating system. 
The AEPS, the Arctic Council and the subset of regional and sub-regional fora 
signify that the approach to Arctic governance has expanded. Initiatives now 
integrate a wide range of stakeholders, including non-governmental 
organizations and indigenous peoples, to address transnational issues and 
concerns. Existing soft-law institutions have already strengthened 
environmental governance by improving knowledge, preparing practical 
guidelines, highlighting Arctic specific issues, and supporting the capacity of 
states to implement commitments. The soft law nature of the AEPS and Arctic 
Council has not, however, impeded the ability to induce states to invest more 
in Arctic environmental monitoring and to harmonize some of those activities. 
This has enriched the mutual interests of preserving the Arctic.  
 
Through the case studies, this thesis identifies that the Arctic operating 
system, with its unique approach to regional governance, has remained above 
the operating system threshold. This thesis identifies characteristics which 
contribute to Arctic operating system robustness. In the Arctic operating 
system, commitment to non-binding initiatives, across which regional norms 
are expressed, is driven by the states involved. Nothing in the operating 
system threatens state authority. As a result, state authority is a dominant 
feature of the Arctic operating system. Voluntary initiatives and recognized 
sovereignty reinforce the ability of state authority to drive participant 
confidence. Moreover, voluntary commitments strengthen the effect of state 
authority. Commitment to regional accountability advances legitimacy and 
resilience within the system. As participants accommodate state interests 
alongside norms of behavior, perceived benefit from abandoning the system 
decreases. Interests are promoted from within the system and any threat of 
instability can be mitigated.  
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Regional collaborative instruments predominantly target environmental 
assessments. They provide guidance while avoiding regulatory and traditional 
security realms. In terms of operating system effectiveness, avoidance of these 
issues helps to ensure prejudice does not occur. In addition, the development 
of normative principles within the Arctic operating system suggests that 
recognized sovereignty can reduce the need for a binding umbrella agreement. 
Voluntary collaboration with recognized sovereignty enables states to 
implement (and enforce) more definitive mechanisms. States can voluntarily 
increase or decrease their level of engagement. Regulatory initiatives that do 
emerge, whether through individual state implementation or collaborative 
negotiation, can be advanced and enforced through individual states.  
 
Because compliance with regional norms (suggested within the cooperative 
framework) or international standards (developed with contributions from the 
Arctic states) is not monitored or guaranteed under an umbrella treaty, there 
may be less consistency across the states. However, there is also potentially 
more flexibility in the application of regulations. Regulatory initiatives are not 
limited to the constraints of a particular collaborative regime but can be 
achieved through various global instruments, industry initiatives, bilateral 
mechanisms, unilateral regulations or collaborative initiatives. In establishing 
regional mechanisms, avoiding prejudice is closely balanced with the 
advancement of state interests, which occurs in parallel with regional norms. 
Thus, in the absence of an umbrella treaty, voluntary initiatives can contribute 
to and reinforce regional norms as well as facilitate the development of 
customary practice without undermining state authority. 
 
As demonstrated in the case study on the Arctic waterways, regulatory 
consistency concerning a controversial issue can arise in a robust operating 
system. Practical implementation of regulations can occur irrespective of 
divergent interpretations. States’ rights can be upheld, commitment to regional 
interests can evolve and advocacy for Arctic-specific issues can increase. 
Definitive legal positions are, therefore, not necessary for an effective and 
robust operating system. From the continental shelf case study it is evident 
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that the perception and influence of state authority play important roles when 
considering rights and obligations of a multilateral legal framework (LOSC), 
principles of regional cooperation, and unilateral state interests within the 
operating system. The capacity of the Arctic operating system has enabled 
states to uphold rights in the absence of prejudice and carry out collaborative 
scientific projects to advance legal continental shelf claims. Boundary 
delimitation issues will continue and their resolution will occur as the need 
arises. In the robust system, state authority is not compromised by these 
considerations and participants can maintain confidence in mitigating 
concerns within the system. The robustness of the operating system does not 
have to be undermined as each state demonstrates confidence and mutual 
respect for the processes.  
 
The oil and gas case study highlights the versatility of the Arctic operating 
system and the manner in which soft law mechanisms foster participant 
accountability and confidence. As discussed, in the non-binding regional 
aspects of the operating system, states can increase or decrease their 
engagement in initiatives. Their level of advocacy may also fluctuate. Within 
the system, diplomatic avenues, which can influence states’ regulatory 
behaviors, can also encourage advocacy. For the Arctic states, consistent and 
unchallenged state authority reduces the perception of external threat from the 
international community. States can advocate for Arctic oil and gas issues 
within this larger community without an overriding sense of protectionism 
towards Arctic governance. Integration of Arctic-specific (industry) 
parameters within international standards and regulations can be promoted 
through this system without undermining state authority. 
 
The Arctic system may not have an overarching treaty to connect regional 
interests; however, regional interests can exist under the current system. 
Participants have expressed their disinterest in an overarching treaty because 
they see no requirement for one. Participation in the existing system can 
reinforce national and regional interests. The soft law nature of the system has 
not impeded the advancement of environmental norms, irrespective of the 
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speed at which regulatory interventions occur. Rights have been upheld in the 
absence of prejudice alongside the development of environmental and security 
norms. States can voluntarily comply with certain initiatives and regulations 
until consensus of the international community integrates these norms of 
behavior into international standards. At such time, compliance can be 
achieved before enforcement is required. States also choose to implement 
standards that are Arctic-specific prior to the recognition of these standards as 
custom. Appreciation of international standards against Arctic-specific 
standards enables acceptability amongst all actors in the absence of perceived 
prejudice.  
 
This effectiveness contributes to the robustness that will carry forward with 
the emergence of contemporary issues related to environmental and energy 
security. As demonstrated through the case studies, the system does not have 
to stagnate in its capacity to encourage compliance or implementation. The 
advocacy and engagement of states across international fora can advance 
normative principles into regulatory initiatives. This can occur without a new 
multilateral treaty and can be interwoven with the soft law commitments of 
the Arctic Council, AEPS and other regional fora.  
 
Antarctic 
Provisions of the Antarctic Treaty form the basis of the normative principles 
within the Antarctic operating system. The binding instruments of the ATS 
and other relevant multilateral treaties are complemented with soft law 
initiatives and diplomacy. Together, normative principles are upheld and 
regional and state interests are protected. The multi-tiered approach to 
implementation and enforcement captures stakeholders across various fora, 
producing an expansive system of governance. Within the Antarctic operating 
system, the ATS promotes international involvement in balance with regional 
environmental norms, while protecting rights associated with common use of 
the high seas. Currently, the boundaries of common use are not clearly 
demarcated, yet the assertion of coastal states’ rights, though protected, also 
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cannot dominate. Lack of definitive jurisdictional certainty increases the risk 
of prejudice of states’ rights occurring. However, at present, the operating 
system does not rely on definitive boundaries for its effectiveness.  
 
In the Antarctic operating system a bifocal approach has developed through 
the established norms of behavior associated with Antarctic Treaty System 
provisions and institutional dynamics. Issues can be accommodated, states’ 
rights are protected and concern surrounding jurisdictional uncertainty is 
placated. By maintaining commitment to the bifocal approach, unilateral 
interests can co-exist with the norms of the operating system. The system 
upholds state authority and in return, states uphold norms of behavior. 
Management of perceived risk to individual state interests in the Antarctic 
operating system has, therefore, been reduced through the Antarctic Treaty 
provisions.  
 
The bifocal approach satisfies and contributes to the normative principles of 
the ATS and related norms of behavior. Acceptability of the norms of 
behavior contributes to the legitimacy of the bifocal approach and, in turn, the 
legitimacy of the normative principles. Legitimacy, therefore, contributes 
significantly to Antarctic operating system robustness. Commitments within 
the Antarctic operating system are accompanied by significant consequences 
for abandoning the system. Consequences include a lack of guarantee that 
similar protection of states rights will be available in the absence of Article IV 
and ATS commitments. Greater perceived consequences reduce the threat of 
internally derived instability. Mitigation of instability that does arise also 
occurs more readily in the existing system. This resilience, in turn, alleviates 
the threat of externally derived criticism and instability, fosters operating 
system legitimacy and contributes to robustness. 
 
The Antarctic operating system addresses regulatory issues within the 
collaborative, binding regime, the ATS. Agreement and compliance with 
collectively negotiated norms occurs without sovereignty needing to being 
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recognized. In light of the fact that enforcement is limited and compliance 
may not carry across uniformly into state practice, engagement by Antarctic 
actors within international institutions is increasingly important. Antarctic-
specific standards can then be appreciated by a wider audience. Resistance to 
international involvement, or defensiveness on the part of the Antarctic actors, 
will potentially diminish advocacy and potentially undermine legitimacy and 
participant confidence.   
 
The CRAMRA case study identifies the commitment to, and confidence in, 
the Antarctic operating system through the capacity to accommodate 
divergent interests. Greater legitimacy emerged from the mitigation of real 
and perceived threats to the ATS and the resilience of the system. It is evident 
from examination of the continental shelf delimitation issues that participant 
confidence and acceptance of the existing system exists. The nuanced 
approach, developed by the participants, upholds norms of behavior 
associated with the Antarctic Treaty and highlights the robust nature of the 
system. States demonstrate confidence in the capacity of the system to be 
effective, protecting states’ rights and avoiding prejudice. This case identifies 
the prevalence and importance of institutional and inter-state dynamics in 
issue resolution.  
 
Norms of behavior, developed over time within the Antarctic Treaty System, 
have committed states to working through an issue in a manner that protects 
each state’s rights and interests. No single interpretation of law within the 
system has to be authoritative. Thus, it is acceptable for divergent views, such 
as those expressed in relation to the delimitation of the Antarctic continental 
shelf or those related to scientific research and offshore oil and gas 
exploration, to co-exist. From the polar oil and gas case study, it is evident 
that the Antarctic operating system has the capacity to develop ideas and 
activities related to conservation, preservation, exploration and future use of 
continental shelf resources in a manner that reinforces regional norms. The 
nature of possible responses to those and other contemporary issues, which 
challenge the prevailing norms of behavior within the system, highlights the 
importance of participant confidence and commitment. Regardless of whether 
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norms of behavior evolve from environmental stewardship to resource 
security paradigms, commitment and persistence can maintain the system 
above the operating threshold.  
 
In the Antarctic operating system, the binding nature of the system derives an 
element of stability from its participants. As such, contemporary issues and 
those associated with energy and environmental security can be 
accommodated. Lack of recognized sovereignty alongside the presence of 
prevalent regional norms and principles encourages advocacy for the 
operating system and the ATS regime. In the past, the Antarctic actors, as a 
group, have been wary of the perception of abdicating authority (refer to the 
CRAMRA case study). This wariness may, however, produce greater 
instability when confronting contemporary challenges driven by global 
industry, economics and politics. In contrast, this examination suggests that 
with the current level of participant confidence and robustness, stewardship, in 
coordination with the larger international community, can be promoted 
without threat to state authority. The combination of existing provisions, 
associated norms of behavior and inter-state dynamics, can continue to foster 
participant confidence and demonstrate effectiveness to the wider community.  
 
The Antarctic operating system combines a mix of soft and hard law 
instruments with confident participants to establish legitimacy of the ATS 
regime and foster resilience within the larger operating system. Although a 
lack of universally recognized sovereignty might place the Antarctic operating 
system in a position of perceived weakness, it can also be perceived to be the 
crux of its robustness. Within the system, every state committed to the 
Antarctic Treaty (and therefore to Article IV) is under the obligation to ensure 
prejudice to states’ rights does not occur. It is evident from the cases studies 
that the manner in which participant confidence and effectiveness (as defined 
by the protection of states’ rights) combine, and reinforce each other, 
maintains the system above the operating system threshold. The system has 
the ability to accommodate divergent and complex issues because of the 
dynamic interaction of the participants with each other and in conformity with 
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the existing regional norms. In addition, this capacity suggests that robustness 
can be sustained as contemporary issues evolve. 
 
Comparison 
Recognized sovereignty within the Arctic operating system may provide a 
sense that the Arctic operating system is more robust than the Antarctic 
operating system. However, perceived strength, which is based on recognized 
and enforceable state authority, can potentially be more easily compromised, 
suggesting that the Arctic system, and its regional norms, may be inherently 
more vulnerable. In addition, it may appear that because the Arctic operating 
system is comprised significantly of voluntary and soft law instruments, it 
may be more easily destabilized by unilateral interests, assertions or activities. 
Sovereignty in the Arctic is unlikely to diminish and regional advocacy may 
have little or no effect on a state’s perceived level of security within the 
system. Therefore, destabilizing or abandoning the system will not have the 
same geopolitical consequences as abandoning the Antarctic system, in which 
the sovereignty question remains. The system may also be more vulnerable 
given the different means through which sovereign states in the Arctic can 
respond to threats as opposed to the demilitarized Antarctic. 
 
The lack of jurisdictional certainty in the Antarctic increases the risk of 
prejudice occurring and increases the consequences of abandoning the system. 
The shared commitment to effectiveness, promoting regional norms of 
behavior, and avoiding geopolitical consequences resulting from abandoning 
the system encourages advocacy for the system. Advocacy plays a dominate 
role in the Antarctic operating system, which, in turn, feeds back into 
participant confidence in the system.  
 
The Antarctic operating system has an overarching treaty and regional regime 
(the ATS). However, the norms of behavior associated with the recognition or 
non-recognition of sovereignty, and associated sovereign rights, produces a 
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dynamic that can mimic the Arctic operating system. Numerous initiatives are 
implemented through the ATCM’s non-binding Resolutions and Decisions. 
Implementation of these, as well as the binding treaty provisions and 
Measures concluded through the consensus process of the ATCM, is the 
state’s responsibility. Enforcement occurs only at the national level. 
Irrespective of the lack of enforcement capacity beyond national levels, these 
initiatives implicate the states. States adhere according to their level of 
interest, capacity, and in response to their commitment to regional norms. 
States accept the norms of behaviours related to the binding provisions 
through their consent to be bound. Similar to the Arctic system, the number 
and complexity of these initiatives increases the commitment of states to the 
normative principles regardless of whether the provisions are expressed as 
binding.  
 
The Arctic operating system may seek to rely on international standards and 
practice to overcome the difficulty of achieving compliance across all states. 
In a similar manner, international standards may create an enforcement 
capacity for the Antarctic operating system. Implementing international 
standards, which can be enforced, need not undermine the perceived collective 
authority of the ATCPs within the ATS. Additionally, advancing regulatory 
initiatives within other fora may also foster the ATCP authority. Further 
international acceptance of the ATS regime may result and de facto, if not de 
jure legitimacy (already evident from the case studies) can be advanced. An 
increased appreciation of ATS independence from the UN can reduce the need 
to assert this autonomy and will facilitate the advocacy of Antarctic-specific 
issues across stakeholders and various fora. In this regard, third parties in the 
Antarctic will not be isolated from international practice because of a 
regionally specific regime within the operating system and the norms of the 
regionally specific regime will not be disengaged from international fora.  
 
The Antarctic Treaty may never become an objective regime. Universal 
recognition is unlikely to ever occur. The capacity of the operating system 
relies on the commitment of states to norms of behavior, including those that 
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reflect the sovereignty arrangement. Thus, acceptance that the operating 
system functions with a capacity similar to the non-binding collaborative 
efforts of the Arctic system could increase internal and external perception of 
the system’s legitimacy. Practical measures and regulatory mechanisms may 
be further facilitated with greater acceptance that the operating system 
functions similar to the Arctic operating system. Contributions from 
participants within the larger international arena could also occur with less 
wariness that their responsibility for stewardship of the Antarctic was being 
abdicated.  
 
The Arctic operating system relies heavily on state authority. De jure 
legitimacy is automatically derived from state authority. Resilience is 
maintained through this legitimate authority. There are more definitive lines 
over which prejudice can be created or avoided; however, there are less 
definitive commitments to advocacy. The consequences of abandoning the 
Arctic system are potentially minimal. In addition, the risk of instability to the 
Arctic operating system from contemporary challenges does not contribute to 
resilience or legitimacy as significantly as it does for the Antarctic operating 
system.  
 
In the Antarctic operating system, legitimacy and resilience dominate 
participant confidence. Norms of behavior deriving from Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty commit states to working through an issue in a manner that 
protects states’ interests and rights. Accordingly, management of perceived 
risk produces effectiveness and fosters legitimacy and resilience, and thus, 
confidence, in a different manner than in the Arctic operating system. State 
authority in the Antarctic operating system is an underlying presence that 
commits states to effectively work within accepted normative principles. It is 
upheld by this commitment. Commitment to norms upholds bifocalism, 
protects states’ rights, their interests and their authority without undermining 
regional concerns.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis highlights the individual and shared features of the Arctic and 
Antarctic operating systems. The case studies provide data regarding the 
variables that comprise robustness and illustrate how each system expresses 
those variables. Through appreciating each component of robustness and the 
contribution each variable makes towards the systems’ robustness, the 
processes and avenues available to mitigate challenges become evident. This 
understanding contributes to the understanding of polar governance.  
 
The polar operating systems are different. However, despite the differences, 
the variables of state authority, legitimacy, resilience and effectiveness exist. 
It is these variables that combine, as participant confidence and effectiveness, 
to hold the systems above the operating system threshold. While it is not a 
quantitative combination, and it is difficult to predict which circumstances 
would abruptly undermine the systems, without these variable, the systems 
will fall below the threshold, demanding restructuring if robustness is to be re-
established. A new or restructured system may not necessarily provide similar 
robustness. Hence, the risk of losing the robust attributes of current systems 
encourages actors to work within the existing capacity in a way that reinforces 
the system. 
 
It is evident from these case studies and analysis that regulatory issues can be 
overcome regardless of sovereignty and jurisdictional challenges. The ability 
to accommodate new and emerging issues relies on the confidence the 
participants have in the system and the system’s effectiveness. As long as 
there is acceptance of the operating system dynamics, sources of law and 
terms of engagement related to sovereign rights and regional cooperation, the 
combination of participant confidence and the effectiveness of the operating 
systems will maintain the systems above the operating system threshold. In 
either system, the terms of engagement must permit effectiveness, protect 
states’ rights and prevent undue prejudice. Advocacy, innovation and 
diplomacy will also continue to play an important role. Advocacy for the 
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Arctic system has the potential to evolve in parallel with the balance of state 
authority within the regional collaborative framework. In a different manner, 
advocacy for the Antarctic system has the potential to evolve from the 
acceptance and legitimacy of norms of behaviour.  
 
As contemporary challenges emerge, such as shipping activities in the Arctic 
and Antarctic, the onset or increase in oil and gas development, or activities 
such as fishing, tourism and bioprospecting, operating system robustness will 
be further tested. This will be particularly evident for areas within the polar 
regions in which regulatory uncertainty prevails. Pressure from the 
international community to intervene on issues of polar governance will also 
continue to increase as global industry activities, regulation and environmental 
accountability are given media attention and generate public concern. 
Nevertheless, the systems can remain effective if the commitment currently 
exhibited by the states continues. This commitment hinges on their 
confidence; confidence which stems from the various elements of state 
authority, legitimacy and resilience. State dynamics within the operating 
systems will determine the likelihood of incurring prejudice and failing 
confidence. While it is difficult to predict what is in store for polar region 
governance, it is evident that each system has the strength to continue. 
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